













Papers relating to the  
Arctic Relief Expedition  
1850

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# ARCTIC EXPEDITION.



RETURN to an Order of the Honourable The House of Commons,  
dated 5 February 1850;—for,

COPIES “ of any REPORTS or STATEMENTS from the Officers employed in the Arctic EXPEDITIONS, or from any other Persons, which have been laid before the Lords Commissioners of the ADMIRALTY, in respect to the Resumption of the Search for Sir John Franklin’s EXPEDITION :”

“ Of any PLAN or PLANS of SEARCH, whether by Ships or Boats, up to the present Date :”

“ COPY or EXTRACTS from any CORRESPONDENCE or PROCEEDINGS of the BOARD of ADMIRALTY, in relation to the ARCTIC EXPEDITIONS (since the Date of the last Return to this House in 1849) :”

“ COPIES of the ORDERS issued by the BOARD of ADMIRALTY to the Captains *Collinson*, *Kellett* and *Moore*, and to Lieutenant *Pullen* ; and, also, Copy of the INSTRUCTIONS given to Dr. *Rae*, through the *Hudson’s Bay* Company :”

“ Of any REPORTS made by any Officer or Officers employed in the late EXPEDITIONS, and addressed to the BOARD of ADMIRALTY :”

“ And, of the latest CHART of the *Polar Sea* compiled by Order of the BOARD of ADMIRALTY.—(in continuation of Parliamentary Papers, Nos. 264 and 386, of Session 1848, and of Nos. 188 and 397, of Session 1849).”

Admiralty, 1  
4 March 1850. }

J. H. HAY,  
Chief Clerk.

(*Sir Robert Harry Inglis.*)

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Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,  
5 March 1850.

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## Papers relating to the Arctic Relief Expedition.

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NARRATIVE of the PROCEEDINGS of Sir *John Richardson* on the Shores of the *Polar Sea*, between the *Mackenzie* and *Coppermine* Rivers; and INSTRUCTIONS delivered by him to Dr. *Rae*.

### NARRATIVE of Sir *John Richardson*.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, for the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, of my return from America in the Royal mail steamer "*Caledonia*."

No. 1.  
Narrative of Proceedings of Sir  
*John Richardson*.

Having, as opportunities offered, sent you from time to time detailed accounts of the progress of the Arctic Searching Expedition under my command, I beg now to submit, for the consideration of their Lordships, a connected summary of the whole proceedings of the party up to this time; and also to report the organization of a detachment, under charge of Mr. *Rae*, to ensure the completion of the entire scheme of search comprehended in their Lordships' Instructions to me.

On the 4th of June 1847, five seamen, 15 sappers and miners, with four boats, 15,800 lbs. of pemmican, and other provisions and stores, were embarked at Gravesend on board the Hudson's Bay Company's ships "*Prince Rupert*" and "*Westminster*." The arrival of these ships at York Factory was later than usual, and some of the expedition stores still remained on board on the 10th of September; but Chief Trader Bell, of the Hudson's Bay Company, who now took charge of the party, considered it imprudent to wait longer for their landing. At this date, therefore, he commenced his voyage into the interior, taking with him, in addition to the English boats and their crews, a large batteau, with sixteen Canadian *voyageurs*, and the stores necessary for building a winter residence, providing for the fisheries, and equipping and paying Indian hunters.

Owing to the extreme dryness of the summer, the rivers were uncommonly low, and the boats being therefore unable to carry more than two-thirds of their ordinary load, it was necessary to leave a considerable quantity of pemmican at York Factory to be forwarded inland, with the additional supplies next summer. The difficulties which Mr. Bell encountered, as well from the lowness of the waters as from the very early setting in of winter, were great; his progress, consequently, was slow, and he was finally arrested by the freezing of the lakes, six days' march short of his intended winter quarters at Cumberland House.

He immediately housed the boats, constructed a store-house for the reception of the provisions and other packages, established fisheries, and as soon as sledges could be made, accompanied the bulk of the party on snow shoes through the woods to Cumberland House.

At that place, and at Beaver Lake, about 60 miles further to the northward, the men were supported through the winter by the fisheries, but at Cedar Lake, where the boats were laid up, the fishing was unproductive, and there was, consequently, an unforeseen consumption of pemmican by the boat-keepers, and the wives and children of three of the *voyageurs* who could not travel over the snow to Cumberland House. This deficit of pemmican was fully made up during the winter by the exertions of the Hudson's Bay Company's officers on the upper portion of Saskatchewan. Mr. Bell made winter journeys to Cedar Lake, and early in the spring sent carpenters down to put the boats in repair, so that everything was ready for the resumption of the voyage on the breaking up of the rivers, which took place in the beginning of June 1848:

On the 25th of March 1848, Mr. *Rae* and I left Liverpool in the North American mail steamer "*Hibernia*," landed a fortnight afterwards at New York, and proceeded by way of the Hudson and Lake Champlain to Montreal, where we

## No. 1.

Narrative of Pro-  
ceedings of Sir  
John Richardson.

found waiting for us 16 Canadian *voyageurs*, forming the crews of two canoes provided by Sir George Simpson, Governor of the Hudson's Bay Company's territories. Our route lay through Lakes Ontario, Erie, St. Claire and Huron to Sault St. Marie, where we were detained some days waiting for the breaking up of the ice on Lake Superior. When the lake opened we resumed our voyage to Fort William, and from thence to Rainy Lake, the Lake of the Woods and Lake Winnipeg, where we were again stopped for some days by the ice, but having at length succeeded in breaking our way through, we entered the Saskatchewan River on the 9th of June, and on the 15th reached Cumberland House. Here we learned that Mr. Bell had set out a fortnight previously, but had been detained by ice in Beaver Lake for four days. We followed him with diligence through Beaver Lake, Churchill River, Isle à la Crosse, Buffalo and Methy Lakes to Methy Portage, where we overtook him on the 20th of June 1848.

With the assistance of the *voyageurs* from Montreal, the boats and stores were transported, on the men's shoulders, across the Portage in eight days; this laborious proceeding having been rendered necessary by the death of the whole of the horses usually employed there. The two canoes, with their crews, were sent back to Canada.

On the 15th of July, having reached the last portage on Slave River, three boats were arranged for the sea voyage, with full loads of pemmican and able crews, consisting in the aggregate of 18 men. Mr. Rae and I embarked in them, to proceed with all speed to the mouth of the Mackenzie, leaving Mr. Bell with the remainder of the party and two boats containing the stores for winter use, with directions to make the best of his way to Great Bear Lake, to establish a fishery at its west end, near the site of Fort Franklin, for the convenience of the sea party, in the event of its having to return up the Mackenzie; and lastly, having traversed the lake to its northern extremity, to erect dwelling-houses and store-houses near the influx of Dease River, and to carry on fisheries at such suitable places as he should discover in the neighbourhood. He was also instructed to despatch James Hope (a Cree Indian belonging to his party, who had been formerly employed in the Expedition, under Messrs. Dease and Simpson, and knew the country well), together with a native hunter of the district, to the banks of the Coppermine in the beginning of September, there to hunt till the 20th of the month, and look out diligently for the arrival of the boats.

On my way to the sea I landed three bags of pemmican at Fort Good Hope, the lowest of the Company's posts on the Mackenzie, for the use of any party from Sir James Ross's ships, or from the "Plover," which might reach that establishment, and I likewise deposited one case of the same article, with several memoranda and letters at Point Separation, which forms the apex of the delta of the Mackenzie, marking the locality in the manner agreed upon.

We reached the sea on the 4th of August, and had an interview with about 300 Esquimaux, who were collected to meet us, having been apprised of our coming by signal fires lighted by their hunting parties on the hills skirting the river. The distance from Point Encounter, where we met this party, to the mouth of the Coppermine River, including the larger inflections of the coast line, is upwards of 800 miles; and as we had almost constantly head winds, we rowed along, near the shore, landing at least twice a day to cook, occasionally to hunt, for the most part at night to sleep on shore, and often to look out from the high capes. Our communications with parties of Esquimaux assembled on the headlands to hunt whales, or scattered in parties of two or three along the coast in pursuit of reindeer and waterfowl, were frequent. They came off to us with confidence, and through the medium of our excellent Esquimaux Albert, who spoke good English, we were able to converse with them readily. They invariably told us that no ships had passed, and were rejoiced to learn by our inquiries that there was a prospect of their seeing more white men on their shores. Up to Cape Bathurst, or for about one-third of the distance between the Mackenzie and Coppermine, the Esquimaux informed us that for six weeks of summer, or as they expressed it, for the greater part of two moons, during which they were chiefly occupied in the pursuit of whales, they never saw any ice.

We found an Esquimaux family encamped on the extremity of Cape Bathurst, but as near to that place as we could effect a landing without observation, we erected a signal post, and buried a case of pemmican; and we made a similar deposit, marked by a pile of painted stones, on the extremity of Cape Parry.

After

After rounding the latter cape we observed, for the first time on the voyage, flocks of drift ice, which became the more numerous as we approached Dolphin and Union Strait; and in this part of the coast we saw no Esquimaux, though we found a few recent traces of their hunting parties.

On the 22d of August we had a strong gale of westerly wind, before which we ran under sail for some hours, but it speedily augmented to a violent storm, and we were compelled to provide for the safety of the boats by running among the ice, loosely packed on Point Cockburn. During the night much ice drifted past, and in the morning we found ourselves hemmed in by dense packs, extending as far as the eye could reach. Up to this time the weather had been of the usual summer temperature of that region, but it now became very cold, and we had continual frosts, with frequent snow storms, during the remainder of our stay on the coast. By keeping close to the beach in places where the shallowness of the water kept off the larger pieces of ice, by cutting passages for the boats where the packs abutted against the rocks, by dragging the boats over the smoother flocks, and by making portages along the shore, according to circumstances, with the aid of occasional spaces of open water, we succeeded, with much labour, in making our way to a bay between Capes Hearne and Kendall by the end of the month. I had previously thought it advisable to abridge the labour of the crews, by leaving one boat, with its cargo of pemmican, on the north side of Cape Krusenstern; and by the time we came near Cape Kendall the two remaining boats were scarcely seaworthy, having been much cut by the young ice which now bound the flocks together. The ground was covered with snow, no open water was visible from the highest capes, and the winter appeared to have set in with rigour. I found myself, therefore, reluctantly compelled to abandon the boats, and to prosecute the journey to our winter residence on Great Bear Lake by land. The pemmican and ammunition were carefully concealed for future use, the boats were hauled up on the beach, and the party directed to prepare for the march. The baggage, consisting of 13 days' provisions, cooking utensils, hatchets, astronomical instruments, a few books, the ammunition, two nets, with several setting lines, Halkett's portable boat, a package of dried plants, my bedding, and a few articles of clothing, were distributed by lot. Each man carried, in addition to his assigned load, his own blanket, mocassins, and such articles of clothing as he chose. All were furnished with snow shoes. Mr. Rae carried the greatest part of his own bedding and spare clothing.

We set out on the 3d of September, and on the following day came to an encampment of Esquimaux. They cheerfully ferried us across the mouth of a wide river, which I named the Rae. We afterwards crossed the Richardson in Lieutenant Halkett's boat, and following the line of the Coppermine, and of its tributary, the Kendall, we gained a branch of Dease's River; and on the thirteenth day reached our destined quarters at Fort Confidence. Our march through half frozen swamps or over hills covered with snow was necessarily toilsome; but by keeping as much as possible in the river valleys, we had to pass only one night without firing for the purposes of cookery. In a thick fog, during which we were able to proceed in the proper direction by compass, James Hope and his Indian companion, who had been despatched by Mr. Bell to meet us, lost their way, and so missed us; but on coming to our trail on the Kendall, they perceived that we had passed, and returned to Fort Confidence two days after our arrival there.

In the voyage between the Mackenzie and Coppermine, I carefully executed their Lordships' instructions with respect to the examination of the coast line, and became fully convinced that no ships had passed within view of the mainland. It is, indeed, nearly impossible that they could have done so unobserved by some of the numerous parties of Esquimaux on the look-out for whales. We were, moreover, informed by the Esquimaux of Back's Inlet, that the ice had been pressing on their shore nearly the whole summer, and its closely packed condition when we left it, on the 4th of September, made it highly improbable that it would open for ship navigation later in the season.

I regretted extremely that the state of the ice prevented me from crossing to Wollaston Land, and thus completing in one season the whole scheme of their Lordships' instructions. The opening between Wollaston and Victoria Lands has always appeared to me to possess great interest, for through it the flood tide evidently sets into Coronation Gulf, diverging to the westward by the Dolphin and Union Strait, and to the eastward round Cape Alexander. By the 5th clause of

Sir John Franklin's instructions, he is directed to steer south-westward from Cape Walker, which would lead him nearly in the direction of the strait in question. If Sir John found Barrow's Strait as open as when Sir Edward Parry passed it on four previous occasions, I am convinced that (complying exactly as he could with his instructions, and without looking into the Wellington Sound, or other openings either to the south or north of Barrow's Strait) he pushed directly west to Cape Walker, and from thence south-westwards. If so, the ships were probably shut up in some of the passages between Victoria, Banks's, and Wollaston's Lands. This opinion, which I have advocated in my former communications, is rather strengthened by the laborious journeys of Sir James Ross having disclosed no traces of the missing ships.

Being apprehensive that the boats I left on the coast would be broken up by the Esquimaux, and being, moreover, of opinion that the examination of the opening in question might be safely and efficiently performed in the only remaining boat I had fit for transport from Bear Lake to the Coppermine, I determined to entrust this important service to Mr. Rae, who volunteered, and whose ability and zeal in the cause I cannot too highly commend. He selected an excellent crew, all of them experienced *voyageurs*, and capable of finding their way back to Bear Lake without guides, should any unforeseen accident deprive them of their leader. In the month of March (1849) a sufficient supply of pemmican and other necessary stores, with the equipments of the boat, were transported over the snow on dog sledges, to a navigable part of the Kendall River, and left there under the charge of two men. As soon as the Dease broke up in June, Mr. Rae would follow with the boat, the rest of the crew and a party of Indian hunters, and would descend the Coppermine River about the middle of July, at which time the sea generally begins to break up. He would then, as soon as possible, cross from Cape Krusenstern to Wollaston Land, and endeavour to penetrate to the northward, erecting signal columns, and making deposits on conspicuous headlands, and especially on the north shore of Banks's Land, should he be fortunate enough to attain that coast. He was further instructed not to hazard the safety of his party by remaining too long on the north side of Dolphin and Union Strait, and to be guided in his movements by the season, the state of the ice, and such intelligence as he might obtain from the Esquimaux. He was, moreover, directed to report his proceedings to their Lordships immediately on his return, and should his despatches experience no delay on the route, they may be expected in England in April or May next. He was also requested to engage one or more families of Indian hunters to pass the summer of 1850 on the banks of the Coppermine River, to be ready to assist any party that may direct their course that way.

With respect to the recommendation of additional measures in furtherance of the humane views of their Lordships, it is necessary to take into account the time for which the Discovery Ships were provisioned. Deer migrate over the ice in the spring, from the main shore to Victoria and Wollaston Lands, in large herds, and return in the autumn. These lands are also the breeding places of vast flocks of snow geese; so that with ordinary skill in hunting, a large supply of food might be procured on their shores in the months of June, July and August. Seals are also numerous in those seas, and are easily shot, their curiosity rendering them a ready prey to a boat party. In these ways and by fishing, the stock of provisions might be greatly augmented. And we have the recent example of Mr. Rae, who passed a severe winter on the very barren shores of Repulse Bay, with no other fuel than the withered tufts of a herbaceous andromeda, and maintained a numerous party on the spoils of the chase alone for a whole year. Such instances forbid us to lose hope. Should Sir John Franklin's provisions become so far reduced as to be inadequate to a winter's consumption, it is not likely that he would remain longer by his ships, but rather that in one body, or in several, the officers and crews, with boats cut down so as to be light enough to drag over the ice, or built expressly for that purpose, would endeavour to make their way eastward to Lancaster Sound, or southwards to the mainland, according to the longitude in which the ships were arrested. I would then beg leave to suggest that the Hudson's Bay Company be authorized and requested to promise liberal rewards to Indians and Esquimaux who may relieve white men entering their lands. Some parties of Esquimaux frequenting the coast to the westward of the Mackenzie are in the habit of passing the winter in the vicinity of the Hudson's Bay Company's post on the Rat River (a tributary of the Peel), and might be interested in the cause by judicious promises. The Russian Fur Company have a post on the Yucan or Colville,



Colville, which falls into the Arctic Sea about midway between the Mackenzie and Behring's Straits, and through their officers similar offers might be made to the western Esquimaux. We know from the Narrative of Sir John Franklin's discovery of that coast, and also from the subsequent voyage of Messrs. Dease and Simpson, that the Esquimaux who frequent the estuary of the Mackenzie meet those from Point Barrow, at an intermediate point, for the purposes of barter; and in this way intelligence of any interesting occurrence is conveyed along the coast. The Russian post on the Colville receives its supplies from a post in Norton Sound, where it would be easy for any vessel bound to Behring's Straits to land a communication. Mr. Rae, having been appointed to the charge of the Mackenzie River fur districts, will give a proper direction to the efforts of Indian hunters in that quarter.

As it is thought by some, whose opinion I highly value, that the Discovery Ships may have penetrated to the westward in so high a latitude as not to come within sight of the mainland, I may further suggest the desirableness of the examination of the western coasts of Banks's and Parry's Islands; but as this would require a ship expedition by way of Behring's Straits, I must leave the discussion of the practicability of such a scheme to the able executive officers who have navigated the Northern Seas.

Having thus, Sir, in a more diffuse manner than is usual in an official letter, but in accordance with my sense of the deep interest felt on the subject, not only by My Lords Commissioners, but by the nation at large, and I may add by the whole civilised world, recapitulated the proceedings of the Expedition, and detailed my opinions, I have only to add, that after the return of Mr. Rae and myself from the coast in September 1848, we devoted our leisure during the winter to observations on the magnetic intensity and force, with the uniplar magnetometer, and Dr. Lloyd's inclinometer, and kept hourly registers for fourteen hours each day of the declinometer, barometer, thermometer and wind vane.

In the beginning of May 1849, Mr. Bell and I, taking with us all the Europeans of the party then remaining at the fort, and such of the Canadians as were not to be employed with Mr. Rae on his summer expedition, crossed Great Bear Lake on the ice, and when the navigation opened in June, ascended the Mackenzie, and retraced my outward route. We were stopped by ice on Great Slave Lake till the 11th of July. On reaching Mothy Portage, Mr. Bell resumed his duties in the Company's service, and I proceeded with the party to Norway House, where I discharged the Canadians, whose term of engagement had expired, and sent the seamen and sappers and miners to York Factory, there to embark in the Company's ship bound for England. I then continued my voyage to Canada in a canoe, and after passing two days at Montreal with Sir George Simpson in examining the charges for supplies furnished to the Expedition, proceeded to Boston for embarkation in the mail steamer.

I have, &c.

(signed) *John Richardson*, Medical Inspector,  
Commanding the Arctic Searching Expedition.

To the Secretary of the Admiralty,  
&c. &c.

#### CORRESPONDENCE.

Fort Confidence, Great Bear Lake,  
May 5, 1849.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to enclose, for the information of My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a copy of the Memorandum which I have issued to Mr. Rae, for his guidance in search of the Discovery Ships during the ensuing summer. Several reasons have combined to induce me to delegate this duty to Mr. Rae, in preference to endeavouring to execute it in person; and I hope that a consideration of them will induce their Lordships to approve of my having done so.



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 ceedings of Sir  
 John Richardson.

In the first place, no one can be better qualified than Mr. Rae for this service, by experience, judgment, zeal and physical endowments. In the next place, the men who have volunteered are mostly natives of the country; and having all been trained in the service of the Hudson's Bay Company, they yield a more ready and cheerful obedience to the Company's officers than to any others. And lastly, in respect to economy, this arrangement is preferable to any other one that I have the means of making. The wages of the European party are higher than those of the men that have volunteered; and had they been employed on this service, they could not have returned to England before October or November 1850, to which time their wages would have run on. Should the next summer be even moderately favourable, I trust Mr. Rae will be able to return to this place by the end of August, or very early in September, to remove everything across the Lake, and to send the men sufficiently far southwards before the close of the navigation, to enable them to reach the Depôt at Norway House in June, when, agreeably to the practice of the country, their engagements terminate.

As Great Bear Lake is not open for the navigation of boats before August, four of the eight men who form Mr. Rae's party must have remained here till that time, to transport the instruments and stores to the Mackenzie, even supposing that the intended summer excursion had not been necessary; so that, in point of fact, the additional expense to be incurred in completing this part of the scheme of search comprehended in my instructions, is the wages of four men for one year. Mr. Rae is appointed by the Governor and Council of the Company to the charge of the Mackenzie River district, and will assume the duties of that situation on reaching that river. The provisions for the party during the summer, and for their voyage southward to some proper fishing station in autumn, are already laid up.

Should Mr. Rae succeed in exploring the passage between Victoria and Wollaston Lands, and the opening to the westward of North Somerset have been examined by the steam launches attached to Sir James Ross's ships, these being the only connecting straits between the western prolongation of Lancaster Sound and the channel which washes the continental shores, it is clear that from the Mackenzie eastward the search for the Discovery Ships along the coasts of the mainland will have been complete. And as all the Esquimaux we met at the mouth of the Mackenzie, and along the coast to Cape Bathurst, agreed in reporting that they had seen no ships, we cannot but conclude that Sir John Franklin had not succeeded in finding a passage to the westward.

There is another point on which I beg leave to say a few words. It may appear to their Lordships, considering the casualties incident to such Expeditions, unsafe to send only one officer on such a service; but, constructed as Mr. Rae's party is, I have no apprehensions on this score for their safety, even supposing that their leader should unfortunately meet with some accident. All the party have been for a length of time in the Company's service, are acquainted with all the expedients for mitigating the severity of the climate, and are more or less accustomed to note landmarks, and find their way for long distances by routes that they have once traversed. Some of them are hunters; one of them is an active and intelligent Esquimaux, who is habituated to an ice-incumbered sea; and two are Cree Indians, as skilful as the native inhabitants of these lands in retracing the way back to Great Bear Lake. The elder of these Crees is engaged as guide for the Coppermine River, having accompanied Dease and Simpson in their voyage of discovery, and being acquainted with all the rapids.

With respect to the party who are to return to England this season, the majority of them wintered at Big Island, in Great Slave Lake, and, as I have lately learnt, have had abundance of fish. Three others were sent, four days ago, across the lake to Fort Franklin, a distance of 160 miles; and Mr. Bell and I, with the remaining sapper and miner, intend to follow them on the 7th instant. Winter is still in full vigour here, the temperature sinking at night to ten or more degrees below zero, and the snow not being sensibly diminished; but we expect to find the spring thaw advanced at the other end of the lake, and to be able to descend Bear Lake River by open water early in June. Great Slave Lake generally becomes navigable about the end of that month, and I hope to conduct all the party to Norway House, on the way to York Factory, time enough to embark in the Company's ship, which leaves that place for England generally in September. It is my intention to return homewards by way of Canada, that I

may

may examine the accounts against the Government, at the Company's establishment at Iachine, to which place they have been forwarded from the several interior posts.

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proceedings of Sir  
John Richd

I have the honour, &c.

(signed) *John Richardson,*  
Commanding Arctic Searching Expedition.

To the Secretary of the Admiralty,  
&c. &c.

Fort Confidence, Great Bear Lake,  
May 1, 1849.

(Memorandum.)

As in the prosecution of the search for traces of the Discovery Ships under command of Sir John Franklin, the continental coast line between the Mackenzie and Coppermine Rivers has been carefully examined, the only part of my instructions not yet complied with, is the examination of the adjoining shores of Wollaston and Victoria Lands, which the state of the ice in Dolphin and Union Straits rendered inapproachable last autumn. That these two lands are separated from each other by a strait lying between the 111th and 113th meridians, is rendered almost certain by a consideration of the direction of the flood tide, which, on the west side of these parallels, sets to the westward through Dolphin and Union Straits, and to the eastward of them, sets to the eastward towards Cape Alexander; coming, we must conclude, from the northward between the lands in question: for the survey by Messrs. Dease and Simpson has shown that the coast of Victoria Land is continuous up to the 111th parallel; and the latter gentleman records his opinion, that much of the heavy drift ice that encumbers Coronation Gulf descends from the north between these lands.

The exploring of the shores of this strait is of much importance in the search for the Discovery Ships, for the following reasons:—Sir John Franklin was directed to steer to the S.W. after he had passed Barrow's Straits, a course which would lead him to the strait in question, and he would be deterred from attempting a direct westerly course by the circumstance of Sir Edward Parry having found that route impracticable for two successive seasons. Should there be several islands between Wollaston and Banks's Lands, and the channels between them be intricate, it is not unlikely that the ships may have been shut up therein by ice. It was the intention of Sir James Ross, in the event of his reaching Winter Harbour last year, to send a party across the ice this spring to pass between Victoria and Wollaston Lands towards Cape Krusenstern and the Coppermine River. To co-operate with that party and to aid it with provisions, or supply its place, should circumstances have prevented its being sent, it is expedient that a party should go from hence, and as you and a party of men have volunteered for this service, I hereby, in virtue of the clause of my instructions which authorizes me to detach you and a party of volunteers under your command, appoint you to this duty. You are therefore to descend the Coppermine River, and as soon as the sea opens in July, are to proceed to explore the strait in question, endeavouring to communicate with any parties of Esquimaux you may meet with on Wollaston or the neighbouring islands. Should you reach the northern coast of Banks's Land, you are there to erect a pile of stones, and deposit a memorandum of your object and proceedings at the distance of 10 feet from its base, marking that side of the pile with a broad arrow in red or white paint. You are also to erect similar piles, and deposit in the same manner memoranda for the guidance of the party detached by Sir James Ross, on conspicuous headlands, when you can do so without materially delaying your progress. Should you discover any piles erected by that party, and learn from the memoranda deposited near them that the strait has been sufficiently explored down to that place, you are to proceed no further in that direction; and you are at liberty to use your own judgment in deviating from this route, if, from information given by the Esquimaux, or obtained from other sources, you are of opinion that the ships, or part of their crews, may be found in another direction.

Having the fullest confidence in your judgment, experience and prudence, I shall not name a period to your advance, further than by requesting you not to hazard the safety of the party entrusted to your care, by delaying your return too long.

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long. The last season furnishes a strong instance of the early date at which the winter occasionally sets in in these seas.

Having performed this service, or prosecuted it as far as practicable, with a due regard to the safety of your party, you are to return with all speed to Fort Confidence, and embarking without delay the instruments and stores remaining at that post, to proceed forthwith to Fort Simpson. Such of the stores as are useful to the Company are to be valued and handed over to them, and the instruments are to be forwarded to England, addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty. The men are to be sent to winter at some fishing station sufficiently to the southward to ensure their early arrival at Norway House next spring; and you are to direct them to be furnished with nets, that they may provide for their own sustenance during the winter, with as little expense to the Government as possible.

Immediately on your return from the coast, you are to communicate an account of your proceedings to the Secretary of the Admiralty, for the information of their Lordships; and you are also to transmit to him a chart of any hitherto unexplored coasts or straits you may discover, as soon as you have had leisure to construct it.

Given under my hand, at Fort Confidence, 1st May 1849.

John Rae, Esq.

(signed) *John Richardson,*  
 Commanding Arctic Searching Expedition.

My Dear Rae,

Lake Winipeg, August 19, 1849.

As I learn from the newspapers which I have just read, and which I shall forward for your perusal, that Sir James Ross did not reach Barrow's Strait till after the 28th of August, and that it is probable that he may have been arrested short of his intended wintering quarters at Melville Island or Banks's Land, and could not consequently send off his proposed spring party to the Coppermine River this season, I consider it likely that he may determine on sending that party next spring; and if so, by the present arrangements they will, on their arrival at Great Bear Lake, find Fort Confidence deserted.

I therefore think it important that you should engage either the Chief of some party, or two expert hunters, to pass the months of June and July 1850, on the portage between Bear Lake and the Coppermine River, promising them a handsome reward if they render any assistance to the expected white party, and paying them such moderate sums, in addition to a full supply of ammunition, as may content them for spending the summer on such excellent hunting grounds.

You will have no difficulty in engaging either Martin Lake or Bear Lake Indians for this service; and there is abundance of time, after the arrival of the March packet, for them to reach Fort Confidence long before the snow begins to melt.

I will thank you to furnish the Indians with five or six memoranda in water-proof cases, with directions to plant them in conspicuous places at the mouth of the Kendall, Fletis Station, Fort Confidence, and elsewhere.

These precautions may prove to be unnecessary, as Ross's party will most likely, early in their march, discover some of your landmarks, and learn, by the notes you have left, your intention of quitting Fort Confidence this season, and thereupon turn back to the ship. But, at a small expense, if the Indians carry their instructions out fully, they will save the party from having to make the long journey round Bear Lake without assistance.

I remain, &c.

(signed) *John Richardson.*

# ARCTIC EXPEDITION UNDER SIR JOHN FRANKLIN.

— No. 2. —

NARRATIVE of the PROCEEDINGS of Captain *Kellett*, of Her Majesty's Ship "Herald," and Commander *Moore* and Lieutenant *Pullen*, of Her Majesty's Sloop "Plover," through *Behring's Straits*, and towards the Mouth of the *Mackenzie River*.

Her Majesty's Ship "Herald,"  
November 22, 1849.

Sir,

HEREWITH I have the honour to transmit, for the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a circumstantial account of my proceedings since leaving Oahu on the 19th of May last.

Passing to the southward of Oneehow and Lissiansky Island, and close to the position of Byen's and Morrell's Islands, without meeting with either of the two latter, we sighted Kamschatka, at 6 a.m. on the 22d of June: there we picked up a fresh gale off the land, which ran me within a mile of Cape Gavarea, and left me in a dead calm. My position would have been critical had I not found at this distance bottom in 30 fathoms.

At daylight three ships were in sight off the Point of Petropaulski, the mirage transforming them into every imaginable shape. With light variable winds, assisted by our boats, and a slight northerly current, we reached an anchorage in the entrance, in 15 fathoms, by 7 p.m.

This voyage occupied 35 days, and was only remarkable for the lightness of the winds, the fineness of the weather, and the almost entire absence of fog, twenty-four hours never having elapsed without having obtained observations, either by day or night, for the position of the ship.

The three vessels we had noticed proved to be American whale ships that had also towed into an anchorage. I boarded one of them, and learned that they had left the port the day before, but having lost some men, had returned to pick them up. From this vessel I also learned that the "Plover" had not been to Petropaulski, but that a report was current of a vessel having wintered somewhere to the northward.

This information determined me to go to the anchorage with the ship, if I could do so without loss of time, getting at the same time two boats ready to proceed there and obtain information, in case it should continue calm.

The wood at this port is excellent, the water easily obtained, and the best I have ever tasted. At Chamisso Island, to have taken in the same quantity of water I did here, would have cost me days for hours.

A fine northerly breeze springing up at midnight, although foul, I weighed with the ship, shortly after despatching the boats. The wind freshened with the tide in our favour, and we came to at 7 a.m., in our former anchorage off the watering-place.

In our passage up, the masters of the American vessels came on board to gain information relative to Behring's Straits, whither they were bound; they informed me that at least 20 American vessels would pass through those straits this year, in consequence of the success of one of their vessels last season. The master of the successful vessel appears to have been an enterprising man; he had a roving commission from his owner, but having been unsuccessful in the Japanese Seas, and reading in Captain Beechey's voyage of the number of whales he had seen in the Arctic Sea, he determined to go there; he did so, and succeeded, entering the straits with a clear ship, and returning about six weeks after, with 4,000 barrels.

The Governor at Petropaulski had not heard of a vessel having wintered to the northward, nor could he inform me from what source such a report could have sprung.

I found lying here the Royal Thames Yacht Club schooner "Nancy Dawson," owned and commanded by a Mr. Shedden, formerly a mate in the Royal Navy. He informed me that his object in coming here was to go through the straits, and as far north as possible, in search of Sir John Franklin's Expedition: he was last from Hong Kong, having touched at the Loo Choo Islands. She is well found in provisions, stores and instruments: her crew were entered at Hong Kong (the

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Off Petropaulski.

Anchored in entrance of Awatska Bay.

Awatska Bay.

Entered the harbour of Petropaulski.

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greater part of them Americans) ; they appear to be a most disorganized set of men. Mr. Shedden offered to place his vessel at my disposal, and appeared anxious that I should send an officer on board him.

By 7 p.m. we had completed our water (having obtained 35 tons), and by 10 p.m. had taken on board as much wood as we could stow.

Sailed from Petropaulski.

June 25.—At 6 a.m. weighed in a calm, and towed out from the anchorage. Got a light wind from the southward, bringing with it a fog, though still not so thick but that both sides of the entrance could be seen. Continued beating out. In making a stretch over to the eastern shore from Babouski Island, the fog closed down over the rocks, and deceived me as to their distance ; I hove the ship in stays with the greatest confidence, but the whirls of the tide made her slack, and shot her on to the rocks, before I had time to bring up with an anchor.

Grounded on the rocks of Pinnacle Point, in Awateka Bay.

Floated again.

The stream anchor and cable was laid out, and hove taut, and at 2. 10 p.m. the ship was hove off into deep water, having been nearly three hours on shore ; fortunately, the water at the time was glassy smooth, so that the ship laid perfectly quiet, until a short time before getting off, when she lifted, and struck heavily by the bow two or three times, bringing away on each occasion small pieces of her false keel. The ship made no water, and I did not consider her much damaged. Remained at anchor during the night.

June 26.—9 a.m. weighed with a light S. E. wind, but was obliged to anchor again in a very exposed position, near the Island of Staritchkoo, it being a calm, with a current setting directly on shore. A thick fog and dead calm during the night. Quantities of fish and crabs were caught at this position.

June 27.—At 10 a.m. we weighed with a light N.E. wind, which took us clear of the shoals off the entrance, and almost immediately we entered a dense fog.

Struggling with light variable winds and fogs, we did not pass Bhering's Island until the 2d of July. On the morning of the 13th we passed the carcass of a dead whale, and in the forenoon another ; shortly afterwards we exchanged colours with one of the American whalers we had seen at Petropaulski, and before 12 o'clock the other two. Large flocks of the little crested auk about the ship. At noon, the north-west end of St. Lawrence Island bore true east, distant 12 miles. Running during the night with a fresh S.S.W. wind, and thick weather. Hauled up for the Asiatic shore at 7 a.m. under easy sail, to make the land, which we did near the northern point of St. Lawrence Bay, having experienced in that time a current of 25 miles to the northward. At 8. 30, passing within three miles of East Cape, shaped our course for Cape Espenberg (Kotzebue Sound) with a very strong S.E. wind.

In passing across the straits, we saw to the northward of the Diomed Islands two other whale-ships hove to, with their heads to the S.W., one of them trying out.

We passed over the shoal spoken of by Captain Beechey, off Schismarief Inlet, and found in 7 fathoms the least water, the sea at the time so high and hollow that it frequently broke into our main chains.

Running along the low land off Cape Espenberg, which we passed shortly after midnight, we had uninterrupted daylight ; the only difference between the light at midnight and noon being as the light of a November day in England is to that of a summer's one.

As we entered the Sound, the wind gradually lightened, and veered to the eastward. Passed several logs of drift-wood.

July 15.—Shortly after 8 a.m. we made out a vessel at anchor under Chamisso Island, and at 10 exchanged numbers with Her Majesty's ship "Plover." We reached the anchorage by 1 p.m., having run in 50 hours from the west end of St. Lawrence Island to the anchorage off Chamisso.

Commander Moore came on board, from whom I was glad to learn that the officers and crew were all healthy and in good spirits. He had only arrived at 6 a.m. the day previous, having passed the winter in a harbour discovered by the "Plover" on the Asiatic shore, close to the south of Cape Tchukatsky.

Before my arrival, two boats had been despatched for the Mackenzie River, under the command of Lieutenant Lee ; fortunately, the "Herald" hove in sight before

before, it was too late to signalize to them; the boats saw the recall, and returned.

We commenced immediately on our arrival to coal and provision the "Plover;" and by 9 a.m. she had on board all the bread she could stow, half her coals, and a proportion of other provisions.

July 16.—We were occupied in stowing "Plover's" provisions and coals, removing officers, discharging objectionable men, and filling up their vacancies from our own complement. While this was going on, I went with Commander Moore, and his acting ice-master, to examine the different bays on the east side of Choris Peninsula, for a wintering station for the "Plover." We found very shoal water in all of them, shoaling gradually northerly towards the Sandy Peninsula. They were of opinion that if a vessel did winter there, that she would be greatly exposed; and probably, on the breaking up of the ice, be either carried into the straits, or shoved up on to the beach.

At 9 p.m. both ships were ready to sail, but our main cap having been reported very rotten, I was detained the next day (17th) to shift it.

On each day of our stay we were visited by two baidars, carrying 12 men each; all of them were particularly tall, well-built, well-armed, and without either their women or dogs.

At first they were rather shy, but as soon as the interpreter began to speak to them in their language, that is, in a dialect which some of them understood, they appeared delighted, came on board, looked all over the ship, and returned (after I had made each of them some trifling present), without attempting to pilfer anything.

They belonged to Spafarcif Inlet, and expressed their delight at meeting with, and being recognized by, Lieutenant Cooper and others, who had visited them at their place last year, making presents to them without seeking a return.

Commander Moore and myself accompanied them to Chamisso Island, where, after hauling up their baidars, canting their bottom to the wind, the weather gunwale resting on the sand, the other raised about three feet, and supported by paddles, the space underneath covered with furs, we partook of several pipes with them.

Whilst we were engaged with our pipes, Commander Moore employed his boat's crew in digging for the flour left by Captain Beechey 23 years before, in a position indicated by directions on a rock, which were as perfect as the day when cut. We found this rock last year, but supposing the flour to have been removed by the natives, did not dig for it. A considerable space was cleared round the cask, its chimes freed, only adhering to the sand by the two lower bilge staves, yet still it required the united strength of two boats' crews, with a parbuckle, and a large spar as a lever, to free it altogether. The sand was frozen so hard that it emitted sparks with every blow of the pickaxe. The cask itself was perfectly sound, and the hoops good: out of the 336 lbs. of flour which it contained, 175 lbs. was as sweet and well-tasted as any we had on board. The tin of beads was also found, those not of glass much decayed; the cotton stringing quite sound.

July 18.—At 6 a.m. we weighed with a S.W. wind, and stood out of the anchorage. The "Nancy Dawson" yacht hove in sight at the same time; she accompanied us without touching at Chamisso Island. The "Plover" leading under all plain sail, the "Herald" keeping in company.

July 19.—At 4 a.m. passed a ship standing to the eastward, and at noon Point Hope bore N. 18° W. 55 miles. We experienced, contrary to my expectation, in this run, a current setting S. 74° W. half a mile per hour. Six p.m. exchanged colours with an American whaler, "Margaret," of Providence: whales at this time blowing in every direction round her; wind too strong, and too much sea for her to attempt them. Fog so dense at 8 p.m. that the "Plover" could not be seen, although within speaking distance. Continued running to the northward during the night, keeping company by gongs and bells.

July 20.—In the forenoon nearly ran over the carcass of a dead whale that had been flinched. Noon, the wind having shifted suddenly to the northward, we had fine clear weather; Cape Lisburne, E. 19 miles. At 5 p.m. we anchored in



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15 fathoms, with Cape Lisburne bearing N. 7° 20' E, mag., distant 2½ miles. "Plover" and yacht in company.

From this position two whale boats were despatched to examine the coast northerly, under the orders of Lieutenant Pullen ("Plover") and Mr. Parsons (second master, "Herald"); a boat was also sent from the "Plover" a short distance to the southward. The "Plover's" boat returned soon after midnight, having landed in one or two places, and met with many natives who were friendly and well-disposed. A beautiful clear night. At midnight the sun showed its semi-diameter above the horizon, and nearly every person in the ship remained up to witness this phenomenon for the first time.

July 21.—Weighed in the morning at 7 a. m. with a N.N.E. wind to follow the boats northerly. The "Plover" being nearer in shore was visited by two baidars, each carrying about 20 natives, men and women; a most miserable set of beings they were: they spoke of the boats having passed their encampment the night before; they collected near this place for the purpose of catching birds, and gathering eggs. Calm, anchored at 6 p. m. in 11 fathoms north and east of Cape Lisburne, off shore about 6 miles.

Weighed again at midnight, with a light northerly wind; the boats hove in sight at 7 a. m.; at 10 they were alongside.

Mr. Pullen had examined the inlet to the eastward of Cape ——— without success; he was informed by the natives, through the interpreter, that none of the inlets on the coast would admit of a vessel entering them; that it was only a few of them at the early spring that their baidars could enter, and they were closed when the winds began to blow from the westward.

We experienced in the ship until 6 p. m. of the 23d a tedious calm, the current fortunately set us north half a mile per hour. During this time we were visited by two baidars, with the same party of natives we had seen off Cape Lisburne; they came alongside fearlessly, and disposed of every article they had, the women selling their fur dresses, even to their second pair of breeches, for tobacco and beads.

During the evening of the 23d, and the morning of the 24th, we were running to the N.E., with a moderate S.S.W. wind, and a thick fog, clearing at intervals for a short time. Walrus, whales, and flocks of the eider duck about. We were guided as to our approach to the ice by the temperature of the sea.

July 25.—a. m. the wind shifted to the N.W., brought with it cold but fine and clear weather. Steering for Wainwright's Inlet. The vast number of walrus that surrounded us, keeping up a continual bellowing or grunting, the barking of the innumerable seals, the small whales, and the immense flocks of ducks continually rising from the water as we neared them, warned us of our approach to the ice, although the temperature of the sea was still high. We made the land a little before noon, 10 miles to the northward of Wainwright's Inlet. At 2 p. m. we anchored in 11 fathoms, about three miles off its entrance. The "Plover" and yacht had done so about an hour before.

In running down along the coast a post was observed on the higher land near the entrance of the inlet; shortly afterwards a man was seen to hoist on it (what we most of us made out to be) a flag. The "Plover" soon afterwards dipped her ensign (simply to clear it, as we afterwards learned): this was answered by the person at the post doing the same, and entirely removing it.

I immediately lowered a boat, and sent Lieutenant Cooper, of this ship, to the shore: he walked up to the post, and found it to be nothing more than a native mark for a quantity of blubber and reindeers' flesh he discovered buried there: the native had left. Lieutenant Cooper, after remaining there some time, returned on board without seeing anybody.

My reasons for selecting this place to equip and despatch the boats from, instead of proceeding as far north as the ships could go, was, that I considered it of the greatest importance that the "Plover's" wintering station should be known by the officer in command of the boat expedition.

Commenced immediately to hoist out the boats, equip, and provision them. While this was going on, I despatched Mr. Hill, master of this ship, to sound the entrance of the inlet; he returned on board a little before midnight, and made to me the following report:—that the channel was very narrow and winding, that 9 feet was the most water that could with certainty be carried in, and that even to ensure

ensure that depth the channel would require close buoying; that a fair wind, or a calm, so that a vessel might either sail or be towed in, was necessary, the channel being too narrow and intricate to warp through. Once in, he reports that there is a sufficiency of water, and a convenient spot for the "Plover" to winter.

From this report I found that it was impossible for the "Plover" to enter this inlet with the water found then, but as the entrance was encumbered with some heavy pieces of ice aground, which during our stay was breaking up fast, I conceived it very probable that, after they had disappeared, the channel might become more direct, and deeper; I therefore determined to return and make a closer examination of the inlet, so soon as I had seen the boats as far north as we could reach in the ships. The boats were therefore directed to visit Wainwright's Inlet on their return, in case it should prove practicable for the "Plover" to enter, but that under any circumstance she would be found at Chamisso Island.

Mr. Hill met there about 40 natives, who were very friendly at first, but when they found he was about to leave them they became annoying, pulling their haidars across his bows, and fouling his oars, not with any hostile intentions, simply to delay his departure, so that they might have time to barter with him for some of his riches.

By midnight the boats were all ready, and shoved off under three hearty cheers from the ships, which were as heartily returned by the boats.

This little expedition consisted of 25 persons, and four boats, as follows: Lieutenant Pullen, commanding "Herald's" 30-foot pinnace, fitted on board with the greatest care, thoroughly decked, schooner-rigged, and called the "Owen," furnished with pumps, spare rudder, and a strengthening piece of 2-inch plank above her water line.

Two 27-foot whale-boats (new boats), brought out by Her Majesty's ship "Asia" from England, covered in abaft as far as the backboard, but without either boxes or cases, the provisions being stowed, the bread in painted bags, and the preserved meats between tarpaulins. The men's clothes were in haversacks, capable of removal in a moment.

"Plover's" pinnace, a half-decked boat, with cases for her provisions, &c., so placed as to resist pressure from the ice.

There was placed in the boats 70 days' preserved meats for the whole party, all the other articles of provisions (except bread), to the same extent, being also soldered up in tins. In addition to these, the "Owen" had on board eight men's allowance of the regular ship's provisions. After she was stowed with this proportion, every corner that would hold a case of preserved meat was filled. The two larger boats carried in each of them five cases of pemmican, for the special use of Sir John Franklin's party.

The ships weighed in company with the boats, and ran along the land within about three miles, with a moderate off-shore wind.

July 26.—At 4 a.m. the ice could be seen in heavy masses, extending from the shore near the Sea-Horse Islands. At 6, we were obliged to heave-to, in consequence of a dense fog; this cleared off at 11.30: the "Plover" was close to, but neither the boats nor the yacht were in sight.

We both made sail, steering true north, and were at 1 p.m. in latitude  $71^{\circ} 05'$ , where we made the heavily packed ice, extending nearly as far as the eye could reach, from N.W. by W. to N.E. At this time we had soundings in 40 fathoms of mud, the deepest water we have had since leaving the island of St. Lawrence. We continued running along the pack until 8 p.m., when a thick fog coming on, we ran two or three miles south, and hove-to, wind blowing from N.N.E., and directly off the ice. We had run along it 30 miles.

The pack was composed of a dirty-coloured ice, not more than five or six feet high, except some pinnacles deeply seated in the pack, which had no doubt been thrown up by the floes coming in contact. Every few miles the ice streamed off from the pack, through which the "Plover" sailed.

July .—At 1.30, the fog cleared off; the pack from N.N.W. to N.N.E., distant about six miles. Made sail during the forenoon, running through streams of loose ice. At 10, passed some large and heavy floes; Commander Moore considering them sufficiently heavy and extensive to obtain a suite of magnetical observations, dropped the "Plover" through between them, and made fast with ice anchors under the lee of the largest, in a most seamanlike manner.



Lat.  $71^{\circ} 30' N.$   
Long.  $162^{\circ} 05' W.$

I landed on the floe with Lieutenant Trollope. The latitude, time and variation were obtained on it, but the other observations were vitiated by its motion in azimuth, and by its constant breaking away, the level would not stand. We had 28 fathoms of mud alongside it, and no current.

I found the ice driving slowly to the southward, with the N. N. E. wind then blowing fresh. Very few walrus, and but a single diver seen. The general height of this floe was five feet, and about one mile in extent; on it were found pebbles and mud, which led Commander Moore to suppose that it had been in contact with the land. I supposed the mud and pebbles to have been fecal remains dropped there by some walrus.

At 3 p. m. the "Plover" slipped from the ice, and both ships, with a N. E. wind, made sail westerly until 6 o'clock, when we hauled up true north, having no ice in sight in that direction, and only from mast-head on weather beam. A fine clear night, running along six and seven knots; temperature of the water,  $40^{\circ}$ ; depth, 21 fathoms (increasing).

At midnight the latitude was obtained by the inferior passage of the sun. At 5 a. m. the temperature of the water had fallen to  $36^{\circ}$ , and almost at the same instant the ice was reported from the mast-head. Between this time and 7 a. m. (when we hove-to within half a mile of the pack) we ran 10.5, so that I consider 11 miles to be about the distance that packed ice in this part of the world can be seen in clear weather from a ship's mast-head.

The pack was of dirty-coloured ice, showing an outline without a break in it five or six feet high, with columns and pinnacles much higher some distance in. Although the wind was off the pack, there was not a particle of loose or drift ice from it; our soundings had gradually increased to 35 fathoms of soft blue mud. The only living things seen were a pair of small divers, black, with a white ball in the back; and two remarkable birds, very like the female of the tropical mau-of-war bird, a dingy black colour, with excessively long wings, and the same flight when soaring. We could not succeed in shooting any of either species. We remained hove-to off the pack for an hour. The temperature of the sea near the pack at every five fathoms was as shown in the margin. In the dredge we got muscles and a few bivalves common to these seas.

This was our most northern position, lat.  $72^{\circ} 51' N.$ , long.  $168^{\circ} W.$  The ice, as far as it could be seen from the mast-head, trended away W. S. W. (compass); Commander Moore and the ice-master reporting a water sky to the north of the pack, and a strong ice blink to the S. W.

It was impossible to gain this reported open water, as the pack was perfectly impenetrable. The pack we had just traced for 40 leagues, made in a series of steps westerly and northerly; the westerly being about 10 or 12 miles, and the northerly 20. We made sail at 9 a. m., steering for the coast, a little to the westward of our track up, wind N. E., gradually decreasing as we got southerly.

5 a. m. fell a dead calm, the sea glassy smooth, and so transparent that a white plate was distinctly seen at a depth of 80 feet. This afforded me an opportunity of ascertaining the extent of damage the ship had received when on shore in Awatska Bay. The forefoot was untouched, the false keel gone for about 10 feet; beyond this she had sustained no damage that we could see; the copper broken, and excessively thin all over. As we approached the coast we again met numbers of whales, walrus, seals and flights of ducks and sea birds.

July 30.—8 a. m. tacked in shore in eight fathoms, close to the northward of Blossom's Shoals. Commander Moore came on board, and proposed that during the time I was surveying Wainwright's Inlet, that he should go along the coast during the fine weather as far north as the ice would permit him, and endeavour to communicate with the larger boats, which we expected were somewhere about Refuge Inlet. With this intention we both started with a fine but adverse wind from N. E.

I worked in short tacks close along shore, the soundings in muddy bottom decreasing, and increasing as we approached or receded from the land. Shortly after 6 a. m. we again anchored off the entrance of Wainwright's Inlet.

Not a particle of the ice seen on our former visit remained. We had not long anchored when we observed the natives carrying their baidars across the narrow neck between the inlet and the sea, and launching them. Wishing to get as many of them as I could off to the ship, so as to have fewer to molest me on shore, I detained the boats until two of them came alongside. They approached

us slowly, frequently resting on their paddles, the bowman each time invariably holding up his hands over his head at an angle of  $45^{\circ}$ , when lowering them passing them over his breast and stomach. I made the boatswain do the same from fore-castle netting; they always waited for his answer before they recommenced paddling.

I made them each a present of some tobacco and beads (which they could hardly understand that I intended to give without return).

I left the ship with three boats for the examination of the inlet, and gave permission to the ship's company to trade with the natives for whatever they had to dispose of, consisting mostly of small figures and tools of ivory, bows, arrows, a few furs, sealskin boots, and pieces of reindeer flesh.

I had not been long on shore before these natives left the ship and followed. Nothing could exceed their good humour. When about to commence my observations, I ordered all trading to cease, drew a large semicircle on the sand, from water's edge to water's edge, and placed the boats' noses between its points. They seemed perfectly to understand the meaning of this line, not one of them attempted to overstep it; they squatted down and remained perfectly quiet and silent. When a stranger arrived they shouted to him, who no sooner understood them than he crept rather than walked to the boundary, and squatted among the rest. They danced and sang for our amusement, played football with the seamen (who had not a chance with them), and displayed their skill in shooting at a mark. "Plover" anchored in company; soon after noon, calm.

Commander Moore went on shore, erected a mark, and buried a bottle with information of the boats. I had satisfied myself before his arrival that 10 feet was the greatest depth that could be carried in; I therefore called upon him to furnish me with a report of what his vessel could be lightened to, a copy of which I have the honour to enclose.

By it their Lordships will perceive, that short of taking the "Plover's" masts out, she could not be lightened sufficiently to enter the inlet. Could it have been done with any partial lightening I should have attempted it, being in every way so very desirable a position: in the first place, from its high latitude, the friendliness of the natives, the supply of reindeers' flesh we found could be obtained there, there being no other harbour south of it nearer than Kotzebue Sound; and lastly, the opinion of the ice-masters of the exposure to which a vessel wintering in the latter place would be subjected. Inside there is a good depth of water, and in one spot the "Plover" might have been placed alongside a bank well sheltered.

The natives gave me to understand that a considerable river runs into it, at least one that they can in their baidars navigate for many days, and that it ran to the S.E. That on its bank and in the neighbourhood of the inlet the reindeer collected in great numbers, in their progress northerly, and in their return south.

The natives began to leave us, as before, by 8 p.m., tracking their baidars with dogs to their tents, in a little sandy bay a mile north of us. By the time we were ready to go off, there was not one with us.

I was sorry to find that, after all their good behaviour, they had been guilty of picking the pockets of two or three: one lost a handkerchief, another a glove, Commander Moore a box of caps, and the naturalist a small glass bottle, containing spirits and water.

Wednesday, August 1.—During the night we had a thick fog, which cleared off at 5 a.m. The boats left the ship to continue their examination; Commander Moore and myself to obtain a suite of magnetical and other observations. I returned to the ship shortly after noon with the boats, to put my work on paper, Commander Moore went up the inlet, and found some baidars that had just arrived with several reindeer cut in quarters. They were stowing it, with a considerable quantity they had already collected, in a hole dug on the sandspit off Point Collie, and appeared much annoyed at their stow-hole having been discovered. It was deep and lined with logs of wood, having a roof formed also of logs, about five feet above the ground, and covered with moss. For a small quantity of tobacco they sold 800 lbs., as much as Commander Moore's boat could carry. Learning from him that they were willing to dispose of more, I sent Lieutenant Cooper, the naturalist, and the surgeon, in a light boat to purchase it. Seeing the boat pulling in fast directly for them, they got alarmed, and at length, before the boat touched the beach, a woman walked to the water's edge and held up the bottle the naturalist had lost the day before, making signs to him when he landed that it

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had been picked up on the beach. It was in the same state as when he lost it, the cork never having been removed. They at least understand that stealing is an offence. At first they appeared rather sulky, and unwilling to part with any of their meat; after a few presents they resumed their former good humour, and sold 14 quarters, all of them of young animals; it was without a particle of fat, badly killed, but still was owned by most on board to be very sweet and tender meat.

In the afternoon a long westerly swell rolled in, with a very light wind still off the land. At 6 it shifted to the southward, with a threatening appearance. We both immediately weighed and stood off the land in a thick fog, and with a falling barometer.

August 2.—At 9 a.m. the fog cleared off; the “Plover” was nowhere to be seen, and the wind was gradually increasing.

August 3.—At 9 a.m. we were reduced to treble reefed topsails and reefed courses, with a very short, deep and trying sea. We were obliged to carry to it to keep off the land, the current setting, as we found it on all occasions, with the wind—rather stronger off Icy Cape than in other parts of this sea.

August 4.—Wind gradually veered to the westward, and by 5 a.m. died away to a calm. Variable airs—the wind settled in the S.W. At 3 p.m. could see the stages on Icy Cape. 3.30 tacked in 11 fathoms, before trimming we were in 8. Very gloomy, squally and threatening weather. In standing off, fell in with the “Plover” again; signalled our position to her, and appointed Cape Lisburne as a rendezvous. Whales seen, also large flocks of ducks and geese, going southerly.

August 5, 6, 7.—Fresh breezes, with heavy falls of snow; but what with the current, the trying sea, and the wind always breaking us off in whichever way we tried to go, we could not make a mile of westing, until the afternoon of the 8th, when the wind shifted suddenly to the N.W. Stood to the W.S.W.

August 9.—In the morning passed the carcass of a dead whale, and another in the afternoon. I sent a boat to this one, stuck a flag in it, and buried a bottle containing a current paper, a notice of my whereabouts, and of my intention to go westerly, for the information of the “Plover,” should she fall in with it. Many reports of land from the mast-head. A land bird seen.

Having this favourable wind for examining the pack to the westward, I continued to steer as nigh as the wind would permit on the starboard tack. The wind continued to lighten until the morning of the 10th, when it fell a dead calm.

The sea was literally covered in streams, with particles of a pink colour, like wood ashes, or coarse sawdust from cedar, a tenth of an inch long, and 0.5 in diameter, and round. On placing it under the microscope, no appearance of circulation could be detected. Mr. Goodridge, the surgeon of this ship, supposes it to have proceeded from the carcasses of the whales we saw yesterday, the oil having been forced through the pores by the pressure of the water, giving the uniform size and shape in which we found it. I endeavoured to dry some in blotting paper, but it was absorbed by the paper, and nothing left but an oily stain. Tried the current, and found it running to the westward one-third of a mile an hour. Walrus grunting around in groups of 8 and 10 together; quantities of small pieces of drift wood, all pine, which appeared to have been washed from some beach. The temperature of the water at the surface, in 29 fathoms, was 45°, and at bottom 43°. The dredge produced (in soft blue mud) a good many muscles, star fish (found in all parts of this sea), a few bivalves (got before), and some very small shrimps.

A light southerly wind sprang up, gradually increasing and veering to the eastward. At 10.30, after standing to the S.W. for 15 miles, the loom of the land in the neighbourhood of North Cape could be seen. I tacked to the N.E., with the wind fresh from E.S.E. Not wishing to run the risk of being caught with a southeaster between the land and the ice floe, which I considered could not be far off, from the extraordinary smoothness of the water, the numbers of walrus, and particularly a little black and white diver, which we never saw except in its vicinity.

August 11.—Steering until this day in very thick and bad weather to the N.E., at which time we were in lat. 70° 1', long. 173° 53'. Bore up north to endeavour to fall in with the pack. By 6 p.m. a dense fog came on; we hauled to the wind on port tack, under reduced sails, ship heading S.E., with a short jumping sea.

August

August 12.—a.m. the wind shifted suddenly to N.N.E., and afterwards N.N.W., blowing hard, reduced to treble reefed topsails and reefed foresail, our soundings having decreased to 17 fathoms mud. No observations. Our reckoning placed us in lat.  $70^{\circ} 20'$ , long.  $171^{\circ} 23'$ , in 18 fathoms sand.

Shortly after noon our depth decreased to 16 fathoms, the colour of the water becoming lighter; with a breaking sea all round. Our soundings decreased a fathom each cast until 1.30 p.m., when we wore in 11 fathoms, shingle, getting in wearing nine fathoms, then 12 fathoms; and when trimmed to go back, as we went on, had several casts of eight and one of seven fathoms; then suddenly got into 14, which gradually increased.

The sun came out, verifying our noon position. Until midnight it blew a strong gale.

August 13.—a.m. Fine. Wore, to stand back to the shoal; shoaled our water to 13 fathoms, and at 10 I imagined I saw breakers on the lee bow. Ship refused stays, wore, but had no less water. At midnight passed over the tail of the bank, in eight fathoms, five miles north-west of our former position. Continued to stand to the eastward until I could weather the south end of the shoal; then tacked, passing in 16 fathoms three miles south of our first position. When I bore up north to fix its western edge, a slight easterly current took me rather further in that direction than I intended. I have, however, confined it within a radius of five miles.

The weather would not allow of our anchoring so as to make a closer examination of the shoal with our boats, and the sea was too heavy and hollow to attempt taking the ship herself into less water. In approaching the shoal the bottom changes from sand to fine sand, and when in the least water, coarse gravel and stones. We found nothing less than seven fathoms, but I am of opinion that a bank exists which would bring a ship up.

August 14 —We experienced very strong variable and S.E. breezes, with rain until midnight of the 14th, when the wind changed to the westward, and brought with it fine weather.

Continued to stand to northward and westward until noon, the 15th, being in lat.  $71^{\circ} 12'$ , and long.  $170^{\circ} 10'$ . Bore up W.  $\frac{1}{2}$  S., passing several pieces of drift wood.

Our soundings increased as we left the bank (westerly) to 25 fathoms mud.

August 16 —Wind very variable in strength, and direction S.S.W. to S.E. Large flocks of phalaropes, divers and gulls numerous. At midnight wind very fresh from S.S.E., steering W.S.W., depth decreasing to 10 fathoms.

August 17 —3 a.m. the temperature of the sea suddenly fell from  $40^{\circ}$  to  $36^{\circ}$ , the wind became light, and excessively cold. Shortened sail, supposing that I was very near the ice. frequent snow showers

At 5 a.m. wind shifted suddenly from the N.W. in a sharp squall, with heavy snow. Shortly after 8, when one of these snow storms cleared off, the packed ice was seen from the mast-head from S.S.W. to N.N.W. five miles distant. The weather was so bad that I bore up for the rendezvous. The weather, however, as suddenly cleared up; I hauled my wind for the north-western extreme of the ice that had been seen.

At 9.40. the exciting report of "Land ho!" was made from the mast-head: they were both soon afterwards crowded.

In running a course along the pack towards our first discovery, a small group of islands was reported on our port beam, a considerable distance within the outer margin of the ice.

The pack here was not so close as I found it before; lanes of water could be seen, reaching almost up to the group, but too narrow to enter unless the ship had been sufficiently fortified to force a hole for herself.

These small islands at intervals were very distinct, and were not considered at the time very distant.

Still more distant than this group (from the deck), a very extensive and high land was reported, which I had been watching for some time, and anxiously awaited a report from some one else. There was a fine clear atmosphere (such a one as can only be seen in this climate), except in the direction of this extended land,

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land, where the clouds rolled in numerous immense masses, occasionally leaving the very lofty peaks uncapped, where could be distinctly seen columns, pillars and very broken summits, which is characteristic of the higher headlands in this sea—East Cape and Cape Lisburne for example.

With the exception of the north-east and south-west extremes, none of the lower land could be seen, unless indeed what I took at first for a small group of islands within the pack edge was a point of this Great Land.

This island, or point, was distant 25 miles from the ship's track, higher parts of the land seen not less, I consider, than 60 miles. When we hove-to off the first land seen, the northern extreme of the Great Land showed out to the eastward for a moment, and so clear as to cause some who had doubts before to cry out, "There, Sir, is the land, quite plain."

From the time land was reported until we hove-to under it, we ran 25 miles directly for it. At first we could not see that the pack joined it, but as we approached the island, we found the pack to rest on the island, and to extend from it as far as the eye could reach to the E. S. E.

The weather which had been fine all day, now changed suddenly to dense clouds and snow showers, blowing fresh from the south with so much sea that I did not anchor as I intended.

I left the ships with two boats; the Senior Lieutenant, Mr. Maguire, Mr. Seemann, naturalist, and Mr. Collinson, mate, in one; Mr. Goodridge, surgeon, Mr. Pakenham, midshipman, and myself in the other, almost despairing of being able to reach the island.

The ship kept off and on outside the thickest part of the loose ice, through which the boats were obliged to be very careful in picking their way on the south-east side, where I thought I might have ascended. We reached the island, and found running on it a very heavy sea. The First Lieutenant however landed, having backed his boat in until he could get foot hold (without swimming), and then jumped overboard. I followed his example; the others were anxious to do the same, but the sea was so high that I could not permit them.

We hoisted the Jack and took possession of the island, with the usual ceremonies, in the name of Her most Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria.

The extent we had to walk over was not more than 30 feet; from this space, and a short distance that we scrambled up, we collected eight species of plants: specimens of the rock were also brought away.

With the time we could spare, and our materials, the island was perfectly inaccessible to us. This was a great disappointment to us, as from its summit, which is elevated above the sea 1,400 feet, much could have been seen, and all doubt set aside; more particularly as I knew the moment I got on board I should be obliged to carry sail to get off the pack, and out of the sight of it we were in; neither could I expect that at this late period of the season the weather would improve.

The island on which I landed is four miles and a half in extent east and west, and about two and a half north and south, in the shape of a triangle, the western end being its apex. It is almost inaccessible on all sides, and a solid mass of granite. Innumerable black and white divers (common to this sea) here found a safe place to deposit their eggs and bring up their young: not a walrus or seal was seen on its shore, or on the ice in its vicinity. We observed here none of the small land birds that were so numerous about us before making the land.

It becomes a nervous thing to report a discovery of land in these regions, without actually landing on it, after the unfortunate mistake to the southward; but as far as a man can be certain, who has 130 pair of eyes to assist him, and all agreeing, I am certain we have discovered an extensive land; I think also it is more than probable that these peaks we saw are a continuation of the range of mountains seen by the natives off Cape Jakan (coast of Asia), mentioned by Baron Wrangell in his Polar Voyages. I returned to the ship at 7 p.m., and very reluctantly made all the sail we could carry, from this interesting neighbourhood, to the S. E., the wind at the time allowing me to be just clear of the pack.

August 18.—Towards the morning we had a very strong wind, with constant snow storms and excessive cold. The wind having changed to northward, left me no choice but to return to my rendezvous for the boats.

August 20.—Sighted Cape Lisburne in a thick fog; hauled off to await clear weather: passed several carcasses of whales.

August



August 21.—At 2 p. m. again made the Cape, found the high land heavily covered with snow, and the low land partially. Very threatening weather. Remained off and on until noon of the 23d, when we anchored, in 14 fathoms, about 25 miles to the southward of the Cape, near the ——— of Captain Beechey's charts. Here I landed, accompanied by the naturalist and several officers; I erected a mark, and buried a bottle. A beautiful stream of water ran into this bay. The naturalist had a good harvest on its banks, which were literally covered with flowers, removed only a few feet from what I considered to be perpetual snow. Quantities of coal was also found here.

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There were about 40 natives, all of whom we had seen before, very poor and miserable looking, but very friendly. They all had their bows and quivers with them, but on coming up to us placed them in.

Finding a line drawn on the sand, so useful as a boundary for their approach at Wainwright's Inlet, I again had recourse to it, which they respected as before. I made them all presents, and returned to the ship in the evening, just before she was enveloped in a dense fog.

August 24.—a. m. weighed with a light air from the N. E. and clear (hot) weather, running for Point Hope, where I intended to build another mark, if the "Plover" had not already done it.

At 1 p. m. sighted off the low land the "Nancy Dawson" yacht and the "Owen." Mr. Shedden came on board, accompanied by Mr. Martin, the second master of the "Plover," who had been sent back by Mr. Pullen, in charge of the two large boats of the Expedition. I learned from Mr. Martin that he had arrived at the anchorage off Point Hope on the 19th instant, in company with the yacht, and was preparing to start again, north, in the "Owen," sending the other boats back in charge of the yacht to Kotzebue Sound.

The boats, after leaving the "Plover" on the 25th of July, were detained a day or two by the ice, before reaching Point Barrow; found the natives most friendly and anxious to assist them in every way. The boats were accompanied as far as Point Barrow by the yacht; this vessel had many escapes: she was pressed on shore once, ran on shore on another occasion to the eastward of Point Barrow, and was only got off by the assistance of the natives, who manned her capstan, and hove with great good-will.

On another occasion she parted her bower cable, from the pressure of the ice that came suddenly down on her, and had a narrow escape of a severe squeeze; she recovered her anchor and cable. Mr. Shedden erected a mark on Refuge Inlet, where he also intended to have left some provisions, but the natives were too numerous to do so without their knowing.

He found another small inlet a short distance south of Refuge Inlet, in latitude  $71^{\circ} 5'$ , where he buried from his own store a large cask of flour and a large cask of preserved meats. At Refuge Inlet he left information as to the position of these casks.

Nothing could exceed the kindness of Mr. Shedden to those in the boats, in supplying them with everything his vessel could afford, and in following them with considerable risk. His crew were unfortunately a most disaffected set; he had too many of them for so small a vessel.

The boats all reached Dease's Inlet on the evening of the 3d, but were detained until the 5th by strong winds.

Their time, however, was well employed in stowing their boats and a baidar Mr. Pullen bought at Point Barrow. They were fairly away on the afternoon of the 5th, having with them 100 days' provisions, besides 10 cases of pemmican; this little expedition then consisted of two 27-foot whale-boats, and one native baidar, manned with 14 persons in all.

I have sent their Lordships copies of Mr. Pullen's letters, both public and private, that have been received since his departure; from them they will gain more information than I could afford.

Through these letters their Lordships will also see with what a noble and proper spirit Lieutenant Pullen undertook his voyage, being nevertheless fully alive to its dangers and exposure.

I am quite sure their Lordships, when they appointed Mr. Pullen, were fully aware of his character and capabilities; I trust, however, that they will not consider the following comments out of place.

I don't know any officer more capable of conducting with success such an Expedition;

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Expedition: he possesses health, great bodily strength, and endurance, ability, and great decision of character. Coupled with all these good points in their leader, the boats had an open sea and a fair wind, so that I have no apprehension as to their reaching one of the Hudson Bay's establishments on the Mackenzie early in this season, though not sufficiently early to return to Kotzebue Sound this year.

Dease and Simpson certainly made their voyage from the Mackenzie to Point Barrow and back in one season; but then they travelled west at the commencement of the season, and returned to the eastward at its close, when the winds prevailed from the westward. Our boats would have to return to the westward at the latter part of the season, which I believe to be impossible, from the packing of the ice, the heavy westerly winds, and currents.

Mr. Pullen's letter says pretty plainly that he will not return; he will, therefore, be awaiting their Lordships' instructions at York Factory.

August 24.—We hove-to off Point Hope towards midnight, in very dirty weather.

August 25.—In the morning stood in, sent a boat to the yacht to tell her I thought she was in a very dangerous anchorage, with the wind as it then was from the S.S.E. Ordered the two larger boats out immediately. Finding the weather still more threatening, I hoisted the "Plover's" boat in, being handier for my tackles than the "Owen," determining to go myself north in the ship.

Provisioned the "Owen," and despatched her, in company with the yacht, to Kotzebue Sound, supposing the "Plover" to have gone there. I desired Commander Moore to employ her in the examination of the Buckland River.

We had a calm in the afternoon, with heavy rollers (without any apparent cause); we fortunately were two or three miles off the land. Had the yacht and boats remained at their anchorage, they certainly would have been driven on shore, without my being able to render them any assistance.

A fresh breeze from the southward released us from this unpleasant position. We just scraped clear of the shoal off Point Hope, and bore up northerly, parting company with yacht and "Owen."

August 27.—Continued to run to the northward until 6 a.m. of this day. Had an increasing breeze from S.S.E., with frequent snow showers. Hove-to for fine weather. By 9 a.m. we were reduced to a close-reefed main-topsail and staysail, having washed away one of our quarter boats. I have never seen so hollow or distressing a sea for a ship—no small-decked boat could have lived in it. It was therefore fortunate that I had arrived at Point Hope before the "Owen" started again north, and that I had decided on sending her to Kotzebue Sound.

I kept the ship heading-in for the land, hoping that this gale, like our former ones, would be of short duration, and that I might again look into Wainwright's Inlet. The only alteration, however, in the weather was, that the gale from the S.S.E. ceased in about 12 hours, and shifted to N.W., and W., from which points it blew gales, bringing with them excessive cold weather, with strong squalls and heavy falls of snow.

August 27.—In standing to the westward, we observed at 10 p.m. the ice blink very strong from N. to N.W., about 15 miles from us. Wore, hoping to weather Blossom Shoal, at least 40 miles.

August 28.—Wore in 11 fathoms on the shoal this morning, having 9 fathoms before we trimmed. Had a current N. 84° E., setting 36 miles in 18 hours. Wind west.

Finding it impossible to remain on the coast, I began to work off with all the sail the ship would carry. My crew were necessarily much exposed in making and shortening sail, and suffered a good deal from colds and rheumatism. I was also short-handed, having been obliged to send 10 men to the "Plover," besides those I discharged at Oahu.

On the morning of the 31st I again stood in for Point Hope; but finding there was no landing there, I bore up for Kotzebue Sound.

Passed Cape Krusenstern on the morning of the 1st, in a gale from the N.W., under treble-reefed topsails and reefed courses.

Before passing Hotham we were under all sail, and anchored off Chamisso Island at 9.30 p.m.

Found

Found the "Plover" and the yacht at anchor under Choris Peninsula. The "Owen" was absent with Captain Moore up the Buckland River, but expected daily her return on the 3d.

After completing our water from the springs in Chamisso, my people were employed assisting the "Plover" in preparing her winter quarters. The boatswain with a party, and the carpenters building a house.

Commander Moore having determined to winter in the Sound, and being very desirous to visit some chiefs who were reported to live in a considerable place up the river, I determined to go there with a party sufficient to ensure respect from these people, although Captain Moore told me they were most friendly. Accordingly, on the 9th, I started with the "Owen," "Plover's" decked boat, "Herald's" cutter, and two gigs,—their crews, and several officers.

The first night we bivouacked at Elephant Point, and had the whole crew roaming over the ice-cliffs for fossils, but could not find one of any importance.

The second night we stayed at a large native village of 22 tents and about 150 people. We pitched our tents close to one extreme of them, had our coppers, pots, kettles, axes, saws, &c. on shore, but not an article was lost, although at times we had a third of their numbers about us. Even in this way they were not troublesome, when we told them we wished them to go away.

They were all very fine men, but disfigured in appearance by the labrets they all wear. They brought us wood and water, gave us fish and venison, and offered us whales' blubber and seals' flesh.

Leaving a few of the men to take care of the boats, the rest came on shore for an hour. The natives were highly amused, and joined in their sports of leaping and running. The sportsmen were always accompanied by some of them; they were greatly surprised to see some of the young officers killing the birds right and left.

The moment the boats started (until we got far up), we were preceded by their little kiacs, sounding with their paddles, to the channel. We had pilots in each of the large boats, who remained constantly with us, and who experienced great concern when they unavoidably got us on shore.

I have been the more particular in my remarks relative to these interesting people, because their behaviour, on the visits of Captain Beechey and myself, have been so very opposite. It may be accounted for in this way: we had an interpreter, who could speak with them, through which they found out what our object was in going amongst them.

The Russian settlement has also, I consider, been very instrumental in causing this alteration in their conduct. We found many of them with shirts, handkerchiefs of gaudy colours, cotton printed with walrus, reindeer, and all the other animals that they are in the habit of catching and representing in ivory, knives and kettles; all these came from the Russian settlement. They were latterly very anxious to obtain muskets, and evinced no fear in discharging them.

September 11.—We arrived with the boats at a part of the river 30 miles up, perfectly barred across with heavy rock, over which there was a fall of about 18 inches. Here the heavy boats were stopped; but, by unlading the lighter ones, we were enabled to haul them over.

Wishing myself to return to the ship, and Commander Moore being still anxious to go on, I directed Mr. Maguire (senior Lieutenant of "Herald") to accompany him in my gig for the purpose of mutual protection (leaving one of the larger boats below the fall to await their return). I directed him to make a tracing of the river as far as they might ascend it, and return to their respective vessels before the 23d instant. They ascended the river about 30 miles beyond where I left them. In this distance they met with but two natives. They passed several places where they were obliged to unload, and haul these light boats over. They found also the pine trees, scattered about in twos and threes, a little distance from the bank.

The river, from the mud and leaves hanging on the banks, showed that at some period of the year it was at least 10 feet above the level at that time.

The absence of spars, or wood of any description, on the frequent bridges of rocks across the river, on the tops of the many spits of sand, or on the summit of the banks (which bear evident marks of having been overflowed at some season), shows that the Buckland is not the source from which the enormous quantities of wood



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found at Choris Peninsula is derived. We have never found a particle of wood on the eastern face of this peninsula: all on its western.

Commander Moore and his party returned on the 19th. We now commenced to prepare for our departure southward. The "Plover's" house was nearly completed, and as much provisions as he could stow or take care of were placed on board her.

September 26.—By this day we were ready to start, having fully completed all the "Plover's" wants. She was not dismantled, nor did Commander Moore intend doing so until she was fairly laid up on the beach.

In consequence of the illness of Mr. Shedden, of the yacht, and of my having previously removed his chief mate, I was obliged to direct Mr. Parsons (second master), of this ship, to take charge of her, and navigate her to Mazatlan, where he might expect to meet me.

Early on the morning of the 29th of September, I weighed from Kotzebue Sound, with a fair breeze from the N. E.; yacht in company. At the time of our departure, there was early snow on the low lands. The streams were still running. In fact, the whole month of September had been remarkably fine, generally with strong winds from the eastward.

We experienced very bad weather on getting out of the Sound. Parted company with the yacht.

Passed Behring's Straits in the morning of the 2d of October, in a heavy gale from N. N. W.

October 11.—At midnight, passed the Aleutian groups by the Straits of Amoukhta, in long.  $171^{\circ}$  W. These straits are 35 miles wide, perfectly safe, and free from the races usually met with in the other straits of this chain.

On the 13th of October, in lat.  $47^{\circ} 30'$  and long.  $167^{\circ}$ , we experienced a heavy northerly gale, with an unusually heavy sea, which broke on board of us, and nearly swept our decks.

On the 19th of October, in lat.  $43^{\circ}$  and long.  $160^{\circ}$ , we had another gale at S. S. E. Between this and the 14th of November, when we anchored at the port of Mazatlan, there was nothing remarkable but the prevalence in  $41^{\circ}$  N. of S. E. winds, which forced us to the coast within 100 miles of San Francisco, before we got the N. W. wind.

At Mazatlan I found lying Her Majesty's ship "Amphitrite," and the "Nancy Dawson" yacht; this little vessel having arrived the morning previous.

I have endeavoured in this letter and the accompanying documents to give their Lordships a detailed account of my proceedings while in the Arctic Circle, which, I trust, will meet with their approval.

And, in conclusion, I hope for the consideration of their Lordships for the officers serving under my command, who have, as heretofore, without an exception, displayed uncommon zeal in their respective duties.

I have, &c.

The Secretary of the Admiralty,  
 London,

(signed) *Henry Kellett*,  
 Captain.

Her Majesty's Ship "Plover," off Chamisso Island,  
 17 July 1849.

Sir,

I BEG to propose the following arrangements, as most likely to forward the particular service on which this ship is employed, after leaving Kotzebue Sound:

That on arriving off Cape Lisburne, the decked boats of the "Herald" and "Plover," with a whale-boat, be hoisted out, Lieutenant Pullen taking the "Herald's," with the interpreter, and seven men. Mr. Martin (second master of this ship) in the "Plover's," accompanied by the ice-master, and six men. They

They

They should then visit every nook or inlet along the coast, the ships being in the offing, with whom they should communicate; when an inlet is found sufficiently large to anchor the ships in, the two vessels then to anchor, whilst the boats examine the anchorage.

A rendezvous should be appointed, where the boats may meet the ships in foggy weather.

On arriving off Wainwright's Inlet, should no place be found to the southward, it should be examined, despatching the two boats, reinforced with 70 days' provisions, with orders to proceed as far as (after a personal examination of the ice) should be found prudent.

I would recommend that the ships remain off the packed ice, if Wainwright's Inlet prove unavailable, till the 25th of September, when, should the boats not have returned, they proceed to Chamisso Island, in Kotzebue Sound; but in the event of their being back before that date, to Lawrence Bay, or my former winter quarters.

I have, &c.

Captain Kellett, C. B.  
&c: &c.

(signed) T. E. L. Moore, Commander.

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ceedings of Capt.  
Kellett, Commander  
Moore, and Lieut.  
Pullen.

Sir,

Her Majesty's Ship "Herald," at Sea,  
off Cape Krusenstern, 19 July 1849.

THE following remarks are founded on their Lordships' orders to me, as well as from those to yourself, relative to the boat expedition along the coast of Georgia.

You will perceive, by my first orders, that their Lordships consider light boats, or baidars, as the most eligible for prosecuting the voyage along the coast; in my second, that they desire, in case of not meeting the "Plover," whose boats are fitted for the expedition, that my launch should be in readiness to accompany the baidars to the eastward, towards Point Barrow.

In your orders their Lordships also lay much stress on the description of boat to be sent; any departure, therefore, from their views on this head requires to be most maturely considered. I shall be guided entirely by your matured opinion on this subject, from the experience you have had in the navigation of ice-bound coasts.

I consider that, before any boats finally proceed, it should be decided, and the party made thoroughly acquainted with the "Plover's" intended winter quarters.

In your orders their Lordships emphatically state, that, if no position is found for the "Plover" north of Kotzebue Sound, she must winter there. Your opinion, however, is, that a vessel cannot winter in Kotzebue Sound without the danger of being carried to sea, or thrown on the beach (as the "Fury" was) by the great drift of the floes in that sound. This being your opinion of that place for wintering, I would propose Grantley Harbour as a more fitting place for rendering assistance than any part outside the straits on the Asiatic shore.

From Grantley Harbour (if travelling across the land be practicable), the distance to Chamisso Island is but 116 miles; by the coast 220. From your former winter quarters you were enabled, with the assistance of the natives, to travel nearly to East Cape—a greater distance than from Grantley to Chamisso, overland; and should you, even now that you know of the friendly disposition of the natives in your last year's quarters, be enabled to travel across the straits on the ice, any break up of it would cut your parties off from the ship. My own opinion is, that a vessel from Oahu, fortified as you are, could reach Chamisso Island at an earlier period than a vessel wintering where you did last season.

I fully concur with you in the manner of examining the coast by the boats northerly.

I consider that in consequence of Sir George Simpson's letter, relative to the resources of the Hudson's Bay posts on the Mackenzie, that the boats should be ordered to return to the "Plover" by September 27.

Should it be impossible to get into Wainwright's Inlet, I see no objection, and think it most advisable, that the "Plover" should remain as far north as safety from her being blocked up for the winter in the ice will permit, returning to meet the "Herald" before she goes south, by the 25th of September, off Chamisso Island.

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I do not see the necessity of the two ships remaining together after we have solved the question as to winter quarters for the "Plover;" the "Herald's" time may after that be usefully employed in an examination of the ice line westerly, and also up the shoals marked in Captain Beechey's chart.

The method of examining the coast for a winter harbour, I should propose as follows:—That the "Owen" ("Herald's" decked boat), with a whaler, or perhaps a smaller boat, be sent direct to Wainwright's Inlet, having your ice-master and second master on board, with orders to return to the ship and communicate the result of their examination; the ships, as you propose, in the offing, having your decked boat, and another boat in shore, going along the coast leisurely.

As it would be attended with most serious results were this ship to be beset in the ice, I shall trust her safety from such a disaster to your greater experience in ice-strewn seas.

I have given you my feelings and opinion on this subject most freely, and shall expect and receive yours in a similar way.

I am, &c.

Commander T. E. L. Moore,  
H.M.S. "Plover."

(signed) *Henry Kellett, Captain.*

Her Majesty's Ship "Plover," at Sea,  
19 July 1849.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter of this day's date, relative to the proceedings of the boats on arriving off Cape Lisburne, I beg to inform you, that I am of opinion that they should on no account be out of sight of the ships at any time, the vessels being kept as close to the land in company with the boats as may be consistent with safety.

My objection to their proceeding direct to Wainwright's Inlet is, that a loss of time would be incurred should the boats in shore find a convenient harbour to the southward, by their missing the ships on their return, in thick or bad weather, as it would be impossible to appoint a rendezvous.

On finding a proper inlet to winter the "Plover," I should myself proceed with the decked boats, two baidars, and a whaler, along the coast towards the Mackenzie; but should I meet with any difficulties which might endanger the return to the "Plover" this year (and taking into consideration that provisions cannot be procured at the Hudson's Bay Company's posts on Peel River or Fort Good Hope), I shall deposit one decked boat's provisions on a convenient spot (sending her back to the ship), in the event that I should be so unfortunate as to be obliged to abandon my other boats and travel overland (by the coast) to the ship.

Should all our efforts to procure a harbour of refuge for the "Plover," after examining Wainwright's Inlet, prove unsuccessful, I propose that the two decked boats, two baidars and a whale boat be immediately despatched towards the Mackenzie, with orders to the officer in command that should the ice be heavily packed along the coast, in such quantities as to prevent the larger boats from proceeding, he will bury the decked boat's provisions, and prosecute the voyages, as far as he possibly can with safety, in the smaller and lighter boats, leaving the larger ones in such a position as may be most available, in case the baidars and whaler be unable to reach the Mackenzie, or such place as shall be appointed, so as to return in them to the "Plover," as I do not consider the native boats sufficiently safe in a sea-way.

In conclusion, I beg to inform you I am still of opinion that the ships should remain as long off the packed ice (if no harbour be found) as circumstances will allow.

I have, &c.

Captain Kellett, c. B.  
H.M.S. "Herald."

(signed) *T. E. L. Moore, Commander.*

In case of its falling calm, I think it would be advisable to send whalers, instead of the decked boats, in search of a winter harbour.

Sir,

Her Majesty's Ship "Herald," off Wainwright Inlet,  
26 July 1849.

Sir,

As I consider that the orders which Commander Moore has given you for the conduct of the interesting expedition of which he has given you the charge to embrace all contingencies, I shall simply send you a few extracts from the printed papers connected with the Arctic Expedition, as well as a few from the narrative of Dease and Simpson's voyage from the Mackenzie to Point Barrow.

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ceedings of Capt.  
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A few points in your orders will, I consider, require your immediate decision on your arrival with the boats off Point Barrow.

The first and most material point is, on arriving at Point Barrow, to decide whether you will push for the Mackenzie in the light boats and send back the launches (having filled up from them with provisions). I hardly think it possible to go half way to the Mackenzie and get back to join the "Plover," but consider it very practicable in light boats to go direct there. Simpson did it, you perceive, in 13 days, leaving Point Barrow on the 4th of August.

Should you decide on returning, you should be south of Icy Cape by the first week in September. So says Captain Beechey, whose authority is not to be doubted.

Should you leave the heavy boats at Refuge Inlet, as a rendezvous, with an intention of returning to them, you must bear in mind that I think it likely, in the middle of August, with the first westerly wind, they will be obliged to leave it, to escape being beset; and as to all appearances Wainwright's Inlet does not offer refuge (it being barred at its entrance); they would be obliged to run for Point Hope, where you should instruct them to rendezvous, and where, up to the 10th of September, they may expect to meet this ship, or find instructions for their guidance buried 10 feet magnetic north from a pole, or written directions on some conspicuous rock or cliff.

Should you get to the Mackenzie, and not return this year (which I think you should be most cautious in attempting), and that you endeavour to return next year, it will be necessary for you to be south of Point Barrow early in August 1850, to ensure meeting either this ship or the "Plover."

Trusting that you and your gailant little band may, through the blessing of Providence, enjoy good health, and that your exertions in behalf of our countrymen may be crowned with success,

I remain, &c.

(signed) H. Kellett, Captain.

By *Thomas E. L. Moore*, Esq., Commander of Her Britannic Majesty's  
Brig "Plover," &c. &c.

You are hereby required and directed to proceed with the decked boats of the "Herald" and "Plover," accompanied by two whalers, in the route which I shall point out to you in these instructions, taking under your orders Mr. W. H. Hooper (acting mate), Mr. Henry Martin (second master), and John Abernethy (acting second master, ice).

The boats will be victualled for 70 days, besides which each will take five cases of pemmican, to be disposed of as I shall hereafter direct.

After you have satisfied yourself that your boats are in every respect provided with the necessary stores, provisions, &c., you will make the best of your way towards the Mackenzie River, first visiting Refuge Inlet, to ensure a retreat for the decked boats, should you be unable to proceed in them, prosecuting your voyage in the smaller boats, and sending the decked ones back to Refuge Inlet, in charge of Mr. Hooper, with instructions to him to remain there as long as possible for your return, but to bury a part of his provisions, and proceed to sea on the appearance of ice in the Inlet, keeping as close to the rendezvous as he can.

You are to keep the land as close on board as you can consistently do with safety, so that you may be enabled to notice any marks which may have been left by the party of whom you are in search.

On your arrival at the head of the delta of the Mackenzie, you will visit Point Separation, in lat. 67° 38' N., long. 133° 53' W., and Whale Island, at the north

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of the Mackenzie, at which places you will find land-marks of wood or stone, painted either in white or red, or with black stripes; and also pieces of rock similarly marked, and bottles buried on the circumference of a circle drawn with a 10-feet radius from the point of a broad arrow painted on the signal posts.

On your obtaining any of these notes, you will be guided by their contents as to the propriety of bringing them to the ship for my inspection or not, taking care to re-bury them (should you find it necessary), in such manner that the natives may not be led to suspect that anything lies concealed near the spot.

When you visit Point Separation, you will bury a bottle, enclosing a note, therein stating the date of your arrival, and the tenor of your instructions, marking the place as distinctly as you possibly can.

After leaving every information in your power at Point Separation, you will make the best of your way back to the "Plover," but should you find in your journey towards the Mackenzie that you will be unable to gain it in sufficient time to reach the ship by the 15th of September, you will use your own discretion as to the best time to return, leaving marks on the most conspicuous parts of the coast, with buried information of the "Plover's" position, and the proceedings of the boats.

After your arrival at the Mackenzie, should you be by any unfortunate occurrence prevented from returning, you are to make for a post of the Hudson's Bay Company on Peel River, which falls into the Mackenzie at the head of the delta; but as no reliance can be placed on receiving any supplies of provisions there, you will pay the strictest possible attention to the issuing and safe-keeping of the boat's provisions, so that there be no loss or injury sustained.

Should you find it absolutely necessary to seek a post, it would be better, if possible, for you to proceed to Fort Good Hope, situated on the north or west bank of the Mackenzie, one day, or one day and a half, tracking above Point Separation.

The cases of pemmican with which the boats will be supplied are on no account to be opened, but for any parties of Sir John Franklin's Expedition, except your own provisions fail you, and you have no chance of a fresh supply.

You will occasionally land along the coast, taking care to search for any marks which may have been erected.

Should you meet natives, you are to glean every information in your power from them relative to Sir John Franklin (as you have the interpreter with you, I think you will have little difficulty in conversing with them); taking every precaution that you give them no offence, never making an unnecessary display of fire-arms, or landing when any number are assembled.

With reference to your movements in case you should be prevented returning as before mentioned, after arriving at the Mackenzie you are most distinctly to understand that though Peel River and Fort Good Hope are to be sought for by you in case of necessity, you are to use every possible endeavour to surmount any difficulties which may be thrown in your way, by encouraging those under your orders, and taking timely advantage of every favourable circumstance which may occur to return to the ship. Should, however, your efforts prove unavailing, you will make the best of your way to York Factory, reporting yourself and party to their Lordships with as little delay as possible.

Whenever you have an opportunity (without losing a moment's time) of collecting specimens of natural history, you are to do so.

You will keep a journal of your proceedings, wherein you will note every circumstance worthy of remark, which is to be delivered to me on your return, with a written detail of your journey.

You will be provided with a quantity of cutlery, tobacco, beads, &c., which you will distribute among such natives as you may meet with, doing everything in your power to obtain their friendship.

Should any of the notes you may obtain state that provisions can be procured at Peel River or Fort Good Hope, you are to winter there, if you think it at all possible that you may meet with difficulties on your return, which would cause you to winter on the coast.

With respect to the time of your return, and the manner of proceeding, it must be left of course entirely to your own judgment and discretion, bearing in mind that you have no prospect of obtaining supplies at either of the posts mentioned in these orders.

I would

I would recommend, that on your arriving off Point Barrow, you leave one, or even both your decked boats at that place, as I think you would accomplish the journey in a much shorter time in the smaller boats; giving orders to Mr. Hooper to return to Refuge Inlet, or any place most convenient, so as to meet you on your return.

On your passage up, you should make arrangements as to the spot where the provisions should be buried in case of necessity.

Having the acting ice-master with you, you will have the advantage of an experience of nearly twenty years amongst ice, which I trust will be sufficient to give you timely warning as to the approach of danger.

In conclusion, I have to point out to you Icy Cape, Point Hope, and Cape Lisburne, as places of rendezvous where you will meet me, or find buried information of my position; but you may be quite sure of finding me at Chamisso Island.

Having been fortunate enough to reach  $70^{\circ} 46' N.$ , and Wainwright's Inlet proving unavailing as winter quarters for the "Plover," I am unavoidably prevented leaving this ship. I therefore express a hope that every exertion will be exercised by you and your party, in carrying out these orders and the wishes of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty; and I shall see you leave in full confidence in your intentions to put forth all your energy for the relief of our missing countrymen; and may you, by God's help, be the fortunate means of rendering them assistance, being careful of yourself and party, as you must be aware of the anxiety which will be felt by myself and all on board on your account.

(Given under my hand, on board Her Majesty's ship "Plover,"  
off Wainwright's Inlet, the 25th July 1849.

Lieutenant Pullen,  
H. M. S. "Plover."

(signed) *T. E. L. Moore*, Commander.

Schooner "Owen," Monday Evening,  
30 July 1849.

Dear Sir,

We have got this far very well; may the rest of our expedition prove as successful. We met the main pack in  $71^{\circ} 15' 58'' N.$ , much farther south than I at all expected, from the mildness of the weather and the fine open sea. I have been unsuccessful in my search for a place for the boats; not even Refuge Inlet, very shallow, and a very narrow entrance.

If I do get to Fort Good Hope, Captain Moore directs me to proceed to York Factory, provided there are not supplies there, and report myself to their Lordships; so it will rest with them whether I return next season, much as I should like it. We have been detained here a day with a strong wind, and great quantities of ice, completely blocking the channel. Our whale-boats are now loaded, and swim very deep; so I think I shall most likely take the large boats on to Point Barrow—that is, if possible.

We have had most beautiful weather till to-day, and the thermometer was last night down to  $36^{\circ}$ . We have found the "Owen" rather leaky, but nothing to prevent our getting on. The pump is very good.

The latitude of the most southern part of the pack was  $72^{\circ} 15' 48'' N.$ , mer. alt., and where we anchored formed a large bay with the shore, the outer or south-east point of the pack being about two miles from the shore. The channel is in the deep of this bay, close in shore, and very narrow.

In the bay are two small icebergs; under the lee of one, and close up to it (moored to it), we are now lying with the "Nancy Dawson." I have seen several natives, and rubbed noses with some again; not a pleasant salutation, I assure you.

Mr. Shedden has promised to deliver these letters, and from him I have got a copy of reckoning, showing his track. And now, dear Sir, I must close.

Captain Moore has got a full account of all I have done. With kind remem-

No. 2.  
Narrative of Pro-  
ceedings of Capt.  
Kellelt, Commander  
Moore, and Lieut.  
Pullen.

brances to all my messmates and shipmates, and gratitude to you for your kindly feelings and acts of goodness,

Captain Kellelt, C.B.  
H. M. S. "Herald."

Believe me, &c.  
(signed) W. J. L. Pullen, Lieutenant.

Schooner "Owen," fast under the lee of an iceberg, pinnacle and the two whale-boats close alongside; also, schooner-yacht "Nancy Dawson," in company. Lat.  $71^{\circ} 15' 58''$  N., two miles off shore.

Sir,

Monday, 30 July 1849.

I BEG to inform you of my anchoring with the boats at 3.15 yesterday afternoon at the edge of the pack, and the entrance of a narrow channel leading northward, and close along shore. We have had a long passage up, but towing two boats with the wind light sometimes, and always foul, has been the cause. The second night after leaving the vessel we anchored in the southern part of Peard's Bay, our reckoning at noon being  $71^{\circ} 9'$  N. lat. mer. alt., and  $159^{\circ} 27'$  long. D. R. The morning, as you know, was a fog, very thick. I did not like to track the pinnacle, and second whaler being to windward and out of sight (although not far off), feared I might lose them, or should have been closer in shore (neither of them heard my musket signals). We lay at this anchorage only two hours, to get wood. Between it and Cape Smyth every place likely to afford shelter has been looked into without success, not even Refuge Inlet. I sounded it on Saturday night, and on the bar got only three feet, and that so narrow, that I consider it entirely out of the question as a place for the boats. I shall not take the larger boats farther on than we now are, and hope to leave to-morrow, as there is now a strong N.E. wind, also a current of two knots through the channel, setting S.W., with large floes of drift ice. Standing up for the ice yesterday, it appeared quite connected with the land; when I stood to the westward along the pack, hoping there was a passage there, I saw the "Nancy Dawson" running towards us. At six I boarded her, when Mr. Shedden informed me of his having been up to  $72^{\circ}$  N., was then stopped by the pack, and ran it down to this point. He anchored about an hour after us, one-eighth of a mile south of the western of the two icebergs we were lying between. This morning, heavy masses of field ice about us, and the channel completely blocked up, with a strong N.E. wind. The "Owen" and schooner had to haul close under the lee of an iceberg, in consequence; the pinnacle doing so last evening to get clear of the drift. Under these circumstances, I do not consider it prudent to start; I shall therefore hold on till the channel is clear, and wind moderate. We have had beautiful weather and a very clear sea, until Saturday night; in fact, up to that time we had seen more ice off Wainwright's Inlet and Sea-Horse Islands.

We have had a great many natives, with whom I rubbed noses; they have been very friendly, but to-day, when the boats were lying under the berg, preparing for the start, they suddenly decamped, and, on overhauling, missed one of the boat's crutches, Mr. Shedden three, and two gangway brasses for side-ropes. Our boats are certainly very deep, as I am most anxious to take as much provision as possible, that we may not distress Fort Good Hope in the event of our reaching it, or any other of the Hudson's Bay Company's establishments, as I do not think it likely I shall get back again this season. I have loaded them up with seventy days from this time, including Mr. Hooper (mate) and myself, intending to leave Mr. Martin (second master) with the larger boats, thinking him better adapted for the service, and not knowing how to use the "Fox's" dipping instrument. I did say, in the former part of this letter, I should not take the larger boats further on; but seeing the whalers so deep, I shall not part with them till I get to Point Barrow; then return to the edge of the pack.

The natives, as far as we can understand each other, say there is a clear sea all along the coast for boats, and that they have seen nothing like ships. The interpreter has not understood them well, although he has made himself generally useful. On overhauling the bread, I find we are nearly 300 lbs. short, without counting the two bags I left behind; and as Mr. Shedden has offered to let us have whatever we want, I have filled up, and have directed Mr. Martin to get a supply from him when he requires it. I also found wanting a pickaxe and a

shovel,



shovel, with which he has supplied me. In fact, his attention and willingness to assist in every possible way has been quite beyond my praise, nor have I any means of making an adequate return. I shall leave to you, Sir, to do what is right on this occasion. I have got the latitudes and longitudes, together with a few extracts from his log, which may be perhaps interesting.

And now, Sir, I must bring this to a conclusion, as I think I have given you all particulars. I need hardly say how anxious I am, as well as my men, to get on, but it would be madness to start with such a breeze as is now blowing, and the boats so deep. I am happy to say all are well, and the men have conducted themselves much to my satisfaction. For our success I cannot say: I hope we all know with whom that rests, and trust He will be pleased to grant it to us, particularly by finding those of whom we are in search, and remove all danger and difficulty from our path. With kind remembrances to Captain Kellett, all my messmates and shipmates in the "Herald," not forgetting those in the

lover,

I remain, &c.

(signed) *W. J. L. Pullen,*  
Lieutenant H. M. S. "Plover."

Commander Moore,  
&c. &c.

My dear Captain Kellett,

Night of 4 August 1849.

I WROTE to you from the edge of the pack, and then thought that we should have been much further in advance than we now are, but ice is terrible stuff to deal with; however, I do not despair, and confidently hope to reach the Mackenzie, but still so late that I do not expect to get back again. I bought a baidar off Point Barrow, so that I am not in any way afraid of want, should we have to winter at Fort Hope. I am now just on the start again from our present position, lat.  $71^{\circ} 12' N.$ , long.  $154^{\circ} 56' W.$ , with a clear open sea and a fair wind. I stayed at Point Barrow all the 2d, got the dip  $82^{\circ} 4'$  observations for time, latitude and declination, but not worked. The second master, who I send back with the boats, has got them, and can give you any particulars.

The small compass you so kindly lent me I send back, as I did not recollect at the time I had one myself.

Mr. Shedden has followed us up quite to Point Barrow. I hope he is now all clear; his kindness has been unbounded, assisting us in every way. It is now fine. For the last day we have had strong breezes from S. and S.S.W., with heavy rain.

I much fear we cannot take the interpreter; he is very ill, and seems to be frightened, so I think his room would be better than his company; he has been of but little use; in fact, does not understand the natives here. We have got on with them famously, and have been among them as old standing friends. I will now wind this up, as time is now drawing near for our start.

May God bless you, Sir, for your kindness; and I hope we shall meet again. With kind remembrances to all on board,

Believe me, &c.

Captain Kellett, c.b.  
&c. &c.

(signed) *W. J. L. Pullen.*

*P.S.*—Captain Moore, in his orders, says, if I am obliged to seek Fort Hope, I am to make the best of my way to York Factory, and report myself to the Admiralty; in that case I shall hardly get back next season, but go home with the Hudson's Bay ships.

Schooner "Owen," north of a low sandy islet, extending nearly east and west, in one fathom sandy bottom. Lat.  $71^{\circ} 12' N.$ , long.  $154^{\circ} 56' W.$

Sir,

4 August 1849.

I BEG leave to forward, by return of the decked boats, a copy of my proceedings up to this time. We anchored here yesterday afternoon, just as a heavy breeze



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ceedings of Capt.  
Kellett, Commander  
Moore, and Lieut.  
Pullen.

from the S.S.W. was coming on, accompanied with rain ; and immediately commenced stowing the whale-boats and a baidar, which I bought from the natives at Point Barrow. We left the place from which my last was dated on the evening of the 31st of July, making good progress, and from the open sea in the channel, leading north between the packed ice and the main, hoped to reach Point Barrow that night. The wind was N.E., and a strong southerly tide against us, when at 11, to our disappointment, we were most effectually stopped, four miles from the point; the ice, from the land to the main pack, formed in one solid body, some of it aground in four fathoms water. All we could do now was to wait patiently for a change of wind. The next day, 1st of August, wind still the same, and occasionally a thick fog, we managed to get on about a mile by tracking, and secured to the shore ice in lat.  $71^{\circ} 20' 30''$  N. With the ice-master I pulled along with one of the whale-boats the whole edge of the grounded ice up to the main pack, without discovering any passage, or chance of one, when I determined that, if to-morrow did not see the edge of the ice clear, to haul the two boats over the narrow part of the land of Point Barrow, and push through by Elson's Bay, as the sea was there clear. In the evening I landed, and visited the natives, who mustered very strong, but who were very friendly and glad to see us. I went to their tents, in fact all over their camps, when they all assembled. I should say no less than 80 men, women and children--and for an hour danced for our amusement; I gave them a few beads, tobacco, snuff, &c., and returned to the vessel, accompanied by a few. One of them having been wounded in the hand, requested me to dress it; I did so, as well as possible, and sent him away with a cleaner hand than I think he ever had before. I had not been half an hour on board when I heard a heavy gun to the southward; I thought it might be the "Plover;" pulled away in the direction; fog so thick not able to see, but soon saw the schooner "Nancy Dawson," who seems determined to go as far as possible.

In the night, about 11 o'clock, the wind veered to S.E. and S., and by 4 o'clock the ground ice was on the move, driving to the northward, with a current of at least two knots.

At 5 we were off, and at 7 came-to in two fathoms water, 100 fathoms off shore of Point Barrow. Here I landed to erect a mark and get sights, and look for the post Elson left; I could not find it, therefore went on with our observations. The dip,  $82^{\circ} 4'$ ; the latitude, longitude and variation I have not worked, leaving it for a future time, when I have more to spare. I send you, by Mr. Martin, the observations.

At Point Barrow, we were on shore all day, and were well received by the natives, who constantly surrounded us, but no trouble; quiet and orderly, which we particularly wanted while getting our observations.

I can assure you it gives me great pleasure being able to speak of them in this way. I bought a baidar for the purpose of taking all our own provisions, the whale-boats floating very deep with even only 50 days', and if we do not come back, as I most confidently hope to reach the Mackenzie, from the open and clear sea now around us.

We anchored in this spot yesterday afternoon, just as a stiff breeze was coming on from S.S.W., but we went on with our loading, and start to-day, sending Mr. Martin and the two large boats back. I have given him only three weeks' provisions, taking all his remainder myself, to guard against no supply at Fort Hope, if we are obliged to seek it.

Mr. Shedden has followed us up most perseveringly, for now I have every reason to think he is at Point Barrow, as he was under weigh yesterday morning, driving with the ice which surrounded him to the north. He will let Mr. Martin have provisions, if required, and bury a quantity at Refuge Inlet. The mark I left at Point Barrow was 20 feet in length, with a cross in it, and painted was "Plover's' boats arrived on the 2d August. Intelligence, 10 feet N.E." In a hole, a preserved meat tin, with a letter stating where going, how many men, what provisions, and that the large boats return again, staying as long as possible off the pack; also the places of rendezvous of "Herald" and "Plover."

With every hope of our success,

I remain, &c.

Captain Moore,  
H. M. B. "Plover."

(signed) W. J. L. Pullen,  
Lieutenant H. M. B. "Plover."

August

August 4, Midnight.—The two whale-boats left us, towing a baidar laden with provisions, to enable them to carry 100 days' provisions for 14 men (in all), amidst three hearty good cheers on both sides, the wind at the time being about W. by S.; force, four; with about one knot, easterly current: it had been blowing fresh at times during the day, from the same quarter, with rain. The day was employed in stowing the provisions in the boats, and otherwise preparing them, as, the season being so far advanced, it was thought to be impossible for them to return this year, in which case they would make their way to York Factory, and most probably proceed to England, every one of us left behind envying them their good luck, being ready and willing to contend with the hardships they must more or less experience in the open boats. 2.30. of the 5th, Mr. Hooper returned in one of the whalers, having missed, or unable to find, the percussion caps; but one of the men recollected him stowing them in the magazine half-case. I, however, gave him some of mine, in case of his not finding them; in a quarter of an hour he was again under weigh, and soon out of sight, the wind having freshened a little.

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ceedings of Capt.  
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Moore, and Lieut.  
Pullen.

All the day (5th) could not get under weigh, the wind blowing, about six or seven, from W. by S. to S. W. by W., with a lee current, the ice in the offing drifting fast to leeward, but none came foul of us, being under the lee, and protected by a long low narrow bank, which I think must be about four or five miles off the main; also very low; the water between being very shallow, lat.  $71^{\circ} 12' N.$ , long.  $154^{\circ} 56' W.$

Monday, 6th.—Finer looking from westward. 4 to 5, current East. Weighed about 11. Stood over to the ice, and back, but barely fetched where we came from. Tried short tacks, but gaining nothing, came-to again at 3. Men employed cleaning their arms. It came on small rain about 5, but cleared off about 8, the wind still continuing the same.

Tuesday, 7th.—Got under weigh; wind from westward about 3. It soon after fell calm, and then catspaws, round the compass. Noon, after preparing for tracking, getting on shore, laying anchors out, &c., got a light breeze about E.N.E., of which we took advantage, and stood on about W.; the weather fine and clear, sun out. The wind came round to S.E. about 4; still fine and clear; force about three to four. These last three days observed a great many flocks of wild ducks migrating W.S.W., flying low mostly.

Wednesday, 8th.—4 a.m. Came-to off Point Barrow in three fathoms; filled up with water, and got wood; found the natives very friendly, carrying our bar-ricoes for us. The men on shore by turns. About noon, blowing fresh from S.E., purchased a baidar from the natives, who seemed rather unwilling to part with it, having very few. I saw but two others, although several in frame. I, however, got the boat for two knives and about a pound and a half of tobacco; they did not fancy the looking-glass so well as the knives. About 5 p.m. Mr. Dunn, chief officer of the "Nancy Dawson" yacht, came on board, having walked round from the point to the southward, where he was for the purpose of recovering a bower anchor and some chain, which the yacht had lost, by the cable parting, from the pressure of the ice, on the 5th or 6th, she having made sail afterwards and forced her way through the ice to the southward of Refuge Inlet, where she was laying awaiting the launch's return. We got under weigh about 6, intending to run down to the yacht's launch and go to the schooner; but falling calm, we were obliged to come-to again, as we were fast drifting to the northward, and had to get the oars out, the yacht's skin boat towing to get near the shore again. After coming-to spliced the mainbrace, and let all but five or six men go on shore, the yacht's men being in company with them, taking their muskets for shooting. The natives, seeing the yacht's boats join us, and so many of them going on shore together, with their arms, fancied we intended attacking them; and after sending their women and children out of the way, met our men with their bows and arrows, ready to act on the defensive: they appeared most anxious for us to go on board, and get under weigh; but it being calm at the time, we could not; so that all the men took their arms down to the boat, left them, and returned unarmed. The natives then took their bows away, and they commenced dancing and singing. I remained about an hour, and then went on board.

## No. 2.

Narrative of Proceedings of Capt. Kellen, Commander Moore, and Lieut. Pullen.

The next day (9th) the yacht's boat left to return on board, when I landed with most of our men unarmed, to show them we were friendly and did not mistrust them; they appeared now quite friendly, dancing and singing, and filled our water barriques again.

It again fell calm, so that we could not follow the yacht's boat, which was pulling; but about 5 p. m., having a light breeze from the W.N.W., got under weigh; it came on thick, and the breeze freshened, steered S. by W. about 26' mag. At a little after 10 p. m. came-to in seven fathoms, close to the schooner "Nancy Dawson," their boat having returned about 20 minutes before. Went on board.

Friday, 10th.—Went on shore with Mr. Shedden, in his gig, to obtain the latitude of an inlet, off which we were anchored. The inlet was, however, barred across, although his jolly-boat had been in the day before; landed on the beach, but as it was blowing fresh, and a heavy surf beating, we very nearly swamped the boat in so doing. Mr. Dunn in the afternoon went on shore to ascertain if there was another inlet further north; found another larger one, about 5' further along the coast, and there being huts on its northern and eastern side, we concluded it to be Refuge Inlet.

Saturday, 11th.—Went on shore to erect a post and bury provisions from the yacht, with Mr. Shedden, as, owing to the natives being at Refuge Inlet, and there being none here, we could accomplish it the more easily. Mr. Dunn erected a post at Refuge Inlet, with marks to find a bottle buried there, containing information that the provisions were buried at this inlet. The forenoon was calm; a breeze sprung up in the afternoon from the eastward; a shower of hail about 1 p. m.; lit a large fire over the buried provisions, to destroy signs of digging, which was very hard frozen.

Sunday, 12th.—Wind easterly. 4 to 5 a. m. fine; p. m. showers of rain, cloudy; wet afternoon. About 6 p. m., then tolerably fine, not rainy, I was called on by Mr. Shedden to assist him, as his men had refused to work when called to hoist the launch in; being myself present at the time, hearing and seeing the mutinous disposition of three in particular, and seeing no just cause for such behaviour from them, after hearing the Agreement and Scales of Victualling, &c. read, I placed the three men in irons, our men assisting to get the launch in, as but very few of the schooner's men would work on account of the others being placed in irons. Kept the corporal and the only two marines on board the schooner, in case of any outbreak to release the others; our men in the boats being close-to and within hail, ready to come on board with their arms to assist. Also had arms ready in the schooner's cabin, Mr. Shedden not feeling safe; he having been told that in case of the vessel having to winter, by being blocked up in the ice, some of them would do for him, with other threatening language.

Monday, 13th.—On the yacht's men being called on in the morning to weigh, they nearly all refused to work, without the other men were liberated, which I did not deem prudent, being able to work the schooner and the boats with our own men, and the few of the schooner's who were at work. Got under weigh, and took the boats in tow (they also sailing), wind at W.N.W. Steered S.W.; force from three to four; wind heading, at times breaking-off to S.W. by S. Observed the Sea-Horse Islands, bearing about S.W. by W.; having had a strong south-easterly current, tacked, as requisite to get to windward of ditto.

Tuesday, 14th.—Calms and light winds having shifted to the S.E. Sea-Horse Islands a-head, and observing a bank to the northward on which the sea was breaking, kept along the N. and N.N.W., to clear ditto; hauling up at noon, to S.W. At 1, S.S.W.; and 2. 30, S.; 3. 30, made the land, standing-in for ditto, to observe if a post had been erected on or near Wainwright's Inlet, with information where to find the ships. Wind E.S.E., about 4 to 5. Wind in the evening increasing to a moderate gale from southward, the sea rising. Reefed the topsails; fore and mainsails two reefs.

Wednesday, 15th.—a. m., moderate gale from southward; the boats broke adrift three or four times, and the skin boat lost by breaking adrift; about 3, very heavy sea; 9, looked dirtier a-head; close reefed fore and main topsails, and fore stay-sail;

sail; p. m., calm. Got a breeze in the evening from N.N.E. Steered E.S.E., towing boats, expecting to make Icy Cape.

Narrative of Peter  
Cedings of Capt.  
Killett, Command  
Moore, and Lieut  
Pullen.

Thursday, 16th.—3. 30 a. m., made the land; hauled up E. by N. for ditto. 5, Cape Collier E.N.E. Made a W. by S.  $\frac{1}{4}$  S. course, 38' from ditto to noon, having to keep-up several times, from observing the land a-head of us, about 10.30 it bearing nearly W.N.W., by which bearing, if the chart had been correct, we ought to have been on shore; as it was, we were running on five or six knots, the wind from the northward. Fresh; at 8 the boats again broke adrift, and as there was a good heavy following sea, deemed it best for them to proceed by themselves, the schooner making and shortening sail to keep company. Noon, from a rough altitude, the land being in the way, and from our soundings, four or five fathoms, found we were on the Blossoms Shoals. At 2 kept her S. W. by S., as we had experienced such a very strong current to eastward, and southerly withal, the breeze falling lighter in the afternoon, and the sea down. On making Cape Collie, found that we had not seen it before, the huts being lower, a surf some considerable distance off, and long low beach. We could not discover the entrance to Wainwright's Inlet, although there was every appearance of it. The place with huts, seen on the evening of the 14th, must have been Point Belcher, giving these also a strong easterly set, which we had experienced the night before when near the Sea-Horse Islands; but nearly on all occasions before, I have found the currents influenced entirely by the winds setting whichever way it has been blowing hard to, and near Point Barrow, on both sides, have drank the water alongside, although rather brackish.

Friday, 17th.—Steering S. W. by S. all day. Boats in company, wind light, north-westerly and northerly. Cloudy all day.

Saturday, 18th.—Made the land of Cape Lisburne about 4 a.m., bearing about S.S.E. Steered for ditto, which we did not get abreast of till the evening, although running four or five knots, making the current easterly before sighting, and northerly afterwards. Ran close enough in shore to observe, had a post been erected any where by Cape Lisburne, but saw none. Hove-to at midnight, being too dark to discern the end of Point Hope, to which we knew we must be near.

Sunday, 19th.—Bore up and came-to under the lee of Point Hope at 4 a.m., in 11 fathoms. Landed to get wood. Got pinnacle's mainmast down, and repaired the sail. Met about a dozen natives, very dirty looking, and very great adepts at pickpocketing. They appeared very poor, nothing to barter; all their skins bad. They did not belong to Point Hope, but near to the lagoon on S.E. end of point. Wind about 6, all day N.N.W.

Monday, 20th.—Wind N.N.W. and N.W., 6 to 8, heavy squalls, and a good deal of snow.

Tuesday, 21st.—Weather more moderate, wind N.W., heavy squalls all day, sleet, snow and rain. Wind coming more to westward.

Wednesday, 22d.—Very fine and warm, quite calm, a strong current setting to the eastward. Got boats alongside to clear and repair, both being leaky in their upper works. Bought another skin boat for a string of beads and some tobacco; they preferred the beads to a knife. Could not get any water. Came on to blow fresh from southward, with rain, heavy showers. First watch wind shifted to E.N.E. Very heavy sea.

Thursday, 23d.—Wind from eastward, raining in forenoon, vessel rolling heavily. Noon finer, less wind; wind from N.E. 2 to 3, sea fast decreasing.

Friday, 24th.—Wind N.E., 3. Observed Her Majesty's ship "Herald" coming from the northward. Shoved off from yacht with Mr. Shedden, to go on board her.

No. 2.

Narrative of Pro-  
ceedings of Capt.  
Kellett, Commander  
Moore, and Lieut.  
Pullen.

Her Majesty's Ship "Plover," at Sea,  
4 August 1849.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to call your attention to the necessity of deciding on and placing the "Plover" in a safe position for the approaching winter, without further delay, in consequence of the impossibility I feel exists of my being able to keep within proper distance of any of the points of rendezvous (for the boats) without risking the safety of this ship, from the unfortunate circumstance that nothing can be done with her on a wind; in proof of which I beg to acquaint you that, on the night of the 2d instant, while standing to the westward, with the wind strong at S.W., it was with the utmost difficulty that I weathered the packed ice; and such was my position, that had the wind veered a couple of points more to the westward, nothing could have prevented her being driven on the pack; and with the sea then running on it, I feel convinced the consequences would have been most serious.

On a wind, with all plain sail set and a strong breeze, she has been going 1.8 per hour. With a ship possessed of such sailing qualities, I am thoroughly satisfied that if caught on a lee shore, any chance of saving her would be small indeed.

Being now acquainted with such positive proof of the difficulties under which I labour, you will, I am sure, perfectly understand my anxiety to place Her Majesty's ship under my command in her winter quarters as soon as possible.

I have, &amp;c.

Captain H. Kellett, c.b.  
H. M. S. "Herald."

(signed) T. E. L. Moore, Commander.

Her Majesty's Brig "Plover," Choris Peninsula,  
Kotzebue Sound, 26 September 1849.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you that it is my intention, on the breaking up of the ice in Kotzebue Sound in 1850, to proceed to the northward, and that should you arrive before I return to the southward, you will find information of my position, &c., buried ten feet magnetic north of the post on Chamisso Island, and in the house on Choris Peninsula.

I have, &amp;c.

Captain H. Kellett, c.b.  
H. M. S. "Herald."

(signed) T. E. L. Moore, Commander.

It is my intention to communicate with Point Barrow next year, and return to this place about the end of July.

(signed) T. E. L. Moore, Commander.

Her Majesty's Discovery Ship "Plover," Choris Peninsula,  
Kotzebue Sound, 25 September 1849.

Sir,

HAVING had no opportunity of communicating with Great Britain since my last Report to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated August 1848, at Woahu (Sandwich Islands), I have the honour to acquaint you, for their Lordships' information, with the "General Proceedings" of Her Majesty's ship under my command up to this period.

After filling up water and laying in a stock of fresh provisions, vegetables, &c., I sailed from Woahu (25th of August 1848) with the north-east trade wind, which I carried pretty steadily till the 3d of September, at which time I had reached the parallel of 36° N. and 171° W. From this date I continued to hold a course to the S.W. (though much impeded by northerly winds), in order that in the event of meeting westerly winds, as I had been led to expect, I might have the passage through the Aleutian Islands under my lee. On the 27th of September I had the satisfaction of knowing, by the ship's reckoning, that I had passed the latitude

latitude of Attu, the westernmost island of this group, though from the prevailing cloudy and foggy weather no indication of my approach to land could be observed, beyond a slight discoloured appearance of the sea, which had been first noticed on the 20th, on which day I commenced to sound, but found no bottom, till the 5th of October, in lat.  $61^{\circ} 19' N.$ , long.  $174^{\circ} 8' E.$

As I had now obtained soundings, and having observed for a day or two past a bright yellow blink extending from N. to S. E. by E., I kept the deep sea lead constantly going, which gave on the 8th (October) 170 fathoms, gradually decreasing from that day, till the Island of St. Lawrence was seen on the 13th.

From the 23d of September I experienced a succession of variable and light winds, with frequent squalls of moderate force, chiefly from N.W. and N.E., and occasional calms, the weather being almost constantly thick and cloudy, with frequent falls of rain; and subsequently to the 3d of October, when the temperature had fallen permanently below  $40^{\circ}$  Fahr., sleet and snow prevailed.

On the 13th the island of St. Lawrence was made out, already covered with snow, causing its appearance to be with difficulty reconciled with the delineations on the Admiralty charts; those of Behring's Straits, together with the "Sailing Directions" forwarded by Admiral Lutzke, through Captain Kellett, unfortunately not having reached me. In the evening, whilst yet in the passage, the wind again veered to N.E., and continued to blow from that quarter, increasing in force during the night, and, notwithstanding the utmost vigilance of the officers of the watches, found on the 16th I was 30 miles to the southward of my position on the previous day, being several miles to leeward of the South Cape (Asiatic shore), instead of weathering Cape Chaplain as I expected. Finding the vessel thus totally unqualified to contend against an adverse wind, and a strong current setting to the S.W. (which had been felt in some considerable degree these several days past), I felt the necessity of seeking shelter under the land whilst still in my power, rather than remain at sea under such unfavourable circumstances. I accordingly came-to at 7. 20 a.m., in a bay on the south-west coast of Siberia, open to the south and west, at a distance of four miles from the land, in readiness to take immediate advantage of any favourable circumstance that might occur. Mr. Henry Martin (second master) was despatched to examine an indentation which I observed, having the appearance of a river, who on his return reported the existence of an extensive harbour, with safe anchorage, protected from the sea by a long low spit. In the meantime a number of natives came off to the ship, from whom I understood that I could conveniently procure a supply of water near the anchorage reported by Mr. Martin. I stood in on the following day, and anchored at 9. 45 p.m., in 20 fathoms water, the wind being still fresh at N.E.

On the 20th, finding the direction and force of the wind to continue, the temperature of the air to fall as low as  $23\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$  Fahr., and the sea-water to  $28\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ , I deemed it prudent to take the opinions of the officers as to whether an endeavour to proceed to the northward should be made (these opinions I have the honour to enclose), which I beg to state were strictly in accordance with my own sentiments; viz., that it would be better to remain in this secure harbour for the winter, than make a useless attempt to proceed northward, with a probability of being unable to regain my advantageous position (from which I could send out overland expeditions), and, on account of the advanced season, to lose the chance of wintering even in Petropaulski. I therefore determined, should no favourable change take place before the 26th, to select a convenient spot in which to place the ship for the winter.

On the 23d a still further reduction of temperature took place; the upper part of the harbour was reported freezing over, and large masses of ice forming during the night about the ship; in consequence of which, after a personal examination of an inner harbour, possessing many advantages, I removed thither on the 24th, anchoring at 3 p.m., in seven fathoms.

The harbour to which I had now removed communicated with the larger one by an opening a mile wide, forming a basin four miles long, and one and a half in breadth, surrounded on every side by lofty mountains, except to the southward, where it was separated from the sea by a tract of low land, and an extensive lagoon, and having deep water at the entrance and middle, with good anchorage on each side close to the shore. On the low land at the south was a native settlement of seven huts, to which belonged a large herd of reindeer, from which I hoped from time to time to obtain supplies of fresh meat. Considering it, however,



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safer for the ship, on account of the force and prevalence of the N.E. winds, as well as the probability of the ice drifting, and on the whole better to be at a little distance from a people whose friendly disposition was not yet established. I removed to the north side of the harbour on the 25th, and there secured the ship for the winter, on the 28th (October).

From the 29th, the people were employed in dismantling the ship, leaving nothing but the lower rigging over the mast-heads; building a house of stones, for the convenience of working the forge, drying clothes, &c., and housing the ship in, all which was completed by the 8th of November.

During this time, ice was continually forming around, and frequently broken up by squalls and strong N.E. winds, so that the ship was not finally frozen in until the 18th, when the natives were first enabled to visit us alongside the ship, in their sledges, drawn by dogs.

It will now be necessary for me to inform their Lordships of the friendly intercourse I had succeeded in establishing with the different tribes of natives near my winter quarters. They first appeared to hesitate about coming on board, but on making a few presents, and allowing some traffic to be carried on with them, they gained confidence, at least so far as to enter the ship readily when invited to do so; being careful on all occasions to guard against treachery on their part, on account of the warlike and relentless character attached to the people of these coasts by some authors.

During the months of November and December, the ship was daily visited, not only by those in the vicinity, but also by others from a distance along the coast and inland; by my intercourse with whom I was enabled to satisfy myself that they were not only peaceful, but disposed to be actively friendly toward myself and the officers and men under my command. The first difficulty was to gain some knowledge of the language, to which all the officers applied themselves with surprising success; so much so, that in the early part of the year I was enabled to send them in different directions, with the confident expectation that they would be able to make successful inquiries as to whether any vessels answering to the description of Her Majesty's ships "Erebus" and "Terror" had visited any part of the coast, or been seen during the past year by any of the natives.

On these expeditions, every officer in the ship (except Mr. Francis Lee, acting second master, ice) took his turn, displaying throughout a persevering energy in enduring fatigue and hardship, as well as firmness and discretion in their intercourse with the natives, which I cannot sufficiently commend; which conduct, I sincerely trust, will meet their Lordships' approbation, and tend to their future advancement.

Of these hardships I can confidently speak from my own experience, in travelling on several occasions on a sledge, in heavy snow drifts, with the thermometer at 30° below zero. The following account of a party, which left the ship in February, will be read with interest, I think.

Having understood from the natives that there was to be seen the remains of a vessel near East Cape, (but the time of the ship's wreck I could not make out), to gain more certain information of which, I sent Mr. Wm. H. Hooper, acting mate, Mr. Henry Martin, second master, and Mr. Wm. H. Moore, master's assistant, with two native guides, who were familiar with that part of the coast, and upon whom I could confidently depend, giving them directions to proceed as far as they found the natives friendly, and, if practicable, to cross the straits, and visit Kotzebue Sound, but on no account rashly to trust themselves among tribes with whom their guides were not familiar, or were in every way doubtful of. On the second day of their journey, when about 50 miles from the ship, they were overtaken by a violent snow storm, by which their progress was much impeded, and from the thickness of the weather, all idea of the direction in which they had travelled became lost, and at nightfall the guides confessed they knew not where they were, and that they must wait for clear weather, which might be expected with the moonlight. On the second day, the guides were in some degree reassured, and again proceeded; but at night found themselves as ignorant of their position as ever; and the third day was passed in the same manner. On the fourth day, Mr. Martin, from the fact of their having been for the greater part of the time on the sea ice, having once only been on the land, which they imperceptibly lost, judged that their wandering had been made in a circle of moderate extent, proposed, from his knowledge of the coast in a previous journey, to attempt reaching the place they had last left, by the aid of his pocket compass, to which

Mr.

Mr. Hooper readily agreed; and in the evening, when the weather cleared a little, they had the happiness to find that a merciful Providence had brought them out of their difficulties, when to every appearance they were cut off from all hope. The slight view of the land they obtained recovered their exhausted frames, and stimulated them to fresh exertions, by which they gained Ung-wy-Luck (Cape Chaplain on the charts) before darkness set in.

It would be impossible for me to describe their sufferings from cold, fatigue, and want of fire, with the snow and drift finding its way beneath the folds of their garments, and there gradually thawing, penetrating their under-clothes. Under these trying circumstances, to add to their misfortunes, Mr. Moore, on the second night of their exposure, was seized with a violent bowel complaint, which continued until the day they reached the village, at which he arrived literally more dead than alive. He had complained also of cold feet, which were now found not frozen, but completely chilled as high as the knees, which in the course of the night, by the kind attentions of the natives, were restored to their natural temperature; but many weeks elapsed before sensation and the power of voluntary motion were re-established in the right foot and ankle. I received a letter from Mr. Hooper, by the hands of a trusty native, giving a detail of their progress, and expressing a strong desire to be permitted to proceed, leaving Mr. Moore to return to the ship as soon as his strength would permit, which I granted, sending a further supply of provisions, and providing for Mr. Moore's immediate return to the ship. Messrs. Hooper and Martin continued their journey as far as to get a view of East Cape, beyond which they could not go, as the tribes to which their guides belonged were at feud with those further to the northward. I had the pleasure of receiving them on board in good health, after an absence of six weeks, and by their account found that so far as they went the natives were friendly and obliging, from whom they gained the information that some considerable time ago a vessel with one mast had been seen on the coast, which was understood to have been wrecked on the American side, where her stern frame is still to be seen on the beach.

Whilst these journeys were being performed, the observations on board and the duties of the ship were conducted by Lieutenant Wm. A. R. Lee and the other officers, under my own direct superintendence; and at intervals Mr. Martin, assisted by Mr. Hooper, made a survey of the place in which I had secured the ship for the winter, which, connected with Mr. Martin's and my own observations on the coast to the westward, will, I hope, give a tolerably correct representation of these shores, and when associated with magnetic observations on every attainable point, will, I trust, meet their Lordships' approbation.

Among the internal arrangements of the ship, those for the instruction and recreation of the crew, according to the example set by Captain Sir William Parry, were not omitted; and I gladly availed myself of the proffered services of Mr. J. Simpson, assistant surgeon, and Mr. John J. Lindsay, clerk in charge, in conducting a school for reading and writing, and getting up plays and masquerades for their amusement and pastime in the long dreary nights of winter.

Soon after my arrival in Emma's Harbour (the name which I have given to the place in which I wintered), I was fortunate enough to procure a supply of reindeer flesh from the natives, and saw large herds of these animals near the village, where I hoped to procure further supplies. And in this I was not ultimately disappointed, though the unwillingness of these people to barter large quantities at a time, and the distance to which they were obliged to drive the flocks in search of pasturage whilst the land appeared entirely covered with snow, considerably reduced the quantities that might have been under other circumstances obtained. Toward the month of March, I therefore readily acceded to the wish of a chief, who had come from a great distance with the carcasses of 12 reindeer, in return for a ship's musket, which I did not doubt their Lordships would approve of, considering the advantage arising to the ship's company by a change of diet.

In the beginning of April, finding that the sea edge of the ice began to break away, I set about fitting the ship for sea, which was completed in the fine weather of that month; and on the 22d of May, when the floes had been broken as far as the fetch of the ice would reach, I deemed it necessary to commence cutting the ship out of the remaining portion, which appeared fixed by two opposite points of land a mile and a quarter astern of the ship. The ice was found from



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five to six feet thick, and cutting out seemed a formidable operation for so small a crew; but the officers and men set to work with such alacrity, and carried on with such perseverance, that, notwithstanding interruptions occasioned by snow-storms, the work of cutting a canal of 2,000 yards in length was completed in 22 days, and on the 13th June I had the pleasure of seeing the "Plover" released from her icy cradle and at anchor in the clear water of the harbour.

The ship being thus free and thoroughly refitted, as far as my means would permit, and filled up with water of excellent quality, my departure was delayed by baffling winds and calms; but on the 15th gained the outer anchorage, by towing and taking advantage of the ebb tides. Here again I was mortified to find the prevailing winds westerly and S.W., driving a heavy and close pack of ice on the coast and outlet of the anchorage, which was rendered the more annoying by receiving frequent reports from the natives of two ships being off Cape Chaplain, on board of which they had not been allowed. Although I considered it too early in the season to expect Her Majesty's ship "Herald," I felt the necessity of assuring myself as to what nation they might belong, and for this purpose, as soon as I discovered there was room for a boat to make her way between the coast and the pack, I sent Mr. Henry Martin, second master, in the gig, to gain information regarding them; by whose account I ascertained that one ship, which he boarded, at anchor about 20 miles to the northward of us, was the "Tiger," American whaler (Brewster, master), from China. Mr. Martin also reported that the vessel had been detained by streams of ice in the straits northwards, but so far as he could observe, the sea was clear between the island of St. Lawrence and the main; that the other vessel seen was the "Tiger's" consort, also a whaler, and that a heavy pack was set close in shore to the distance of 10 or 12 miles east of my present anchorage, between which and the beach he frequently found insufficient room for the boat's oars to pull in clear water.

After several attempts to get the ship to sea, and having personally examined the extent of the pack from the top of a neighbouring promontory, I was at length successful (with a breeze at N.E., which drove the ice to the distance of a mile off shore) in rounding the S.E. cape, and anchored alongside the "Tiger" on the south side of Cape Chaplain, on the 1st of July. To guard against delay in meeting the "Herald," I took the precaution to purchase from the master of the "Tiger" some bread and a small quantity of salt meat, which were of superior quality, and almost European prices.

The wind continued at N.E., varying from a light to a reefed topsail breeze, but by working in shore on the west side, and anchoring occasionally, I was enabled to get as far as the bay of St. Lawrence, but found the vessel totally incapable of weathering East Cape whilst the wind continued adverse. At this place I was detained several days, but had the good fortune to obtain a supply of reindeer's flesh; and on the 11th of June I sailed, favoured by a W.S.W. breeze, which carried me to Chamisso Island, Kotzebue Sound, where I anchored on the 13th. Here I first got intelligence of the "Herald" having visited the straits (September 1848), and immediately set about preparing the boats to start the first favourable opportunity.

On the following morning I despatched two boats (pinnace and gig), Lieutenant W. A. R. Lee in the one, and Mr. W. H. Hooper, acting mate, in the other, victualled for 70 days, with instructions to Lieutenant Lee to make the best of his way to the Mackenzie River; but they had not got out of signal distance, when Her Majesty's ship "Herald" hove in sight, and they were recalled.

On the 15th Lieutenant Pullen joined, and Lieutenant Lee was discharged for passage to join the "Asia." After receiving as much provisions as I could conveniently stow, it was determined by Captain Kellett and myself to proceed to Wainwright's Inlet, from whence the boats should be again despatched, examining the coast as the ships passed up for the purpose of finding some secure winter quarter for the "Plover," which was accordingly done, and on the 17th left Kotzebue Sound, and on the afternoon of the same day was joined by Robert Shedden, Esq., in his schooner-yacht the "Nancy Dawson," not finding any spot in which to place this ship, to the southward, we arrived off Wainwright's Inlet on the 25th, and after examining it, and being satisfied she could not be got in, the decked boats of the ships, with two whalers, were sent away under the command of Lieutenant Pullen, accompanied by Mr. W. H. Hooper, acting mate, and Mr. Henry Martin, second master. (A copy of my instructions to Lieutenant Pullen I have the honour to enclose.) The two ships, with the "Nancy Dawson," weighed,

weighed, and proceeded in company with the boats, and it was my intention to have gone as far as Point Barrow, had not the wind hauled round N.E., when we lost sight of the boats (26th). We then stood on to the northward and westward till the following day, when we fell in with the pack, and on the 27th observed an appearance of land extending from N.W. by N. to N., and the drift ice to be covered in many parts with mud and shells. Having now reached the lat.  $72^{\circ} 51' N.$ , and long.  $164^{\circ} 28' 30'' W.$ , with the pack stretching from N.W. to N.N.E., without an opening to the northward, and feeling satisfied we could not penetrate further north to join the boats without hampering both vessels, we determined to return to Wainwright's Inlet, re-examine it, and try, if possible, to place the "Plover" there for the winter, off which place we arrived on the 21st of July. On the morning of the 1st of August I again visited the inlet, and much to my disappointment found I should have to lighten the "Plover" too much; and it was fortunate the attempt was not made, for in the evening both ships were obliged to weigh and stand off the land, the wind coming up strong from the S.W., and continued to blow from that quarter for several days, during which time I experienced the utmost anxiety, from the fact that the ship would do nothing; the current setting to the N.E., and the wind hard from the S.W. for some considerable time, I saw no hope for her but the beach. I beg to call their Lordships' particular attention to my position, as noted on the track chart for the time referred to. On the 11th I arrived off Cape Lisburne, where it was appointed the two ships should meet, but not finding her here, proceeded on my way to Chamisso Island, as I did not feel myself justified in keeping this vessel on the coast during the prevalence of the heavy S.W. winds. On the following day, August 12th, the wind increased to a gale from the westward, and it was only by carrying a press of canvas that I was enabled to weather Point Hope, and then with the loss of my port bower anchor, and a length of chain, which I was obliged to slip; the stopper and gear, although new, being carried away by a heavy sea, which struck her on the bow.

On the afternoon of the 16th I arrived off Chamisso Island, and I immediately commenced to search for a nook in which to put the ship, but regret to say I found none which I considered safe for the winter, but determined to place her under the south side of Choris Peninsula, as being the only spot, in my opinion, where she could lay, which was accordingly done.

I now took advantage of the opportunity to send a party to Escholtz Bay, and succeeded in getting some fossil teeth, horns, &c., but not as many or so large as I should have liked to have presented their Lordships. If no opportunity offers to enable me to send them, it is my intention to keep them on board till my arrival in England. I also took up the flour and beads buried by Captain Beechey; the flour is in an excellent state of preservation, so much so as to be eatable. I beg to forward a small keg for their Lordships' inspection. The thermometer buried in Puffin Island we were unfortunately unable to find, having no directions as to the spot where it lies. I also formed a party and went up the Buckland River, to the distance of about 70 miles, where we were unfortunately stopped by a strong rapid of about a quarter of a mile long. From the short time I was able to spare on my visit, I could do no more than establish a most friendly feeling amongst the natives; so much so, that some of them have brought their families down to Kotzebue Sound, to be near us during the winter.

On the 28th of August, the schooner-yacht "Nancy Dawson," with her owner, Robert Shedden, Esq., arrived with Mr. Martin, second master, and one of the decked boats. Here I beg to say, that I cannot sufficiently thank Mr. Shedden for his kindness and attention on all occasions to the boats of the expedition. Mr. Martin reports having left Lieutenant Pullen and Mr. Hooper, with the two whalers, about 50 miles to the eastward of Point Barrow, and that they had every prospect, and hoped to be at the Mackenzie in a few days: I am, therefore, daily and anxiously awaiting their return. Mr. Martin also reports that the water is exceedingly shallow off and about Elson Bay, and that although the summer has been a most favourable one, in every respect, for a vessel coming through, yet the depth of water necessary is wanting; this, together with the N.E. current, and the prevalence of S.W. winds, renders the N.W. passage, in my opinion, decidedly unattainable.

Although every opportunity has been taken advantage of to gain information from the natives as to Sir John Franklin and his party, I regret to say that our labours

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labours have been as yet unsuccessful; but I trust, long ere this reaches England, both he and his expedition will have arrived.

I beg to inform their Lordships, that as soon as the ice breaks up to admit of my proceeding to the northward, I shall do so, making my way back in sufficient time to be at Chamisso when the "Herald" arrives.

I beg, also, to inform their Lordships that I am provided in every respect with provisions, slops, &c., for my whole complement, up to the end of July 1850.

I have now, in conclusion, to express to their Lordships how much I feel satisfied with the conduct and unwearied exertions of the officers and men under my command; and I most earnestly beg to call the attention of their Lordships more particularly to the three following officers:—Mr. Henry Martin, second master; Mr. Wm. H. Hooper, acting mate; and Mr. John J. Lindsay, clerk in charge; and trust their Lordships will grant them the promotion they so much deserve.

I have, &c.

(signed) T. E. L. Moore, Commander.

The Secretary of the Admiralty,  
London.

Her Majesty's Brig "Plover," Choris Peninsula,  
Kotzebue Sound, 27 September 1849.

Sir,

THE time having arrived for the departure of Her Majesty's ship "Herald" for the southward, I beg leave to take advantage of this opportunity to call to the notice of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the services of the several officers under mentioned; viz. Messrs. Martin, Hooper and Lindsay, and, at the same time, to convey my opinion of the value I attach to their services during the last season.

The advantage derived from the exertions of Messrs. Hooper and Martin, in performing the various overland expeditions, during the inclemency of such a season, I feel sure their Lordships will appreciate; as well the equally praiseworthy exertions of the third officer named above (Mr. John J. Lindsay, clerk in charge), in acquiring a knowledge of the language, as far as was practicable, which greatly facilitated the communication of our different expeditions with the natives of the country, and by which means much useful information was obtained.

For the reasons I have above stated, I feel confident in placing these officers' conduct before you for their Lordships' information, that they may receive the advancement to which I am sure their Lordships will admit they are entitled.

I have, &c.

Captain H. Kellett, c. n.  
H. M. S. "Herald."

(signed) T. E. L. Moore,  
Commander.

Her Majesty's Brig "Plover," Lower Anchorage,  
Port Providence, 20 October 1848.

Sir,

IN obedience to your directions to report to you our opinions relative to the propriety of proceeding towards Behring's Straits at this advanced period of the season, we, whose names are hereunto subscribed, are of opinion, that the temperature having fallen to 20°, and pancake ice formed in the upper basin (which we consider the best place for wintering in), if the ship leaves this harbour for the purpose of crossing the straits to obtain a winter anchorage on the American shore, this harbour, during the time of her search for another, would most probably freeze up; and, in the event of not succeeding on that shore, a return to the Sandwich Islands would be the only alternative.

From the information given us by several of the natives, it will be necessary to secure the ship, soon after the 26th instant, in the upper harbour of this place; sooner, should the ice be found to be forming rapidly there.

Under these circumstances, and the wind still prevailing (as it has done since the ship's passage through the Aleutian Islands), from N.N.E. to E.N.E.; as also an invariable current setting to the south-westward, together with the impossibility of the vessel's working to windward against such a variety of oppositions, we would deem it highly imprudent to leave this well-sheltered harbour (where

we think the chances of exit will occur sooner than on the American shore) with the chance of not being able to regain it, in the event of not reaching one on the other coast.

In conclusion, we beg leave to recommend that the 26th instant be the latest date to which the securing the ship should be deferred; that the formation of the ice in the upper harbour be daily watched, and any decisive change acted on immediately, the ship in the meantime being kept in readiness for sea.

(signed)

*W. A. R. Lee*, Lieutenant.  
*H. Martin*, Second Master.  
*Francis Lee*, Acting Second Master, Ice.  
*John Abernethy*, Gunner's Mate; served in the  
 Greenland Fisheries seven years.

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 ceedings of Capt.  
 Kellett, Commander  
 Moore, and Lieut.  
 Pullen.

Sir,

Her Majesty's Ship "Herald," Mazatlan,  
 22 November 1849.

In addition to the accompanying circumstantial account of my proceedings since leaving Oahu on the 19th of May last, I beg to forward, for the information of their Lordships, an abstracted account from that letter of my movements.

Left Oahu on the 19th May. Arrive at Petropaulski on the 24th June. Sail on the 25th. Get on shore without sustaining much damage on the same day. On the 14th July passed Behring's Straits. Anchor off Chamisso Island on the 15th, meeting "Plover" there. Sail from Chamisso on the 18th, joined by "Nancy Dawson" yacht. Anchor off Cape Lisburne on the 20th. Examine the coast, north and south, for a winter station. Anchored and examined Wainwright's Inlet on the 25th. Despatch the boat expedition with Lieutenant Pullen at midnight. Weighed and ran along the edge of the pack northward, until finally stopped by it in  $72^{\circ} 51' N.$ , long.  $163^{\circ} 48' W.$ , on the 28th. Return to Wainwright's Inlet on the 31st. 1st August, sail, to try to touch the pack to the westward. Return to the eastward on account of strong winds and thick weather. Discover a shoal of seven fathoms, and probably less, in lat.  $70^{\circ} 20' N.$ , long.  $171^{\circ} 10' W.$ , on the 12th. Try again to fall in with the ice to the westward. 17th August, discover and land on an island in lat.  $71^{\circ} 20' N.$ , long.  $175^{\circ} 16' W.$ ; at the same time was discovered a small group with a very high and extensive land to the north of it, deeply seated within the ice. Return to the rendezvous off Cape Lisburne. Meet the two large boats sent under Mr. Pullen. Hoisted one in, and sent the other to Kotzebue Sound, in company with yacht. "Herald" again proceeds north. Experienced a heavy gale. Unable to remain on the coast. Return to Kotzebue Sound. Equip the "Plover." Trace the Buckland River. Friendly disposition of the natives. Leave the Sound on the 29th September. Pass Behring's Straits on the 2d October, in a gale. Pass the Aleutian Chain, by the Straits of Amoukhta, on the 11th. Anchored at Mazatlan on the 14th November.

I have, &c.

The Secretary of the Admiralty,  
 London.

(signed) *Henry Kellett*,  
 Captain.

Sir,

Her Majesty's Ship "Herald," Mazatlan,  
 22 November 1849.

In carrying into execution their Lordships' orders the ensuing fine season to the northward, I beg you will be pleased to inform me on the following subjects:—

1. Whether their Lordships deem it necessary for me to despatch another boat expedition to the Mackenzie River?

It will be seen by Commander Moore's letter to me, before leaving Kotzebue Sound, that he more than likely will have visited the coast as far north as Point Barrow before my arrival.

2. What quantity of provisions their Lordships wish to have deposited, and of what species?

I purposed to leave flour, six or seven casks, all the pemmican, and a large proportion of the preserved meats remaining on board "Plover" on my meeting her.

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It will be necessary, I consider, for the vessels to remain within the straits until the first week in September, in case Mr. Pullen should make an attempt to return to his ship. After that time, no voyage westerly can be made by boats.

I have, &c.

The Secretary of the Admiralty,  
London.

(signed) *Henry Kellett*,  
Captain.

Her Majesty's Ship "Herald," Mazatlan,  
22 November 1849.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that it is my intention to leave this port about the end of this month for Guaymas, where I shall refit, and make a survey of the port. I shall, as soon as refitted, continue the survey of the different ports and anchorages in the Gulf of California, returning here again for orders in March.

I shall then sail for Oahu (Sandwich Islands), to provision for my northern voyage.

I can receive answers to these letters here early in March, if replied to by the return mail.

I have, &c.

The Secretary of the Admiralty,  
London.

(signed) *Henry Kellett*,  
Captain.

## — No. 3. —

CORRESPONDENCE between the *Hudson's Bay Company* and the *Admiralty*, with the INSTRUCTIONS to Commander *Pullen* for continuing the Search from *Cape Bathurst* towards *Banks's Land*.

(A. to L.)

## No. 3 (A.)

COPY of a LETTER from *A. Barclay*, Esq., Secretary of the *Hudson's Bay Company*, to *John Parker*, Esq., Secretary of the *Admiralty*.

Sir,

Hudson's Bay House, 20 December 1849.

## No. 3.

Correspondence between the *Hudson's Bay Company* and the *Admiralty*.

WITH reference to my letter of the 24th of November, in reply to the communication received from you, dated the 21st of the same month, I am directed to state to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that the Governor and Committee of the *Hudson's Bay Company*, after the fullest consideration they can give to the subject, do not find that they can recommend any other plan for continuing the search for Sir John Franklin and his companions than that suggested by Sir John Richardson; namely, to send a ship expedition into the Arctic Sea, by way of Behring's Straits, for the purpose of exploring the western coasts of Banks's Land and Parry's Islands; and to interest the Esquimaux westward of the Mackenzie in the search, by offering them liberal rewards for any assistance they may render to the missing expedition, or any intelligence, substantiated by proofs, that they may communicate respecting it.

With the view of carrying into effect the last-mentioned part of the plan, the Governor and Committee will give instructions to Sir George Simpson, the territorial Governor-in-chief, to take measures for opening a communication, at the earliest possible period, with the Esquimaux, who frequent the Arctic shore between the Mackenzie and Point Barrow, provided their Lordships will sanction the necessary expenditure.

They will also communicate with the Russian authorities at Sitka, with whom they have relations, and who, they feel assured, will readily co-operate with them in this good work, through their officers and servants, at their post on the Colville.

Presuming

Presuming that their Lordships would leave no unavailing means untried to afford assistance to Sir John Franklin and the adventurous seamen who with him risked their lives at their country's call, while there remained the slightest hope that they were in existence, or to ascertain their fate, should the worst have befallen, the Governor and Committee, some time ago, wrote to Sir George Simpson for his opinion as to what might be done by the Hudson's Bay Company in the prosecution of the search begun last year by Sir John Richardson and Dr. Rae; and they yesterday received an answer from him, which is in perfect accordance with the opinion they had themselves formed on the subject. Sir George Simpson writes as follows: "If another expedition be employed, it should be to search the coast to the westward of the Mackenzie, and that service had better be left entirely to the Company, under the management of Dr. Rae, who would do the work at a very moderate outlay. If you approve of this suggestion, and authorize me, in course, to set such an expedition on foot, I think there is still time to have the coast from the Mackenzie to Point Barrow examined next summer; but the loss of a single mail might delay it for another year."

From the foregoing extract, it will be perceived that Friday, the 28th of December (which is the next mail day for Canada), is the latest day at which instructions for continuing the search next year can be transmitted to Sir George Simpson. It is, therefore, desirable that the Committee should be apprised of their Lordships' intentions with as little delay as possible.

I have, &c.

(signed) *A. Barclay.*

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No. 3 (B.)

COPY of a LETTER from the Secretary of the Admiralty to *A. Barclay, Esq.*

Sir,

Admiralty, 22 December 1849.

WITH reference to your letter of the 20th instant, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Governor and Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company, that, in ignorance of the point to which Dr. Rae may have attained, last summer, in his search for the expedition under Sir John Franklin, and of the means he may have yet left at his command, it is difficult to say to what special points it would be wise to direct either Dr. Rae's well-known energy, or the generous disposition of the Hudson's Bay Company.

It would, no doubt, be most desirable that Dr. Rae should again proceed to the northward of the Victoria Island; and, though varying his route, yet always endeavouring to approach Banks's Land and Melville Island; but my Lords consider that the safest and surest thing that can be done is to request the Hudson's Bay Company to authorize him to do the utmost that he can accomplish with safety to himself, and with the means in his power, to further the great object in view; and to let him be guided by his own experience and judgment.

If, indeed, all further efforts afloat are beyond his reach, then the expedition proposed by the Governor to the westward of the Mackenzie River, and the establishment of a communication with the Russians and Esquimaux, would be well worth any expense attending it.

Their Lordships also consider that it would be expedient for Sir G. Simpson to have the depôts of provisions which were left on the northern shore visited, and, if necessary, replenished; not only in case that the lost crews might yet find them, but also, as it is possible that detached parties, either from the Bliering's Straits ships, or from those that may proceed next year from Lancaster Sound, or even the boats from the "Plover," may have to take refuge there.

Their Lordships, therefore, request that the Governor of the Hudson's Bay Company will give the requisite orders, and the Government will pay the necessary expense incurred.

I have, &c.

(signed) *J. H. Hay,*  
Pro Secretary.



No. 3.  
Correspondence  
between the Hud-  
son's Bay Company  
and the Admiralty.

No. 3 (C.)

COPY of a LETTER from *A. Barclay*, Esq., to His Excellency *M. Tebenkoff*,  
Governor of the Russian-American Colonies, Sitka.

Sir, Hudson's Bay House, London, 28 December 1849.

I AM directed by the Governor and Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company to acquaint you, that among the various means adopted with the view of discovering the missing expedition to the polar regions under the command of Captain Sir John Franklin, now four years unheard of, the Hudson's Bay Company have directed search to be made along the shores of the Arctic Sea; and rewards to be offered to the Esquimaux, in order to induce them to render assistance to, or procure intelligence of, the said expedition, in the event of its having approached those shores.

In this work of humanity, the Governor and Committee trust they will receive the co-operation of your Excellency, and that you will be pleased to give to the persons employed by the Russian-American Company near the Arctic shores such instructions as you may consider proper, in order that they may communicate with the Esquimaux, and induce them to aid in the search.

I have, &c.

(signed) *A. Barclay*,  
Secretary.

No. 3 (D.)

COPY of a LETTER from *A. Barclay*, Esq., to *John Parker*, Esq.

Sir, Hudson's Bay House, 5 January 1850.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of a communication from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, under the date of the 22d ultimo, and to acquaint you, in reply thereto, for the information of their Lordships, that the Governor and Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company have given directions that every thing possible be done to carry into effect their Lordships' views with regard to the continuation of the search for the missing Expedition under the command of Sir John Franklin.

I enclose herewith an extract relating to this subject, from a despatch forwarded to Sir George Simpson on the 28th ultimo.

I have, &c.

(signed) *A. Barclay*.

EXTRACT of a DESPATCH from the Governor, Deputy Governor, and Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company, to Sir *George Simpson*, dated 28 December 1849.

I AM now to call your attention to the enclosed copy of correspondence with the Admiralty, on the subject of the further prosecution of the search for Sir John Franklin and his companions. You will see that the Lords Commissioners are very desirous that the search should be continued in the direction of Banks's Land and Melville Island, from Victoria Land and Wollaston Land, if it can be done. How far it may be practicable it is impossible to say, in ignorance of what Dr. Rae may have done during the past season. It must therefore be left to him to determine whether he can follow out still further the search in the above-mentioned quarter. Should he be of opinion that he can do so, it is the wish of the Governor and Committee that he should be employed in that service next summer. In short, every thing possible is to be done to carry into effect the views of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

Their Lordships, you will observe, have determined to send an expedition round Cape Horn, to proceed to the Polar Sea through Bhering's Straits (the ships for which are now fitting out), and it is not improbable that another expedition may be sent, *via* Lancaster Sound and Barrow's Strait. This you will, of course, make known to Dr. Rae.

No. 3 (E.)

## No. 3 (E.)

No. 3.  
Correspondence  
between the Hud-  
son's Bay Company  
and the Admiralty.

COPY of a LETTER from Captain *Hamilton*, Secretary of the Admiralty, to the Governor and Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company.

Gentlemen,

Admiralty, 7 January 1850.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to express their thanks for your communication of the 5th instant, relative to the continuation of the search for the missing expedition under the command of Sir John Franklin, and to state the great satisfaction my Lords have derived from the cordial and prompt co-operation of your Company, and their present anxious endeavours for the relief of Sir John Franklin.

I am, &c.

(signed) *W. A. B. Hamilton.*

## No. 3 (F.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain *Hamilton* to the Governor and Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company.

Gentlemen,

Admiralty, 25 January 1850.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, that my Lords gladly avail themselves of the valuable proposal of the Governor of the Hudson's Bay Company to send a despatch to the Mackenzie; that they have accordingly written to Lieutenant (now Commander) Pullen, a copy of which is enclosed; that in addition to this, copies are also enclosed of Sir John Richardson's letter of the 22d instant, and of the extracts from Dr. Scoresby and Lieutenant Osborne's memoranda; and that my Lords rely on the wonted energy and benevolence of the Governor and Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company to carry out their Lordships' views, and in giving such instructions to Mr. Rae, to aid and co-operate with Commander Pullen, as they may think fit; and my Lords would further beg of the Governor and Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company, that they would employ the means at their disposal in providing the necessary supplies for a further search to the northward, should such search be deemed practicable by Commander Pullen, and for the support of his party on their return.

The Hudson's Bay Company will receive herewith two copies of the printed papers which have been supplied to Captain Collinson, of Her Majesty's ship "Enterprize," including copies of their Lordships' orders to that officer—one set to be forwarded to Sir G. Simpson, and the other to Mr. Rae. Double sets of the "Times" newspaper, of yesterday and this day's date, containing reports of the proceedings of Captain Kellett, of the "Herald," and Commander Moore, of the "Plover," are also sent herewith, for the above purpose.

My Lords direct me to add a list of the officers and men composing a boat expedition, which has proceeded from the "Plover," in Behring's Straits, towards the Mackenzie, under command of Commander Pullen.

I have, &c.

(signed) *W. A. B. Hamilton.*

## Enclosure 1, to No. 3 (F.)

Sir,

Admiralty, 25 January 1850.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, that Captain Sir James Ross has returned to England with the "Enterprize" and "Investigator," without having discovered any traces of Sir John Franklin and the missing ships.

2. An expedition has been despatched to Behring's Straits, under the command of Captain Collinson, a copy of whose orders is herewith enclosed.

3. With reference to despatches received from Captain Kellett, of the "Herald," dated to 22d November last, showing the probability of your being at some of the posts on the Mackenzie River, or on the Slave or Great Bear Lake,



No. 3.  
Correspondence  
between the Hud-  
son's Bay Company  
and the Admiralty.

and the Governor and Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company having offered their services to forward any instructions to you, and viewing the possible opportunity which your position may afford of a search being made from Cape Bathurst towards Banks's Land, my Lords are pleased to convey to you their sanction for your prosecuting such search, if, after a mature consideration of all the circumstances of the case, you may consider it likely to be attended with beneficial results.

4. Your acting upon this permission will, of course, depend upon contingencies which at present cannot be calculated upon; but one of the first of these will be the time and place where such permission may reach you. You may be so far on your way south as to render it too late to retrace your steps with any prospect of your reaching the northern shore this season in time to undertake a search from that quarter; and there are other contingencies referred to in the letter of Sir John Richardson of the 22d instant, a copy of which is enclosed.

5. My Lords have called upon Sir J. Richardson to favour them with his views as to the possible means available to you for such undertaking, and the letter above referred to contains his remarks, for your information on this point.

6. The Hudson's Bay Company have been requested to instruct Mr. Rae to afford you his best advice and assistance, if you should fall in with him; and the Company further undertake to deposit provisions at the several points specified in Sir J. Richardson's letter, in order that you may be sure of a supply on your return from the northward.

7. With regard to the manner and direction of any search you may make, my Lords would leave it to your judgment and discretion, desiring you to feel assured that should any reasonable objections to such search present themselves, their Lordships would feel no disappointment, so far as your conduct is concerned, at your determining to return with your party to England; and copies of every paper that, in the opinion of their Lordships, might be of use to you are herewith enclosed, together with a chart, on a large scale, of the country near the mouth of the Mackenzie River; and, in conclusion, I am commanded to convey to you the expression of their Lordships' satisfaction at the report of your conduct up to the date of your departure for the Mackenzie River; and, as a further mark of their approval, my Lords have been pleased this day to promote you to the rank of Commander, and your commission is herewith enclosed.

You will convey to Acting Lieutenant Hooper the same expression of their Lordships' satisfaction at the report of his conduct, acquainting him that should he continue to merit your approbation, his acting commission as Lieutenant will be confirmed, on his passing his examination on his return to England.

I am, &c.

Commander Pullen.  
&c. &c.

(signed) W. A. B. Hamilton.

Enclosure 2, to No. 3 (F.)

Sir,

London, 22 January 1850.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of this day's date, enclosing a plan of further search for Sir John Franklin, to be prosecuted by Lieutenant Pullen, submitted by you to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and upon which I am directed to give my opinion; together with extracts from a letter of Dr. Scoresby's, and of a paper by Lieutenant Osborne, having reference to your proposal.

2. As in the absence of positive intelligence of the wintering place of the boats, and the present resources of Lieutenant Pullen, there must be much provisional matter in the instructions sent to that officer, my opinions may be usefully prefaced by mentioning, in the first place, what I conceive will be the most probable position of Lieutenant Pullen and Mr. Rae, with their parties, when the despatches reach them.

It may be granted that Lieutenant Pullen entered the Mackenzie. The most difficult part of the voyage was past sufficiently early in the season, when he parted from the "Herald's" boats, and the "Nancy Dawson," in Elson Bay; and the Mackenzie remains navigable till about the 20th of October. Lieutenant Pullen would find 80 lbs. of pemmican at Point Separation, and 700 at Fort Good Hope, being about 50 days' provision for 16 men. When he reached Fort Simpson, on

the

Position of the  
boats when the  
despatches reach  
them.

the Mackenzie, in latitude 62°, he would there meet Mr. Rae, and concert with him the necessary measures for the support of the party during the winter.

Fort Simpson is likely to be well provided with food this season, as Mr. Rae was instructed to transport thither the large stock of dried meat left at Fort Confidence; and there was a considerable stock in the Company's stores when I left the fort in June last. Some of this would necessarily be expended in the autumn, in fitting the Company's boats taking supplies to the outposts, and the Indians will require some aid, owing to the periodical murrain among the hares, which form their principal food. The early arrival, however, of Lieutenant Pullen at Fort Simpson will induce Mr. Rae to send both Europeans and Indians to fishing stations, and reserve the dried meat and pemmican for use next summer; and I may observe that this precaution will be requisite, whether Mr. Pullen's voyage to York Factory be contemplated, or his sea expedition.

The Europeans would be sent to winter either at the west end of Great Bear Lake, or at the west end of Great Slave Lake; most probably the latter, as being the most certain and abundant fishing station.

3. The despatch for the Mackenzie, which left England on the 28th of December, may perhaps reach Fort Chipewyan by the time the rivers begin to open in May, and will perhaps experience some delay on Great Slave Lake by the state of the ice there in June. This lake is very seldom navigable till the latter end of that month, and by that time Lieutenant Pullen and Mr. Rae would be at the west end of the lake, waiting for the breaking up of the ice to push on towards Methy portage. On receiving the despatch, Mr. Rae would return to the Mackenzie, and perhaps Lieutenant Pullen also, unless he has received positive instructions to return to England.

The despatch to be now sent out will, most probably, get no further than the Saskatchewan by the time the rivers open, and supposing Lieutenant Pullen to have come on, will meet him on the Athabasca river, north of Methy portage,—time enough, if he turns back at once, for him to reach the sea as soon as it is navigable. His having advanced thus far will be rather advantageous than otherwise, as he may obtain a supply of pemmican at Fort Chipewyan.

The periods above named are calculated on the supposition of no delay on the part of the express men. The difficulty of rounding Lake Superior, when that sheet of water is only partially frozen or open in winter, disturbs all calculations.

4. Lieutenant Pullen will require to be fully victualled for at least 120 days from the 20th of July, when he may be expected to commence his sea voyage; which for 16 men will require 45 bags of pemmican of 90 lbs. each. This is exclusive of a further supply which he ought to take for the relief of any of Franklin's people he may have the good fortune to find. After he leaves the main land at Cape Bathurst, he would have no chance of killing deer till he makes Banks's Land, or some intervening island; and he must provide for the chance of being caught on the floe ice, and having to make his way across by the very tedious portages, as fully described by Sir W. E. Parry in the narrative of his most adventurous boat voyage north of Spitzbergen.

5. Mr. Rae can give Lieutenant Pullen the fullest information respecting the depôts of pemmican made on the coast, but the Hudson's Bay Company have no means of visiting any of these depôts, as suggested by Sir Francis Beaufort, as the only depôts within their reach are those on the Mackenzie, which would be exhausted by Lieutenant Pullen in his ascent of the river.

6. With respect to Lieutenant Pullen's return from sea, his safest plan will be to make for the Mackenzie; but should circumstances place that out of his power, the only other course that seems to me to be practicable is for him to ascend a large river which falls into the bottom of Liverpool Bay, to the westward of Cape Bathurst. This river, which is named the Beghoola Dessy by the Indians, runs parallel to the Mackenzie, and in the latitude of the Cape Good Hope (66° 30' N.), is not above five or six days' journey from that post. Hare Indians, belonging to Fort Good Hope, might be engaged to hunt on the banks of the river till the arrival of the party. The navigation of the river is unknown; but even should Lieutenant Pullen be compelled to quit his boats, his Indian hunters (of which he should at least engage two for his sea voyage) will support and guide his party. Wood and animals are most certainly found on the banks of rivers.

7. It is not likely that under any circumstances Lieutenant Pullen should desire to reach the Mackenzie by way of the Coppermine River, and this could be

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between the Hud-  
son's Bay Company  
and the Admiral

When the des-  
patches will arrive  
Despatch of 28 Decem-  
ber 1849

Despatch of 25 Janu-  
ary 1850.

Depôts.

Lieutenant Pullen  
return from sea.

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son's Bay Company  
and the Admiralty.

Discretionary  
Power.

effected only by a boat being placed at Dease River, for the transport of the party over Great Bear Lake. This would require to be arranged previously with Mr. Rae; and Lieutenant Pullen should not be later in arriving at Fort Confidence than the end of September.

8. The fullest discretionary power should be conceded to Lieutenant Pullen, as suggested in your proposal, for several reasons; and chiefly, because from accidental delays of the express, he may receive his instructions later than is contemplated. Some accident also may have injured his boats in the winter, and they may require repair. The Company's boats are unfit for a sea voyage, unless they are furnished with additional false keels and wash streaks. If these delay the arrival of the party at the sea beyond the 1st of August, there will be scarcely time for Lieutenant Pullen to complete his voyage satisfactorily. For I presume that merely touching at Banks's Land, and returning without exploring a portion of the coast line of that island or islands, is scarcely worth the hazard of the voyage.

I have, &c.

(signed) *John Richardson,*  
Medical Inspector.

Captain W. A. B. Hamilton,  
Secretary to the Admiralty, &c. &c.

Enclosure 3, to No. 3 (F.)

EXTRACT from a LETTER from Dr. Scoresby to Rear-Admiral Sir *Francis Beaufort*, dated 2 January 1850.

LOOKING into the map, it does not appear to me that the examination of the region or channel proximate to Wollaston Land and Victoria Land (as designed, I believe, for Dr. Rae) will comprise all that seems desirable; but that a party (a small one would do), issuing from the Mackenzie towards and beyond Cape Bathurst, in the direction of Banks's Land, would perform a most important service in a great and well-laid plan.

For this line of search, as to me it appears, seems to afford as good a prospect of crossing the track of the missing Expedition as almost any other in contemplation. It would not be a costly undertaking, as it might be done by a very few hands, and I fancy in time for next season, if set about immediately. Do you think anything could be done, that is, under the orders of the Admiralty, herein? A small party so ordered would, with the other recognized measures, fill up the ground and plan in a manner which would do as much credit to the national liberality and comprehensiveness of plan, as to our humanity.

Enclosure 4, to No. 3 (F.)

EXTRACT from a PAPER by Lieutenant *Osborne, R.N.*, dated 4 January 1850, with a view to traversing the distance with a Searching Party between Cape Bathurst and Banks's Land.

GENERAL opinion places the lost Expedition to the west of Cape Walker and south of the latitude of Melville Island. The distance from Cape Bathurst to Banks's Land is only 301 miles, and on reference to a chart it will be seen, that nowhere else does the American continent approach so near to the supposed position of Franklin's Expedition.

Banks's Land bears from Cape Bathurst N. 41° 49' E. 302 miles, and there is reason to believe that in the summer season a portion of this distance may be traversed in boats. Dr. Richardson confirms previous reports of the ice being light on the coast east of the Mackenzie River to Cape Bathurst, and informs us that the Esquimaux had seen "no ice to seaward for two moons." Every mile traversed northward by a party from Cape Bathurst would be over that unknown space in which traces of Franklin may be expected. It is advisable that such a second party be despatched from Cape Bathurst, in order that the prosecution of Dr. Rae's examination of the supposed channel between Wollaston and Victoria Lands

Lands may in no way be interfered with, by his attention being called to the westward.

I would also remind your Lordships that the proposed expedition would carry into execution a very important clause in the instructions given to Sir James Ross, viz., that of sending exploring parties from Banks's Land in a south-westerly direction towards Cape Bathurst or Cape Parry.

No. 3.  
Correspondence  
between the Hud-  
son's Bay Company  
and the Admiralty.

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No. 3 (G.)

COPY of a LETTER from *A. Barclay*, Esq., to Captain *Hamilton*.

Sir,

Hudson's Bay House, 31 January 1850.

I AM directed by the Governor and Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 24th and 25th instant, accompanied by the various documents therein referred to, and to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that those documents were forwarded by the mail of the 25th instant to Sir George Simpson, with instructions authorizing him to put in requisition all the resources of the Company that can be rendered available towards the accomplishment of the objects which their Lordships have recommended to the attention of the Governor and Committee.

I have, &c.

(signed) *A. Barclay*, Secretary.

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No. 3 (H.)

EXTRACT of a LETTER from Sir *George Simpson* to the Governor, Deputy Governor and Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company, dated Lachine, 19 January 1850.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your letter of the 28th December, with the correspondence therein referred to, with the Secretary of the Admiralty on the subject of the Expedition under Sir John Franklin; and as every hour at this advanced season is of the utmost importance, I shall forthwith forward an express for Mackenzie River, with instructions to Dr. Rae, in the event of his not having obtained any information during the past season which may render further explorations unnecessary, to fit out two expeditions as early as possible, one to examine the neighbourhood of Wollaston and Banks's Land, to the northward of the Victoria Islands, but varying the route of the Expeditions of last summer; and the other to prosecute a search in a westerly direction from the Mackenzie; Mr. Rae to command one party, and any officer in the Mackenzie River district, whom he may consider qualified for the duty, to take charge of the other. I shall forward to Dr. Rae a copy of your correspondence with the Admiralty, with directions to do everything in his power to carry out the views of their Lordships, both as regards continuing the search, and replenishing the depôts of provisions left on the northern coast. And as Lady Franklin's suggestions, in a letter I have received from her by this mail, may be useful in directing Dr. Rae's inquiries, I shall at the same time forward to him copy of that communication. But with every exertion, I very much fear these instructions will barely reach Mackenzie River in time to allow much to be done this year, during the season of open water.

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No. 3 (I.)

COPY of a LETTER from *A. Barclay*, Esq., to Captain *Hamilton*.

Sir,

Hudson's Bay House, 9 February 1850.

IN compliance with the request contained in your letter of yesterday's date, I beg to hand you, by direction of the Governor and Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company, a copy of the instructions given by them to Sir George Simpson, Governor-in-chief of Rupert's Land, relative to the Expeditions in search of Sir John Franklin, to be despatched from the Arctic shores under Commander Pullen and Dr. Rae.

I have, &c.

(signed) *A. Barclay*.

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No. 3.  
Correspondence  
between the Hud-  
son's Bay Company  
and the Admiralty.

Enclosure to No. 3 (I.)

COPY of a LETTER from *Archibald Barclay*, Esq., Secretary to the Hudson's Bay Company, to *Sir George Simpson*, Governor-in-chief of Rupert's Land.

Sir,

London, 25 January 1850.

I AM directed by the Governor and Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company to forward to you herewith the copy of a letter addressed to them by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, under this day's date, and also copies of their Lordships' instructions to Commander Pullen, of Sir John Richardson's report in those instructions, dated the 22d instant, and of extracts of memoranda by Dr. Scoresby and Lieutenant Osborne.

I have also forwarded, in a separate packet, a despatch from their Lordships for Commander Pullen, and two copies of the printed papers supplied to Captain Collinson, of Her Majesty's ship "Enterprize," and of their instructions to that officer, with two copies of "The Times" newspaper, of yesterday and to-day, containing Reports of the Expedition, *via* Behring's Straits, under the command of Captain Kellett and Commander Moore. One copy of these documents is intended for yourself, the other is to be forwarded to Dr. Rae.

The Reports of Captain Kellett and Commander Moore, above referred to, make it highly probable that Lieutenant Pullen, with the men under his command, (a list of whom is enclosed herewith) has reached some of the Company's posts on the Mackenzie, and are there passing the winter; and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are most anxious, as you will perceive by the earnestness of their letter of this day's date, that in the event of that object having been successfully accomplished, the services of the Commander and his men should be rendered available in prosecuting the search for Sir John Franklin's Expedition during the ensuing summer. To lay down any precise plan for the search is clearly impossible, and their Lordships have, therefore, very wisely left almost everything to the discretion of the officer who is to conduct it, and who will avail himself of the able advice of Dr. Rae, than whom no one can be better qualified to advise on such a subject. It is not to be understood from this that Dr. Rae's services are to be superseded, or his intended Expedition, starting from another point, relinquished. The plan already proposed for him is to be carried through as far as can be done.

It only now remains for me to say, that the Governor and Committee feel a deep interest in the success of the Expedition to be undertaken by Commander Pullen, and, I may fairly add, not the less so that the proposal originated with the Governor. It is, therefore, their anxious desire that all the resources of the Company that can be made available towards conveying the instructions of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to Commander Pullen with the utmost despatch possible, be put in requisition for effecting the object in view. The security of the messengers, and the supply of provisions to the Mackenzie, are, I need not say, matters of the most vital importance.

I have, &c.

(signed) *A. Barclay*, Secy.

No. 3 (K.)

EXTRACT of a DESPATCH from *Sir George Simpson*, dated 2 February 1850.

WITH reference to the further endeavours you have directed to be made in search of the missing Expedition under Sir John Franklin, I have now the honour to transmit copies of my letters to Chief Trader Rae and Chief Factor Ballenden, conveying instructions on that subject, which I trust you will approve.

Dear Sir,

Lachine, 21 January.

Up to the present time no intelligence of any kind has been received respecting the Expedition under the command of Sir John Franklin, its fate exciting the most intense interest, not only on the part of the British Government and public, but of the whole civilized world. The maritime powers of Europe and the United States are now vying with each other as to who shall be the first to discover

## ARCTIC EXPEDITION UNDER SIR JOHN FRANKLIN.

No. 3.  
correspondence  
between the Hud-  
son's Bay Company  
and the Admiralty.

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discover some trace of the missing navigators, and, if they be still alive, to render them assistance. By the accompanying correspondence between the Governor and Committee and the Admiralty, and by the annexed copy of a letter addressed to me by Lady Franklin, and my reply, you will see that Her Majesty's Government are exceedingly anxious that further efforts should be made by the Hudson's Bay Company to explore the Arctic Sea from the Mackenzie River. I am in hopes that in the course of a few weeks hence we may be in possession of your report on your operations last summer, with, I trust, some intelligence respecting the Expedition. If they be still alive, I feel satisfied that every effort it may be in the power of man to make to succour them will be exerted by yourself and the Company's officers in Mackenzie River; but should your late search have unfortunately ended in disappointment, it is the desire of the Company that you renew your explorations next summer, if possible.

By the annexed correspondence you will observe that the opinion in England appears to be that our explorations ought to be more particularly directed to that portion of the Northern Sea lying between Cape Walker on the east, Melville Island and Banks' Land to the north, and the continental shore or the Victoria Islands to the south.

As these limits are believed to embrace the course that would have been pursued by Sir John Franklin, Cape Walker being one of the points he was particularly instructed to make for, you will therefore be pleased, immediately on the receipt of this letter, to fit out another exploring party to proceed in the direction above indicated, but varying the route that may have been followed last summer, which party, besides their own examination of the coast and islands, should be instructed to offer liberal rewards to the Esquimaux to search for some vestiges of the missing expedition, and similar rewards should be offered to the Indians inhabiting near the coast and Peel's River, and the half-bred hunters of Mackenzie River, the latter being, perhaps, more energetic than the former; assuring them that whoever may procure authentic intelligence will be largely rewarded.

Simultaneously with the Expedition to proceed towards Cape Walker, one or two small parties should be despatched to the westward of the Mackenzie, in the direction of Point Barrow, one of which might pass over to the Youcon River, and descending that stream to the sea, carry on their explorations in that quarter, while the other going down the Mackenzie might trace the coast thence towards the Youcon. And these parties must also be instructed to offer rewards to the natives to prosecute the search in all directions.

By these means there is reason to believe that in the course of one year so minute a search may be made of the coast and the islands, that in the event of the Expedition having passed in that direction, some trace of their progress would certainly be discovered.

From your experience in Arctic discovery and peculiar qualifications for such an undertaking, I am in hopes you may be enabled yourself to assume the command of the party to proceed to the northward; and, as leaders of the two parties to explore the coast to the westward of the Mackenzie, you will have to select such officers of the Company's service within the district as may appear best qualified for the duty: Mr. Murray, I think, would be a very fit man for one of the leaders, and if one party be sent by way of the Youcon, he might take charge of it. In the event of your going on this Expedition, you will be pleased to make over the charge of the district to Chief Trader Bell during your absence.

In case you may be short-handed, I have by this conveyance instructed Chief Factor Ballenden to engage in Red River 10 choice men, accustomed to boating, and well fitted for such duty as will be required of them; and if there be a chance of their reaching Mackenzie River, or even Athabasca, before the breaking up of the ice, to forward them immediately.

Should the season, however, be too far advanced to enable them to accomplish the journey by winter travelling, Mr. Ballenden is directed to increase the party to 14 men, with a guide, to be despatched from Red River immediately after the opening of the navigation, in two boats, laden with provisions and flour, and a few bales of clothing, in order to meet, in some degree, the heavy drain that will be occasioned on our resources in provisions and necessary supplies in Mackenzie River. The leader of this party from Red River may, perhaps, be qualified to act as the conductor of one of the parties to examine the coast to the westward.

You will notice that the Lords of the Admiralty are desirous that the dépôts

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and the Admiralty.

of provisions left on the northern coast should be visited, and, if necessary, replenished. I fear, however, that our means will not allow of your carrying out this part of their plans to any great extent; but whatever may be possible in that way you will of course do. At all events, it is absolutely necessary to keep up the depôt of clothing and provisions at Fort Good Hope, with an ample supply of ammunition and fishing tackle, and experienced fishermen should be stationed at the post. These precautions are required in case of any men of the missing Expedition finding their way, or being brought to that place, so that we may be enabled to relieve their wants in food and clothing until an opportunity offers to forward them toward the civilized world.

I am averse to giving too minute instructions on matters of detail, as I rely much on your good judgment, energy and experience in giving the fullest effect to the views of Her Majesty's Government and the Company; and you are to consider you have *carte blanche* to render available the Company's resources in carrying out this service; and should you not have a sufficient number of men to form the parties contemplated, you may abandon one of the posts in order to draught the men to this service. It is very much to be regretted that circumstances have prevented these instructions being given earlier, as I am apprehensive they may not reach you in time to do much towards the prosecution of this painfully interesting duty this season; but, in that case, you will have to consider whether the parties may not pass the winter near the scene of their future explorations. This, however, is a point which must be left to your own determination.

I remain, &c.

(signed) *George Simpson.*

Mr. John Rae, Hon. Hudson's Bay Company,  
Mackenzie River District.

Dear Sir,

Lachine, 21 January.

No intelligence having been up to this time received of the Expedition under Sir John Franklin, his fate has excited the most intense interest throughout Great Britain and the whole civilized world. Much is expected from the Hudson's Bay Company in prosecuting a search of the Arctic Seas from the direction of Mackenzie River, and herewith are forwarded instructions to Chief Trader Rae to fit out three exploring parties—one to proceed to the northward, in the direction of Cape Walker, under his own command, and the other two by way of the Mackenzie River and the Youcon to the westward, under the charge of officers stationed in the Mackenzie River district; and if this packet be forwarded with all expedition, it is just possible it may reach Mr. Rae in time to enable him to put these parties in operation next summer.

It is very doubtful that there are a sufficient number of men in the district for this service; I have, therefore, to beg that, unless you receive authentic information from Mr. Rae, that further research is unnecessary—a bare possibility, arising from his having found some trace of them—you will engage at Red River for this service 10 active, able, young men, accustomed to boating, and otherwise properly qualified for the arduous duty required of them, and if there be a chance of their reaching Mackenzie River, or even Athabasca, before the opening of the navigation, that you will despatch them, under the command of some officer of the Company's service within reach, or some person engaged for the purpose in the settlement, who has the necessary qualifications for such a charge, and whose services might be useful to Mr. Rae when in Mackenzie River. I need not detail the requisite qualifications for such a leader—activity, physical strength, habits of endurance, perseverance, tact with and authority over the men, &c., as your experience will suggest what is required. Should the season, however, be too far advanced when this packet reaches you to enable the party to reach Athabasca by winter travelling, you will in that case engage 14 men and an experienced guide, to form the crews of two boats, to be despatched from Red River for Mackenzie River, immediately the navigation is practicable in spring, with full cargoes of pemmican and flour and a few bales of clothing. Of the latter article I am aware that you will have but little to spare, and I believe the stock in Mackenzie River is sufficiently large to meet the contemplated demands; but as the party to be sent by you will be supernumeraries, for whom no provision has been made, it is prudent to send with them a few

necessaries



necessaries for their first winter, while the provisions are absolutely required to increase our resources, on which there will not only be a certain heavy drain for the exploring parties, but it is possible we may have to render succour to Sir J. Franklin's Expedition, should we fortunately succeed in discovering them. The provisions must be considered as cargo to be rendered entire at Mackenzie River, whatever may be requisite for rations on the voyage to be supplied at the ports on the route.

We want none but choice men. I therefore place no restriction on the rate of wages, and you may give whatever is necessary to secure the pick of the settlement. They should not be engaged for the year, but for the time they may be employed, at so much per annum, counting from the date of departure from the settlement until their discharge in Mackenzie River, with a fair allowance for the return voyage.

Should such delay be likely to arise in engaging the party at Red River that they could not reach Athabasca by winter travelling, while the packet, if sent on immediately, would have a chance of reaching Mr. Rae before the opening of the navigation, you can despatch it without the men, in that case sending them in boats. Both with the packet, if sent by itself, and with the party, you will forward a circular addressed to the officers in charge of districts and posts, desiring their best assistance in getting them forwarded with all expedition towards their destination.

I remain, &c.

Mr. John Ballenden,  
Red River Settlement.

(signed) *G. Simpson.*

#### No. 3 (L.)

Copy of a LETTER from *A. Barclay*, Esq. to Captain *Hamilton*.

Sir, Hudson's Bay House, London, 6 March 1850.

I AM directed by the Governor and Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company to transmit to you herewith, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the copy of a despatch received by them yesterday from Sir George Simpson, Governor-in-chief of Rupert's Land, together with copies of letters addressed by him to Messrs. Rae and Ballenden, and also to Mr. Mactavish and other officers in charge of posts on the route from Lachine to Red River, relative to the search for Sir John Franklin's Expedition, and directing every possible exertion to be used in forwarding to Commander Pullen their Lordships' despatch, sent to the Hudson's Bay House on the 25th January.

I have, &c.

(signed) *A. Barclay*, Secretary.

#### Enclosure 1 to No. 3 (L.)

Copy of a LETTER from Sir *George Simpson* to the Governor, Deputy Governor and Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company.

Honourable Sirs,

Lachine, 14 February 1850.

I HAVE to acknowledge Mr. Secretary Barclay's letter of 25th January, with the accompanying papers, relating to the further search for the missing Expedition under Sir John Franklin.

The packet from the Admiralty for Commander Pullen, and that for Dr. Rae, containing copies of the printed papers and instructions to Captain Collinson, and copies of "The Times" newspaper of 24th and 25th January, were forwarded express a few hours after their receipt, under the care of one of the clerks of this establishment, to Lac des Allumettes, with instructions to the gentleman in charge of that post to send them on without delay, *via* Lake Nipissingue to Sault Ste. Marie, whereby a saving of about ten days' time will be gained over the communication *via* Penitanguishine, the packet having been received too late to go by the mail from thence on the 15th February, and the next mail not leaving until the 1st March. For your information as to the measures I have adopted for forwarding this packet to Red River, and for supplying the wants of the proposed



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Expeditions in provisions, I beg to hand copies of my letters to Chief Factors Ballenden and Rac, to Chief Trader W. Mactavish, and the gentlemen in charge of posts on the communication. My instructions to Messrs. Ballenden and Rac, under date 21st January (copies of which were forwarded to you), that the Company's resources of every description should be made available for this interesting service, were so full and explicit, that you may rest satisfied nothing will be wanting on the part of the Company's officers to carry out, as far as possible, your benevolent views on this subject.

I have, &c.

(signed) *G. Simpson.*

Enclosure 2, to No. 3 (L.)

COPY of a LETTER from Sir *George Simpson* to *John Rac*, Esq., Chief Factor in the Hudson's Bay Company's Service.

Dear Sir,

Lachine, 13 February 1850.

With reference to my letters of 21st January, I now beg to hand you copy of a communication this day received from Mr. Secretary Barclay, under date London, 25th January, from which you will observe, that both the Lords of the Admiralty and the Governor and Committee are exceedingly anxious that the accompanying packet for Commander Pullen from the Admiralty should reach that officer with the least possible delay. There is likewise forwarded herewith a packet to your address, containing the papers referred to in Mr. Secretary Barclay's letter, and a letter from Sir John Richardson.

By Mr. Barclay's letter you will observe that the instructions now given for a search under Commander Pullen are not to supersede the plans already laid down for your own explorations.

By my letter to Chief Factor Ballenden, of 21st January, copy of which was forwarded to you, you will observe that that gentleman was instructed to send 10 men from Red River, to be placed at your disposal in the prosecution of your researches, if there was the prospect of their getting beyond Fort Chipewyan by winter travelling; on the contrary, if they could not reach that point before the opening of the navigation, he was to send (instead of 10) 14 men, with a guide, to form the crew of two boats, to be laden with provisions for the service in question. Should these two boat-loads of provisions be forwarded, I presume they will, with the resources of the country, be sufficient for every useful purpose; but in the event of the 10 men having been forwarded by winter travelling, I have by this conveyance instructed Mr. Ballenden to forward an extra boat along with the Portage la Loche brigade next summer, laden with provisions, to be specially applied to the use of the Expedition under Commander Pullen, and such parties as you may employ on this service.

All expenses connected with these Expeditions, the forwarding of provisions, packets, &c., are to be charged to the "Arctic Searching Expedition."

In great haste, and with best wishes,

I remain, &c.

(signed) *G. Simpson.*

Enclosure 3, to No. 3. (L.)

COPY of a LETTER from Sir *George Simpson* to *John Ballenden*, Esquire, Chief Factor in the Hudson's Bay Company's Service.

Dear Sir,

Lachine, 13 February 1850.

By instructions from the Governor and Committee just received, I now forward a packet, by special express up the Ottawa, for the purpose of being conveyed to the Sault Ste. Marie, and thence forwarded with every possible expedition from post to post to Red River; and you will be pleased to send it on without delay

delay by the most direct route to Isle à la Croix, from whence it will be forwarded to Athabasca, and on to Mackenzie River.

With reference to my letter of 21st January, should it have reached you sufficiently early to have enabled you to forward ten men to Mr. Rae, to be employed on his proposed explorations, by winter travelling, you will in that case provide a boat's crew to accompany the Portage à la Loche brigade, fully laden, from Red River or Norway House, with about ninety pieces of flour and pemmican, say one-third of the former and two-thirds of the latter. Should the express not have reached you in time to send the ten men by winter travelling, you will of course have increased their number to fourteen, with a guide, to man two boats laden with provisions and clothing, according to my instructions, in which case the third boat above directed will not be required. The lading of the boats or boat should be replenished from post to post, so that the full quantity originally shipped may be forthcoming for the use of Commander Pullen and Mr. Rae's Expeditions.

All expenses connected with this service, the forwarding of provisions, packets, &c., are to be charged to the Arctic Expedition.

I am, &c.

(signed) G. Simpson.

Enclosure 4, to No. 3 (L.)

COPY of a LETTER from Sir George Simpson to William M<sup>r</sup> Tavish, Esquire, Chief Trader in the Hudson's Bay Company's Service.

Dear Sir,

Lachine, 13 February 1850.

HERewith is forwarded, *via* the Ottawa River, a packet for Mr. Ballenden, which I have to beg you will send on with all possible despatch to Red River.

As Mr. Swanston may be short-handed, having already had to provide for two expresses, you had better engage the men, whom you send on from the Sault, on the condition of their remaining at Michipicoton, for a period of two, three, four or more months, as Mr. Swanston may require, by which arrangement the men he sends from Michipicoton may remain at the next post, and so on from station to station. All expenses connected with this service are to be charged to the "Arctic Searching Expedition;" and no consideration of mere cost is to be allowed to interfere in the expeditious transmission of this express.

Please forward copy of this letter to Chief Trader Swanston.

I am, &c.

(signed) G. Simpson.

Enclosure 5, to No. 3 (L.)

COPY of a LETTER from Sir George Simpson to Gentlemen in Charge of Posts on the Route from Lachine to Red River Settlement.

Gentlemen,

Lachine, 13 February 1850.

HERewith is forwarded an express for Red River Settlement, which I have to beg may be sent on from post to post by two carriers, with all possible despatch, as its early receipt is of the utmost importance. The expenses connected with its transmission are to be charged to the "Arctic Searching Expedition."

Let the hour and day of arrival at and departure from each post on the route be marked on the back of this letter.

I am, &c.

(signed) G. Simpson.

— No. 4. —

NARRATIVE of the PROCEEDINGS of Captain Sir *James C. Ross*, in Command of the EXPEDITION through *LANCASTER SOUND* and *BARROW STRAITS*.

No. 4.

Narrative of Proceedings of Capt. Sir J. C. Ross.

In accordance with the intentions expressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty in my letter of the 13th of July 1848, Her Majesty's ships "*Enterprise*" and "*Investigator*" sailed on that day from the Danish settlement of Upernavik.

By running through an intricate archipelago of islands, which lies off the main land, and seems to keep off the pressure of the main pack, we succeeded in passing the position in which the whale ships had been so long detained, and made every day some advance to the northward, until the 20th, when we made fast to a berg aground off Cape Shackleton.

Here we were joined by the "*Lord Gambier*" (of Hull), Mr. R. Hill, master, who informed me that, having run to the southward with all the rest of the whaling ships, and having carefully examined the pack edge for any opening that might lead to the westward, he had come to the conclusion that there was not the smallest chance, from the close, compact and heavy nature of the ice, for any ship crossing to the west coast of Baffin's Bay this season. He had, therefore, returned to the north, and expected that all the other ships would soon follow him, and endeavour to round the north end of the pack; he spoke very confidently of being able to accomplish this by the first week of August, and promised at any rate to remain in company with us until the 3d of August. We cast off from the berg early the next morning, towing the ships through loose streams of ice towards some lanes of water, which had opened out during the calm which prevailed all night.

Our progress was, however, very slow during this and the next few days, and our situation often difficult and embarrassing.

On the morning of the 26th, when off the Three Islands of Baffin, in lat. 74° N., we were surprised, on the fog clearing off, to see the "*Lord Gambier*" about eight miles distant, standing under all sail to the southward, thus disappointing us of the only remaining means of forwarding information of our proceedings to their Lordships; and this was the more annoying as we had only the evening before passed within a quarter of a mile of her, when, upon any signal of their intention of going to the southward, we would have placed on board of her all our letters and despatches. Her enterprising commander deserves the highest praise for persevering alone so far beyond all his fellows, and, had it depended on him, I believe he would not have left us until we had got through the great difficulty of Melville Bay.

We pursued our course to the northward under varying circumstances of perplexity, anxiety and success; for, although I could not but feel assured that we should eventually get through the Melville Bay barrier, yet calms and light winds so greatly impeded any movement in the pack, that day after day passed away until the season had so far advanced as to preclude every hope of accomplishing much, if anything, before the setting in of winter.

No exertions, however, were spared to take advantage of every opportunity of pushing the ships forward, until, on the 20th of August, during a heavy breeze from the N.E., the ships, under all the sail they could carry, bored through a pack of ice of but moderate thickness, but having amongst it heavy masses mingled with the lighter ice that covered the larger surface through which it was necessary to drive the ships at all hazards. The shocks they sustained during this severe trial were great, but fortunately without serious damage to them.

We gained the clear water at 4 p.m. on the 20th of August, in lat. 75½° N., and long. 68° W., and steered direct for Pond's Bay, where I felt assured of meeting with the whale ships, if any should have crossed to the west land, and might learn from them if the "*Erebus*" and "*Terror*," or their party in boats, had passed along that shore, and also with a view to communicate with the Esquimaux who annually visit the coast, and from whom we might have derived information of our absent friends.

On the 23d we made the land about ten miles to the southward of Pond's Bay, and could trace the line of the main pack close in against the land, at a distance of three or four miles to the southward, so closely pressed home as to leave no room for ships or boats to pass between it and the shore. We next stood into Pond's Bay and hove to, within half a mile of those points upon which the Esquimaux are known to place their summer residences, firing guns every half-hour, and with

with our glasses closely examining every part of the shore without being able to discern any human being.

From Pond's Bay we commenced a rigid examination of the coast to the northward, keeping the ships close in along the land, so that neither people nor boats could have passed without our seeing them. Opposed by a strong current, although going before the wind between two and three knots through the water, we found by the result of all our observations, as well as by unerring marks on the land, that we were sometimes carried astern against the wind.

On the 26th we arrived off Possession Bay, and a party was sent on shore to search for any traces of Sir John Franklin's Expedition having touched at this general point of rendezvous. Nothing was found but the paper left there recording the visit of Sir Edward Parry, in 1819. The paper was very much damaged, but by careful washing and fitting together, nearly every word was clearly deciphered. (It is preserved.)

From this point we continued the examination of the coast with equal care, for we fully expected every hour to see those of whom we were in search, and the most vigilant look-out was kept aloft, and from the deck.

On the 1st of September we arrived off Cape York, and a party was sent on shore to seek for our friends, and to fix a conspicuous mark at this remarkable point, on which was placed a paper for the guidance of any party that might fall in with it. This service was performed by Lieutenant M'Clintock, with much skill, under very difficult circumstances.

Every day we were in the practice of throwing overboard a cask from each ship, containing papers with information of all our proceedings: guns were fired during foggy weather, and blue lights and rockets during the hours of darkness, the ships being kept under such easy sail that any boat seeing the signals might have reached them.

The general tenor of the information thus distributed along the coast was to acquaint Sir John Franklin, or any of his party, that as the whale ships had not been able to cross to the west land of Baffin's Bay, they could have no hope of assistance from them, and recommending them to make for Port Leopold, where I intended to form a depot of provisions, and perhaps leave the "Investigator" to winter there; they would at any rate, with the provisions, find a notice of the position in which the nearer ship was passing the winter.

It therefore became necessary to push for Port Leopold to fulfil these promises, for had any of his party met with one of these notices they would assuredly have gone to that point.

We accordingly stood over from Cape York towards North-East Cape, until we came in with the edge of a pack, too dense for us to penetrate, lying between us and Leopold Island, about 14 miles broad; but as we could perceive that it was still in motion, we hoped that a few days might produce a favourable change, and in the meantime we stood over to the north shore of Barrow's Strait, to seek a harbour further to the westward, and to examine the numerous inlets of that shore. Maxwell Bay, and several smaller indentations, were thoroughly explored; and, although we got near the entrance of Wellington Channel, the firm barrier of ice which stretched across it, and which had not broken away this season, convinced us all was impracticable in that direction.

We now stood to the south-west to seek for a harbour near Cape Rennell, but found a heavy body of ice extending from the west of Cornwallis Island in a compact mass to Leopold Island. Coasting along this pack during stormy and foggy weather, we had difficulty in keeping the ships free during the nights, for I believe so great a quantity of ice was never before seen in Barrow's Strait at this period of the season.

With the thermometer at 15 degrees every night, young ice formed rapidly, and became so thick as to frustrate all our exertions to pass through some of the looser streams. Nevertheless, after some days of anxious and arduous work, we succeeded in getting through the pack which still lingered about Leopold Island and North-East Cape, and entered the harbour of Port Leopold on the 11th of September. Had we not got into port on that day, it would have been impossible to have done so any day afterwards, the main pack, during the night, having closed the land, and completely sealed the mouth of the harbour.

We had now, at any rate, accomplished one material point, and were rejoiced to find the anchorage, of which we had before been in much doubt, well adapted

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to our purpose; and, as it was desirable to secure a good position for one ship, I resolved that it should be the winter quarters for the "Investigator."

I had much satisfaction the next morning to find how perfectly our steam-launch fulfilled our expectations in an experimental cruise about the harbour, before proceeding in her to the westward in search of a harbour for the "Enterprise," as it was now beyond probability, from the early setting in of winter, and from the unbroken state of the ice, to reach Melville Island this season. The pack at the harbour's mouth, however, still prevented our immediate departure, and all our energies were devoted to landing a good supply of provisions upon Whaler Point. In this service the steam-launch proved of infinite value, conveying a large cargo herself, and towing two deeply laden cutters, at the rate of four or five knots, through the sheet of ice which now covered the harbour, and through which no boat unaided by steam could have penetrated beyond her own length.

The place selected for the depôt was upon the low south-east point, which forms the chief protection to the harbour, two miles distant from our anchorage. This work was not only tedious, but sometimes hazardous, from the flocs of thin ice folding over each other, and thus forming an obstacle at times difficult to overcome. Indeed, our operations were still incomplete when they were interrupted by the ice in the harbour becoming so thick as to require all our attention to the ships themselves. A prevalence of strong easterly winds had caused the pack to press so heavily against the outer margin of the harbour ice, that the ships were carried away with their anchors so far up towards the head of the bay that they grounded at low water. All hands from both ships were set to work to cut a canal and warp them off the shore. This had scarcely been accomplished when another severe pressure drove them again into shallow water, and, had we not fortunately hauled off in time, it is probable that the ships must have lain aground all the winter. The work of sawing was recommenced, and, after two or three days, we succeeded in getting our ships into a position of comparative safety, although with only a foot or two of water to spare at low spring tides; but the winter had now set in with so much severity it was impossible to keep the people any longer employed at such work without serious injury to their health, and their suffering from severe frost-bites.

On the evening of the 12th of October the ships were hove into their winter position, within 200 yards of each other.

I was indeed most anxious to have taken the "Enterprise" to some distance to the westward, but any attempt to leave the ships, under the circumstances of their situation, would have been highly injurious, and probably have led to some calamity, but the pack which sealed the harbour's mouth the night after we entered it never admitted a chance of even a boat making her way out; and across the isthmus, as far as we could discern from the hills, the same extensive mass of heavy, hummocky ice, which we had coasted along in search of an opening in the early part of September, was still pressed closely home against the north shore of North Somerset, and remained fixed there throughout the winter; so that if the "Enterprise" had been able to get out of the harbour, she could not have proceeded far, and would most likely have been compelled either to pass the winter in the pack, or to have returned to England, and thus have defeated all prospective measures for the assistance of our long absent friends.

And, although I could not but feel extreme disappointment at the small advance we had been able to make during our first season, yet we had much to be thankful for in having been permitted to gain secure winter quarters at Port Leopold—a position that of all others was the most desirable, if any one spot had to be selected for that purpose; being at the junction of the four great channels of Barrow's Strait, Lancaster Sound, Prince Regent Inlet and Wellington Channel, it was hardly possible for any party, after abandoning their ships, to pass along the shores of any of those inlets without finding indications of the proximity of our Expedition.

The winter was passed as are all winters in this climate, but long experience and liberal means gave us many comforts that no other Expedition had enjoyed; yet it is remarkable that the health of the crew suffered more during this winter than on any former occasion. Our want of success might have tended in some measure to depress their spirits, and, unfortunately, the cold of winter was prolonged unusually far into the spring before we could give them more active employment.

During



During the winter, a great many white foxes were taken alive in traps set for the purpose; and as it is well known how large a tract of country these creatures traverse in search of food, I caused copper collars, upon which a notice of the position of the ships and depôts of provisions was engraved, to be clinched round their necks, and then set them at liberty again, with the hope that some of these messengers might be the means of conveying the intelligence to the "Erebus" and "Terror," as the crews of those vessels would assuredly be eager for their capture.

After several short preliminary journeys in April and the early part of next month, to carry out small depôts of provisions to the west of Cape Clarence and to the south of Cape Seppings, I left the ships on the 15th of May, with a party consisting of Lieutenant M'Clintock and 12 men, with 40 days' provisions, which, together with tents, clothes, blankets and other necessities, were lashed upon two sledges. We were accompanied for the first five days of our journey by Captain Bird, in command of a large fatigue party, which increased our numbers to 42. He would willingly have extended his valuable assistance still further, had I not felt that his presence at the ships would be more beneficial to the service in sending forth such other parties, and completing such further measures, as I proposed should be adopted during my absence.

A detailed account of this journey may be found in my Journal; it may be sufficient here to mention, that the examination of all the inlets and smaller indentations of the coast, in which any ships might have found shelter, occupied a large portion of our time, and cost us much labour; but it was necessary that every portion of the coast we passed along should be thoroughly explored.

The north shore of North Somerset trends slightly to the northward of the west, until after passing the extreme North Cape of America, a few miles beyond Cape Rennell; from this point it trends slightly to the southward of west, until after rounding Cape Bunny, when it suddenly assumes a nearly south direction.

From the high land in the neighbourhood of Cape Bunny we obtained a very extensive view, and observed that the whole space between it and Cape Walker to the west, and Wellington Channel to the north, was occupied by very heavy hummocky ice, whilst to the southward it appeared more favourable for travelling; I therefore determined not to divide the party, as I had originally intended, until we should find a more practicable point for their exertions.

We therefore proceeded to the southward, tracing all the indentations of the coast, when our progress became much delayed by several of the party becoming useless from lameness and debility, so that it proved most fortunate that I had not divided the force, which could only, under such circumstances, have terminated in the complete failure of both; for, although the load of provisions was every day becoming less, the necessity of carrying two of the sufferers on the sledges, and the loss of the services of three others, who had scarcely strength to walk behind, greatly increased the labour of the few who were now able to work.

The examination of the coast was pursued until the 5th of June, when, having consumed more than half our provisions, and the strength of the party being much reduced, I was reluctantly compelled to abandon further operations, as it was, moreover, necessary to give the men a day of rest. But, that the time might not be wholly lost, I proceeded with Serjeant Hurditch, and William Thompson, a seaman of great endurance, to the extreme south point in sight from our encampment, distant about eight or nine miles. From this point we had so fine a view as fully to reward us for our additional labour, more especially when we reflected that from the nature of the ice over which we, unencumbered, had travelled with comparative ease, it could hardly have been accomplished by the party in one day, whilst it would have required another to get back to their present encampment.

The extreme point of our operations is in lat.  $72^{\circ} 38' N.$ , and long.  $95^{\circ} 40' W.$  It is the west point of a small high peninsula, and, the state of the atmosphere being at the time peculiarly favourable for distinctness of vision, land of any great elevation might have been seen at the distance of 100 miles.

The extreme high cape of the coast, however, was not more than 50 miles distant, still bearing nearly south,\* the land thus trending for Cape Nicolai, the northernmost point which I had reached during my journey from the "Victory" in

\* The bearings herein given are true.

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in 1832, and which I hoped to have attained on this occasion, as well as to have revisited the Magnetic Pole in its immediate vicinity, and, had not so many of our party broken down, it might have been accomplished.

We observed several small bays and inlets between us and the southernmost cape, of whose continuity we could not be assured at so great a distance; yet they are marked on the chart which accompanies this account of our proceedings, by which it will be perceived that a very narrow isthmus separates Prince Regent Inlet from the western sea at Cresswell and Brentford Bays.

On our return to the encampment, I found they had all been well occupied during our absence; Lieutenant McClintock had taken some magnetic observations, which will be of great value, from our being so near to the Magnetic Pole; two of the party had cut through the ice, which they found to be eight feet thick, and fixed a pole by which the state of the tides was ascertained; and all the rest that could work had erected a large cairn of stones on a high knoll just above the tents, in which a copper cylinder was placed, containing an account of our proceedings, and all necessary information for the guidance of any of Sir John Franklin's party that might be journeying along this coast.

Although our resources did not admit of any further perseverance on our part, we could not but feel some satisfaction in the assurance, that if those of whom we were in search had at any time been upon the north or west coast of North Somerset, we must have met with some traces of them; the season for travelling in these regions had also passed away, the thaw having commenced; and, had they abandoned their ships at Melville Island, they must have arrived on either of these shores long before this time, where they would have found us in the best possible position to render them assistance, and conduct them to our vessels.

We set forward on our homeward journey in the evening of the 6th of June, and, after encountering a variety of difficulties, to which I need not now further allude, we reached the ship on the 23d, the party so completely worn out by fatigue that every man was, from some cause or other, in the doctor's hands for two or three weeks, and I am sorry to say that two of them are not yet recovered.

I had walked in advance of the party, to select the best road by which to cross the isthmus, and as soon as I got sight of the ships, I was met by Captain Bird and Lieutenant McClure, from whom I was greatly grieved to hear of the decease of Mr. Henry Matthias, the assistant-surgeon of the "Enterprise," of consumption, which had been deeply rooted in his constitution before leaving England; he was a promising young man, of great amiability of disposition, universally beloved and regretted. Several others of the crews of both ships were in a declining state, and the general report of health was by no means cheering.

During my absence, Captain Bird had despatched parties in several directions,—one under the command of Lieutenant Barnard, to the north shore of Barrow's Strait; a second, commanded by Lieutenant Brown, to the east shore of Prince Regent Inlet; and a third, conducted by Lieutenant Robinson, along the western shore of that inlet. The labours of these parties were of comparatively short durations; still they, like ourselves, all suffered from snow blindness, sprained ankles, and debility, especially that under Lieutenant Robinson, who extended his examination of the coast for several miles to the southward of Fury Beach.

Although it was now but too evident, from no traces of the absent Expedition having been met with by any of these parties, that the ships could not have been detained anywhere in this part of the Arctic regions; yet I considered it proper to push forward to the westward as soon as our ships should be liberated from their winter harbour. My chief hopes now centered in the efforts of Sir John Richardson's party; but I felt fully persuaded that Sir John Franklin's ships must have penetrated so far beyond Melville Island as to induce him to prefer making for the continent of America, rather than seeking assistance from the whale ships in Baffin's Bay.

Our crews, weakened by incessant exertion, were in a very unfit state to undertake the heavy labour which they had yet to accomplish. The season at this place was so extremely backward that hardly a pool of water was to be seen on the surface of ice which covered the harbour, except only along the line of gravel which had been spread out towards the harbour's mouth during the winter, and there appeared but small prospect of any release this season.

All hands that were able commenced with saws, extending the breadth of the canal so much as to admit the ships to pass down it towards the point of the harbour, a distance of rather more than two miles.

There



## ARCTIC EXPEDITION UNDER SIR JOHN FRANKLIN.

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These labours were continued until the 15th of August, when, the canal being nearly finished, the harbour ice divided along its line into two nearly equal parts, and thus saved us a few days' work; but the ice to seaward remained to all appearance as firmly fixed as during the winter, though we could perceive it was wasting away close along the shores, and it was not until the 28th of August that we succeeded in getting clear of the harbour.

Before leaving Port Leopold, I had caused a house to be built of our spare spars, and covered with such of our housing cloths as we could dispense with, and for which we could find a substitute if needful, leaving also twelve months' provisions, fuel and other necessaries, together with the Investigator's steam-engine and launch, which had been lengthened seven feet for the purpose, and now formed a fine vessel, capable of conveying the whole of Sir John Franklin's party to the whale ships, or ourselves, should any calamity befall our ships in their progress to the westward.

We now proceeded towards the north shore of Barrow's Strait, for the purpose of following up the examination of Wellington Channel, and, if possible, of extending our researches as far as Melville Island; but when about 12 miles from the shore we came to the fixed land ice, which had not broken away this season, and nothing but an uniform sheet of heavy ice was to be seen to the westward.

We kept the ships near that which appeared to be the most probable spot, watching for any opening that might present itself, when a strong wind suddenly arising on the 1st of September, brought the loose pack, through which we had been struggling, down upon and it closely beset the ships. At times, during two or three days, they sustained severe pressure, and ridges of hummocks were thrown up all around us, but after that time, the temperature falling to near zero, it formed the whole body of the ice into one solid mass. We were so circumstanced that for some days we could not unship the rudder, and when, by the laborious operation of sawing and removing the hummocks from under the stern, we were able to do so, we found it twisted and damaged, and the ship was so much strained as to increase the leakage from three inches in a fortnight to 14 inches daily, which, though of but trifling importance at present, served to convince us that she was not, as we had hitherto believed, invulnerable.

The ice was stationary for a few days; the pressure had so folded the lighter pieces over each other, and they were so interlaced, as to form one entire sheet, extending from shore to shore of Barrow's Strait, and as far to the east and west as the eye could discern from the mast-head, whilst the extreme severity of the temperature had cemented the whole so firmly together that it appeared highly improbable that it could break up again this season. In the space which had been cleared away for unshipping the rudder, the newly formed ice was 15 inches thick, and in some places along the ship's side the 13 feet saws were too short to work.

We had now fully made up our minds that the ships were fixed for the winter, and, dismal as the prospect appeared, it was far preferable to being carried along the west coast of Baffin's Bay, where the grounded bergs are in such numbers upon the shallow banks off that shore, as to render it next to impossible for ships involved in a pack to escape destruction.

It was, therefore, with a mixture of hope and anxiety that, on the wind shifting to the westward, we perceived the whole body of ice begin to drive to the eastward, at the rate of 8 to 10 miles daily. Every effort on our part was totally unavailing, for no human power could have moved either of the ships a single inch; they were thus completely taken out of our hands, and, in the centre of a field of ice more than 50 miles in circumference, were carried along the southern shore of Lancaster Sound.

After passing its entrance, the ice drifted in a more southerly direction, along the west shore of Baffin's Bay, until we were abreast of Pond's Bay, to the southward of which we observed a great number of icebergs stretching across our path, and presented the fearful prospect of our worst anticipations. But, when least expected by us, our release was almost miraculously brought about. The great field of ice was rent into innumerable fragments, as if by some unseen power.

Hope revived, and our people worked with energy; all sail was made, and warps run out from each quarter, to spring the ships past the heavy floe pieces. The "Investigator" reached an open space of water on the evening of the 24th, but it was not until noon of the 25th of September that the "Enterprise" could

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clear the pack. It is impossible to convey any idea of the sensation we experienced when we found ourselves once more at liberty, whilst many a grateful heart poured forth its praises and thanksgivings to Almighty God for this unlooked-for deliverance.

The advance of winter had now closed all the harbours against us; and, as it was impossible to penetrate to the westward through the pack from which we had just been liberated, I made the signal to the "Investigator" of my intention to return to England.

Standing to the S.E., we came in with the middle ice of Baffin's Bay, within a few miles of the land, and were obliged, in order to make our retreat the more sure, to run along its western edge to the N.E., until we reached the latitude 74½° N., where we rounded its north end, on the 4th of October, in sight of the coast of Greenland.

Favoured by unusually fine weather as we proceeded to the southward, we passed without any accident through the great cluster of bergs which is always found in lat. 69° N., and on the 12th we re-crossed the Arctic Circle, after which time we saw no more ice.

Strong westerly winds carried us past the meridian of Cape Farewell on the 18th, and at 1 a.m. of the 28th we struck soundings off Mould Head. At daylight we found ourselves in the fairway between North Ronaldshay and Fair Island, but southerly wind so impeded our further progress, that it was late on Saturday night before we could anchor off Scarborough.

I arrived at the Admiralty early on Monday, the 5th of November.

I cannot conclude this Report without expressing my deep obligations to Captain Bird, for his cordial co-operation and zealous support throughout this most arduous service, and my admiration of the conduct of the officers and crews of both ships, whose meritorious exertions fully entitle them to the most favourable consideration of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

*James C. Ross.*

— No. 5. —

PROCEEDINGS of Her Majesty's Ship "North Star."  
(A. to F.)

No. 5 (A.)

No. 5.  
Proceedings of Her  
Majesty's Ship  
"North Star."

COPY of ORDERS from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to Mr. *James Saunders*, Master, commanding Her Majesty's Ship "North Star," dated 14 May 1849.

By the Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c.

HAVING selected the "North Star" for the purpose of conveying a supply of provisions and stores to the "Enterprize" and "Investigator," now employed in search of the ships under the orders of Captain Sir John Franklin, and having equipped and stored her accordingly, we have thought fit to appoint you to her command; and as soon as she shall be in every respect ready for sea, and her crew have been paid advance, you are to proceed in her to the Nore, where you will be joined by the "Stromboli" steam-vessel, the commander of which will be directed to tow the "North Star" as far to sea as her coals will last; or, as according to your judgment, with reference to wind and weather, her assistance will expedite your voyage to Baffin's Bay. And, with the object in view, you are at liberty, on leaving the Nore, to pursue your voyage down the English Channel, or to go north about by the Orkneys, according as the wind may appear to hang to the eastward or westward.

In case of your adopting the former of these routes from the Nore, you are to make the best of your way to Cork, where the commander of the "Stromboli" will use all despatch in completing his fuel; so that, when that object is effected, you may immediately put to sea, and prosecute your voyage. While the "Stromboli" is thus employed, you will endeavour to obtain whatever observations the weather may permit for rating your chronometers. But in the event of your adopting the Orkney route, you will touch at Aberdeen, and pursue the like observations there.

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The papers marked A, B, C, D and E,\* which accompany these orders, will inform you not only of all the circumstances which have led to the employment of the "North Star" on this service, but also, that the main object of your voyage is, first, by replenishing the stock of provisions in the ships of Sir James Ross, to prevent the return of the "Investigator" to England this summer; in order that Captain Bird with his ship may continue to co-operate with Sir James Ross in prosecuting his search during the summer of 1850; and secondly, in case of not meeting the "Investigator" or her boats, that you shall land the necessary supplies at the following places; viz.—Possession Bay, Cape Hay, Cape Crawford, and Cape York, or Whaler Point, endeavouring to reach the latter place in preference, and leaving such notices or indications of the places where you may have landed these supplies as will enable Captain Bird to find them, if it should happen by any unforeseen occurrence that you should not fall in with the "Investigator" or her boats. In this case the provisions must be buried in such manner as to prevent their being got at either by the natives, or the wild animals which frequent these parts.

Should you not be able to reach any of those spots (a contingency not likely to occur), you are to use your utmost endeavours to land them either at Pond's Bay or Agnes Monument, which are the remaining places mentioned in Sir James Ross's orders to Captain Bird, taking care to secure your return back to the eastward, and to clear the ice of Davis's Straits before the winter shall commence, as we desire that you will carefully avoid risking all hazard of the "North Star" being detained a winter in that region.

Among the papers which accompany these orders, there is a copy of the Instructions delivered to Sir James Ross on his leaving England last spring (marked B), and also a copy of the Instructions given by Sir James Ross to Captain Bird, (marked C, page 4); and improbable as it is that you may be able to do more than carry out our instructions as herein conveyed to you, yet it is not our purpose to limit your proceedings so stringently as to prohibit you from rendering any assistance in your power to the "Investigator," in prosecuting the search in which she is engaged. But you are most distinctly to understand, that this permission is given only in case of your joining her sufficiently early for that purpose, and of your paying implicit obedience to our order that you return to England, so as to run no risk of being shut up in the ice.

We cannot be aware of what communications may have passed between Sir James Ross and Captain Bird, nor of the information respecting the intention of the former, of which Captain Bird must by this time be in possession; but we can scarcely doubt that measures have either been taken, or are provided for, by Sir James Ross, for as close an examination of Wellington Channel as possible, with a view to ascertain whether any marks of Sir John Franklin's having proceeded in that direction are left on its shores, as also of any indications of his having touched at any part of the Prince Regent's Inlet, or of the northern shore of Lancaster Sound; and if any fortuitous circumstance should place you, when in company with the "Investigator," so as to enable you to make a similar search at any part of those shores, where traces of Sir John Franklin's ships may probably be found, you will use your own judgment as to undertaking this search, consistently with your getting clear of Baffin's Bay before the winter sets in.

As the usual track to the northward, through Davis's Straits to Baffin's Bay, will possibly lead you near the Danish settlement of Disco, or of Opernavick, on the Greenland shore, it might be prudent, if a convenient opportunity should offer, of inquiring at one of those places for intelligence, and should you obtain any information concerning the two absent Expeditions, that, in your opinion, would justify a departure from any part of these instructions, we leave you at liberty to act accordingly.

We conclude, that Captain Bird will be so far informed of Sir James Ross's instructions, as to know whether he contemplated making search in the direction of Jones's or Smith's Sounds, and therefore do not dwell on the obvious necessity of search in that direction (if all others fail) being signified to Captain Bird when you fall in with him.

When approaching Lancaster Sound, you are to cause a diligent look-out to be kept

\* The several Papers which have been presented to Parliament on the subject of the relief of Sir John Franklin's Expedition.

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kept for the boats of the "Investigator," Captain Bird having been directed to send his launch thither this summer; and if no boat is discovered, the same vigilance is to be used in looking out for any signals or marks on the shores of Lancaster Sound and Barrow Straits that might be seen in passing, while you pursue your course to the westward; and you are, in case of foggy weather, to heave-to occasionally, in your approach or in your passage up Lancaster Sound and Barrow Straits, and fire guns as signals; and also, during the few hours of darkness in the latter part of the season, occasionally to burn blue lights and to throw up rockets, in order to prevent any ship or boats from passing you unobserved.

In landing portions of the provisions at the several points before mentioned, you will, as already intimated, give a decided preference to Whaler Point, near the entrance of Prince Regent's Inlet, unless you should in the meantime meet with Captain Bird, whose directions you will then follow respecting their disposal. Should you not be so fortunate as to do so, an alternative which we can scarcely entertain, you will, after having landed the provisions at one or more of the above-named places, run up to the head of Baffin's Bay, if the water is open (and in your opinion time will admit), and look into Smith's and Jones's Sounds, so as to ascertain, if possible, whether Sir John Franklin's ships have entered either of those inlets, and then make the best of your way to Spithead, reporting your arrival to our Secretary.

Though precise surveys are not expected from you, yet we desire that you give an intelligible account of every port or road in which you may anchor, showing as many soundings as you can readily procure, describing the nature of the adjacent shore—selecting some cape of which the bearing is to be given by the standard compass (and also by azimuth from the sun), and placing all other points in the sketch by horizontal angles from that cape. The latitude of some point in each of these sketches is to be determined, when practicable, by artificial horizon on shore; and its longitude by careful chronometric observations or equal altitudes.

The daily comparison of your chronometers at one uniform hour throughout your voyage is to be strictly recorded, as well as the temperature at noon and at midnight.

Having selected you for this special service, with an entire confidence in your judgment and discretion, as well as from a reliance on your skill and ability to carry out our intentions, we are not disposed to enter into a very minute detail in these instructions for your guidance; being satisfied, on the one hand, of your ability and resources to meet contingencies for which no foresight or instructions could provide; and believing, on the other, that too scrupulous an adherence to minute directions might involve you in difficulties against which your own judgment, skill and sagacity would have provided.

In the papers accompanying the Instructions you will find memoranda relative to former Arctic voyages, and the views of those persons whose experience and knowledge render their opinions valuable, and whose generous and anxious solicitude in the objects of your voyage have been there fully set forth.

Provided as you are with every thing requisite for such an enterprise, we feel the utmost reliance on the zeal and energy of yourself and those who are embarked with you in this service; and we earnestly hope that, by the aid of a wise and merciful Providence, you will be enabled to render important assistance to the Expeditions which have preceded you; and that your endeavours, as well as theirs, may be crowned with success.

Given under our hands this 14th May 1849.

To Mr. James Saunders,  
 Master commanding Her Majesty's  
 Ship "North Star."

(signed) *F. Baring.*  
*J. W. D. Dundas.*

By Command of their Lordships.

(signed) *W. A. B. Hamilton.*

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No. 5 (B.)

COPY of a LETTER from Commander Lord A. W. Beauclerk, of Her Majesty's Ship "Stromboli," to the Secretary of the Admiralty, reporting Arrival of "Stromboli" and "North Star" at Stromness.

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Majesty's Ship  
"North Star."

Her Majesty's Steam Sloop "Stromboli," Stromness,  
21 May 1849.

Sir,

I beg to report for the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that Her Majesty's ships "Stromboli" and "North Star," arrived off Aberdeen, at 3.30 a. m., on Sunday, 20th May; but as there was a heavy sea on the bar, the wind blowing strong from the E.S.E., and the tides being neap, myself and Mr. Saunders thought it advisable not to risk the ships' safety by entering the port, the tides only rising fourteen feet high water, spring tides, and nine feet neap tides, and there also being a scud of two or three feet on the bar, the wind being dead into the bay; under these circumstances, I bore up for Stromness, in the Orkneys, and anchored both ships in the harbour of Stromness, at 10.40 last night.

I found that on towing the "North Star," she steered very wild, owing to her being so deep in the water, and our speed was as follows, according to the changes of wind and weather:—With a fair wind and fresh breeze, the engines at full speed and making sixteen revolutions, we towed her nine knots. With the expansion gear in gear on the third step, with the engines making fourteen and a half revolutions, with a fair wind and moderate breeze, we towed her seven knots. With a fair wind and the expansion gear in gear on second step, and the engines making fifteen revolutions, the breeze fresh, and a moderate sea, we towed her eight knots. With the engines at full speed and making thirteen revolutions, towing head to wind, with a moderate breeze and sea, we made from five and a half to six knots. With the engines at one third speed and making from 10 to eleven revolutions, the throttle-valve being nearly closed, and towing head to wind with a strong double-reefed topsail breeze, and a heavy sea, both ships pitching heavily, we towed her from three and a half to four knots.

I further beg to state, that I found a collier at Stromness which had put into the port in a leaky state, having on board about 320 tons of South Hetton double-screened coal, which is very good coal for stowing and keeping up steam, and it being at the price of 17s. 6d. per ton, I have made arrangements for the purchase of 130 tons, which is the quantity we require. I purpose starting from Stromness to-morrow afternoon, after completing coals and water.

I have, &c.

(signed) A. W. Beauclerk,  
Commander.

No. 5 (C.)

COPY of a LETTER from Mr. Saunders to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

Her Majesty's Ship "North Star," Monday midnight,  
18 June 1849. Lat. 73° 30' N., long. 56° 53' W.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that I arrived this evening, at seven o'clock, off Uppernevik, but found the land ice running so far off the land, that it was impossible to get within 10 miles of it, and as the wind was fair, with clear weather, we continued on our course.

We intended to call at Disco, but the weather was so thick and the wind blowing strong from the southward, it was not prudent to attempt it.

At 11.30 p. m., two boats from the "Lady Jane," whaler, of Newcastle, came alongside (the other five boats belonging to that ship having gone on board the "Jane," of Bonness, for passage to England).

Finding we are likely to remain out, the two boats' crews prefer proceeding to the Danish settlement, about 15 miles to the southward, having provisions on board, except rum, with which I have supplied them.

Since leaving the "Stromboli" (up to which date you will have been made acquainted

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acquainted by Lord Amelius Beauclerk), we have had generally a fair wind, with thick foggy weather.

From what I can learn of the two boats' crews on board, the ice appears more open than usual, and I have every hope of being able to reach Lancaster Sound without any great detention.

These men report that the "Superior," of Peterhead, is lost, and the "McClellan," of New London, America, is much damaged: crews saved.

I have, &c.

(signed) J. Saunders,  
 Master and Commander.

Crew all well on board.

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No. 5 (D.)

COPY of a LETTER from Mr. Saunders to Captain Bird, of Her Majesty's Ship "Investigator."

Her Majesty's Ship "North Star," at Sea, 23 June 1849.

Sir,

Lat.  $73^{\circ} 47' N.$ , long.  $58^{\circ} 10' W.$

I HAVE to acquaint you that it is my intention to proceed to the different places mentioned by Sir James Ross for landing the provisions for the Arctic Expedition (sent out by the Admiralty in this ship); but if we should not be able to land them at either of those places, I shall proceed to Port Bowen, and there land them, if possible.

I am, &c.

(signed) J. Saunders,  
 Master and Commander.

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No. 5 (E.)

COPY of a LETTER from Mr. Saunders to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

Her Majesty's Ship "North Star," 19 July 1849.

Sir,

Lat.  $74^{\circ} 3' N.$ , long.  $59^{\circ} 40' W.$

I ADDRESSED a letter to their Lordships on the 18th ultimo, when in latitude  $73^{\circ} 30' N.$ , and longitude  $56^{\circ} 53' W.$ , detailing the particulars of my proceedings up to that date, which letter was sent by a boat from the "Lady Jane," whaler, which vessel was wrecked, and whose boats were proceeding to the Danish settlements.

Since then, I regret to state our progress has been almost entirely stopped, owing to the ice being so placed across Melville Bay as to render it perfectly impassable. On the 6th instant, finding it impossible to make any progress, I deemed it advisable to run as far south as  $72^{\circ}$ , examining the pack as we went along.

At  $72^{\circ} 22'$ , the pack appeared slacker, and we entered it; and, after proceeding about 12 miles, found ourselves completely stopped by large floes of ice. We accordingly put back and steered again for the northward.

Having this day reached the latitude of  $74^{\circ} 3' N.$ , and long.  $59^{\circ} 40' W.$ , the ice appeared more open, and we stood in toward the land, when we observed two boats approaching, and which afterwards, on coming alongside, we found to belong to the "Prince of Wales," whaler, which vessel was nipped by the ice on the 12th instant in Melville Bay.

By the captain of the "Prince of Wales" I forward this letter to their Lordships, he intending to proceed in his boats to the Danish settlement.

I have, &c.

(signed) J. Saunders,  
 Master and Commander.

Crew all well on board.



COPY of a LETTER from Mr. *Gravill* to Rear-Admiral Sir *Francis Beaufort*, K.C.B.

Sir,

Hull, 27 November 1849.

In reply to your letter of the 23d instant, which I did not receive (owing to my absence from Hull) until last night, I respectfully beg to inform you that I saw no traces whatever of Her Majesty's ship "North Star" during my voyage.

I heard from Mr. Hill, of the "Lord Gambier" whaler, that he had seen the "North Star" in July last; but there is no later account, that I am aware of, than what was stated by Mr. Lee, of the late ship "Prince of Wales," when he arrived in Hull.

In fact, I saw no ship during my passage up the Straits, as I was most anxious to make my way to Jones' Sound or Smith's Sound, which it had been fixed that I should reach if possible, and the only vessels I saw, or was in company with during the voyage, were the "Lord Gambier" and the "Horn," whom I fell in with about the 7th September, near Cape Hooper.

I took the pack on my outward passage, in lat.  $72^{\circ} 30'$ , on the 31st July, and got through into the West water in lat.  $74^{\circ} 20'$ , on the 21st August, after being in the ice 21 days; our longitude at that time would be about  $69^{\circ}$  West, or about 150 miles from the East land, but I did not pay particular attention to that point.

My first endeavour, after getting through, was to push northward as fast as possible, which I was enabled to do, the wind being fair, and I proceeded as far as Cape Clarence, when the wind changed, and I bore up for Jones' Sound. There is a particular rock, not laid down in any chart that I have seen, about a mile to the eastward of Cape Hardwick, which appeared to be about 200 feet high, and shaped like a sugar-loaf; we saw this rock about 20 miles distant, and at first took it for a ship under sail.

On nearing this rock we discovered our error, and hauling round it at about half a mile distant, we entered the Sound, and giving instruction to keep the ship under proper canvas, I landed with a good telescope, and at an eminence of from 300 to 400 feet above the level of the water, I had the opportunity of surveying the Sound for a distance of 40 to 50 miles from its entrance.

There was a quantity of floating ice and bergs in the Sound, but there was also much open water, so that if any ships had been there, sufficient opportunity was afforded, in my opinion, for them to make their way out without difficulty.

Seeing no vestige of any ship, or anything to lead me to suppose that any ship had ever been in that neighbourhood, I re-embarked, and the wind then blowing hard out of the Sound, we came south, and on the 24th, passing Cape Leopold, where I had a boat also on shore, we proceeded across Lancaster Sound, making the land between Cape Hay and Cape Liverpool, where a few miles of loose ice lay along the south shore of the Sound.

We then came to the eastward, until abreast of Cape Byam Martin, when we bored through a small point of ice, and crossing Pond's Bay, which was free from land ice, we proceeded further to the south, and caught our whales near Cape Hooper, the first being taken on the 17th September, and the last being taken in Brodie Bay on the 11th October.

The weather then becoming boisterous, and a heavy continuous swell coming from the eastward, without ice to shelter either the whales or ourselves, we came still further south, and finally took our departure from Exeter Bay on the 16th October. At that time there was no ice to impede our passage, and but few bergs in that neighbourhood.

I am, &amp;c.

(signed) *John Gravill*.

P.S.—I may state that the south point of Jones' Sound extends to the eastward 10 or 12 miles further than the north point, and also that the course of the Sound itself trends more northerly than it is laid down in my charts.

And it has occurred to me since writing the foregoing, that on the 16th August, whilst



No. 5.

Proceedings of Her  
Majesty's Ship  
North Star.

whilst in the pack, we drifted so far to the northward as to be in sight both of Cape Melville and Cape York, bearing E.N.E. about 70 miles.

From thence the ice set us south again, until the 21st August, when we got clear, as before stated.

The appearance of the sky to the northward on the 16th August, indicated the presence of much ice in that direction, and it is therefore possible that the "North Star" might have been impeded in her passage through the throat of Melville Bay, if that route had been taken by Captain Saunders; but of course I can offer no positive opinion on this subject.

(signed) John Gravill.

— No. 6. —

VOYAGE of the "Truelove" and "Advice" Whale Ships, through *Launceston Sound*, in the Summer of 1849.

(A. to C.)

No. 6.

Voyage of the  
"Truelove" and  
"Advice" through  
Launceston Sound.

No. 6 (A.)

COPY of a LETTER from Mr. *Thomas Ward*, of Hull, to Captain *Hamilton*.

Sir,

Hull, 4 October 1849.

I HAD the satisfaction of making a short communication this morning by telegraph, relative to Sir John Franklin's Expedition. I have now to forward, for the inspection of their Lordships, the Admiralty chart of Baffin's Bay, &c., which Captain Parker, of the "Truelove," has put into my hands, together with his remarks, which will, perhaps, convey better information than any lengthened detail of mine; and a rough sketch made by an Esquimaux, given to Captain Ker, of the "Chieftain," who handed it over to Parker.

It appears that the "Chieftain" and other ships got to Pond's Bay a day or two before the "Truelove;" immediately they reached that place, some of the natives went on board, and without questioning, the man drew the sketch, and by signs and in words of his own language, understood by the masters of the whalers, stated that two of the ships had been frozen up for four years on the west side of Prince Regent's Inlet, and that the other two had been frozen up on the east side for one year—that the two ships which had been there the longest had tried to get beyond Cape Rennell, but not being able, had come into Prince Regent's Inlet to winter, where the ice had not broken up since—that he and his companions had been on board all the four ships in March last, and they were then all safe. After receiving this account from the master of the "Chieftain," Mr. Parker turned his attention to the endeavour to reach Prince Regent's Inlet, or at any rate to examine Launceston Sound, for the purpose of giving such information as might be obtainable of the state of the country, &c., and of using his utmost efforts to carry out the instructions of their Lordships. He accordingly left his fishing ground off Scott's Bay, and proceeded north on the 22d July, on the passage to Launceston Sound, and having met with the "Advice" of Dundee, Captain Penny (with whom he was on friendly terms) agreed to accompany him. At that time both the ships were well fitted, the "Truelove" having 145 tons of oil on board, and the "Advice" 140 tons; but the masters judged (and rightly too) that although the risk was great with such valuable cargoes on board, they would be disgraced if the attempt were not made to render all the assistance which they were capable of doing.

On the 5th August, they got as far as Croker's Bay, where they were stopped by a solid body of ice stretching across the Straits to Admiralty Inlet; and no water being visible to the westward, they were compelled to return, coming close in with the edge of the ice; and on the 8th of August Mr. Parker landed a cask of preserved meats, and 30 bags of coals (which had been sent on board by Lady Franklin) upon Cape Hay, deposited the letters, cylinders, &c., according to the Instructions of their Lordships, and having erected a high pole to attract the attention of the ships or boats which might pass at a future time, they made the best of their way back to the fishing ground, which they reached on the 17th August.

I trust

## ARCTIC EXPEDITION UNDER SIR JOHN FRANKLIN.

No. 6.

I trust their Lordships will consider that this attempt to reach the Expeditions may be worthy of favourable consideration, and be disposed to recommend some compensation for the risk run and the loss of time occasioned thereby; but this is a point which the present is not a fitting time to urge, and I merely allude to it lest it might be imagined that any future application was an afterthought not worthy of notice.

The innumerable interruptions arising from the anxious inquiries of the public generally, on the subject which so long has interested them, must be my apology for any errors or omissions which I may have made; and all that I would venture to add, is the expression of my earnest hopes that this information, however imperfect, may ultimately lead to the adoption of such steps as may extricate those brave men from a state of danger and difficulty.

If their Lordships wish for further information, or to submit specific questions, my humble endeavours shall be used to obtain correct answers; and if they would prefer that Mr. Parker should attend in London, he is ready to do so, on receiving orders to that effect.

I am, &c.

(signed) *Thos. Ward,*  
Owner of the "Truelove."

No trace was seen of the "Investigator's" launch; neither did there appear to be any reason to doubt the correctness of the statement made by the Esquimaux, that the upper part of Lancaster Sound was a solid mass of ice.

On the 8th August, which was a clear day, Mr. Parker landed on high ground at Cape Hay, with his telescope, to see if any thing could be discovered of the "North Star," but no ship of any description was visible in Lancaster Sound, except the "Advice."

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### No. 6 (B.)

Mr. *Goodsir's* NARRATIVE of the Voyage of the "Advice" Whale Ship,  
Mr. *Penny*, Commander, through Lancaster Sound.

My letters, which were forwarded by the "Truelove," were very hurriedly written, and I had neglected to mention in them many things, trifling indeed in themselves, but which, in the entire absence of any information of the Expeditions from other quarters, may be looked upon as interesting. Not calculating upon their gaining the publicity they did, I had scarcely referred to the credit which Captain Penny, of the "Advice," deserves for his enterprise and exertions. He ran no slight risk in doing what he did; for his ship had already a valuable cargo on board, and her doublings and fortifications were almost under water. But with a well-grounded confidence in his experience and knowledge of the navigation of these seas, he determined to run all risks, and do his utmost to render assistance to the Expeditions, trusting that if he could procure whales in the Sound, it would justify the step to his owners.

I may here mention, that Mr. Penny has spent almost the whole of his life amidst the hardships of the Davis' Straits whale fishing; that his natural habits of observation are great, and his knowledge of the different phenomena connected with the motions of the immense fields of ice in Baffin's Bay profound. This is not only my own opinion, formed after eight months' constant intercourse, and after many conversations with him upon the interesting and yet little known subject of the Arctic ice, but it is the expressed opinion, also, of every one amongst the whalers to whom I have spoken upon the subject. His name as a navigator is moreover already known, from his accurate exploration of the Gulf of Teundiak-beek or Hogarth's Sound, generally called by the whalers Keirniksoke, and the coast to the northwards.

It was on the 2d of August that Captain Penny determined to proceed immediately to Lancaster Sound, and, if possible, to Prince Regent's Inlet, having on that day heard, through the American ship "M'Clellan," of New London, of the entire loss of the "Lady Jane," of Newcastle, and the "Superior," of Peterhead; and that nothing whatever had been seen or heard of the "North Star" by any of the ships. Sail was immediately made, and the ship run to the northward, with a sharp breeze from S.S.E. In the afternoon we were off Cape Walter

Bathurst.

No. 6,  
Voyage of the  
"Truelove" and  
"Advice" through  
Lancaster Sound.

Bathurst. On this occasion, and in passing over the same ground a month previously, we saw a considerable number of middling-sized icebergs, all of them of a very dark colour, and having immense blocks of quartz embedded in their substance. This seems to be peculiar to the bergs of the west coast, for although I saw on some of those on the east side dirt bands and earthy stains, it was very far from being so general as it is here. Unluckily I had no opportunity of closely examining these icebergs. A strong and favourable breeze continued throughout the night to carry us rapidly into the Sound, the weather being still clear and delightful. A keen and anxious look-out was kept by every one for the slightest trace which might have been left by either of the Expeditions.

We had run past the magnificent headland of Cape Byam Martin, and Possession Bay was opening out to our view. It still continued beautifully clear, but every object within sight was transformed by refraction—a phenomenon the effects of which so often attract the attention of the Arctic voyager. I was standing on the fore-castle, examining with a telescope every point of the shore with an anxious eye, when, with a thrill of joy, I recognized a flag-post and ensign. I gazed earnestly at it; there could be no mistake, I could almost make out the waving of the flag. Without saying a word, I put the glass into the hands of a man who was standing near me, and told him to look at the point a-head. He did so, and, with a start, immediately pronounced that he saw a signal flying. Delighted and overjoyed, I snatched the glass from his hands, and again applied it to my eye. For an instant, I saw the wished-for signal, but for an instant only; it faded and again appeared, but now distorted into a broken and disjointed column, now into an upturned and inverted pyramid. The refraction had caused a piece of ice to assume these forms. I need not say I was dejected after this sudden disappointment; but I resumed my eye-search along the shore, as did also not a few warm-hearted souls on board; the master scarcely ever leaving the crow's-nest.

During the whole of Friday; the 3d. the favourable breeze continued, carrying us rapidly on. We had as yet met with very little ice, and what we had seen was very light; everything looked well, and we had high hopes. In the forenoon, whilst off Cape Hay, an Admiralty cylinder was put overboard, enclosed in a cask, according to the Admiralty Instructions, marked with a pole and vane, and properly-ballasted. We were now running past Navy Board Inlet, and had to stand more to the northward, so that we were rather further from the south shore, and the headlands on each side of the deep Bight of Croker Bay were seen looming in the distance of the opposite shore.

From what I could make out at the distance, the country to the westward of Navy Board Inlet appeared to me to be of a much leveller and flatter nature than any I had yet seen.

The immense towering and snow-capped mountain ranges had disappeared, and a moorlike, champagne country taken their place. On some parts of the shore, however, were abruptly precipitous rocks of an extraordinary appearance, perfectly flat on the top, and having a basaltic buttressed appearance in front, without any apparent trace of stratification; for here, even at a great distance, the fact of a rock being stratified or not can be made out by the snow resting on the successive ledges.

We continued running, with every sail set that would draw, during the whole of Friday the 3d. Late in the evening it began to lower and overcast, when I retired to my berth, having been on deck, without intermission, since we had entered the Sound. On going on deck again at 4 a.m. on Saturday the 4th, to my great chagrin I found that it was quite thick, and blowing very hard with a heavy sea, and all the appearance of an increasing gale. The topgallant sails had to be stowed and the topsails reefed. By 6 a.m. the gale had so increased that the ship had to be hove-to under close-reefed maintopsail. A heavy cross sea was by this time running, and it was exceedingly thick and misty. At 10 a.m. we fell in with heavy washing ice; a press of sail had to be made on the ship, and she was reached over to the north side of the Sound, where she was again hove-to, until 10 at night, when the ice was again found to be under our lee. The sea was here breaking with the greatest violence and magnificently upon the heavy masses of ice and upon a solitary berg which was in sight.

Sail had again to be made, and the ship plied to windward. A very heavy cross sea running, the waist-boats had to be taken in on deck. It moderated slightly on the forenoon of Sunday, the sea was falling, and to my great joy the weather

weather began to clear. We found ourselves in the deep bight of the ice, which apparently stretched in a crescentic or concave direction, from Cape York on the south side, to about Burnett's Inlet on the north. The gale had completely broken up the ice, that is to say, it was in the state of pack ice. Captain Penny says, that he could make out from the mast-head Prince Leopold Islands, and, moreover, that he distinctly saw a water sky beyond the ice. I have the most perfect confidence in this opinion of Mr. Penny, for I know that he has an eye thoroughly educated to the use of the telescope, and is, as I have on many occasions had opportunities of remarking, an adept in the use of it.

We now commenced to ply our way out of the Sound again, deeply chagrined at having to renounce our search. For my own part, I was miserably distressed, for I had failed in achieving the principal if not the only object of my voyage. But Mr. Penny had scarcely another course open to him; he was not authorized by his owners to prosecute the search, or to go out of his way in obtaining information regarding the Expeditions. As long as there was a chance of procuring whales in Prince Regent's Inlet, he might have persevered, although, as I have said before, his ship was very deep in the water, and the risk would have been great in pushing through the heavy pack ice which we had fallen in with. But when, at the conclusion of the gale, we found that the land-ice had been entirely broken up, which rendered it impossible to prosecute the fishing in this direction, and consequently his continuation of a search after the Expeditions incompatible with his duty to his owners, he was reluctantly compelled to retrace his steps.

The next three days were melancholy enough, and the weather was dark and stormy. Our progress eastward was very slow—a curious fact, as Mr. Penny informed me that, on previous occasions, the difficulty always had been to make their way up the Sound against the current, which sets to the east with great strength.

About midday, on Thursday the 9th, it began to clear. We found ourselves about three miles off the west cheek of Navy Board Inlet. Throughout the afternoon and evening it gradually improved, until about midnight, when it was calm and brilliantly clear. An Admiralty cylinder was here got ready, and enclosed in a small cask, along with some of the latest newspapers which we had on board, and two boats were despatched on shore to bury it in the most conspicuous place possible. I went in one of the boats: we landed on a small island upon the west side of the inlet—one of the Wollaston Islands, I apprehend. Whilst pulling in and approaching the land, I strained my eyes in all directions in search of cairns and signals of any sort, but not the slightest vestiges of such were to be seen. As we rounded the west side of the island, to obtain a suitable landing place, I saw many blocks of ice aground on the rocks, and observed through the clear water that the rocks at the bottom were all scratched and polished by the friction of the ice. The only appearances of algæ were in the deep clefts of the rocks, and these were but scanty. We landed on the south-west side of the island, and found it to be entirely composed of limestone, and about a little more than a quarter of a mile square. Scattered about on the island were various large worn boulders of granite, some of them more than half way up the highest point, which I should say was about 50 or 60 feet above the level of the sea. There was scarcely a vestige of vegetation to be seen.

We disturbed on our landing about half-a-dozen pairs of the eider duck (*somateria mollissima*). Their eggs I found to be within a very few hours of maturity. There were besides numerous nests, the occupants of which had, I suppose, already winged their way southwards. Two brent geese (*anser bernicla*) and a single pair of arctic terns (*sterna arctica*) were most vociferous and courageous in defence of their downy offspring whenever I approached. These were the only birds I saw, with the exception of a solitary raven (*corvus corax*), not very high overhead, whose sharp and yet musically bell-like croak came startling upon the ear.

On the east side of the island, in a snugly sheltered little cove, was the remains of an Esquimaux summer hut, but evidently of some seasons back, surrounded by the bones of the bear, fox and seal, and a few little bits of balcen. I observed also a portion of the base of a human skull, but evidently long exposed to the effects of weather and atmosphere. In the meantime the men had dug a hole on the top of the island, and having inserted the cask, it was covered up, a cairn

No. 6.  
Voyage of the  
"True Love" and  
"Advice" through  
Launceston Sound.

of stones erected on the top, and a pole fixed therein, on which was put a black ball.

We then prepared to return to the "Advice," which by this time had stood further in, and had the signal of recall hoisted. It was with slow and tardy steps that I made my way towards the boats, scarcely being able to believe that it was necessary I should leave a spot which seemed to me so near our dear friends—a spot, moreover, rendered memorable as being almost the exact one from which a despairing party was, on a former occasion, snatched from a lingering fate.

We had not been long on board before thick weather came on. We lost sight of the land entirely, and did not see it again until the 14th, when we were far to the southward, in lat.  $71^{\circ} 59'$ .

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No. 6 (C.)

*Vide* Chart at the  
end.

TRACK CHART of Mr. *Parker*, in the "True Love," forwarded for the Information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 4 October 1849.

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-- No. 7. --

REPORT of the Hydrographer of the Admiralty, with the OPINIONS of Captain Sir *W. Edward Parry*, Captain Sir *James C. Ross*, Captain *Beechey*, Captain Sir *George Back*, and Dr. Sir *John Richardson*, on the proposed EXPEDITION to *Behring's Straits*.

(A. to F.)

No. 7 (A.)

No. 7.  
Report on the  
proposed Expedition  
to Behring's  
Straits.

REPORT of Rear-Admiral Sir *Francis Beaufort*, K.C.B., Hydrographer of the Admiralty, on the proposed Expedition to Behring's Straits.

Admiralty, 24 November 1849.

THERE are four ways only in which it is likely that the "Erebus" and "Terror" would have been lost:—by fire, by sunken rocks, by storm, or by being crushed between two fields of ice. Both vessels would scarcely have taken fire together; if one of them had struck on a rock, the other would have avoided the danger. Storms in those narrow seas, encumbered with ice, raise no swell, and could produce no such disaster; and, therefore, by the fourth cause alone could the two vessels have been at once destroyed; and even in that case the crews would have escaped upon the ice (as happens every year to the whalers); they would have saved their loose boats, and reached some part of the American shores. As no traces of any such event have been found on any part of those shores, it may therefore be safely affirmed that one ship at least, and both the crews, are still in existence; and therefore the point where they now are is the great matter for consideration.

Their orders would have carried them towards Melville Island, and then out to the westward, where it is therefore probable that they are entangled amongst islands and ice. For should they have been arrested at some intermediate place, for instance, Cape Walker, or at one of the northern chain of islands, they would undoubtedly, in the course of the three following years, have contrived some method of sending notices of their position to the shores of North Somerset or to Barrow Straits.

If they had reached much to the southward of Banks's Land, they would surely have communicated with the tribes on Mackenzie River; and if, failing to get to the westward or southward, they had returned with the intention of penetrating through Wellington Channel, they would surely have detached parties on the ice towards Barrow Straits, in order to leave deposited statements of their intentions.

The general conclusion, therefore, remains, that they are still locked up in the Archipelago to the westward of Melville Island. Now it is well known that the

state

state of the weather alternates between the opposite sides of Northern America, being mild on the one when rigorous on the other; and accordingly, during the two last years, which have been unusually severe in Baffin's Bay, the United States whalers were successfully traversing the Polar Sea to the northward of Behring's Straits. The same severe weather may possibly prevail on the eastern side during the summer of 1850, and if so, it is obvious that an attempt should be now made by the western opening, and not merely to receive the two ships, if they should be met coming out (as formerly), but to advance in the direction of Melville Island, resolutely entering the ice, and employing every possible expedient by sledging parties, by reconnoitring balloons, and by blasting the ice to communicate with them.

These vessels should be intrepidly commanded, effectively manned, and supplied with the best means for travelling across the ice to the English or to the Russian settlements, as it will be of the greatest importance to be informed of what progress the Expedition has made; and for this purpose likewise the "Plover" (of whom we have heard nothing since August 28) will be of material service, lying at some advanced point near Icy Cape, and ready to receive intelligence, and to convey it to Petropaulski or to Panama.

These vessels should enter Behring's Straits before the 1st of August, and therefore every effort should be now made to despatch them from England before Christmas. They might water at the Falkland Islands, and again at the Sandwich Islands, where they would be ready to receive additional instructions *via* Panama, by one of the Pacific steamers, and by which vessel they might be pushed on some little distance to the northward.

(signed) *F. B.*

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No. 7 (B. 1.)

MEMORANDUM from Captain Sir *W. E. Parry*.

Haslar Hospital, 29 November 1849

SIR JOHN RICHARDSON recommends that a Paper be drawn up, and printed in the Russian language, under the authority of the Emperor of Russia, or his Minister in London, addressed to the Agents of the Russian Fur Company, on the north and north-west coast of America (especially their most westerly posts, near the coast of the Polar Sea), directing them to offer rewards to the natives for affording relief to any white men cast on their coast, and especially for conducting them to any of the Russian posts.

The Admiralty of Great Britain to repay the Company for the rewards thus given, and for any other expense incurred in this service, in case of any of the missing English party being relieved by their efforts.

To be printed immediately, and sent out by the "Enterprize" and "Investigator" and also in the spring to the Hudson's Bay Company's posts nearest to the Russians.

(signed) *W. E. Parry*,  
Captain R.N.

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No. 7 (B. 2.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain Sir *W. Edward Parry* to the  
Secretary of the Admiralty.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Haslar Hospital, Gosport, 2 December 1849.

IN obedience to their Lordships' commands, signified to me by your letter of the 30th November, I beg leave to submit the following considerations as to the expediency of adopting further measures for the relief of the Expedition under the command of Sir John Franklin.

With respect to the place in which these ships have been detained, we have, I think, no data on which to found any very satisfactory conjecture beyond the fact that in the attempt to penetrate to the westward, towards Behring's Straits, they have, up to the time when information could reach England, been too far removed from the continent of America to render a communication practicable; because I believe that such a communication would otherwise have been effected by Sir John Franklin after passing the second winter (1846-7) in the ice.



But it seems to me likely that the ships have been pushing on, summer after summer, in the direction of Behring's Straits, and are detained somewhere in the space south-westward of Banks's Land. On the other hand, should they, after the first or second summer, have been unsuccessful in that direction, they may have attempted to proceed to the northward, either through Wellington Channel, or through some other of the openings among the same group of islands. I do not myself attach any superior importance to Wellington Channel as regards the north-west passage, but I understand that Sir John Franklin did, and that he strongly expressed to Lord Haddington his intention of attempting that route, if he should fail in effecting the more direct passage to the westward.

The ships having been fully victualled for three years, the resources may, by due precautions, have been extended to four years for the whole crews; but it has occurred to me, since I had the honour of conferring with their Lordships, that, if their numbers have been gradually diminished to any considerable extent by death (a contingency which is but too probable, considering their unparalleled detention in the ice), the resources would be proportionably extended for the survivors, whom it might, therefore, be found expedient to transfer to one of the ships, with all the remaining stores, and with that one ship to continue the endeavour to push westward, or to return to the eastward, as circumstances might render expedient; in that case, the necessity for quitting both the ships in the past summer might not improbably have been obviated.

Under these circumstances, which, it must be admitted, amount to no more than mere conjecture, it seems to me expedient still to prosecute the search in both directions; namely, by way of Behring's Straits (to which I look with the strongest hope), and also by that of Barrow's Straits. In the latter direction, it ought, I think, to be borne in mind, that the more than usual difficulties with which Sir James Ross had to contend have, in reality, left us with very little more information than before he left England, and I cannot contemplate, without serious apprehension, leaving that opening without still further search in the ensuing spring, in case of the missing crews having fallen back to the eastern coast of North Somerset, where they would naturally look for supplies to be deposited for them, in addition to the chance of finding some of those left by the "Fury." For the purpose of further pursuing the search by way of Barrow's Straits, perhaps two small vessels of 150 or 200 tons might suffice, but they must be square rigged for the navigation among the ice. Of course the object of such vessels would be nearly that which Sir James Ross's endeavours have failed to accomplish; and the provisions, &c., left by that officer at Whaler Point, as well as any which may be deposited in that neighbourhood by the "North Star," would greatly add to the resources, facilitate the operations, and lessen the risk of any attempt made in that direction.

If, however, there be time to get ships to Behring's Straits by the first week in August 1850, which would perhaps require the aid of steam vessels to accomplish with any degree of certainty, I recommend that the "Enterprise" and "Investigator" be forthwith equipped and despatched there, with instructions to push through the ice to the E. N. E. as far as possible in the ensuing season, with the hope of meeting with at least one of the ships, or any of the parties which may have been detached from them. This attempt has never yet been made by any ships, and I cling very strongly to the belief that such an effort might be attended with success in rescuing at least a portion of our people.

My reason for urging this upon their Lordships is, that the admirable instructions under which the "Plover," assisted by the "Herald," is acting, embraces only the search of the Coast Line eastward from Icy Cape; since the boats and baidars cannot effect anything except by creeping along, as opportunities offer, between the ice and the land, so that this plan of operations meets only the contingency of parties reaching, or nearly reaching, the land; whereas the chance of rescue would, as it appears to me, be immensely increased by ships pushing on, clear of the coast, towards Banks's Land and Melville Island, as far at least as might be practicable in the best five or six weeks of the season of 1850.


I beg also to draw their Lordships' attention to the memorandum which I had the honour of submitting to them, containing a suggestion of Sir John Richardson as to the expediency of printing, under the sanction of the Emperor of Russia, or of his Minister in London, directions, in the Russian language, to the Agents of their Fur Company at the various posts on the north and north-west coast of America, to offer rewards to the natives for assistance rendered to any white men





Nº7 (B.3.)

[To face Page 77.]



cast upon their shores ; these directions to be sent out in our own ships to Behring's Straits, and likewise through the Russian agents, who annually go to America from Petropoulocoski. Similar rewards may be offered through the medium of the Hudson's Bay Company in the territory occupied by their servants, and especially that to the westward of the Mackenzie River, which district Dr. Rae is about to superintend, after completing the service entrusted to him for the past summer by Sir John Richardson.

In offering the foregoing opinion, I beg to assure their Lordships that I have done so under a deep sense of their anxious and even painful responsibility, both as regards the risk of life, as well as the inferior consideration of expense involved in further attempts to rescue our gallant countrymen, or at least the surviving portion of them, from their perilous position.

But it is my deliberate conviction that the time has not yet arrived when the attempt ought to be given up as hopeless ; that the preparations made for further efforts in the course of the next few weeks may determine their fate ; and that, whether it please God to give success to these efforts or not, their Lordships, and the country at large, will hereafter be better satisfied to have followed up the noble attempts already made, so long as the most distant hope remains of ultimate success.

I have, &c.

(signed) *W. E. Parry*, Captain R. N.

#### No. 7 (B. 3.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain Sir *W. E. Parry* to Captain *Hamilton*.

Sir,

Haslar Hospital, 11 February 1850.

I beg leave to transmit to you herewith a model of a sledge, which I found to be invaluable for the conveyance of provisions over the ice, in my attempt to reach the North Pole in the year 1827, and which may therefore prove equally useful to Captain Austin, for detached travelling parties, in the proposed Expedition in search of Sir John Franklin's ships.

The sledge is constructed from four Lapland snow-shoes, put together so as to be flexible and light ; any stiff and heavy sledge made of one piece, however strong, being very soon broken to pieces. The length of the sledge was about 6 or 7 feet, and its breadth in exact proportion to the model now sent. A shorter sledge does not answer so well, being more easily diverted from the direct course, and therefore occasioning additional labour in drawing. Ash or hickory would be the best material.

Both the sledge and the mode of stowing the bags of pemmican and biscuit powder are so contrived as to be placed conveniently in a boat's bottom, without any unpacking, and handed out when the boat has to be lightened, for hauling over ice or land ; and on tolerably smooth snow, each of these sledges, with the weights marked on the bags (in all about 350 lbs., besides the sledge itself), may be drawn by a couple of men.

The cloth is "Mackintosh," the seams of the bags having been very carefully sewn together, and "paid" with the solution of caoutchouc sold for that purpose ; and, with these precautions, we never lost a pound of pemmican or biscuit powder, though the sledges were dragged, day after day, through soft snow, or more frequently through four or five inches of snow-water.

I have, &c.

(signed) *W. E. Parry*, Captain R. N.

#### No. 7 (C.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain Sir *James C. Ross* to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

Sir,

12, Pall Mall, 30 November 1849.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this day's date, containing the copy of a report of the Hydrographer of the Admiralty, suggesting another Expedition in search of Sir John Franklin, and conveying to

me the desire of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that I should state my opinion thereon.

I have to acquaint you, for the information of their Lordships, that upon all the main points of that report I entirely concur.

1st. With respect to the probable position of the "Erebus" and "Terror," I consider that it is hardly possible they can be anywhere to the eastward of Melville Island, or within 300 miles of Leopold Island, for if that were the case, they would assuredly, during the last spring, have made their way to that point, with the hope of receiving assistance from the whale-ships which for several years previous to the departure of that Expedition from England had been in the habit of visiting Prince Regent's Inlet in pursuit of whales, and in that case they must have been met with, or marks of their encampments have been found by some of the numerous parties detached from the "Enterprize" and "Investigator" along the shores of that vicinity during the only period of the season in which travelling is practicable in those regions.

It is probable, therefore, that during their first summer, which was remarkably favourable for the navigation of those seas, they have been enabled (in obedience to their orders) to push the ships to westward of Banks' Land, and have there become involved in the heavy pack of ice which was observed from Melville Island always to be setting past its westernmost point in a S. E. direction, and from which pack they may not have been able to extricate their ships.

From such a position retreat to the eastward would be next to impossible, whilst the journey to the Mackenzie River, of comparatively easy accomplishment, together with Sir John Franklin's knowledge of the resources in the way and of its practicability, would strengthen the belief that this measure will have been adopted by them during the last spring.

If this be assumed as the present position of the "Erebus" and "Terror," it would manifestly be far more easy and safe to afford them relief by means of an Expedition entering Behring's Straits, than from any other direction, as it would not be necessary for the ships to depart so far from the coast of North America as to preclude their keeping up a regular communication with the Russian settlements on the River Colville, or those of the Hudson's Bay Company near the mouth of the Mackenzie, whilst the whole space between any position in which the ships might winter and Banks' Land could be thoroughly examined by travelling parties early in the spring, or by boats or steam launches at a more advanced period of the following season.

2dly. I agree with the Hydrographer in considering that two strong ships are indispensable to enable the commander of such an Expedition to push forward with confidence, or with any reasonable hope of success; and no more suitable vessels than the "Enterprize" and "Investigator" could be selected for that service.

And 3dly. In the suggestion that the ships should sail from England by the 1st of January next, at latest, and in order to their being got ready in time, it would be necessary that they should be taken into dock without delay, thoroughly examined, caulked and coppered, and that an effective crew might be got together to overhaul and refit the rigging and stores: they should be immediately put into commission.

And finally, that the vessels should enter Behring's Straits by the 1st of August; that they should touch at the Falkland Islands for water, and thence proceed to the Sandwich Islands, there to wait their Lordships' final instructions, by way of Panama.

I beg leave in conclusion to remark, that having, in conjunction with Admiral Beaufort, given much consideration to this anxious question, it cannot but be satisfactory to myself to find that we have arrived at the same judgment on the several essential points above enumerated.

✱

I have, &c.

(signed) *Jas. C. Ross,*  
Captain R. N.

COPY of a LETTER from Captain *Beechey* to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

Sir,

Cheltenham, 1 December 1849.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday's date, enclosing a report of the Hydrographer to the Admiralty, and suggesting another Polar Relief Expedition in search of the ships under the orders of Sir John Franklin, and desiring my opinion thereupon.

I quite agree with Sir Francis Beaufort in what he has stated with regard to any casualties which Sir J. Franklin's ships may have sustained, and entirely agree with him and Sir Edward Parry, that the Expedition is probably hampered amongst the ice somewhere to the south-westward of Melville Island; but there is yet a possibility which does not appear to have been contemplated, which is, that of the scurvy having spread among the crew, and incapacitated a large proportion of them from making any exertion towards their release, or that the whole, in a debilitated state, may yet be clinging by their vessels, existing sparingly upon the provision which a large mortality may have spun out, in the hope of relief.

In the first case, that of the ships being hampered and the crews in good health, I think it certain that as the resources of the ships would be expended in May last, Sir John Franklin and his crew have abandoned the ships, and pushed forward for the nearest point where they might reasonably expect assistance, and which they could reasonably reach.

There are consequently three points to which it would be proper to direct attention, and as the case is urgent, every possible method of relief should be energetically pushed forward at as early a period as possible, and directed to those points, which I need scarcely say are Barrow Straits, Behring's Straits and the northern coast of America.

Barrow Straits should be visited in the ensuing summer, as early as possible, by the two ships which have lately returned, as they are ready prepared, otherwise smaller vessels would have answered, and they should carry out the instructions of last year, excepting so far as any part of them may have been superseded by the Expedition of Sir James Ross, and that of their return at the end of the season being imperative.

As regards Behring's Straits, the very full and able instructions sent to Captain Kellett and Commander Moore would not leave anything to be desired there, could we but communicate to the "Plover" the state of affairs, and the urgent necessity of carrying out their instructions to the uttermost, and at the same time be certain that Commander Moore has been able to provide boats necessary for the extended Coast Expedition which has now become imperative. In the present emergency, therefore, I consider it would be proper to send a vessel to apprise Commander Moore of the state of the case, and to carry up to him additional means of pushing forward parties beyond Point Barrow, to furnish him with increased means of purchasing what he may require of the natives, and of rewarding them for any assistance they may render, which, with respect to procuring information, may be very great.

As it would be late before any vessel fitted in this country could reach Behring's Straits, I suggest that one of the South American squadron be detached for this purpose, and I see no objection, as regards the navigation of Behring's Straits as far as Kotzebue Sound, to a steamer being employed. This vessel should carry out a volunteer commander and crew, with every other requisite for an intrepid undertaking, and should be provided with a decked barge to accompany the baidars, some of which of a large size and stronger build than those of the Esquimaux may possibly be procured at Sitka or Oonalaska or Michaelowski, where the ship in her advance northward would touch.

Commander Moore during the last summer will no doubt have sent out a party to visit the coast eastward of Point Barrow, and another Expedition will now start under the great advantage of their experience, so that we may hope the contemplated party will be able to reach a considerable distance along the coast. I will not go into detail as to how far these boats should prosecute the search, or whether it might or might not be prudent for one party at an advanced position to branch off towards Melville Island, whilst a second kept along the continent, as that

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involves considerations which alone could be judged of on the spot, and which the experience of Sir John Richardson and Sir George Back, and other travellers in the polar regions, would be necessary to decide; of which one would be, whether parties unacquainted with the localities might safely have recourse to the Mackenzie River in the event of not being able to return round Point Barrow; but if no tidings should be had of the crews of the missing ships, an effort should be made to reach the spot where the ships are thought likely to be, to meet the case of a disabled crew alluded to in the early part of my letter.

Of the measures which can be resorted to on the northern coast of America, the officers who have had experience there, and the Hudson's Bay Company, will be able to judge; but I am of opinion that nothing should be neglected in that quarter; for it seems to me almost certain that Sir John Franklin and his crew, if able to travel, have abandoned their ships and made for the continent, and if they have not succeeded in gaining the Hudson's Bay outposts, they have been overtaken by winter before they could accomplish their purpose.

Lastly, as to the opinion which naturally forces itself upon us as to the utility of the sending relief to persons whose means of subsistence will have failed them more than a year by the time the relief could reach them, I would observe, that a prudent reduction of the allowance may have been timely made to meet an emergency, or great mortality may have enabled the survivors to subsist up to the time required, or it may be that the crews have just missed reaching the points visited by our parties last year before they quitted them, and in the one case may now be subsisting on the supplies at Leopold Island, or be housed in eastward of Point Barrow, sustained by depôts which have been fallen in with, or by the native supplies; so that, under all the circumstances, I do not consider their condition so utterly hopeless that we should give up the expectation of yet being able to render them a timely assistance.

I have, &c.

(signed) *F. W. Beechey*, Captain.

No. 7 (E.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain Sir *George Back* to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

6, Nelson-crescent, Ramsgate,  
1 December 1849.

Sir,

IN answer to the letter I have had the honour to receive, requesting my opinion on the report of the Hydrographer, suggesting another Expedition in search of Sir John Franklin, I beg to state that a further search certainly ought to be made, and perfectly agreeing with Sir F. Beaufort in his general conclusion, "that the ships are still locked up in the Archipelago to the westward," or I should rather say, in the neighbourhood "of Melville Island," it becomes of the first importance to get at that locality with the least risk to the lives of those and the vessels to be employed.

You will be pleased, Sir, to impress on my Lords Commissioners, that I wholly reject all and every idea of any attempts on the part of Sir John Franklin to send boats or detachments over the ice to any point of the main land eastward of the Mackenzie River, because I can say from experience, that no toil-worn and exhausted party could have the least chance of existence by going there.

I will not enter into the question of the "weather alternating between the opposite sides of North America," for the obvious reason that it is extremely doubtful if two such heavy ships as the "Enterprize" and "Investigator" could reach Behring's Straits by the "1st of August," or in time to be of use, otherwise than by (according to the Hydrographer's expression) "resolutely entering the ice in the direction of Melville Island."

Had I been ignorant of the instructions issued to Captain Kellett and Commander Moore, I might have agreed in the last suggestion; but those instructions seem to me so fully to embrace all that can be said, and to provide for all contingencies, that the sending out other ships in that quarter, except in the sense of the above quotation, I hold to be superfluous.

On the other hand, from my knowledge of Sir John Franklin (having been three times on discovery together), I much doubt if he would quit his ship at all,

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all, except in a boat; for any attempt to cross the ice a long distance on foot would be tempting death; and it is too laborious a task to sledge far over such an uneven surface as those regions generally present. That great mortality must have occurred, and that our ship, as Sir E. Beaufort hints at, may be lost, are greatly to be feared; and, as on all former Expeditions, if the survivors are paralysed by the depressing effects of scurvy, it would then be impossible for them, however desirous they might be, to leave the ship, which must thus become their last most anxious abode.

If, however, open water should have allowed Sir John Franklin to have resorted to his boats, then I am persuaded he would make for either the Mackenzie River, or, which is far more likely, from the almost certainty he must have felt of finding provision, Cape Clarence and Fury Point.

I am aware that the whole chances of life in this painful case depend on food; but when I reflect on Sir John Franklin's former extraordinary preservation under miseries and trials of the most severe description, living often on scraps of old leather and other refuse, I cannot despair of his finding the means to prolong existence till aid be happily sent him.

Finally, believing with Sir F. Beaufort, that the coast about "Melville Island," including the south-west direction from Cape Walker and Wellington Channel, as well as the two points already mentioned, to be the most probable places of finding, or at least ascertaining beyond conjecture the fate of the Expedition, I would propose to my Lords Commissioners the expediency of again despatching the "Enterprize" and "Investigator" about March next in that direction, as being, in my opinion, the best means of satisfying the public voice of humanity, and rescuing our long absent countrymen from their perilous situation.

I have, &c.

(signed) George Back, Captain.

No. 7 (F.)

COPY of a LETTER from Dr. Sir John Richardson to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

Royal Naval Hospital at Haslar,  
1 December 1849.

Sir,

In compliance with the commands of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that I should give my opinion on an Expedition in search of Sir John Franklin, suggested by the Hydrographer of the Admiralty, I beg leave to inform you, that it seems to me to be very desirable that the western shores of the Archipelago of Parry's Islands should be searched in a high latitude in the manner proposed by the hydrographer.

If the proposed Expedition succeeds in establishing its winter quarters among these islands, parties detached over the ice may travel to the eastward and south-eastward, so as to cross the line of search which it is hoped Mr. Rae has been able to pursue in the present summer, and thus to determine whether any traces of the missing ships exist in localities the most remote from Behring's Straits and Lancaster Sound; and from whence shipwrecked crews would find the greatest difficulty in travelling to any place where they could hope to find relief.

The climate of Arctic America improves in a sensible manner with an increase of western longitude. On the Mackenzie, on the 135th meridian, the summer is warmer than in any district of the continent in the same parallel, and it is still finer, and the vegetation more luxuriant on the banks of the Yukon on the 150th meridian. This superiority of climate leads me to infer, that ships well fortified against drift-ice, will find the navigation of the Arctic Seas more practicable in its western portion than it has been found to be to the eastward. This inference is supported by my own personal experience, as far as it goes. I met with no ice in the month of August, on my late voyage, till I attained the 122d meridian, and which I was led, from that circumstance, to suppose coincided with the western limits of Parry's Archipelago.

The greater facility of navigation, and the more healthy atmosphere, which are to be expected in the western portion of the Arctic Seas, are circumstances which are of great importance in the present state of our knowledge of the region.



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attempt to penetrate the Polar Sea from that quarter has not been resumed since the time of Cook, is, that the length of the previous voyage to Behring's Straits would considerably diminish the store of provisions; but the facilities of obtaining supplies in the Pacific are now so augmented, that this objection has no longer the same force.

A full store of provisions is very essential to the safety and success of an Expedition intending to winter in the Polar Seas.

In very low temperatures, more food is required to sustain the temperature of the human body, and to supply the waste occasioned by the active respiration of a condensed atmosphere. The preservation of the health of the crews, therefore, requires a considerable increase of the usual allowance of animal food to be made during the winter.

To provide for opportunities of intercourse with the Esquimaux which may occur in or near Behring's Straits, it seems to be advisable that such an Expedition should be provided with an interpreter; and as it is not probable that a native Esquimaux could be obtained in proper time, I beg leave to suggest the possibility of engaging one of the Moravian brethren to fill that office: many of the missionaries of that Society, who have been employed in Greenland or Labrador, speak the Esquimaux language fluently; and should it happen that one so qualified is now available, the humane object of the Expedition might induce the Society to allot him for this service.

A proper supply of copper kettles, saws, hatchets, knives, files, tobacco and beads, would enable the commander of the Expedition to purchase dogs from the Esquimaux, which would be serviceable to travelling parties; and liberal promises of these articles might, through the persuasions of an interpreter, induce a few active unmarried Esquimaux to accompany the ships, and act as hunters of the walrus, seals and whales.

Captain Cook says that the flesh of the walrus is a sweet and wholesome article of food, and the whales would furnish light and fuel.

I have, &c.

(signed) John Richardson,  
Inspector of Hospitals.

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ORDERS and INSTRUCTIONS for the EXPEDITION to *Behring's Straits*, under the Command of Captain *Collinson*, C.B., of Her Majesty's Ship "Enterprize," and Commander *McClure*, of Her Majesty's Ship "Investigator."

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No. 8.

Orders and Instructions for the Expedition to Behring's Straits.

SAILING ORDERS from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to Captain *Collinson*, C.B., of Her Majesty's Ship "Enterprize;" dated 15 January 1850.

By the Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

1. WHEREAS the efforts that have been made during the last two years to relieve the "Erebus" and "Terror" have failed, and all access to the Parry Islands has been prevented by the accumulation of ice in the upper part of Barrow Straits: And whereas it is possible that the same severity of weather may not prevail at the same time in both the eastern and western entrances to the Arctic Sea, we have now determined, in a matter of such moment, to send an Expedition into the Polar Sea from the westward; and, having a full confidence in your zeal and skill, we have thought proper to appoint you to the command of Her Majesty's ship "Enterprize," and also to place under your orders Her Majesty's ship "Investigator;" both of which vessels having been duly fortified against collision with the ice, equipped for the polar climate by warm-air apparatus, and furnished with provisions for three years, as well as a large supply of extra stores, you are now required and directed, so soon as they are in all respects ready for

sea, to proceed to make the best of your way to Cape Virgins, in order to arrive at Behring's Straits in July.

2. At Cape Virgins, the Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific has been desired to have a steam-vessel waiting for you, and by her you will be towed through the Straits of Magellan, and the Wellington Channel, and on to Valparaiso.

3. At that port you will use the utmost despatch in watering and refreshing your crews, and in fully replenishing your bread and other provisions and stores; and having so done, you will again use your best exertions to press forward to the Sandwich Islands.

4. There is only a bare possibility of your reaching those islands in time to meet Her Majesty's ship "Herald," under the command of Captain Henry Kellett; but if that should be the case, you will receive from him, not only every assistance, but much useful information touching your passage to the Strait, and your further proceedings to the northward. It is still more improbable that Her Majesty's ship "Plover" should be there; but wherever you may fall in with her, you are hereby directed to take her and Commander Moore under your orders.

5. At the Sandwich Islands you will find additional orders from us for your guidance, which we propose to forward from hence by the Panama mail of next March; but if none should arrive, or if they do not in any way modify these directions, you will enforce the greatest diligence in re-victualling your two vessels, in procuring, if possible, the necessary Esquimaux interpreters, and in making all requisite preparations for at once proceeding to Behring's Straits, in order to reach the ice before the 1st of August.

6. An examination of the several orders issued to Captain Kellett will show that it is uncertain where he may be fallen in with. You may probably find the "Herald" and "Plover" together.

7. We consider it essential that, after entering the ice, there should be a dépôt, or point of succour, for any party to fall back upon. For this purpose the "Plover" is to be secured in the most favourable quarter, as far in advance as can be found - such as Wainwright's Inlet, or the Creek at Hope Point: but if they be unsat, and none has been discovered nearer to Barrow's Point, then at Chamisso Island, or any part of Kotzebue Sound, which may afford the necessary shelter.

8. Considering, however, the nature of the service in which the "Plover" will already have been employed, and that a portion of her crew may be unfit to contend with the rigours of a further stay in those latitudes, you will call for volunteers from that ship, and from the "Herald" if in company, sufficient to form a crew for the "Plover;" taking care that the men to be selected are men of good character, and that they do not exceed in number what is actually required for the care of the ship, and for defence and security against any treacherous attack on the part of the natives of Norton Sound.

9. The petty officers' ratings that may be vacated by men invalided are to be filled up by men volunteering to remain; such volunteers are to be subjected to a strict and careful survey by the medical officers of the several ships; and those only are to be retained who would seem to be in all respects fit to encounter this extended service; and the remainder necessary to complete the crew is to be made up from the "Enterprize" and "Investigator."

10. Such crew having been formed (to continue under the command of Commander Moore, and with the officers now in the "Plover," or with those who may volunteer for the service), the "Plover," if the "Herald" should be in company, is to be filled up by Captain Kellett with all the provisions, fuel and stores that can possibly be spared by Captain Kellett, who will bear in mind not only what may be required for the use of the "Plover's" crew until the autumn of 1853, and the contingency of parties arriving on board from Sir John Franklin's Expedition, but also the possibility of any party from the "Enterprize" or "Investigator" having to fall back upon the "Plover."

11. In providing for this necessary equipment for the "Plover," attention will be paid to the numbers left in the "Herald," and the supplies necessary to carry that vessel to Whooahoo; and having received from Captain Kellett any baidars, or light boats, that he may be able to spare, and which may be likely to form a useful addition to your own boats, or those of the "Investigator," when searching parties may be detached from the ships in the spring, the "Herald" will return to the Sandwich Islands, there to fill up provisions, and from thence proceed to Hong Kong on her way to England, in pursuance of our orders of the 14th December last.

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12. On detaching the "Plover" to take up her winter quarters, you will direct Commander Moore to remain there until you join him, or, failing your return to him, until the end of the summer of 1853; when, but not until it is absolutely necessary for securing the "Plover's" passage through the Aleutian group of Islands, he is to quit Behring's Straits, and make the best of his way to Valparaiso (touching at the Sandwich Islands for refreshment), where he will receive further instructions relative to his return to England from the Commander-in-Chief.

13. If the "Herald" and "Plover" should be fallen in with to the northward and eastward of Behring's Straits, or in the Polar Sea, Captain Kellett, on detaching himself from your company, should consort with the "Plover" as far as her winter quarters, and if time and circumstances admitted of it, he should assist in securing her there.

14. In the event of your having to winter your ships on the continent or Esquimaux shores, you will probably meet with some of the wandering tribes, or with Indians. With these you will cultivate a friendly feeling, by making them presents of those articles to which they are apt to attach a value; but you will take care not to suffer yourself to be surprised by them, but use every precaution, and be constantly on your guard against any treacherous attack. You will also, by offering rewards, to be paid in such manner as you may be able to arrange, endeavour to prevail on them to carry to any of the settlements of the Hudson's Bay Company an account of your situation and proceedings, with an urgent request that it may be forwarded to England with the utmost possible despatch.

15. In whatever place you may have to establish your winter quarters, you will devote every resource in your power to the preservation of the health, the comfort and the cheerfulness of the people committed to your care.

16. We leave it to your judgment and discretion as to the course to be pursued after passing Point Barrow, and on entering the ice; and you will be materially assisted in this respect by what you will learn from Captain Kellett, if he should be fallen in with at the Sandwich Islands, as well as from the observations of Sir E. Parry and Captain Beechey contained in the memoranda, of which we send you copies.

17. We have desired that you shall be furnished, not only with a copy of the orders under which Commander Moore is now acting, but also with copies of all the orders which from time to time have been given to Captain Kellett, as well as with those under which an attempt was made to relieve the "Erebus" and "Terror" by Captain Sir James Ross on the eastern side through Baffin's Bay. You will further be supplied with all the printed voyages or travels in those northern regions; and the memoranda and instructions drawn up by Sir John Richardson, as to the manners and habits of the Esquimaux, and the best mode of dealing with that people (a copy of which is also sent), will afford a valuable addition to the information now supplied to you.

18. We deem it right to caution you against suffering the two vessels placed under your orders to separate, except in the event of accident or unavoidable necessity; and we desire that you will keep up the most unreserved communication with the Commander of the "Investigator," placing in him every proper confidence, and acquainting him with the general tenor of your orders, and with your views and intentions from time to time; so that the service may have the full benefit of your united efforts in the prosecution of such a service; and that in the event of any unavoidable separation, or of any accident to yourself, Commander M'Clure may have the advantage of knowing, up to the latest period, all your ideas and designs relative to the satisfactory completion of this undertaking.

19. We also recommend that as frequent an exchange may take place as conveniently may be of the observations made in the two ships; that any information obtained by the one, be as quickly as possible communicated for the advantage and guidance of the other.

20. In case of any irreparable accident happening to the "Enterprise," you are hereby authorized to take command of the "Investigator," and to make such arrangements for the officers and crews as may be most consonant to the rules of the service, and most conducive to the objects of the Expedition.

21. In the event of Great Britain being involved in hostilities with any foreign power during your absence, you are to abstain from the smallest act of aggression towards any vessel belonging to such nation, it being the practice of all civilized

# ARCTIC EXPEDITION UNDER SIR JOHN FRANKLIN.

No. 8.

Orders and Instructions for the Expedition to Behring's Straits.

civilized countries to consider vessels engaged in service of this kind as exempt from the rules and operations of war.

22. In carrying out the foregoing orders, you will avail yourself of every practicable occasion of acquainting our Secretary with every step of your progress, as well as with your future intentions; and occasionally during your voyage, you will throw overboard one of the tin cylinders with which you have been supplied (headed up in any cask or barrel that you could manufacture or spare), containing an account of the date, position, &c. On your reaching England, you will call on every person, in both vessels, to deliver up their logs, journals, charts and drawings, but which, they may be informed, shall be returned to them in due time.

23. With respect to your search proving fruitless, and your finally quitting the Polar Seas, as well as your securing your winter quarters towards the close of any one season, we cannot too strongly impress upon you the necessity of the utmost precaution and care being exercised in withdrawing in time, so as in no case to hazard the safety of the ships, and the lives of those entrusted to your care, by your being shut up in a position which might render a failure of provisions possible.

We feel it unnecessary to give you more detailed instructions, which might possibly embarrass you in a service of this description; and we have therefore only to repeat our perfect reliance on your judgment and resolution, both in doing all that is possible to relieve the missing ships, and in withdrawing in time, when you come to the painful conclusion that your efforts are unavailing.\*

24. You will bear in mind that the object of the Expedition is to obtain intelligence, and to render assistance to Sir John Franklin and his companions, and not for the purposes of geographical or scientific research; and we conclude these orders with an earnest hope that Providence may crown your efforts with success, and that they may be the means of dispelling the gloom and uncertainty which now prevail respecting the missing Expedition.

Given under our hands, this 15th day of January 1850.

(signed) *F. T. Baring.*  
*J. W. D. Dundas.*

By command of their Lordships,

(signed) *J. Parker.*

Richard Collinson, Esq., C. B.  
Captain of H. M. S. "Enterprise," at Devonport.

— No. 8\* —

CORRESPONDENCE as to the Selection of Mr. *Miertsching* as an INTERPRETER to Captain *Collinson's* Expedition.

(A. to I.)

No. 8\* (A.)

COPY of a LETTER from the Secretary of the Admiralty to Captain *Sir W. Edward Parry.*

Sir,

Admiralty, 22 December 1849.

No. 8\*.

Correspondence: Interpreter to Capt. Collinson's Expedition.

As it seems desirable that the Expedition about to proceed in search of Sir John Franklin should be provided with an interpreter, to provide for opportunities of intercourse with the Esquimaux which may occur in or near Behring's Straits, and as it is not probable that a native Esquimaux could be obtained in proper time, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, that they consider that it would be highly advisable to endeavour to engage one of the Moravian brethren to fill that office, as many of the missionaries of that Society who have been employed in Greenland or Labrador speak the Esquimaux language fluently; and should it happen that one so qualified is now available, the humane object of the Expedition might induce the Society to allot him for this service.

No. 8\*.

Correspondence:  
interpreter to  
Capt. Collinson's  
Expedition.

My Lords, therefore, request that you will take the necessary steps to carry out this object, and that you will communicate with Mr. La Trobe on the subject.

I am, &amp;c.

(signed) J. H. Hay,  
Pro Secretary.

No. 8\* (B.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain Sir W. Edward Parry to John Parker, Esq.,  
Secretary of the Admiralty.

Sir,

Haslar Hospital, 27 December 1849.

I beg to acquaint you, for the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that having, in obedience to their Lordships' commands, communicated with the Rev. Peter La Trobe as to the practicability of procuring the services of one of the Moravian missionaries as an Esquimaux interpreter, to accompany the Expedition fitting out for Behring's Straits, under Captain Collinson, that Mr. La Trobe informs me that there is not in England, at this time, any person who would be available for this purpose. Mr. La Trobe thinks, that if time permitted, he could procure such a person from among their missionaries now in Germany; but as he speaks of being in personal communication with Captain Collinson, perhaps their Lordships will deem it expedient now to leave the arrangement in the hands of that officer.

I have, &amp;c.

(signed) W. E. Parry,  
Captain Superintendent.

No. 8\* (C.)

COPY of a LETTER from the Rev. P. La Trobe to Captain Hamilton,  
Secretary of the Admiralty.

Sir,

27, Ely-place, 14 January 1850.

I beg to leave to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that on the receipt of a letter from Sir Edward Parry, dated the 24th of December, communicating the wish of their Lordships, that a Moravian missionary, conversant with the Esquimaux language and habits of life, should be requested to accompany the Expedition about to proceed in search of Sir John Franklin, in the character of interpreter, I lost no time in opening a correspondence on the subject with the Mission Board of our Church at Herrnhut, in Saxony. It affords me much satisfaction to be able now to inform their Lordships, that the result of this correspondence has been the appointment of a missionary to this important office, and one whom I cannot but consider the best qualified for the discharge of its duties that could have been selected from the whole number of missionaries, either in retirement or on visits to Europe from their respective fields of labour in Greenland and Labrador. Mr. Miertsching, the missionary appointed, is a man in the prime of life, about 30 years of age, of robust health, inured, by a service of five years in Labrador, to the hardships and privations of the Arctic Regions, and sufficiently acquainted with the language and manners of the Esquimaux to be able to hold friendly and unreserved intercourse with them. Though well aware that his absence from the proper sphere of his useful activity, to which he was preparing to return in the spring of the present year, will be a serious disappointment to his fellow-servants, the Directors of the Brethren Missions have felt it their privilege, as well as their duty, by ready compliance with the application of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, not only to prove how fully and gratefully they appreciate the favour and encouragement which the Mission on the coast of Labrador has invariably experienced from the British Government, ever since its establishment in the year 1770, but also to manifest the deep interest which they feel in the fate of Sir John Franklin and his brave companions, and their sympathy in the generous efforts which are about to be made for their rescue.

I am instructed further to inform their Lordships, that Mr. Miertsching, who



is not unacquainted with the English language, was to set out for London without delay, in the hope of arriving in time to join the "Enterprise" and "Investigator" at Plymouth. Unless a second letter, which I addressed to our Mission Board on the 2d instant, after hearing from Captain Collinson the proposal of their Lordships, that the missionary should join the Expedition at the Sandwich Islands, should have had the effect of delaying his departure for a few days, I think it most probable that he may be with us early in the course of the present week. Whenever he may arrive, I am persuaded that he will be prepared to follow any directions with which their Lordships may be disposed, in the meantime, to favour me.

No. 8<sup>c</sup>.  
Correspondent  
Interpreter to  
Capt. Collinson's  
Expedition.

I have, &c.

(signed) *P. La Trobe*,  
Secretary to the Church and Missions  
of the United Brethren.

No. 6\* (D.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain *Hamilton* to the Rev. *P. La Trobe*

Sir,

Admiralty, 15 January 1850

IN reply to your letter of the 14th instant, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, that their Lordships are greatly obliged for your generous exertions in procuring an interpreter for the Expedition about to proceed in search of Sir J. Franklin, and my Lords would be glad to hear that Mr Miertsching had been able to arrive in time to proceed with the present Expedition. My Lords would further request you to be the medium of communicating to the Directors of the Brethren Mission the expression of their best thanks for their ready and active participations in their Lordships' views, and for the valuable aid they have rendered the Expedition in affording the services of one of their most able servants.

I am, &c.

(signed) *W. A. B. Hamilton*.

No. 8\* (E.)

COPY of a LETTER from the Rev. *P. La Trobe* to Captain *Hamilton*.

Sir,

27, Ely-place, 16 January 1850.

I LOSE not a moment in informing you that Mr. Miertsching has just arrived in London, and in requesting that you will have the goodness to furnish me (if possible, by the return of the messenger, or in the course of the evening) with any directions the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty may have to communicate with reference to his outfit, and the day on which he should join the "Enterprise" and "Investigator" at Plymouth.

If you think it at all desirable, I shall have much pleasure in calling upon you at the Admiralty to-morrow morning, at any hour you may be pleased to appoint as most convenient.

I trust you will excuse the haste and informality of this letter, and of the acknowledgment which I beg very respectfully to offer to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, in return for the expression of their satisfaction at the ready compliance of our Mission Board with their application, which you have so kindly conveyed to me, and which I shall not fail to communicate to my ecclesiastical superiors.

I am, &c.

(signed) *P. La Trobe*,  
Secretary, &c &c.

No. 8\*.

Correspondence:  
Interpreter to  
Capt. Collinson's  
Expedition.

No. 8\* (F.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain *Hamilton* to the *Rev. P. La Trobe*.

Sir,

Admiralty, 16 January 1850.

I HAVE received and laid before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letter of this day's date, and am commanded by their Lordships to acquaint you, that they have heard of the arrival of Mr. Miertsching with much satisfaction, and consider that the object for which his services has been obtained would be best served by his proceeding at once to Devonport.

Orders will be sent to the Admiral (Sir W. Gage) at Devonport to aid Captain Collinson in fitting out Mr. Miertsching at that port; but should there be any particular articles of outfit known to you, or specified by Mr. Miertsching as essentially necessary or desirable for the service on which he is to be engaged, and which can be best procured in London, my Lords would be greatly obliged to you if you would give the necessary directions for Mr. Miertsching being supplied with such articles in London, previous to his departure for Devonport.

As the ships will not be detained many more hours at Devonport, all that is required to be done in London should be done without a moment's delay.

I am, &amp;c.

(signed) *W. A. B. Hamilton.*

No. 8\* (G.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain *Hamilton* to Admiral Sir *W. H. Gage*,  
G.C.H., Commander-in-chief at Devonport.

Sir,

Admiralty, 16 January 1850.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, that Mr. Miertsching, who is to be employed as an interpreter between Captain Collinson's Expedition and the Esquimaux, has just arrived in London, and their Lordships have desired him at once to proceed to Devonport.

My Lords desire that you will call upon Captain Collinson to assist in pointing out what is necessary to fit out Mr. Miertsching on his arrival; and my Lords request you will afford all the aid in your power in equipping that gentleman, so as to occasion as little as possible detention to the ships.

All expenses incurred on the above account are to be paid by you, and to be charged in your contingent account

I have, &amp;c.

(signed) *W. A. B. Hamilton*

No. 8\* (H.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain *Hamilton* to Admiral Sir *W. H. Gage*, G.C.H.

Sir,

Admiralty, 17 January 1850.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to desire you will advance to Mr. Miertsching, interpreter of Esquimaux to the Arctic Expedition, any reasonable sum of money that you may consider necessary to provide for his mess at the gun-room mess of the "Enterprize," charging the same in your contingent account.

I have, &amp;c.

(signed) *W. A. B. Hamilton.*

No. 8\* (I.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain *Hamilton* to Captain *Collinson*, C.B.  
of Her Majesty's Ship "Enterprize."

Sir,

Admiralty, 17 January 1850.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, that they consider Mr. Miertsching (the Esquimaux interpreter) as placed under



under your especial protection; that Mr. Miertsching is to mess at the gun-room table; and you are from time to time, and as you may deem necessary, to supply any reasonable sums that may be required for this gentleman's mess, or other necessary expenses, keeping an account of the same for transmission to this office.

No. 8\*.  
Correspondence:  
Interpreter to  
Capt. Collinson's  
Expedition.

I have, &c.

(signed) *W. A. B. Hamilton.*

— No. 8\*\* —

MEMORANDA and CORRESPONDENCE with reference to Captain  
*Collinson's Expedition.*  
(A. to H.)

No. 8\*\* (A.)

MEMORANDUM by Captain Sir *W. Edward Parry.*

No. 8\*\*.  
Memoranda and  
Correspondence:  
Capt. Collinson's  
Expedition.

EVERY exertion should be made to reach the ice to the northward of Behring's Straits by the 1st of August. Assistance from steam-vessels would be desirable.

As the southern margin of this body of ice has invariably been found to trend in about a N.E. by E. and S.W. by W. direction, extending from one continent to the other, time will be saved by making it well to the eastward; *i. e.*, towards the American coast, and not endeavouring to enter it to the southward or westward. The exact place for making this attempt must be left to circumstances,—such as the state of the ice, the wind, and the weather. The great object of the Expedition to be borne in mind is, to penetrate, if possible, to Banks's Land, or even to Melville Island, with the hope of finding at one of these places, or in the progress thither, some trace of the ships or crews composing the Expedition under Sir John Franklin. If unavoidably detained at the margin of the ice, there may be an opportunity of communicating with some of the Russian fur traders, so as to put them in possession of the papers in the Russian language which are to be provided, offering rewards for assistance rendered to persons cast upon their shores; and, should any Esquimaux come off to the ships, an opportunity may thus be afforded for conveying the papers to the Russian posts.

Although this is the first attempt ever made to enter the ice in this direction, with ships properly equipped for the purpose, there is no reason to anticipate any greater difficulties in this navigation than those encountered in other parts of the North Polar Sea; and, even in the event of not succeeding in reaching Banks's Land, in the summer of the present year, it may be possible to make such progress as to afford a reasonable hope of effecting that object in the following season (1851). Indeed it is possible that, from the well-known fact of the climate being more temperate in a given parallel of latitude, in going westward from the Mackenzie River, some comparative advantage may be derived in the navigation of this part of the Polar Sea.

It is of importance to the security of the ships and of their crews that they should winter in some harbour or bay not at a distance from land, where the ice might be in motion during the winter; and it will be desirable, should no land be discovered fit for this purpose, in the space at present unexplored between Point Barrow and Banks's Land, that endeavours should be made to reach the continent about the mouth of the Mackenzie River, or further eastward, towards Liverpool Bay, where there is reason to suppose sufficient shelter may be found, and in which neighbourhood, it appears, there is generally no ice to be seen from the shore for about six weeks in the months of August and September. Sir John Franklin's Narrative of his Second Journey, that of Messrs. Dease and Simpson, and the Admiralty Charts, will furnish the requisite hydrographical information relative to this line of coast, so far as it has been attained.

The utmost economy should be exercised in the use of provisions and fuel during the time the ships are in winter quarters; and if they should winter on or near the continent, there would probably be an opportunity of increasing their

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stock of provisions by means of game or fish, and likewise of fuel, by drift or other wood, to some considerable amount.

If the progress of the ships in 1850 have been considerable—for instance, as far as the meridian of 120° W.—the probability is, that the most practicable way of returning to England will be, still to push on in the same direction during the whole season of 1851, with a view to reach Barrow's Straits, and take advantage, if necessary, of the resources left by Captain Sir James Ross at Whaler Point, near Leopold Harbour; if not the same season, at least after a second winter. If, on the other hand, small progress should have been made to the eastward at the close of the present summer, it might be prudent that when half the navigable season of 1851 shall have expired, no further attempts should be made in proceeding to the eastward, and that the remaining half of that season should be occupied in returning to the westward, with a view to escape from the ice by way of Behring's Straits after the winter of 1851-52, so as not to incur the risk of passing a third winter in the ice.

During the summer season, the most vigilant look-out should be kept from the mast-heads of both ships night and day, not only for the missing ships, but for any detached parties belonging to them; and during the few hours of darkness which prevail towards the close of each season's navigation, and also when in winter quarters, signals, by fires, blue lights, rockets or guns, should be made as the means of pointing out the position of the ships to any detached parties belonging to the missing Expedition. And in the spring, before the ships can be released from the ice, searching parties might be sent out in various directions, either in boats or by land, to examine the neighbouring coasts and inlets for any trace of the missing crews.

Cautions should be given in all such cases to detached parties, and indeed on every other occasion, to be strictly on their guard against any hostile attempts of large parties of the Esquimaux, to whom, however, every kindness should be shown consistently with a due and unceasing regard to the safety of the ships and people.

In every part of the ships' progress, all prominent points of land should be as strictly examined as circumstances will permit, for any piles of stones or flag staves near which information may have been deposited; and this mode of leaving information of the ships' proceedings should be adopted in all situations where it may, by possibility, be available for the relief of the missing crews; and in case of wintering on the continent, or being able to communicate with it during the summer, all practicable means should be used to convey to England information of the ships' positions, proceedings and intentions, by letters intrusted to the natives, on promise of adequate remuneration on delivering them to the nearest trading-posts, whether English or Russian.

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No. 8\*\* (B.)

MEMORANDUM by Captain *F. W. Beechey*, dated 10 January 1850.

IF the progress of the Expedition be impeded by ice, the boats might be pushed forward; but if the passage be free, a direct course should be steered for Melville Island, carefully keeping the two ships at all times throughout this and the rest of the voyage in company.

On rounding Point Barrow, there will probably be a choice of either entering the "pack," should it show itself in open floes, or of pursuing a lane of water along shore, until sufficient casting has been gained, and then branching off to the northward. The first would involve the probability of being beset on a shift of wind, and of being carried back; whilst the other, that of being set upon a shallow coast by the closing of the ice with the land; and as it is scarcely possible to provide for every contingency, choice might be left to proceed by that route which would appear to be the best, and which, from appearances and information derived on the spot, may most expeditiously and safely lead toward the accomplishment of the object of the voyage, taking care, if the ships should get beset, and driving westward in spite of all exertions, to push in time for the land, and not to risk the chance of being carried westward of Point Barrow, in which direction the decreasing soundings seem to mark the presence of banks upon which the ice would ground, and the pressure become very heavy in consequence.

quence of the strong tides which prevail about Point Barrow. Captain Kellett, of the "Herald," may perhaps be able to speak as to this being the case.

The endeavours to push forward might be continued until the 30th of August at latest, at which time, if the ships be not near some land where they can conveniently pass a winter, they must direct their course for the mainland, and seek a secure harbour in which they could remain. And on no account should they risk a winter in the pack, in consequence of the tides and shallow water lying off the coast.

Should the Expedition reach Herschel Island, or any other place of refuge on the coast near the mouth of the Mackenzie or Colville Rivers, endeavours should be made to communicate information of the ships' position and summer's proceedings through the Hudson's Bay Company or Russian settlements, and by means of interpreters; and no opportunity should be omitted of gaining from the natives information of the missing vessels, as well as of any boat expeditions that may have gone forward, as well as of the party under Dr. Rae.

If nothing should be heard of Sir John Franklin in 1850, parties of observation should be sent forward in the spring to intercept the route the ship would have pursued, and in other useful directions between winter quarters and Melville Island; taking especial care that they return to the ship before the time of liberation of the ships arrive, which greatly depends upon their locality.

Then, on the breaking up of the ice, should any favourable appearance of the ice present itself, the Expedition might be left free to take advantage of such a prospect, or to return round Point Barrow; making it imperative, however, either to ensure their return, so far as human foresight may be exercised, or the certainty of their reaching Melville Island at the close of that season, and so securing their return to England in 1852.

But if, after every precaution and endeavour, they should be compelled to make a retrograde course, they should strictly observe what has been said about wintering in the pack, and communicating information of their proceedings to the Admiralty.

If, after all, any unforeseen event should detain the ships beyond the period contemplated above, every exertion should be used, by means of boats and interpreters, to communicate with the Mackenzie; and should any casualty render it necessary to abandon the vessels, it should be borne in mind that the reserve-ship will remain at her quarters until the autumn of 1853, unless she hears of the safety of the ships and boats in other directions; while in the other quarter, Fort Macpherson, at the entrance of the Mackenzie, may be relied upon as an asylum.

The "Plover," or reserve-ship, should be provided with three years' provisions for her own crew, and for contingencies besides. She should be placed as near as possible to Point Barrow, and provided with interpreters, and the means of offering rewards for information; and she should remain at her quarters so long as there can be any occasion for her presence in the Arctic Seas; or, if she does not hear anything of the Expedition under Captain Collinson, as long as her provisions will last.

In the event of being beset, and requiring a dock in the floe in which the ship may be placed, away from the danger of the pressure and grinding of the packed ice, Captain Collinson might advantageously make use of the exploding cylinders supplied him for blasting the ice, and blast a dock in a short time; as heavy pressure of the ice may be anticipated from its progress being suddenly arrested by shallow water.

(signed) F. W. Beechey.

No. 8\*\* (C.)

MEMORANDUM by Dr. Sir John Richardson.

SHOULD Captain Collinson be compelled, by the state of the ice within Behring's Straits, to coast the continental shores of America, the only native people he will be certain of seeing are the Esquimaux. It may, therefore, be of service to him to be made acquainted with the following particulars respecting that people.

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The Esquimaux tribes which frequent the coasts lying between Point Barrow and the Mackenzie are comparatively populous, but they are, on the whole, well-disposed, and not prone to violence. It is, however, necessary, that small boat parties should be on their guard when in the vicinity of a large body of Esquimaux; as the temptation of appropriating the iron-work and other articles of value to them in possession of the Europeans might be too great for the natives to withstand, and might lead to a treacherous attack. If mischief be intended, the women are generally called in to aid, by crowding round the Europeans, distracting their attention, and giving an opportunity for their men to make an effective rush. If a boat is to be assailed, the women's baidars or oomiaks are run alongside, and across the bows, so as to afford a platform, upon which the men can easily disembark from their kayachs and overpower a small crew. These attacks are seldom planned and carried on without many expressions of encouragement being bandied about among the assailants, and one who understands the language can almost always detect a conspiracy in the outset.

It is a good precautionary measure totally to prohibit the oomiaks from coming alongside, and to permit only one or two of the kayachs to approach at a time; never suffering any of the natives to enter the boats, as whoever is admitted will not cease to inflame the cupidity of his countrymen by descriptions of the wealth he discovers there. On shore it is proper to draw a line, over which neither Europeans nor Esquimaux are to pass. This is a procedure well understood by the latter.

All the Esquimaux are expert thieves, and if allowed to exercise their skill, the recovery of the abstracted articles is attended with difficulty, and a breach of harmony, if insisted upon; or if not, further attempts are promoted. Particular caution as to these points is requisite at the mouth of the Mackenzie, where the Esquimaux, having been long practised in war with a neighbouring Indian tribe, are more daring and apt in stratagem.

The Esquimaux between Cape Barrow and the Mackenzie, carry on a traffic along the coast, the western party meeting the eastern ones for that purpose at Point Barter, in the middle of summer (early in August). They do not, as far as I have been able to learn, communicate directly with the Russian posts, but receive the articles of trade through the medium of a conterminous tribe of Indians. These Indians, named generally Tchutski, inhabit the interior of Russian America, down to Cook's Inlet, and extend eastward to the mountains which skirt the Mackenzie. A few also frequent the lowest of the Hudson's Bay posts on that river, where they are designated Loucheux. The Tchutski are an active, intelligent people, versed in trade, and using strings of white enamelled beads as a medium of exchange. They are on friendly terms with the Esquimaux, with whom they can converse, and barter with them articles obtained from the Russians for fox skins and other furs. Some of them are furnished with fowling-pieces, but none of the Esquimaux as yet possess that weapon. Both nations hold in great value tobacco, snuff, white enamel beads, dentalium shells, iron or copper kettles, saws, hatchets, chisels, knives and files.

A few parties of the Tchutski occasionally visit the Esquimaux on the coast in the summer time, and some of the Esquimaux spend the winter on the Tchutski lands, associating with the hunters. It is, therefore, probable, that if papers in the Russian language be freely distributed on the coast, some of them may reach the fur posts, and make the presence of the Expedition on the coast and its objects known to the fur traders; and this object will be more readily attained if the natives can be made to understand that they will receive a reward if they bring an answer. Russian posts exist on the Yucan and its tributaries, and in Norton and Kotzebue Sounds, as marked on the Admiralty Arctic Chart, No. 260.

If the Expedition should winter near the mouth of the Yucan or Colville, that river may be ascended in a boat in the month of June, before the sea ice begins to give way. The river varies in width from a mile and a half to two miles, and flows through a rich, well-wooded valley, abounding in moose deer, and having a comparatively mild climate. A Russian trading post has been built on it, at the distance of three or four days' voyage from the sea, with the current; but as the current is strong, from nine to twelve days must be allowed for its ascent, with the tracking line. It would be unsafe to rely upon receiving a supply of provisions at the Russian post, as it is not likely that any stock beyond what is necessary for their own use is laid up by the traders; and the moose deer  
being

being a very shy animal, is not easily shot by an unpractised hunter, but the reindeer abound on the neighbouring hills, and are much more approachable. The white-fronted goose also breeds in vast flocks in that district of the country, and may be killed in numbers, without difficulty, in the month of June.

If the Expedition should winter within a reasonable distance of the Mackenzie, Captain Collinson may have it in his power to send despatches to England by that route. The river opens in June, and as soon as the ice ceases to drive, may be ascended in a boat with a fair wind under sail, or with a tracking line. The lowest post at present occupied by the Hudson's Bay Company on this river is Fort Good Hope. The site of this post has been changed several times, but it is at this time on the right bank of the river, in latitude 66° 16' N., and is 10 or 11 days' voyage from the sea. At Point Separation, opposite to the middle channel of the delta of the river, and on the promontory which separates the Peel and the Mackenzie, there is a can of pemmican (80 lbs.) buried, 10 feet distant from a tree, which has its middle branches lopped off, and is marked on the trunk with a broad arrow in black paint. A fire was made over the pit in which the case is concealed, and the remains of the charcoal will point out the exact spot. This hoard was visited last year by a party from Fort McPherson, Peel's River, when all was safe.

A boat party entering the river as soon as it opens would reach Fort Good Hope about the end of June, and it is proper for Captain Collinson to know, that at that season the Esquimaux muster in large force, and ascend to Point Separation, where they trade with the Loucheux, or make war upon them, according to circumstances. After passing Point Separation, the boat party would see families of Loucheux and Hare Indians on the banks of the river. These people live in constant dread of hostile visits from the Esquimaux, and will, and are in the habit of concealing themselves immediately on observing a boat or canoe, until they have ascertained that it is manned by white men. These Indians may be fully trusted, and the sight of an English ensign will give them confidence to approach.

Captain Collinson's despatches may be forwarded up the river from Fort Good Hope by Indians engaged there, but it is not likely that any of the Company's servants could go on with it, as there are seldom more than one or two left at a post in the summer, the rest being employed in conveying the furs out, and bringing stores in, during the whole open season. Eight bags of pemmican, weighing 90 lbs. each, were deposited at Fort Good Hope in 1848, and would remain there last summer for the use of any boat parties that might ascend the river in 1849; but it is probable that part, or the whole, may have been used by the Company by next year.

A boat party should be furnished with a small seine and a short herring net, by the use of which a good supply of fish may often be procured in the eddies or sandy bays of the Mackenzie. They should also be provided with a good supply of buck-shot, swan-shot, duck-shot, and gunpowder. The Loucheux and Hare Indians will readily give such provisions as they may happen to have, in exchange for ammunition. They will expect to receive tobacco gratuitously, as they are accustomed to do from the traders.

The Mackenzie is the only water-way by which any of the Hudson's Bay Company's posts can be reached from the Arctic Sea. There is a post on the Peel River which enters the delta of the Mackenzie, but no supplies can be procured there. To the eastward of the Mackenzie no ship-party would have a chance of reaching a trading post, the nearest to the sea being Fort Resolution, on Great Slave Lake, situated on the 61st parallel of latitude, and the intervening hilly country, intersected by numerous lakes and rapid rivers, could not be crossed by such a party in less than an entire summer, even could they depend on their guns for a supply of food. Neither would it be advisable for a party from the ships to attempt to reach the posts on the Mackenzie by way of the Coppermine River and Fort Confidence; as in the absence of means of transport across Great Bear Lake, the journey round that irregular sheet of water would be long and hazardous. Bear Lake River is more than 50 miles long, and Fort Norman, the nearest post on the Mackenzie, is 30 miles above its mouth. Mr. Rae was instructed to engage an Indian family or two to hunt on the tract of country between the Coppermine and Great Bear Lake in the summer of 1850; but no great reliance can be placed on these Indians remaining long there, as they



desert their hunting quarters on very slight alarms, being in continual dread of enemies, real or imaginary.

A case of pemmican was buried in the summit of the bank, about four or five miles from the summit of Cape Bathurst, the spot being marked by a pole planted in the earth, and the exact locality of the deposit by a fire of drift wood, much of which would remain unconsumed.

Another case was deposited in a cleft of a rock on a small battlemented cliff, which forms the extreme part of Cape Parry. The case was covered with loose stones; and a pile of stones, painted red and white, was erected immediately in front of it. This cliff resembles a cocked-hat in some points of view, and projects like a tongue from the base of a rounded hill, which is 500 or 600 feet high.

Several cases of pemmican were left exposed on a ledge of rocks in latitude  $68^{\circ} 35' N.$ , opposite Lambert Island, in Dolphin and Union Straits, and in a bay to the westward of Cape Krusenstern, a small boat and 10 pieces of pemmican were deposited under a high cliff above high-water mark, without concealment. The Esquimaux on this part of the coast are not numerous, and from the position of this hoard, it may escape discovery by them; but I have every reason to believe that the locality has been visited by Mr. Rae in the past summer. A deposit of larger size, near Cape Kendall, has been more certainly visited by Mr. Rae.

In regard to diet, Captain Collinson may be informed, that in the summer time the usual allowance on board Her Majesty's ships is sufficient, but in the winter time, and especially when the temperature is unusually low, and the men are employed on any fatiguing labour which increases the frequency of the respiration, additional food is requisite, and particularly of fat meat or other food which furnishes a large supply of carbonaceous matter. When the temperature of the atmosphere is very low, much carbon is exhaled from the lungs; and if the waste be not supplied by food, it is taken from the body, impairing its vigour and power of resistance. The use of ardent spirits tends to diminish this waste, but it is at the expense of animal heat; for it is the activity of the respiration, inducing the exhalation of carbon, that is the most effective means of generating animal heat. With an empty stomach the power of resisting external cold is greatly impaired; but when the process of digestion is going on vigorously, even with comparatively scanty clothing, the heat of the body is preserved. There is in the winter time, in high latitudes, a craving for fat or oleaginous food, and for such occasions it may be well to preserve the flesh of seals, walruscs or bears, issuing it as an extra article of diet. The necessity for increased food, in very cold weather, is not so great when the people do not work.

As a measure tending to preserve the health of the crews, I would recommend that the men's bedding should be opened out and dragged backwards and forwards in the loose snow in the winter, and then hung up on lines till the evening. In this way blankets may be effectually cleaned from dirt and condensed perspiration, and more easily than by washing.

(signed) *John Richardson,*  
Medical Inspector.

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No. 8\*\* (D.)

COPY of a LETTER from *J. Parker, Esq.*, Secretary of the Admiralty, to  
*H. C. Addington, Esq.*, Foreign Office.

Sir,

Admiralty, 19 December 1849.

I AM commanded by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of Viscount Palmerston, copies of two memoranda from Sir John Richardson, proposing the issue of the same in the Russian language, pointing out a means of endeavouring to afford assistance to the Expedition in the Polar Seas under the command of Captain Sir J. Franklin; and I am to state that it is most desirable that no time should be lost in this and other arrangements; but my Lords are unwilling to take, or sanction, any steps of this nature, without ascertaining through the Foreign Office whether there will be any objection on the part of the Russian government.

I am, &c.

(signed) *J. Parker.*

Enclosure

Enclosure No. 1, to No. 8\*\* (D.)

MEMORANDUM from Sir John Richardson.

15 December 1849.

No. 8\*\*  
Memoranda and  
Correspondence:  
Capt. Collinson's  
Expedition.

THEIR Lordships propose, that the following Paper might state, that—

The discovery ships under Sir John Franklin sailed from England in 1845, and were last seen in Baffin's Bay in July of that year, steering for Lancaster Sound.

The ships not having returned at the time expected, search was made for them by two Expeditions, which found no traces of them to the eastward, nor on the North Sea coast between the Mackenzie and Coppermine Rivers. Hence it is inferred, that the ships have been blocked up in the ice in the vicinity of Melville Island (or the adjoining lands), from whence neither Lancaster Sound nor the continental coast to the south could be reached with the means the crews possessed. Further search is to be prosecuted by the British Government in the summer of 1850. Two ships (the "Enterprize" and "Investigator,"") commanded by Captain Collinson and Commander McClure, are to enter Behring's Straits, and to penetrate, if possible, to the western extremity of Melville Island, there to winter, and make further search, in the spring of 1851, for the crews of the lost ships.

The aid of the officers of the Russian Fur Company and of all his Imperial Majesty's subjects is earnestly solicited in the humane endeavour to rescue such of the missing crews as may succeed in reaching the shores of the continent. And it is conceived that this aid may be effectually rendered by offering to the Esquimaux and Tchutski the promise of a liberal reward of kettles, saws, knives, beads or such other articles of commerce as they covet, for any effectual relief afforded to any white men that may be cast on their coasts, and for conducting them in safety to a neighbouring fur post.

The English Admiralty will defray the expense of such rewards, on application, &c. &c.

This memorandum should be translated into the Russian language, and plentifully circulated along the northern coasts of Siberia, and throughout his Imperial Majesty's American dominions; 200 or 300 copies printed; and attached to each copy should be an order from the Russian Minister in London, enjoining all Russian subjects, in the Emperor's name, to carry out the objects therein named.

(signed) W. E. Parry.

Enclosure No. 2, to No. 8\*\* (D.)

ADDITIONAL MEMORANDUM from Sir John Richardson.

15 December 1849.

THE only post of the Russian Fur Company known to me as being conveniently situated for communication with the Tchutski and Esquimaux who inhabit the Arctic coasts of America, is one situated on the Yucan River, not far from its junction with the Polar Sea in Gwyder Bay, and near the 150th meridian. The natives report that the Russian traders on the Yucan receive their supplies from a fort in Norton Sound, and that there is another fort in the north-east corner of Kotzebue's Sound. Papers left at either of these places might be transmitted by the traders to the Yucan; and it would be advisable to send some copies to the Russian Company's depôt at Sitka, and to place some in the hands of their agent at the Sandwich Islands.

The Hudson's Bay Company's agent at the Sandwich Islands, by means of their steamers which trade with the Russian American posts, might also distribute some copies of the Paper at the places they touch at, so as to multiply the chances of their reaching their destination.

Another and perhaps a more certain route to the Russian post on the Yucan may also be found through the aid of the Hudson's Bay Company by the Mackenzie. The Company's officer at La Pierre's house on the Rat River might commit some copies of the Paper to the native hunters, and promise them the



No. 8\*\*.

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Expedition.

value of a few articles of trade (say from 1*l*. to 5*l*. sterling), if, either directly or through the medium of intervening tribes, they brought an acknowledgment of the communication from the Russian officer.

The ships bound to Behring's Straits might take some of the Papers. Other copies might be sent, *via* Panama to the Pacific, at once, to be forwarded to the Sandwich Islands, and thence by our Naval Commander in Chief to the Russian posts, as before stated; and the Hudson's Bay Company could forward some to the Mackenzie in the spring, when their canoes go to the north.

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Enclosure No. 3, to No. 8\*\* (D.)

No time should be lost, I submit, in translating and dispersing the first memorandum; and of inviting the attention of the Hudson's Bay Company to the means suggested by Sir J. Richardson, in the second.

(signed) *F. Beaufort.*

No. 8\*\* (E.)

COPY of a LETTER from *H. U. Addington, Esq.*, to *John Parker, Esq.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, 2 January 1850.

WITH reference to your letter of the 19th ultimo, I am directed by Viscount Palmerston to transmit to you a copy of a despatch from Baron Brunnow, and I am to request that, in laying the same before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, you will move their Lordships to favour Lord Palmerston with their opinion thereupon, to enable his Lordship to reply to Baron Brunnow.

I am, &c.

(signed) *H. U. Addington.*

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Enclosure to No. 8\*\* (E.)

Ashburnham House, le 17<sup>17</sup>/<sub>29</sub> Décembre 1849.

LE Baron Brunnow présente ses complimens à M. le Vicomte Palmerston, et en réponse à la communication qu'il a bien voulu lui adresser, sous la date du 22 de ce mois, a l'honneur d'informer Son Excellence qu'une intervention de sa part auprès des autorités de la Compagnie Russe Américaine, en dépassant les limites de ses attributions, serait loin de remplir le but proposé avec autant d'efficacité que le ferait une disposition directe faite d'ordre de l'Empereur.

Connaissant l'intérêt bienveillant que Sa Majesté a désigné prendre au succès des mesures déjà antérieurement prises pour aller à la recherche de l'Expédition de Sir John Franklin, le Baron de Brunnow se fera un devoir empressé de porter à la connaissance de l'Empereur la présente communication de M. le Vicomte Palmerston, accompagnée du memorandum y annexé, dans la persuasion que le Gouvernement Impérial avisera aux moyens les plus utiles pour prêter à l'exécution du plan projeté toute la co-opération en son pouvoir.

Le Baron Brunnow profite, &c. &c.

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No. 8\*\* (F.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain *Hamilton* to *H. U. Addington, Esq.*

Sir,

Admiralty, 5 January 1850.

IN reply to your letter of the 2d instant, transmitting a copy of a despatch from the Russian minister at this court, relative to assistance being rendered by the Russian Government in endeavouring to obtain tidings of the Expedition under Sir J. Franklin, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of Viscount Palmerston, that my Lords are very sensible of the kind interest with which Baron Brunnow is endeavouring to forward their Lordships' wishes; and the accompanying memorandum is now forwarded

## ARCTIC EXPEDITION UNDER SIR JOHN FRANKLIN.

forwarded to Lord Palmerston for transmission to Baron Brunnow, with their Lordships' request that it may be printed in Russian, and circulated along the northern coasts of Siberia, and of his Imperial Majesty's dominions in North America; and my Lords would beg to express their earnest hope that the benevolent interest already evinced by his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia, in the measures hitherto taken for the succour of Sir John Franklin, will be extended to the present proposal; and that the powerful aid of the Emperor will be further afforded their Lordships, by his Imperial Majesty's issuing his own orders upon the subject.

No. 8\*\*  
Memoranda and  
Correspondence  
Capt. Collinson's  
Expedition.

I am, &c.

(signed) *W. A. B. Hamilton.*

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Enclosure to No. 8\*\* (F.)

(COPY.)

5 January 1850.

THEIR Lordships propose that the following Paper be printed in the Russian language:—

“The discovery ships, under Sir John Franklin, sailed from England in 1845, and were last seen in Baffin's Bay in July in that year, steering for Lancaster Sound.

“The ships not having returned at the time expected, search was made for them by two Expeditions, which found no traces of them to the eastward, nor on the northern sea-coast of America, between the Mackenzie and Coppermine Rivers. Hence it is inferred that the ships have been blocked up in the ice in the vicinity of Melville Island, or the adjoining land; from whence neither Lancaster Sound nor the continental coast to the south could be reached with the means the crews possessed.

“Further search will be prosecuted by the British Government in the summer of 1850. Two ships, the ‘Enterprise’ and ‘Investigator,’ commanded by Captain Collinson and Commander M'Clure, are to enter Behring's Straits, and to penetrate, if possible, to the western extremity of Melville Island, there to winter, and make further search in the spring of 1850 for the crews of the lost ships.

“The aid of the officers of the Russian Fur Company, and of all his Imperial Majesty's subjects, is earnestly solicited in the humane endeavour to rescue such of the missing crews as may succeed in reaching the shore of the continent.

“And it is conceived that this may be effectually rendered by offering to the Esquimaux and Tchutski the promise of a liberal reward of kettles, saws, knives, beads, and such other articles of commerce as they covet, for any effectual relief afforded to any white men that may be cast on their coasts, and for conducting them in safety to a neighbouring fur-post. The English Admiralty will defray the expense of such rewards on application.”

This memorandum should be plentifully circulated along the northern coasts of Siberia, and those of his Imperial Majesty's American dominions; and attached to each copy should be an order from the Russian Government, enjoining all his Imperial Majesty's subjects, in the Emperor's name, to carry out the objects therein.

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No. 8\*\* (G.)

COPY of a LETTER from *H. U. Addington, Esq.*, to *John Parker, Esq.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, 14 January 1850.

WITH reference to your letter of the 5th instant, I am directed by Viscount Palmerston to transmit to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a copy of a note from Baron Brunnow, stating that every step will be taken to second the measures taken by the Admiralty for the discovery of the Expedition under Sir John Franklin.

I am, &c.

(signed) *H. U. Addington.*

No. 8\*\*.

Memoranda and  
Correspondence:  
Capt. Collinson's  
Expedition.

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PAPERS AND CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO THE

Enclosure to No. 8\*\* (G.)

Ashburnham House, 11 Janvier 1850.

Le Baron Brunnow présente ses complimens à M. le Vicomte Palmerston, et en réponse à sa note du 10 de ce mois, s'empresse de lui réitérer l'assurance du vif empressement qu'il mettra à seconder les mesures prises par l'Amirauté pour aller à la recherche de l'Expédition de Sir John Franklin.

Dans ce but, le Baron de Brunnow s'est fait un devoir de transmettre à M. le Chancelier de l'Empire le memorandum rédigé par le bureau de l'Amirauté, et dont la publication en langue Russe pouvait faciliter, peut-être, le succès de ses recherches; par l'assistance des habitans du nord de la Sibérie, et des colonies Russes sur la côte nord-ouest d'Amérique.

Le Baron Brunnow profite, &c. &c.

No. 8\*\* (H.)

COPY of a LETTER from his Excellency the Baron Brunnow to  
Viscount Palmerston.

My Lord,

Ashburnham House, ce 21 Février 1850.  
3 Mars

J'ai eu l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que je m'étais empressé de solliciter l'appui du Gouvernement Impérial en faveur des nouvelles démarches faites en Angleterre pour aller à la recherche de l'Expédition de Sir J. Franklin.

Je viens de recevoir une communication officielle, qui m'annonce l'accueil favorable qu'à obtenu le recours que j'ai fait dans ce but au Gouvernement Impérial.

Il a adressé aussitôt les ordres nécessaires au Directeur-en-Chef des colonies Russes sur la côte nord-ouest d'Amérique, afin de lui recommander d'offrir toutes les facilités en son pouvoir aux officiers de la Marine Royale envoyés à la découverte des traces de l'ancienne Expédition.

Ces ordres sont renfermés dans le paquet ci-joint, que je m'empresse de vous faire parvenir, My Lord, avec prière de le transmettre à l'Amirauté.

De plus, le Ministère Impérial m'annonce que la publication dont votre Excellence m'a communiqué le projet, traduite en langue Russe au nombre de 300 exemplaires, sera distribuée au printemps prochain parmi les habitans du littoral vers lequel se dirigent les présentes recherches.

En portant ces dispositions à la connaissance du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, je profite de cette occasion, &c.

(signé) Brunnow.

— No. 9. —

REPORTS of the HYDROGRAPHER of the ADMIRALTY and the SECOND SECRETARY, with the Opinions of Captain Sir *W. Edward Parry*, Captain Sir *George Back*, Captain *Beechey*, Dr. Sir *John Richardson*, and Colonel *Sabine*, R. A., on the proposed Expedition to *Barrow Straits*.

(A to H.)

No. 9 (A.)

MEMORANDUM by Rear-Admiral Sir *Francis Beaufort*, K. C. B., Hydrographer of the Admiralty; dated 29 January 1850.

No. 9.

Reports on the proposed Expedition to Barrow Straits.

1. THE Behring's Straits Expedition being at length fairly off, it appears to me to be a duty to submit to their Lordships that no time should now be lost in equipping another set of vessels to renew the search on the opposite side, through *Baffin's Bay*; and this being the fifth year that the "*Erebus*" and "*Terror*" have been absent, and probably reduced to only casual supplies of food and fuel, it may be assumed

assumed that this search should be so complete and effectual as to leave unexamined no place in which, by any of the suppositions that have been put forward, it is at all likely they may be found.

2. Sir J. Franklin is not a man to treat his orders with levity, and therefore his first attempt was undoubtedly made in the direction of Melville Island, and not to the westward. If foiled in that attempt, he naturally hauled to the southward, and using Banks' Land as a barrier against the northern ice, he would try to make westing under its lee. Thirdly, if both of these roads were found closed against his advance, he perhaps availed himself of one of the four passages between the Parry Islands, including the Wellington Channel. Or, lastly, he may have returned to Baffin's Bay, and taken the inviting opening of Jones' Sound.

3. All those four tracks must therefore be diligently examined before the search can be called complete, and the only method of rendering that examination prompt and efficient will be through the medium of steam; while only useless expense and reiterated disappointment will attend the best efforts of sailing vessels, leaving the lingering survivors of the lost ships, as well as their relatives in England, in equal despair. Had Sir James Ross been in a steam vessel, he would not have been surrounded by ice and swept out of the Strait, but by shooting under the protection of Leopold Island, he would have waited there till that fatal field had passed to the eastward, and he then would have found a perfectly open sea up to Melville Island.

4. The best application of steam to in-going vessels would be Eriesson's screw; but the screw or paddles of any of our moderate-sized vessels might be made to elevate with facility. Vessels so fitted would not require to be fortified in an extraordinary degree, not more than common whalers. From the log-like quiescence with which a sailing vessel must await the crush of two approaching floes, they must be as strong as wood and iron can make them, but the steamer slips out of the reach of the collision, waits till the shock is past, and then profiting by their mutual recoil, darts at once through the transient opening.

5. Two such vessels, and each of them attended by two tenders laden with coals and provisions, would be sufficient for the main lines of search. Every prominent point of land where notices might have been left would be visited, details of their own proceedings would be deposited, and each of the four tenders would be left in proper positions as points of rendezvous on which to fall back.

6. Besides these two branches of the Expedition, it would be well to allow the whaling Captain (Penny) to carry out his proposed undertaking. His local knowledge, his thorough acquaintance with all the mysteries of the ice navigation, and his well-known skill and resources, seem to point him out as a most valuable auxiliary.

7. But whatever vessels may be chosen for this service, I would beseech their Lordships to expedite them; all our attempts have been deferred too long; and there is now reason to believe that very early in the season, in May or even in April, Baffin's Bay may be crossed before the accumulated ice of winter spreads over its surface. If they arrive rather too soon, they may very advantageously await the proper moment in some of the Greenland harbours, preparing themselves for the coming efforts and struggles, and procuring Esquimaux interpreters.

8. In order to press every resource into the service of this noble enterprise, the vessels should be extensively furnished with means for blasting and splitting the ice; perhaps circular saws might be adapted to the steamers, a launch to each party, with a small rotary engine, sledges for the shore, and light boats with sledge bearings for broken ice fields; balloons for the distribution of advertisements, and kites for the explosion of lofty fire-balls. And, lastly, they should have vigorous and numerous crews, so that when detachments are away, other operations should not be intermitted for want of physical strength.

9. As the council of the Royal Society, some time ago, thought proper to remind their Lordships of the propriety of instituting this search, it would be fair now to call on that learned body for all the advice and suggestions that science and philosophy can contribute towards the accomplishment of the great object on which the eyes of all England, and indeed of all the world, are now entirely fixed.

(signed) F. B.

No. 9.  
Reports on the pro-  
posed Expedition  
to Barrow Straits.

No. 9 (B.)

MEMORANDUM by Captain *Hamilton*, Secretary of the Admiralty ;  
dated 5 February 1850.

WITH reference to Sir Francis Beaufort's memorandum, it may be useful to advert to certain papers before the Board, relative to the eastern search.

I would refer to three of those papers in particular, and would take them in the order of their date.

On the 15th November 1840, a Mr. Hamilton, writing from Stromness, affirms positively that "on the day previous to Sir John Franklin sailing from that place, he (Sir John Franklin) expressed his determination to endeavour to find a passage to the westward, through Alderman Jones' Sound."

Mr. Hamilton adds, "that Sir John Franklin, during his stay at Stromness, expressed himself to this effect on several occasions."

He further informs their Lordships that "his house was the last Sir John Franklin visited in this country, and that he is ready to refer their Lordships to other gentlemen to whom Sir John Franklin expressed himself in similar terms."

Mr. Hamilton adds, that he is brother-in-law to Dr. Rae, the eminent chief trader and active coadjutor of Sir John Richardson, and of whose proceedings, since he separated from Dr. Richardson, the Board are now so anxious to hear.

Now it cannot be doubted that Sir John Franklin is as little likely as any man to deviate from his orders, and it is therefore difficult to believe that he could have expressed himself as described by Mr. Hamilton. At the same time it is quite possible that Sir John Franklin may, in conversation, have referred to Jones' Sound, and that Mr. Hamilton has construed his mentioning Jones' Sound in a conditional sense, as an unconditional statement of his intentions.

I would now refer to other papers tending to show what the opportunities are which Jones' Sound offers, and which could not be unknown to Sir John Franklin.

Captain Penny, in the offers of his services to the Admiralty, of the 22d December last, says, "If an early passage be obtained, I would examine Jones' Sound, as I have generally found in all my early voyages clear water at the mouth of that Sound; and there is a probability that an entire passage by this route might be found into Wellington Strait."

Captain Gravill, of the "Abraham," an old whaling captain, in his letter of the 25th January, alludes to his "voyage" last year up Jones' Sound, and suggests Jones' Sound and Smith's Sound, together with other quarters, as points of search; added to which there is (or at least was) a letter in this office from Captain Lee, of the "Prince of Wales," also an experienced Commander, in which he reports his having mistaken the entrance of Jones' Sound, in thick weather, for Lancaster Sound, and that he sailed 100 miles up the Sound, without meeting with obstructions of any sort, before he discovered his mistake; and that in running out of the Sound, the carpenter of the ship observed a cairn of stones on one of the headlands.

Admitting, therefore, the utmost desire of Sir John Franklin to follow his orders, it is not unlikely that he may have found a literal compliance with them impossible; and their purport being to push to the westward, he would naturally take the next means of doing so, if the first failed; and if on arriving off Lancaster Sound he found obstruction from ice or contrary winds, he would most probably make the attempt by Jones' Sound.

Added to this, and the circumstances of Sir John Franklin being well aware that both Jones' and Smith's Sounds, have always given promise of open water, there is the important fact that a diligent search has been made by Sir James Ross in Lancaster Sound and Prince Regent's Inlet, and that no traces of Sir John Franklin having proceeded in that direction have been found by him.

It may be therefore considered that there are sufficient grounds for instituting a specific and separate search, both into Jones' and Smith's Sounds, and there is reason to believe that this may be speedily and effectually done by a steamer.

The narrative of Captain Parker, of the "Truelove," as well as the statements of Captain Penny and Gravill, already referred to, would lead to the supposition that in a fair season those Sounds may be reached without the vessel coming into collision with the ice, and with the important appliance of steam power this would most probably prove to be the case; nor does it follow that the fortifying and fitting

fitting a steam vessel to look into those Sounds need be of a very costly or complicated description, nor such as to involve any material loss of time.

Their Lordships will have before them several propositions respecting the eastern search. And with respect to any Expedition that may proceed by the way of Lancaster Sound, Captain Penny's may be difficult to improve upon. Captain Gravill's letter also offers some useful suggestions; but the question may still be submitted to the Board of an examination into Jones' and Smith's Sounds by a steamer, as separate from the other. There are officers anxious and able to undertake this search; it might be completed in a comparatively short time, and might be the means of early satisfying the public mind on one most important particular, viz., the direction taken by Sir John Franklin in his carrying out the instructions of the Admiralty.

(signed) *W. A. B. Hamilton.*

I would observe that, when the above was written, I had not seen the paper by Dr. M'Cormick, in which great stress is laid upon the necessity of a search into Jones' Sound.

(signed) *W. A. B. Hamilton.*

Enclosure 1, to No. 9 (B.)

To the Secretary of the Admiralty, London.

Sir,

Stromness, 15 November 1849.

I CONSIDER it proper to put you in possession of the following information as to Sir John Franklin's expressed determination regarding the route he purposed to follow on reaching Baffin's Bay, which, if he followed out according to his intention, I would submit that neither of the Expeditions yet sent out in search of him would have a chance of meeting with any trace of him or his party.

During Sir John Franklin's stay here, I had frequent opportunities of conversing with him on the subject of his voyage, and the last house he visited in Great Britain was mine, on the day previous to his sailing from Stromness, on which occasion, as well as on several others, he expressed his determination of endeavouring to find a passage to the westward through Alderman Jones's Sound, instead of Lancaster Sound; and if he acted on this intention, it is not improbable that the ships may have entered this unknown Sound, and got so fixed in the ice as to render it impossible for them to be extricated; and it will be recollected that the summer of 1845 was one of uncommon mildness in the northern regions, and consequent absence of ice to the northward of Devil's Thumb (as the report of the whalers of that season fully proves) would add to the probability of his finding little obstruction to his reaching this point.

I may mention that Sir John Franklin's principal reason for attempting Alderman Jones's Sound in preference to Lancaster Sound, was from his own knowledge, or a strong impression (I do not remember which), that a great current flowed out of it, indicating an open sea to the westward.

I will feel obliged by your laying this information before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty; and if their Lordships should consider it of any importance, as regards future efforts that may be made to relieve our unfortunate countrymen, I shall be happy to refer them to gentlemen here who heard Sir John express himself in similar terms to them.

I may also state that I am brother-in-law to Dr. Rae, who went out with Sir J. Richardson in the land Expedition; and as his relations are anxious regarding his safety, I would esteem it as a particular favour to be informed of any accounts that may reach the Admiralty regarding him, as it is not improbable this may be the case, without our knowing any thing regarding him.

I have, &c.

(signed) *J. M. Hamilton.*

*Note.*—In the event of the Expedition under Sir John Franklin having entered Alderman Jones's Sound, some trace of it would undoubtedly be found either on Cape Hardwick or Cape Lindsay, which forms the entrance to the inlet, for it seems pretty certain, from the result of Sir James Ross's voyage, that the "Erebus" and



No. 9.

Reports on the proposed Expedition to Barrow Straits.

and "Terror" did not enter Lancaster Sound; else, from the minute examination of that gallant officer, it is next to impossible but some indications of the circumstance would have been discovered.

(signed) J. M. H.

Enclosure 2, to No. 9 (B.)

To the Secretary of the Admiralty.

Sir,

Stromness, 11 February 1850.

I HAD the honour of addressing a letter to you on the 15th November last, relative to Sir John Franklin's Expedition, to which I have not been favoured with a reply; but feeling deeply interested in the fate of our gallant and enterprising countrymen, and being convinced in my own mind, from frequent personal communications with Sir John Franklin, that, in the event of the state of the ice in Baffin's Bay permitting him, he would endeavour to penetrate Alderman Jones' Sound instead of Lancaster Sound, which I have no doubt he acted on, as I have ascertained from persons who were in the whale ships in 1845, that the ice was quite open that season to the northward of the Devil's Thumb.

I have myself coasted the north shore of Lancaster Sound as far to the westward as Maxwell Bay. I feel satisfied that, from the nature of the land that intervenes between Lancaster and Jones' Sound, it is utterly impracticable that any passage could be effected across such a country; and should the Expedition have reached from the 85th degree of west longitude to the 90th, it is probable that the ships have been inextricably fixed in that unexplored and unknown region.

I hope I will be pardoned for presuming to force my views upon the notice of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, but I feel that I should be culpable if I refrained doing so, under the circumstances I have mentioned; and I therefore request the favour of your laying this communication before their Lordships, along with my former letter to you on this subject.

I have, &amp;c.

(signed) J. M. Hamilton.

No. 9 (C.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain Hamilton to J. M. Hamilton, Esq.

Sir,

Admiralty, 6 February 1850.

OWING to some inadvertence which it may be unnecessary to explain, but in which every apology is due to you, it would appear that your letter of 15th November last, addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty, had never been acknowledged.

I am commanded by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to refer to that letter, and in conveying to you the expression of their regret that it should have remained unanswered, to thank you at the same time for your communication.

I have, &amp;c.

(signed) W. A. B. Hamilton, Capt. R.N.  
Second Secretary to the Admiralty.

No. 9 (D.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain Sir W. Edward Parry to J. Parker, Esq.,  
Secretary of the Admiralty.

Sir,

Haslar Hospital, 6 February 1850.

WITH reference to the subject of the conference at which I had yesterday the honour of being present at the Board of Admiralty, I now, in obedience to their Lordships' commands, beg leave to submit the following considerations as to the proper mode of conducting the search for the ships under the command of Sir John



John Franklin, which Her Majesty's Government has decided on renewing by way of Baffin's Bay.

I am decidedly of opinion that the main search should be renewed in the direction of Melville Island and Banks's Land, including as a part of the plan the thorough examination of Wellington Strait and of the other similar openings between the islands of the group bearing my name. I entertain a growing conviction of the probability of the missing ships, or at least a considerable portion of the crews, being shut up at Melville Island, Banks's Land, or in that neighbourhood, agreeing as I do with Rear-Admiral Sir Francis Beaufort, in his report read yesterday at the Board, that "Sir John Franklin is not a man to treat his orders with levity," which he would be justly chargeable with doing if he attached greater weight to any notions he might personally entertain than to the Admiralty instructions, which he well knew to be founded on the experience of former attempts, and on the best information which could then be obtained on the subject. For these reasons I can scarcely doubt that he would employ at least two seasons, those of 1845 and 1846, in an unremitting attempt to penetrate directly westward or south-westward towards Behring's Straits.

Supposing this conjecture to be correct, nothing can be more likely than that Sir John Franklin's ships, having penetrated in seasons of ordinary temperature a considerable distance in that direction, have been locked up by successive seasons of extraordinary rigour, thus baffling the efforts of their weakened crews to escape from the ice in either of the two directions by Behring's or Barrow's Straits.

And here I cannot but add, that my own conviction of this probability—for it is only with probabilities that we have to deal—has been greatly strengthened by a letter I have lately received from Colonel Sabine, of the Royal Artillery, of which I had the honour to submit a copy to Sir Francis Baring. Colonel Sabine having accompanied two successive Expeditions to Baffin's Bay, including that under my command, which reached Melville Island, I consider his views to be well worthy of their Lordships' attention on this part of the subject.

It must be admitted, however, that considerable weight is due to the conjecture which has been offered by persons capable of forming a sound judgment, that having failed as I did in the attempt to penetrate westward, Sir John Franklin might deem it prudent to retrace his steps, and was enabled to do so, in order to try a more northern route, either through Wellington Strait or some other of those openings between the Parry Islands to which I have already referred. And this idea receives no small importance from the fact (said to be beyond a doubt) of Sir John Franklin having before his departure expressed such an intention in case of failing to the westward.

I cannot, therefore, consider the intended search to be complete without making the examination of Wellington Strait and its adjacent openings a distinct part of the plan to be performed by one portion of the vessels which I shall presently propose for the main Expedition.

Much stress has likewise been laid, and I think not altogether without reason, on the propriety of searching Jones' and Smith's Sounds in the north-western part of Baffin's Bay. Considerable interest has lately been attached to Jones' Sound, from the fact of its having been recently navigated by at least one enterprising whaler, and found to be of great width, free from ice, with a swell from the westward, and having no land visible from the mast-head in that direction. It seems more than probable, therefore, that it may be found to communicate with Wellington Strait; so that if Sir John Franklin's ships have been detained anywhere to the northward of the Parry Islands, it would be by Jones' Sound that he would probably endeavour to effect his escape, rather than by the less direct route of Barrow's Strait. I do not myself attach much importance to the idea of Sir John Franklin having so far retraced his steps as to come back through Lancaster's Sound, and recommence his enterprise by entering Jones' Sound; but the possibility of his attempting his escape through this fine opening, and the report (though somewhat vague) of a cairn of stones seen by one of the whalers on a headland within it, seems to me to render it highly expedient to set this question at rest by a search in this direction, including the examination of Smith's Sound also.

To accomplish what I consider the main object, namely, the search in the direction of Melville Island and Banks' Land, including that of Wellington Strait, I recommend the equipment of two steam-vessels of 800 to 900 tons, sufficiently strengthened,

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strengthened, but not so as to impair their capacity and burden, propelled by a screw, and rigged as Her Majesty's smaller steam-vessels usually are, but with the addition of square sails on the foremast, so as to render them fair sailing vessels when the power of steam is not required, and to enable them to stop their way by their sails alone. I prefer wooden vessels to iron ones; 1st, because the latter have never been tried in the navigation among the ice; and 2dly, because of the brittleness of iron at a low temperature. I conceive paddle-wheels to be entirely inadmissible on this service, from the impossibility of securing them from damage by the ice; and the aperture for receiving the screw should be strengthened in the manner adopted by Mr. Lang for Sir John Franklin's ships. The screw should be fitted, as is now usual in Her Majesty's ships, so as to be speedily drawn up on deck, and a spare one furnished.

I must add, however, that out of several plans which I remember to have been submitted to the Admiralty for fitting a screw propeller, without any aperture in the dead wood, and for topping it up out of harm's way, Mr. Lloyd might very probably select one that would be admirably adapted for this special service, and require no long time to fit.

To each of the two steam-vessels thus equipped, I propose to attach a ketch-rigged tender of about 150 to 200 tons, strongly fortified, and otherwise equipped as usual for the ice navigation; the object of these tenders being either to accompany the steam-vessels, to form depôts for falling back upon in certain positions, or to be detached on separate examinations, as the various circumstances might require.

On reaching the neighbourhood of Wellington Strait, I should propose to send one steam-vessel, with her tender, to examine that passage and the adjacent openings between the Parry Islands, searching all the shores very strictly for any traces of the missing ships, and leaving frequent and conspicuous notices of their own progress and of the depôt formed at Port Leopold, and then endeavour to ascertain the connexion with Jones' Sound, coming out through that opening, if practicable, into Baffin's Bay. In case of these two vessels effecting this object, or of finding it necessary to return towards Barrow's Straits, I would propose their taking up their winter quarters in or near Port Leopold or elsewhere, as may have been previously agreed upon with the other two vessels of the Expedition, according to the state of the ice, &c., when they part company.

In the meantime, these other two vessels should use their utmost endeavours to push towards Melville Island and Banks's Land, very carefully searching the southern shores of the Parry Islands as they pass along, and leaving frequent and conspicuous notices of their own progress and of the depôt formed at Port Leopold, and then taking up their winter quarters, whenever the season closes, in the best position they can find.

My object in recommending the use of steam-vessels on this service is to endeavour to make the most powerful effort within our reach at this anxious crisis in search of our gallant missing countrymen; but I have no hesitation in saying that this mode of conducting the search will not allow of extending the resources of the Expedition to so lengthened a period as by the employment of sailing vessels only, on account of the great bulk and weight of coals required for steam. I believe, however, that the advantage of being able to make one vigorous effort in the right directions would more than compensate for the disadvantages to which I refer, especially if the Expedition were assisted (as in former cases) by a transport loaded with coals and other resources, to be despatched to Disco before the Expedition, and there to await its arrival for discharging her cargo.

The Expedition might likewise call at Port Leopold, if the ice would conveniently permit, both to replenish their coals, &c., and to ascertain whether any of the missing crews had been there since Sir James Ross's visit.

The operations of this Expedition during a second summer must depend on so many circumstances of resources and efficiency, that it must obviously, I conceive, be left to the discretion of the officers in command.

Independently, however, of the four vessels I have mentioned, I cannot but think it would be well to avail ourselves of the offer of Captain Penny, whose intelligence, zeal and long experience in ice navigation appear to me to entitle his opinion to their Lordships' favourable consideration.

I think that Captain Penny might be advantageously employed in the examination of Jones's and Smith's Sounds, by which means the question as to Sir John Franklin

Franklin having entered either of them might be set at rest, and the communication between Jones's Sound and Wellington Strait determined, in connexion with the researches of the two before-mentioned vessels.

If I were myself going on this service (of examining Jones's and Smith's Sounds), I should feel considerable confidence of being able to effect the whole, in ordinary seasons, in a steam vessel, in one summer, and to return to England in the autumn, and this without much risk of damage from ice, by reaching Disco early in July, replenishing coals there from the proposed transport, and watching the favourable opportunities for getting round the northward of the "Middle Ice." As, however, Captain Penny has not been accustomed to the management of a steam vessel, it might be better to adopt his own proposal of two small sailing vessels, in which I have no doubt he would be able to effect much towards the accomplishment of the object which we have in view without involving the necessity of remaining a winter in the ice.

Mr. M'Cormick's plan for searching by boats might form an useful and not expensive appendage to this branch of the Expeditions.

In submitting the foregoing plan of search, I have not failed to give due consideration to the valuable reports on this subject previously made to the Admiralty, and more especially those by Sir Francis Beaufort and Captain Hamilton, to which our attention was yesterday directed.

Their Lordships will perceive, that what I have now proposed, when taken in connexion with the efforts of Captain Collinson from the west, and those of Dr. Rae and Commander Pullen from the south, will complete a concentration of search (so to speak) in the direction of Banks' Land and Melville Island, which I believe to constitute our best hope of success. And I do confidently trust that, by the blessing of God on these several endeavours, we may yet hope to receive back in safety a large portion of those valuable men for whom our apprehensions have been so long and so painfully excited.

I have, &c.

(signed) ● W. E. Parry,  
Captain, R. N.

#### No. 9 (E.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain Sir *George Back* to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

106, Gloucester-place, Portman-square,  
6 February 1850.

Sir,

IN reference to the plan proposed in Sir Francis Beaufort's letter, for continuing this season the search of Sir John Franklin's Expedition, in the direction of Barrow Straits, Melville Island, and the openings north and south, especially Wellington Strait, together with a thorough examination of Jones's Sound, there cannot, I think, be a second opinion.

I am persuaded that the missing ships are somewhere thereabouts; hence the necessity of carefully searching every opening which may hold out encouragement of a passage.

Experience has shown that sailing vessels are liable to frequent detentions, and in calm weather are comparatively useless, thereby losing many chances of getting on; this, in the few weeks comprising an Arctic season for navigation, is a great objection.

The employment of screw steam vessels, as recommended by Sir Francis Beaufort, would obviate such objection, provided they can be so strengthened, both in the hulls and screws, as to withstand the ordinary pressure of the ice; for however alert in their movements to avoid danger, still such a contingency (almost certain to happen) should, in common prudence, be guarded against.

If this additional power of resistance can be given in so complete a manner as to protect the machinery and screws (of which I do not constitute myself a judge), then steam vessels would be infinitely preferable to any other class; nevertheless, as their employment on such a service may be considered experimental, I strongly recommend, with Sir F. Beaufort, that a sailing tender of not less than 150 tons should accompany each steamer, not only to serve as a depot for fuel and provision,

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provision, but, in the event of unavoidable accident, for the important purpose of a refuge also.

The foregoing remarks apply to the Expedition by Barrow Straits, &c., &c.; but I cannot conclude without expressing to their Lordships a hope that the second plan (as alluded to by Captain Hamilton) of exploring Jones's Sound may be simultaneously executed.

I have, &c.

(signed) Geo. Back, Captain.

No. 9 (F.)

Copy of a LETTER from Captain *Beechey* to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

Sir,

London, 7 February 1850.

1. In obedience to their Lordships' directions, I have carefully perused the communications of Sir Edward Parry, Captain Hamilton and Colonel Sabine, on the subject of further researches for the Expedition under Sir John Franklin, and I think I cannot better express my own opinions upon the subject than by observing I fully concur in everything that is contained in their letters, except that it seems to me that the vessel which accompanies the steamer ought to be sufficiently capacious to receive on board, and house and provision for the winter, if necessary, the crew of the steamer, as she will be the most likely of the two to suffer from the pressure of the ice, and that these tenders should be about 270 or 300 tons each.

2. The urgent nature of the case alone can justify the use of ordinary steamers in an icy sea, and great prudence and judgment will be required on the part of their commanders to avoid being disabled by collision and pressure.

3. I would also add, as an exception, that I think Leopold Island and Cape Walker, if possible, should both be examined prior to any attempt being made to penetrate in other directions from Barrow Straits, and that the bottom of Regent's Inlet, about the Pelly Islands, should not be left unexamined. In the memorandum submitted to their Lordships on 17th January 1849, this quarter was considered of importance; and I am still of opinion, that, had Sir John Franklin abandoned his vessels near the coast of America, and much short of the Mackenzie River, he would have preferred the probability of retaining the use of his boats until he found relief in Barrow Straits, to risking an overland journey *via* the before-mentioned river; and it must be remembered, that at the time he sailed, Sir George Back's discovery had rendered it very probable that Boothia was an island.

4. An objection to the necessity of this search seems to be, that had Sir John Franklin taken that route, he would have reached Fury Beach already. However, I cannot but think there will yet be found some good grounds for the Esquimaux sketch, and that their meaning has been misunderstood; and as Mr. McCormick is an enterprising person, whose name has already been before their Lordships, I would submit whether a Boat Expedition from Leopold Depot, under his direction, would not satisfactorily set at rest all inquiry upon this, now the only quarter unprovided for.

5. With reference to the examination of the Sounds at the head of Baffin's Bay, but especially of Jones's Sound, I fully concur in the suggestions of Captain Hamilton, more especially as there seems to be an opinion that this Sound will be found to communicate with the Wellington Channel, and as, in the event of Sir John Franklin not being discovered in other directions, it will be a source of painful regret that such places should have been left unexplored.

I have, &c.

(signed) F. W. Beechey, Captain.

COPY of a LETTER from Dr. Sir John Richardson to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

Haslar Hospital, Gosport,  
7 February 1850.

Sir,

HAVING heard read a letter from Rear-Admiral Sir Francis Beaufort to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, suggesting a plan of further search for the missing ships under the command of Sir John Franklin, also a paper on the same subject by Captain W. A. B. Hamilton, Secretary to the Admiralty, and a letter from Mr. Penny, master of a whaler, I have the honour, in compliance with their Lordships' directions, to submit to them the following observations :

1. That the search ought not to be abandoned at the present time. I have endeavoured to show in a former paper, we ought not to judge of the supplies of food that can be procured in the Arctic regions by diligent hunting, from the quantities that have been actually obtained on the several Expeditions that have returned, and consequently of the means of preserving life in those regions. When there was abundance in the ships, the address and energy of the hunting parties was not likely to be called forth, as they would inevitably be when the existence of the crews depended solely on their personal efforts, and formed their chief or only object in their march towards quarters where relief might be looked for.

2. This remark has reference to the supposition, also formerly advanced, that on the failure of the stock of provisions in the ship, the crews would, in separate parties, under their officers, seek for succour in several directions ; and, to meet this contingency, the search ought to be pursued in several localities.

3. With respect to the direction in which a successful search may be predicated with the most confidence, very various opinions have been put forth ; some have supposed either that the ships were lost before reaching Lancaster Sound, or that Sir John Franklin, finding an impassable barrier of ice in the entrance of Lancaster Sound, may have sought for a passage through Jones's Sound. I do not feel inclined to give much weight to either conjecture. When we consider the strength of the "Erebus" and "Terror," calculated to resist the strongest pressure to which ships navigating Baffin's Bay have been known to be subject, in conjunction with the fact that, of the many whalers which have been crushed or abandoned since the commencement of the fishery, the crews, or at least the greater part of them, have, in almost every case, succeeded in reaching other ships, or the Danish settlements, we cannot believe that the two discovery ships, which were seen on the edge of the middle ice so early as the 26th of July, can have been so suddenly and totally overwhelmed as to preclude some one of the intelligent officers, whose minds were prepared for every emergency, with their select crews of men, experienced in the ice, from placing a boat on the ice or water, and thus carrying intelligence of the disaster to one of the many whalers which remained for two months after that date in those seas, and this in the absence of any unusual catastrophe among the fishing vessels that season.

4. With respect to Jones's Sound, it is admitted by all who are intimately acquainted with Sir John Franklin, that his first endeavour would be to act up to the letter of his instructions, and that therefore he would not lightly abandon the attempt to pass Lancaster Sound. From the logs of the whalers year after year, we learn that when once they have succeeded in rounding the middle ice, they enter Lancaster Sound with facility : had Sir John Franklin, then, gained that Sound, and from the premises we appear to be fully justified in concluding that he did so, and had he afterwards encountered a compact field of ice, barring Barrow Straits and Wellington Sound, he would then, after being convinced that he would lose the season in attempting to bore through it, have borne up for Jones's Sound, but not until he had erected a conspicuous landmark, and lodged a memorandum of his reason for deviating from his instructions.

5. The absence of such a signal-post in Lancaster Sound is an argument against the Expedition having turned back from thence, and is, on the other hand, a strong support to the supposition that Barrow Strait was as open in 1845 as when Sir W. E. Parry first passed it in 1819 ; that, such being the case, Sir John Franklin, without delay and without landing, pushed on to Cape Walker, and that, subsequently, in endeavouring to penetrate to the south-west, he became involved in the drift ice, which, there is reason to believe, urged by the prevailing winds and the set of the flood tides, is carried towards Coronation Gulf, through channels more



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or less intricate. Should he have found no opening at Cape Walker, he would, of course, have sought one further to the west; or, finding the southerly and westerly opening blocked by ice, he might have tried a northern passage.

6. In either case, the plan of search propounded by Sir Francis Beaufort seems to provide against every contingency, especially when taken in conjunction with Captain Collinson's Expedition, *vid* Behring's Straits, and the boat parties from the Mackenzie.

7. I do not venture to offer an opinion on the strength or equipment of the vessels to be employed, or other merely nautical questions, further than by remarking, that the use of the small vessels, which forms part of Sir Francis Beaufort's scheme, is supported by the success of the early navigators with their very small craft, and the late gallant exploit of Mr. Shedden, in rounding Icy Cape and Point Barrow, in the "Nancy Dawson" yacht.

8. And further, with respect to the comparative merits of the paddles and screw in the Arctic seas, I beg leave merely to observe, that as long as the screw is immersed in water it will continue to act, irrespective of the temperature of the air; but when, as occurs late in the autumn, the atmosphere is suddenly cooled below the freezing point of sea water, by a northerly gale, while the sea itself remains warmer, the paddles will be speedily clogged by ice accumulating on the floats, as they rise through the air in every revolution. An incident recorded by Sir James C. Ross furnishes a striking illustration of the powerful action of a cold wind; I allude to a fish having been thrown up by the spray against the bows of the "Terror," and firmly frozen there, during a gale in a high southerly latitude. Moreover, even with the aid of a ready contrivance for topping the paddles, the flatness or hollowness of the sides of a paddle steamer renders her less fit for sustaining pressure; the machinery is more in the way of oblique beams for strengthening, and she is less efficient as a sailing vessel when the steam is let off.

9. As stowage is very important, especially where small vessels and steamers requiring much fuel are employed, I beg leave to suggest the use of pemmican as the principal article of diet; food can scarcely be compressed into smaller space. Two pounds of pemmican, with one pound of coarse barley-meal, oatmeal or wheaten flour, would be a full daily supply of food to labouring men, in the severest winter, and an ample provision against scurvy, without biscuit or vegetables; less might suffice in summer, or if biscuit and prepared potatoes were issued as part of the diet; but I would suggest, that the store of biscuit, as of an article occupying much space, should be limited to a small quantity, sufficing only for an occasional variation in the rations. I have found that seamen readily accustom themselves to pemmican, especially when it is boiled, or with barley-meal; and the latter, when coarsely ground, makes a nutritious gruel or porridge, which is generally relished. Preserved meats, when often served out, become disagreeable to seamen, and do not produce the feeling of a substantial meal, created by an equal bulk of pemmican.

10. I beg also to suggest, as an advisable measure, the total disuse of ardent spirits on the voyage: I believe that there would be no difficulty in engaging men for the enterprise on what are termed "temperance principles;" and in the Arctic winters the use of tea as a stimulant is not only safer, but would, I think, be almost universally preferred by men who have tried both. An additional quantity of tea might be issued in lieu of spirits.

11. Mr. Penny's project, restricted as it is by Sir Francis Beaufort to the search of Jones's Sound at its outlets, seems to be a fitting appendage to the other measures. Although I have endeavoured to show, in a preceding paragraph, that it is not likely the missing ships entered Jones's Sound from Baffin's Bay, yet, as they may have been compelled to take a northerly course from Barrow Straits, and might afterwards, in trying to regain Baffin's Bay, have been arrested near Wellington Sound, with which it is understood Jones's Sound communicates, the latter ought to be explored, and its headlands carefully examined. The cairn seen by Mr. Penny, at the entrance of the Sound, should be visited and searched for memoranda.

I have, &c.

(signed) John Richardson,  
Med. Insp.



COPY of a LETTER from Colonel *Sabine*, R. A., to Captain Sir *W. Edward Parry*.

(Confidential)

Castle-down Terrace, Hastings,  
15 January 1850.

My dear Parry,

WHEN you were kind enough to write to me on the subject of Franklin's Expedition, and to ask my opinion of the probabilities as to the place of their detention, and the best mode to adopt in renewing the search, I was still too ill to reply to you with the consideration which the subject required. The same cause (*viz.*, my late severe illness) has prevented my taking a part in any of the recent discussions; but as time is passing away, I am become extremely anxious to learn whether any, and what steps are likely to be taken for attempting relief in the quarter which still appears, as it has always appeared to me, the most important and the most promising. There can be little doubt, I imagine, in the mind of any one who has read attentively Franklin's Instructions, and (in reference to them) your description of the state of the ice and of the navigable water in 1819 and 1820, in the route which he was ordered to pursue; still less, I think, can there be a doubt in the mind of any one who had the advantage of being with you in those years, that Franklin (always supposing no previous disaster) must have made his way to the south-west part of Melville Island either in 1845 or 1846. It has been said that 1845 was an unfavourable season, and as the navigation of Davis's Straits and Baffin's Bay was new to Franklin, we may regard it as more probable that it may have taken him two seasons to accomplish what we accomplished in one. So far, I think, guided by his Instructions and by the experience gained in 1819 and 1820, we may reckon pretty confidently on the first stage of his proceedings, and, doubtless, in his progress he would have left memorials in the usual manner at places where he may have landed, some of which would be likely to fall in the way of a vessel following in his track. From the west end of Melville Island our inferences as to his further proceedings must become more conjectural, being contingent on the state of the ice and the existence of navigable water in the particular season. If he found the ocean, as we did, covered to the west and south, as far as the eye could reach from the summit of the highest hills, with ice of a thickness unparalleled in any other part of the Polar Sea, he would, after probably waiting through one whole season in the hope of some favourable change, have retraced his steps, in obedience to the second part of his Instructions, in order to seek an opening to the north which might conduct to a more open sea. In this case some memorial of the season passed by him at the south-west end of Melville Island, and also of his purpose of retracing his steps, would doubtless have been left by him; and should he subsequently have found an opening to the north, presenting a favourable appearance, there also, should circumstances have permitted, would a memorial have been left.

He may, however, have found a more favourable state of things at the south-west end of Melville Island than we did, and may have been led thereby to attempt to force a passage for his ships in the direct line of Behring's Straits, or perhaps, in the first instance, to the south of that direction, namely, to Banks's Land. In such case two contingencies present themselves: first, that in the season of navigation of 1847 he may have made so much progress, that in 1848 he may have preferred the endeavour to push through to Behring's Straits, or to some western part of the continent, to an attempt to return by the way of Barrow Straits; the mission of the "*Plover*," the "*Enterprise*," and the "*Investigator*," together with Dr. Rae's Expedition, supply, I presume (for I am but partially acquainted with their Instructions), the most judicious means of affording relief in this direction. There is, however, a second contingency; and it is the one which the impression left on my mind by the nature and general aspect of the ice in the twelve months which we ourselves passed at the south-west end of Melville Island, compels me, in spite of my wishes, to regard as the more probable, *viz.*, that his advance from Melville Island in the season of 1847 may have been limited to a distance of 50, or perhaps 100 miles at farthest, and that in 1848 he may have endeavoured to retrace his steps, but only with partial success. It is, I apprehend, quite a conceivable case, that under these circumstances, incapable of extricating the ships from the ice, the crews may have been,

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at length, obliged to quit them, and attempt a retreat, not towards the continent, because too distant, but to Melville Island, where certainly food, and probably fuel (seals), might be obtained, and where they would naturally suppose that vessels despatched from England for their relief would, in the first instance, seek them. It is quite conceivable also, I apprehend, that the circumstances might be such that their retreat may have been made without their boats, and probably in the April or May of 1849.

Where the Esquimaux have lived, there Englishmen may live, and no valid argument against the attempt to relieve can, I think, be founded on the improbability of finding Englishmen alive in 1850, who may have made a retreat to Melville Island in the spring of 1849; nor would the view of the case be altered in any material degree, if we suppose their retreat to have been made in 1848 or 1849 to Banks's Land, which may afford facilities of food and fuel equal or superior to Melville Island, and a further retreat in the following year to the latter island as the point at which they would more probably look out for succour.

Without disparagement, therefore, to the attempts made in other directions, I retain my original opinion, which seems also to have been the opinion of the Board of Admiralty, by which Ross's Instructions were drawn up, that the most promising direction for research would be taken by a vessel which should follow them to the south-west point of Melville Island, be prepared to winter there, and, if necessary, to send a party across the ice in April or May to examine Banks's Land, a distance (there and back) less than recently accomplished by Ross in his land journey.

I learn from Ross's despatches, that almost immediately after he got out of Port Leopold (1849), he was entangled in apparently interminable fields and floes of ice, with which, in the course of the summer, he was drifted down through Barrow Straits and Baffin's Bay nearly to Davis's Straits. It is reasonable to presume, therefore, that the localities from whence this ice drifted are likely to be less encumbered than usual by accumulated ice in 1850. It is, of course, of the highest importance to reach Barrow Straits at the earliest possible period of the season; and, connected with this point, I learnt from Captain Bird, whom I had the pleasure of seeing here a few days ago, a very remarkable fact, that the ice which prevented their crossing Baffin's Bay in 72° or 73° of latitude (as we did in 1819, arriving in Barrow Straits a month earlier than we had done the preceding year, when we went round by Melville Bay, and nearly a month earlier than Ross did last year) was young ice, which had formed in the remarkably calm summer of last year, and which the absence of wind prevented their forcing a passage through, on the one hand, whilst, on the other, the ice was not heavy enough for ice anchors. It was, he said, not more than two or two and-a-half feet thick, and obviously of very recent formation. There must, therefore, have been an earlier period of the season when this part of the sea must have been free from ice; and this comes in confirmation of a circumstance of which I was informed by Mr. Petersen (a Danish gentleman sent to England some months ago by the Northern Society of Antiquaries of Copenhagen, to make extracts from books and manuscripts in the British Museum), that the northmen, who had settlements some centuries ago on the west coast of Greenland, were in the habit of crossing Baffin's Bay in the latitude of Upernavik in the spring of the year, for the purpose of fishing in Barrow Straits, from whence they returned in August; and that in the early months they generally found the passage across free from ice. Mr. Petersen told me that I should find this fact clearly made out in a recent publication of the Society of Northern Antiquaries, to whom we have been so much indebted. The pressure of other subjects, and more recently my illness, have prevented me from obtaining and reading the work referred to; but if the latitude in which Baffin's Bay is stated to have been crossed, and the period of the year be correct, it would appear (backed by the experience of last year, as related by Captain Bird,) that Barrow Straits may be reached at a much earlier period of the year than we have hitherto attempted. If, therefore, it be in contemplation to send a vessel or vessels in that direction in the present year, the sooner such an intention is acted on the better.

In the preceding remarks, I have left one contingency unconsidered: it is that which would have followed in pursuance of his Instructions, if Franklin should have found the aspect of the ice too unfavourable to the West and South of Melville Island to attempt to force a passage through it, and should have retraced

retraced his steps in hopes of finding a more open sea to the northward, either in Wellington Strait or elsewhere. It is quite conceivable that here also the Expedition may have encountered, at no very great distance, insuperable difficulties to their advance, and may have failed in accomplishing a return with their ships. In this case, the retreat of the crews, supposing it to have been made across land or ice, would most probably be directed to some part of the coast on the route to Melville Island, on which route they would, without doubt, expect that succour would be attempted.

I have written you a long letter; but this I am sure our common interest in the subject will abundantly excuse. I have recovered my health, but not my strength perfectly, and am still a prisoner here in consequence of the very severe weather.

Very truly yours,  
(signed) *Edward Sabine.*

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PLANS of Captain Sir *John Ross*, C.B., for an EXPEDITION in Search of  
Captain Sir *John Franklin's* ARCTIC EXPEDITION.

(A to K.)

No. 10 (A.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain Sir *John Ross*, C.B., to the Right Honourable  
Sir *Francis T. Baring*, Bart.

Dear Sir,

267, Strand, London, 1 September 1849.

As the time has now arrived when news, good or bad, may be expected from the ships in search of Sir John Franklin, and as these ships, in my humble opinion, being large and of a greater draught of water than the field ice, they are thereby more obnoxious to damage, especially as they would have to run more than usual risk, and the weather in the north having been (by report of the Greenland whalers) exceedingly tempestuous, it is by no means improbable that the expected news may be disastrous. Taking these circumstances into consideration, I venture most respectfully to suggest that a vessel should be prepared, and kept in readiness to be despatched with relief, and I am of opinion that the 16th of September would not be too late for her to sail on that important service. I find that there is a vessel at Woolwich, named the "Mastiff," that would suit admirably. But she and my own little yacht (as a retreat vessel), which is also at Woolwich, should be towed round to Portsmouth, ready to be victualled, and which would incur very little expense, and, even if not wanted, would show the public that your Lordships had not neglected any means that had the least chance of rescuing the unfortunate Franklin and his fellow sufferers. I have recommended Portsmouth for the starting port, as being a nearer and a better outlet than going round by Shetland.

I need scarcely add, that I am a volunteer for this service, and I have no hesitation in pledging myself to reach Lancaster Sound, with the help of a steamer as far as Davis's Straits, if I sailed before the 17th of September.

I shall not attempt to apologise for this trespass on your attention, and trust that your candour will excuse my zeal in the cause of humanity, even if you disapprove of the step I have taken.

I have, &c.

(signed) *John Ross*,  
Captain, Royal Navy.

No. 10.

Reports on the proposed Expedition to Barrow Straits.

No. 10.

Plans of Captain Sir John Ross, C.B.

No. 10.  
Plans of Captain  
Sir John Ross, C. B.

No. 10 (B.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain Sir *John Ross*, C. B., to Captain *Hamilton*,  
Secretary of the Admiralty.

Sir,

267, Strand, London, 27 November 1849.

I AM to request you will be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that I am still a candidate and volunteer for the command of any Expedition their Lordships may think proper to send in search of Sir John Franklin; that I am confident my state of health and constitution are perfectly equal to that arduous undertaking; and that having originally been the only officer who had actually made promises and arrangements with Sir John Franklin for that purpose, I humbly claim a preference to all other officers for that service.

I beg to add, that my plans can be executed not only at one-fourth of the expense, but with much greater efficiency than the recent unsuccessful attempts made ostensibly for the gallant Franklin and his devoted companions.

I am, &amp;c.

(signed) *John Ross*,  
Captain in the Royal Navy.

-----  
Enclosure to No. 10 (B.)

PLAN proposed by Sir *John Ross* to search for the Expedition under  
Sir *John Franklin*.

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PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

27 November 1849.

I SHALL not trouble my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty with a detailed refutation of the published opinions given by the several officers in favour of large ships being employed in the Arctic regions, instead of small vessels, as the question must now have been sufficiently decided by the recent failure of the "Enterprize" and "Investigator," proposed by them in the place of the four small vessels recommended by me, which would have not only extended the search, and carried an equal quantity of provisions, but would have been more efficiently navigated with half the number of men, and at half the expense, while it would have saved the necessity of despatching the now missing ship with supplies, and at half the expense. And it is to be regretted that their Lordships were led, by those who were by them supposed to know what was best, into that unfortunate determination.

But I must beg leave to state, and that too from experience, that Captain Beechey's objections to the use of a steam-vessel among ice, are totally without foundation, and could only have arisen from his consummate ignorance of the subject. My little steam-vessel the "Victory" was fitted with paddle-wheels (which Captain Beechey never saw) of a peculiar construction for use among ice; they could be taken entirely out of danger by two men in less than a minute, and the sponsons, instead of endangering the vessel, contributed mainly to her safety, the ice coming under them in a collision (which was often the case in the "Victory") assisted the vessel in rising up to the pressure, instead of being crushed by it, on which mainly depends her safety. And the engine itself being fixed totally independent of the straining of the vessel, can receive no injury whatever from the distortion of her frame. The only further observation I think it necessary to make is; that (page 46) Sir James Ross's assertion in contradiction to Dr. King, that "Barrow Strait was not ice-bound in 1832," is a wilful misrepresentation of the fact, and can be contradicted by Serjeant Park, of the E division of police, Robert Shreeve, of Lower Seymour-street, and Thomas Abernethy; and it is also true, that on that year, and several others, no ship could get up Barrow Straits for ice, where, at length, he himself found it unnavigable. Provisions being already stored at Whaler Point, the following vessels only will be required, the expense of which, the sale of the "Enterprize" and "Investigator," which are only

only fit for employment in the whale fishery, would more than cover. It therefore only remains to give the following brief

No. 10.  
Plans of Captain  
Sir John Ross, c. b.

#### OUTLINE of Sir John Ross's PLAN.

1. One of the two Port Patrick packets to be fitted nearly as the "Victory" was, with an additional deck, paddles on Robinson's plan, to be raised when required; the vessel to be doubled at the water-line, and protected by plates of galvanized iron.

2. One vessel of the description of the packets between Leith and London, of about 150 tons, doubled and protected as the steam-vessel.

3. Sir John Ross's small yacht the "Mary," 11½ tons, also protected in like manner.

4. The present engine on board the steamer being quite sufficient, no material alteration is required, and the expense of the whole would be comparatively moderate. The crew of the steamer would be 25, and that of the sailing vessel 12, including officers; the yacht would be towed out.

(signed) *John Ross,*  
Captain, Royal Navy.

#### Enclosure to No. 10 (B.)

Sir F. B.'s REPORT upon enclosed Letter.

17 December.

WHATEVER may have been urged to the contrary, I have no hesitation in here repeating my full belief that steam is the only means by which we can make sure of reaching in a single season, through Lancaster Sound, the position of the "Erebus" and "Terror," and thereby, of either relieving their crews, or discovering their fate; for steam alone can take advantage of every transient opening in the ice, or quickly avoid the approaching danger of closing fields. Steam alone can press forward, regardless of securing a retreat; it can select places of immediate refuge, search every narrow and winding channel, and persevere in the one leading object without anxiety or fear. I do, therefore, heartily and earnestly approve of furnishing with that powerful arm any expedition intended for the eastern entrance to those seas; and though I should prefer Eriesson's detached propeller, yet the mode suggested by Sir John Ross would, I dare say, answer the desired purpose.

With regard to Sir John Ross, he is well acquainted with the management of steam; he possesses a singularly hardy constitution; he has acquired much dear-bought experience in the ice, is full of inventive resources, and would feel a degree of pride in carrying out this his favourite scheme.

F. B.

#### No. 10 (C.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain Sir John Ross, c. b., to the Right Honourable Sir Francis T. Baring, Bart.

Dear Sir Francis,

267, Strand, 10 January 1850.

I BEG leave to send herewith a description of a vessel building at Aberdeen, which would answer as a second vessel to the steamer in eastern expedition, and, I think, save some expense.

I also beg to call your attention to the extract of a letter from Mr. Severight, the master of a whaler at Peterhead, who is the brother of a person at Woolwich that I employed to ask about men. I am sure it is of great importance to secure them; I know they will volunteer for me if immediately applied to; but the time has now arrived when they engage for a whaling voyage.

I am, &c.

(signed) *John Ross.*

No. 10.  
Plans of Captain  
Sir John Ross, C. B.

## Enclosure to No. 10 (C.)

DESCRIPTION of a Clipper Brig, now almost ready for launching at the Building Dock, *Aberdeen*.

|                              |   |   |   |                                 |
|------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------------|
| Length of keel and fore-rake | - | - | - | 104 feet $\frac{6}{16}$ inches. |
| Extreme breadth              | - | - | - | 23 $5\frac{1}{2}$ "             |
| Depth of hold                | - | - | - | 14 " 1 "                        |
| Tonnage                      | - | - | - | 199 tons, new measurement.      |

Clipper built, to sail fast, can be got ready immediately, fully equipped, strengthened and fortified for service in the Arctic regions, with masts, sails, ropes, anchors and cables. Price 2,950 £.

*N. B.*—This vessel is built for the Provost of Aberdeen, and cannot be excelled for beauty of mould and quality of workmanship, and will, no doubt, be a first-rate sailing craft.

Her draft of water loaded will be nine feet.

(signed) *R. Rettie.*

*Mcm.*—I am of opinion, that the purchase of this vessel for the Expedition in search of Sir John Franklin would be more economical than strengthening an old vessel, as well as being more efficient.

(signed) *John Ross.*

Respecting the crews: the following answer to my inquiries on the subject has been received from Mr. Severight, of the "Pacific" whaler:—

"There is a set of the finest young men that I have ever seen in this place, and I know would volunteer, if wanted, as they have already been inquiring of me; but if men of good qualification is wanted, you would require to make early application, as a great many of them will be engaging in the whalers. I have no doubt but you will get the pick of the men; but the sooner you apply the better. Mention the terms. I shall do all I can to assist Sir John Ross, &c.

(signed) "*S. Alexander Severight.*"

*N. B.*—Mr. Severight is a volunteer, as ice master; he has been 30 voyages to Davis's Straits.

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No. 10 (D.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain Sir John Ross, C. B., to Captain Hamilton.

Dear Sir,

Wednesday.

PRAY be so kind as to mention to Admiral Dundas, or some of their Lordships, that unless I have very soon authority to secure the services of the 25 fine fellows that have volunteered for me at Peterhead to serve in the eastern expedition, I fear I shall lose them, as the time has now arrived that they engage in the whalers, and that I think it of the utmost importance that their services should be immediately secured, and you will much oblige

Yours very truly,

(signed) *John Ross.*

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No. 10 (E.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain Sir John Ross, C. B., to John Parker, Esq., Secretary of the Admiralty.

Sir,

267, Strand, 14 January 1850.

HEREWITH you will receive enclosure, No. 1, being "The Outline of a Plan of affording Relief to the Expedition under Command of Sir John Franklin from the Eastward, by way of Baffin's Bay," and, No. 2, "Being a Statement of my peculiar Claims for the Command of the Vessels that may be employed on that important Service;" and I am to request that you will be pleased to lay the same before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

I have, &c.

(signed) *John Ross,*  
Captain, R.N.

Enclosure



Enclosure to No. 10 (E.)

By Captain Sir John Ross.

## OUTLINE of a PLAN for affording Relief to the Expedition under the Command of Sir John Franklin, from the Eastward, or by the Way of Baffin's Bay.

As vessels destined to navigate the Arctic Seas must necessarily be exposed to the collision of fields of ice, which are frequently set in motion by the winds, tides and currents; and as it is evident (as, indeed, most fully proved during my late voyage), that small vessels can not only withstand more pressure than large ships, which have hitherto been employed, as they will rise to the pressure of the ice, but are also less obnoxious to injury from drawing less water than the ice, which by grounding first on rocks or shoals over which they are often inevitably carried, the bottom of the small vessel is safe, while the large one is wrecked, as in the case of the "Fury," in 1824. Again, any damage done to a small vessel is easily repaired, as by running, at high water, on the beach, inside of a large piece of ice (called an ice harbour), which is to be found every where, the tide (that there ebbs nine feet) would leave the vessel dry. That could not be the case with a large ship. It follows, therefore, that small vessels, carrying an equal quantity of provisions for the number of their crews, as large ships do for their number, must be the best to employ on this occasion, particularly as there is already a large depot of provisions and stores at Leopold Harbour; and the Expedition for the relief of that under the command of Sir John Franklin should consist of three small vessels drawing under nine feet.

1st. A small steam-vessel, such as the "Asp," lately a Port Patrick Packet of 112 tons burden, and 50-horse power; she should be strengthened, and rose upon five feet (as was my late vessel the "Victory"), to enable her to carry a sufficient quantity of fuel, and to have the paddle-wheels made to trice up clear of the ice when necessary. She should have a crew of 24 men, including the captain, officers, engineer, stokers, &c.

2dly. A small clipper brig, such as the "Isle," of Aberdeen, of 119 tons (a description of which is annexed), with a crew of 14, including the officers, so that the whole number employed in the Expedition would be 34. The price of the "Isle," fortified, and ready for use, is 1,100 £.

3dly. My own yacht, the "Mary," of 12 tons, as a retreat vessel: she is strongly built of mahogany, but will require a little fortifying. She is the same vessel I navigated, in very bad weather, from Stockholm to London, in 1846, and is now in the Royal Dock-yard, at Woolwich. She would be towed out, as we did a vessel of the same size in May last Expedition, and requires no crew.

These vessels being fitted and stored in the usual way, should leave England in May, make the passage to the ice under sail, and reserve the steam for the intricate passages among the ice.

The Expedition should first touch at Lupley, in Greenland, and there procure two Danish interpreters, who speak the Danish and the Esquimaux languages, and also some sledge dogs. Then call at Leopold's Harbour, and from thence proceed to the Western Cape of Wellington Channel, where, probably, the first intelligence of Sir John Franklin may be found; and, subsequently, according to circumstances, proceed to visit the headlands between it and Melville Island.

If it is found necessary to proceed to Banks' Land, the retreat vessel "Mary," should be hauled up at Winter Harbour, and left with nine months' provision, fuel and ammunition, which would secure the ultimate safety, both of our own crew and any that may be found alive of the missing Expedition.

If no intelligence of Sir John Franklin's Expedition is found at the different positions in Barrow's Straits, small parties, consisting of an officer and two men, must be detached in every direction likely to find the missing ships, on small sledges, constructed in the form of boats of "gutta percha," which would be capable of overcoming every difficulty better than those hitherto used, as dogs can easily draw small sledges, but not large ones. Lastly, it is necessary immediately to secure the services of the seamen who have been brought up in the whale fishery, 25 of whom have volunteered to serve under my command; and it is of the greatest importance they should be secured. They are now waiting at Peterhead for my answer.

I am decidedly of opinion, that with the plan I have suggested, I could perform this

No. 10.

Plans of Captain  
Sir John Ross, C.B.

this important service during the summer and autumn months; and I have no hesitation in pledging my word, that I shall return in October next, after having decided the fate of Sir John Franklin and his devoted companions.

(signed) *John Ross.*

## DESCRIPTION of the Clipper Brig "Isla," now for Sale at Aberdeen.

BRIG "Isla," 119 new, 143 old, tons measurement. Doubled and fortified for a voyage to Davis' Straits in 1845; had a large repair this spring, class *Æ.* in Lloyd's Register; well found in stores, sails fast, and is well known to be a handy craft; draught of water, in ballast, 7 feet 6 inches, loaded 10 feet. She will carry 200 tons. The price is 1,100 *l.*, including masts, sails, anchors and stores. Ready for sea, excepting provisions.

(signed) *R. Rettie.*

Aberdeen, 31 December 1849.

*Memorandum.*—Of the claims of Captain Sir John Ross for the command of the Eastern Expedition for the relief of Sir John Franklin.

1st. As senior officer employed in the Arctic seas.

2dly. The only officer who actually promised to search for Sir John Franklin in the event of his not returning in 1847.

3dly. Having had communication with Sir John Franklin, touching the positions in which he may be found.

4thly. Being acquainted with the Danish language, and by procuring a Dane at Greenland, who speaks the Esquimaux language, he will be most likely to gain intelligence of the missing ships.

5thly. Being perfectly acquainted with navigation by steam, which is indispensable.—[See his publication on that subject].

6thly. Has a constitution extremely well adapted to the climate.

7thly. Having been six years Consul in Sweden, is well acquainted with sledging on snow and ice.

8thly. Dr. John Lee has promised to lend him the astronomical instruments he formerly lent to Colonel Checney on the survey of the Euphrates, and also an excellent five-foot telescope.

9thly. The men who have volunteered at Peterhead will serve under no other officer but Sir John Ross. They are all men who have served in the whale fishery.

(signed) *John Ross,*  
Captain, Royal Navy.

## No. 10 (F.)

REPORT of Rear-Admiral Sir *Francis Beaufort*, K.C.B., Hydrographer of the Admiralty.

18th January.—Sir F. Beaufort to report.

"Being thoroughly convinced that nothing but a steam-vessel will ever be able to advance through the Arctic Sea to any considerable distance, or to retreat with certainty, the proposal of Sir John Ross to employ one of the Port Patrick steamers appears to be good if she can be sufficiently fortified, and if the paddle-wheels can be made to elevate with instant facility.

"All his suggestions, indeed, are prudent, and the whole plan excellent, if he is really able and willing to carry it into execution.

"F.B."

## No. 10 (G.)

COPY of a LETTER from the Secretary of the Admiralty to  
Captain Sir *John Ross*, C.B.

Sir,

Admiralty, 22 January 1850.

HAVING laid before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letter of the 14th instant, enclosing the outline of a plan of affording relief to the Expedition

dition under command of Sir John Franklin by way of Baffin's Bay, and a statement of your claims for the command of the vessels that may be employed on that important service, I am commanded by their Lordships to acquaint you, that further search from the eastward has not yet been determined on.

My Lords, therefore, are not prepared to sanction any arrangements that you might have been desirous of entering upon with a view to the future; yet, as they would be glad to be provided with those views in detail in the event of a further Expedition being equipped, their Lordships, without in any way binding themselves to employ you in such service, would, at the same time, wish you to furnish them with a complete (proximate) estimate of the whole expense of such an Expedition as the one you have proposed to their Lordships.

I am, &c.

(signed) *W. A. B. Hamilton.*

No. 10.  
Plans of Captain  
Sir John Ross, c.

### No. 10 (H.)

COPY of a LETTER from Captain Sir *John Ross*, c. B., to Captain *Hamilton*.

Sir,

267, Strand, London, 24 January 1850.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22d instant, by which I am informed, that, having laid mine of the 14th instant before their Lordships, you are commanded to acquaint me, that though not yet prepared to sanction any arrangements, with a view to the future, yet they would be glad to be provided with those views in detail, in the event of a further Expedition being equipped, and that their Lordships, without in any way binding themselves to employ me on such service, would, at the same time, wish me to furnish them with a complete (proximate) estimate of the whole expense of such an Expedition as the one I have proposed to their Lordships; and, according to their Lordships' desire, I have the honour to enclose a detailed statement of the whole expense of such an Expedition, which I calculated as to the expenses of completing the three vessels I have named, ready for sea, from the opinions of several ship-builders, and as to the stores and provisions from the expenses of the "Victory" discovery ship in 1829; and as most of those articles are much reduced in price since that time, I have no doubt that my estimate will be found to be rather above than below the truth.

I beg leave to add, that I am confident it is of almost vital importance to the success of an eastern Expedition for the relief of that under Sir John Franklin, that the seamen brought up in the whale fishery (25 of whom have volunteered at Peterhead), should be immediately secured, as the time has now arrived when they usually engage for the whaling voyage, and after they are gone it will be impossible to obtain a crew so efficient.

In conclusion, I have to request you will be pleased to assure their Lordships, that I am perfectly able, as well as willing, to undertake this arduous service; and I am confident that during next summer, if I am honoured with the command, I shall, under Providence, be completely successful in deciding the fate of the gallant Franklin and his devoted companions.

I have, &c.

(signed) *John Ross,*  
Captain, Royal Navy.

### Enclosure to No. 10 (H.)

A COMPLETE (proximate) ESTIMATE of the whole EXPENSE of an EXPEDITION proposed to be equipped for the RELIEF of the EXPEDITION under the Command of Sir *John Franklin* by the Eastern Route.

|   | £.    | s. | d. |
|---|-------|----|----|
| 1. The expense of fortifying and raising another deck on Her Majesty's steam-vessel "Asp," estimated by several builders*       | 1,000 | -  | -  |
| 2. The expense of converting the paddle-wheels on Robinson's plan, so that they could be raised up clear of the ice at pleasure | 100   | -  | -  |
| 3. The  |       |    |    |

\* Messrs. Fletcher, Ditchburn, Chasfield and Peel.

No. 10.

Box of Captain  
John Ross, c. s.

3. The price of the second vessel, the "Isle," now for sale at Aberdeen, completely fortified and ready for sea, with anchors and cables - £. 1,100 - s. - d. -  
 4. Spare sails for both vessels - - - - - 400 - - -  
 5. Expense of fortifying the yacht "Mary" - - - - - 20 - - -  
 6. Estimate of the expense of warm clothing for the crews of both ships, consisting of 36 officers and men:

|  |    |                |    |     |
|--|----|----------------|----|-----|
| Flushing jackets - - - - -                     | 36 | } estimated at | 90 | - - |
| Monkey jackets - - - - -                       | 36 |                |    |     |
| Red shirts - - - - -                           | 72 |                |    |     |
| Flushing trousers - - - - -                    | 72 |                |    |     |
| Swandown drawers - - - - -                     | 72 |                |    |     |
| Wadmill hose, pairs - - - - -                  | 72 |                |    |     |
| Gutta percha shoes - - - - -                   | 72 |                |    |     |
| Scotch caps - - - - -                          | 36 |                |    |     |
| Pairs of mitts - - - - -                       | 72 |                |    |     |
| Comfortables - - - - -                         | 36 |                |    |     |
| Norwegian Lapland clothing, 12 suits - - - - - |    |                | 30 | - - |

N.B.—The Norwegian Lapland clothing can be procured by Consul-general L. R. Crowe, at Christiana, and is necessary for sledging parties.

## 7. Boatswain's stores:

|  |        |     |     |      |
|--|--------|-----|-----|------|
| Whale lines, 60, 120 fathoms each - - - - -              |        |     | 160 | - -  |
| Boats, 8, 12 cutters in exp. - - - - -                   | £. 123 | - - |     |      |
| Boats of gutta percha, 4, for sledges - - - - -          | 4      | 12  | -   |      |
| Ice-anchors, 24, of sizes - - - - -                      | 36     | -   | -   |      |
| Ice-axes, 12 - - - - -                                   | 4      | 8   | -   |      |
| Ice-saws, 12 - - - - -                                   | 4      | 4   | -   |      |
| Ice-spears, 12 - - - - -                                 | 2      | 8   | -   |      |
| Ice-poles and hooks, 24 - - - - -                        | 10     | 4   | -   |      |
| Harpoons, 10 - - - - -                                   | 1      | 10  | -   |      |
| Whale-lances, 20 - - - - -                               | 7      | -   | -   |      |
| Deep-sea clammers, 4 - - - - -                           | 6      | -   | -   |      |
| Deep-sea leads, 4; 2 of 100 lbs., 2 of 50 lbs. - - - - - | 2      | 5   | -   |      |
| Blubber and chopping knives, 10 - - - - -                | 2      | 5   | -   |      |
| Canvas, 400, from Nos. 2 to 8 - - - - -                  | 150    | -   | -   |      |
| Brooms and brushes, 20 - - - - -                         | 2      | -   | -   |      |
|  |        |     | 573 | 11 - |

## 8. Carpenter's stores:

|  |       |     |    |     |
|--|-------|-----|----|-----|
| Frames to two hulls, 2, each 24 by 12 - - - - -                    | £. 20 | - - |    |     |
| ½-inch board, 500, of fir - - - - -                                | 3     | 2   | 6  |     |
| ¾-inch board, 500 - - - - -  | 4     | 3   | 4  |     |
| 1-inch board, 400 - - - - -  | 4     | 3   | 4  |     |
| Other pieces, for repair in boats, 500 - - - - -                   | 4     | 13  | 9  |     |
| Elm boards, 1-inch, 200 - - - - -                                  | 2     | 13  | 4  |     |
| Elm boards, ¾-inch, 200 - - - - -                                  | 2     | 10  | -  |     |
| Nails, boat, 6 lbs. 10,000 - - - - -                               | 1     | 5   | -  |     |
| Nails, boat, 8 lbs. 5,000 - - - - -                                | -     | 17  | 6  |     |
| Nails, boat, 10 lbs. 500 - - - - -                                 | -     | 2   | 9  |     |
| Four-penny, three-penny, two-penny, 22-oz. nails, 10,000 - - - - - | 1     | 10  | -  |     |
| Oakum, rosin, pitch and tar, 2 casks of each - - - - -             | 4     | 9   | -  |     |
| Sledges, with gutta percha runners, 12 - - - - -                   | 18    | -   | -  |     |
| Wheels for sledges, 2 pair - - - - -                               | 2     | -   | -  |     |
| Shovels, 20 - - - - -  | 1     | 17  | -  |     |
| Sheet lead, 100 lbs. - - - - -                                     | 1     | 2   | -  |     |
| Sheet copper, 100 lbs. - - - - -                                   | 5     | -   | -  |     |
|  |       |     | 53 | 1 6 |

## 9. Gunner's stores:

|  |       |     |     |     |
|--|-------|-----|-----|-----|
| Guns, 12-pounders, 4 - - - - -                         | £. 20 | - - |     |     |
| Gunpowder for them, 10 cases, and cartridges - - - - - | 20    | - - |     |     |
| Gunpowder, fine, for them, 6 cases - - - - -           | 10    | - - |     |     |
| Shot for the 12-pounders, 500 - - - - -                | 5     | - - |     |     |
| Canister, 500 - - - - -                                | 5     | - - |     |     |
| Sky-rockets, 1,000 - - - - -                           | 10    | - - |     |     |
| Blue lights, 1,000 - - - - -                           | 5     | - - |     |     |
| Muskets, or fowling-pieces, 36 - - - - -               | 40    | - - |     |     |
| Small shot, of sizes, 50 bags - - - - -                | 40    | - - |     |     |
| Pistols, 12, and balls - - - - -                       | 12    | - - |     |     |
| Cutlasses, 24 - - - - -                                | 12    | - - |     |     |
| Boarding pikes, 24 - - - - -                           | 6     | - - |     |     |
|  |       |     | 175 | - - |

10. Engineer's stores:

|                                       | £.         | s. | d. |
|---------------------------------------|------------|----|----|
| A small forge, 1, and tools - - - - - | £. 17      | 4  | -  |
| Tallow, 1 ton - - - - -               | 40         | -  | -  |
| Oil, gallons, 500 - - - - -           | 86         | 5  | -  |
| Bar iron, 100 lbs. - - - - -          | -          | 8  | -  |
| Bolt iron, 100 lbs. - - - - -         | -          | 8  | -  |
|                                       | <u>144</u> | -  | -  |

RECAPITULATION of the whole (proximate) Expense.

|                  | £.              | s.        | d.       |
|------------------|-----------------|-----------|----------|
| No. 1 - - - - -  | 1,000           | -         | -        |
| No. 2 - - - - -  | 100             | -         | -        |
| No. 3 - - - - -  | 1,100           | -         | -        |
| No. 4 - - - - -  | 400             | -         | -        |
| No. 5 - - - - -  | 20              | -         | -        |
| No. 6 - - - - -  | 120             | -         | -        |
| No. 7 - - - - -  | 543             | 12        | -        |
| No. 8 - - - - -  | 53              | 1         | 6        |
| No. 9 - - - - -  | 175             | -         | -        |
| No. 10 - - - - - | 144             | -         | -        |
|                  | <u>£. 3,655</u> | <u>12</u> | <u>6</u> |

(signed) *John Ross,*  
Captain, R.N.

ESTIMATE of Provisions for Two Years.

|                                 |             |  |
|---------------------------------|-------------|--|
| Bread - - - - -                 | 14,000 lbs. |  |
| Flour, for bread - - - - -      | 14,000 "    |  |
| Beef, in 8-lb. pieces - - - - - | 3,000 "     |  |
| Pork, in 6-lb. pieces - - - - - | 10,000 "    |  |
| Flour - - - - -                 | 24,000 "    |  |
| Suet - - - - -                  | 3,000 "     |  |
| Raisins - - - - -               | 2,000 "     |  |
| Cocoa - - - - -                 | 10,000 "    |  |
| Sugar - - - - -                 | 15,000 "    |  |
| Peas - - - - -                  | 300 bushels |  |
| Oatmeal - - - - -               | 300 "       |  |
| Barley - - - - -                | 300 "       |  |
| Wine - - - - -                  | 300 gallons |  |
| Spirits - - - - -               | 600 "       |  |
| Vinegar - - - - -               | 1,200 "     |  |
| Tobacco - - - - -               | 4,000 "     |  |
| Lemon juice - - - - -           | 10,000 lbs. |  |
| Sugar for ditto - - - - -       | 10,000 "    |  |
| Candles - - - - -               | 10,000 "    |  |
| Molasses - - - - -              | 6,000 "     |  |
| Coals - - - - -                 | 200 tons    |  |
| Edwards' potatoes - - - - -     | 10 "        |  |
| Preserved meats - - - - -       | 10 "        |  |

- - Estimate of expense of provisions for two years for 36 men, being about the rate of 2s. per man per day—

£. s. d.  
1,200 - -

Expenses carried on - - - 1,560 - -  
3,655 12 6

GRAND TOTAL - - - £. 5,215 12 6

Being for the three vessels in fitting, stores and provisions for two years.

(signed) *John Ross,*  
Captain, R.N.

No. 10.  
 of Captain  
 John Ross, c. b.

No. 10 (I.)

COPY of SUPPLEMENTAL LETTER from Captain Sir *John Ross*, c. b., to his  
 Letter of the 24th January 1850, to Captain *Hamilton*.

Dear Sir,

Friday.

I FORGOT to mention in my estimate yesterday, that I did not mention astronomical instruments, because Dr. John Lee had offered to lend me those which Colonel Cheeney had on the Survey of the Euphrates, and which he has had put into perfect good order on purpose.

I have one chronometer of my own, and several makers will send some with me on trial, for the sake of my report, so that a barometer, and a few thermometers, will be all I want, of which the Admiralty have plenty.

I am, &amp;c.

(signed) *John Ross*.

*P.S.*—I forgot to mention that I have in my estimate charged for only two tons of fresh preserved meats, which are intended for the crew, the others being for depôts at different parts of the coast, and also, that I was not able to get the expense of medicines.

(signed) *J. R.*

No. 10 (K.)

REPORT from Captain Sir *B. W. Walker*, K. C. B., Surveyor of the Navy, on the Communication from Captain Sir *John Ross*, c. b., 1st February 1850; and also, from Captain *Ellice*, Comptroller of Steam Machinery.

Admiralty, 31 January 1850.

Messrs. Edye and Watts to report on the enclosed letter from Sir John Ross, as far as relates to this department.

(signed) *B. W. W.*

We beg to state as follows:—

1st. There is no doubt that the sum of 1,000 *L.* would defray the expense of raising a deck on the “*Asp*,” but the state of the vessel, as to age and stability, to support such a deck, is doubtful.

2d. As regards the paddle-wheels, that subject is for the report of the steam department.

3d. The sum of 1,100 *L.* for the purchase of the “*Isla*,” as to her valuation, can only be known by an inspection of her size, state, &c., no particulars being given.

4th. The value of the sails also can only be ascertained by the number, size and description being explained.

5th. With respect to the expense of fortifying the “*Mary*” yacht, it will be necessary that her size and state should be known.

(signed) *J<sup>r</sup> Edye.*  
*Isaac Watts.*

No. 80, February 1st.

Having called upon my assistants to report on the enclosed papers from Captain Sir John Ross, I beg to submit the same for their Lordships’ information, observing that I concur in their remarks.

(signed) *B. W. Walker.*

No. 219.

The cost of altering the paddle-wheels of the “*Asp*,” as proposed by Sir John Ross, for raising them above the ice, would, in my opinion, amount to about 100 *L.*

(signed) *A. Ellice.*



## —No. 11.—

DR. *M' Cormick's* PLAN of a BOAT EXPEDITION in Search of Sir John Franklin's Arctic Expedition

A. to D.

## No. 11 (A.)

COPY of a LETTER from Doctor *M' Cormick* to the Secretary of the Admiralty

11, Craven-street, Strand,

24 April 1849.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to submit the accompanying outline of a plan of a Boat Expedition in search of Captain Sir John Franklin's Expedition, for the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and request you will be pleased to take an early opportunity of laying the same before the Board.

No. 11.  
Dr. *M' Cormick's*  
Plan of a Boat  
Expedition.

I am, &amp;c.

(signed) *R. M' Cormick*,  
Surgeon, R.N

## Enclosure to No. 11 (A.)

## OUTLINE of a Plan of a Boat Expedition in Search of Sir John Franklin's Expedition

His Majesty's ship "North Star," recently commissioned for the purpose of taking out an additional supply of provisions to Lancaster Sound, for the use of the Arctic ships now absent, offers so favourable an opportunity for making another effort to ascertain the fate of Sir John Franklin's Expedition, and that, too, without in any way impeding the particular service in which the "North Star" is to be employed, or even involving the necessity of that ship's wintering in the ice.

I feel it my duty, as an officer who has been employed in former Expeditions, and devoted many years past to the subject of Polar discovery, to suggest, that Jones and Smith's Sounds, at the head of Baffin's Bay, should be carefully examined by a Boat Expedition, but more especially the former, it being the first opening north of the entrance to Lancaster Sound.

These openings to the Polar Sea, although most important ones, still remain unexplored, not coming within the sphere of search of any of the Expeditions at present employed in those seas. That they are important ones, I need only quote the opinion entertained by Colonel Sabine, one of the best authorities on this subject, who states, in a letter to the Admiralty, that "it was Sir John Franklin's intention, if foiled at one point, to try in succession all the probable openings into a more navigable part of the Polar Sea. The range of coast is considerable in which memorials of the ships' progress would have to be sought for, extending from Melville Island, in the west, to the Great Sound, at the head of Baffin's Bay, in the east." The same authority told Lady Franklin, that Sir John Franklin mentioned to him, that if he were baffled in every thing else, he might perhaps look into the Sounds north of Baffin's Bay before he returned home.

The intense anxiety and apprehension now so generally entertained for the safety of Sir John Franklin, and the crews of the "Erebus" and "Terror" under his command, who, if still in existence, are now passing through the severe ordeal of a fourth winter in those inclement regions, imperatively calls for every available effort to be made for their rescue from a position so perilous; and as long as one possible avenue to that position remains unsearched, the country will not feel satisfied that every thing has been done which perseverance and experience can accomplish to dispel the mystery which at present surrounds their fate.

No. 11.  
Dr. McCormick's  
Plan of a Boat  
Expedition.

The plan I propose is neither difficult or expensive in the accomplishment. Jones' Sound is within the short distance of about 100 miles of Lancaster's Sound and Smith's Sound; is scarcely as much farther north of Jones' Sound. The "North Star" ought to arrive there about the beginning of August, which month, with part of September, would leave nearly two of the best months of the year for the examination of one or both these Sounds to their probable termination in the Polar Sea. Jones' Sound, with the Wellington Channel, on the west, may be found to form an island of the land called "North Devon." All prominent positions on both sides of these Sounds should be searched for flag staves and piles of stones, under which copper cylinders or bottles may have been deposited, containing accounts of the proceedings of the missing Expedition; and if successful in getting upon its track, a clue would be obtained to the fate of our gallant countrymen.

The searching party should commence its return in time to reach the entrance of Jones' Sound at an appointed time and place, at which the "North Star" should be directed to call, after she had delivered her stores for the ships in Lancaster's Sound. The latter part of September would be early enough for her final departure (so as to secure her from being beset for the winter), as that month is well known to be the best period of the year for navigating Baffin's Bay.

Having already twice volunteered my services to the Admiralty as long ago as the year 1847, to be employed in the general search for the lost Expedition, I need scarcely add how happy I shall be to conduct such a Boat Expedition as the one I have proposed. All that I should require for the performance of such a service would be an open boat—a whale boat would, perhaps, be the best, with a tent and stove, and the requisite equipment for her crew, six in number.

And further, should it be found necessary to continue the search in the following year, I am ready to winter on the coast, in a log hut, supplied with sufficient fuel, provisions and clothing for the existence of my small party through a polar winter, or on board the "North Star," should it ultimately be deemed desirable that vessel should remain out.

Should this outline of my plan meet with approval, I am prepared to furnish a more detailed statement.

(signed) R. McCormick,  
Surgeon, R.N.

11, Craven-street, 21 April 1849.

#### No. 11 (B.)

COPY of a LETTER from Dr. McCormick to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

11, Apsley Cottages, Twickenham-green,  
1 January 1850.

Sir,

MAY I request that you will be pleased to lay before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the accompanying plan of a Boat Expedition, in search of Captain Sir John Franklin, with the offer of my services to conduct it.

Together with the enclosed copy of a letter from Captain Sir Edward Parry (under whose command I had the honour to serve in the attempt to reach the North Pole in the year 1827, reporting strongly in favour of my plan of search by boats, which I had the honour to submit for their Lordships' consideration last spring).

I have had much experience in icy regions, both north and south, having served in the late Antarctic Expedition.

I have, &c.

(signed) R. McCormick,  
Surgeon, R.N.

P. S.—I have also submitted my plan of a Boat Expedition, by way of the Coppermine River, for the year 1847.

(signed) R. M.C.

Enclosure (D.)

Enclosure 1, in No. 11 (B.)

No. 11.  
Dr. M'Cormick's  
Plan of a Boat  
Expedition.Walpole Lynn, Norfolk,  
18 April 1849.

Dear M'Cormick,

I NEED scarcely say that I greatly admire the zeal which has prompted you to propose an additional plan for obtaining information respecting Sir John Franklin's Expedition, and that I consider any proposition coming from one so well acquainted with the polar regions as yourself well worthy of attention, more especially when you offer your own services in putting it into execution.

I will now give you my deliberate opinion as to the utility and practicability of the plan you have submitted to me.

There can be no doubt as to the importance, and, considering our increasing anxiety respecting Sir John Franklin, I could almost say the necessity, of examining the various Sounds and Inlets between Lancaster's Sound and the head of Baffin's Bay.

More especially, as Jones' Sound is said to have been recently entered by a whaler, and found to extend a considerable distance to the westward.

Among the probabilities to which we are now driven, there is none more likely than that Sir John Franklin may have tried some one of those inlets, after failing in Lancaster's Sound.

Then, as to your plan of effecting this examination, I am decidedly of opinion that, so long as the summer remains open, by which I mean until young ice begins to form a serious impediment in shore, there is more to be done by a well-equipped boat than in any other way; both as regards certainty of progress and actual safety, more is to be done in close examination in a boat than in a ship, as I have more than once found by experience.

Two questions then arise—

- 1st. What time would you have for effecting this object, supposing you went out in the "North Star"?
- 2d. What prospect of securing your retreat, or of wintering in safety?

I am decidedly of opinion that the "North Star" cannot for one moment be permitted to go out of her course (*i. e.* to be diverted from her main object of delivering provisions to the "Investigator," in order to land any resources for you at the mouth of Lancaster's Sound, much less at any place to the northward of it).

I am more and more confident that the "North Star" will have little or no time left after delivering her stores (which is no easy job), and if she has, we have proposed that she shall be employed under Captain Bird to carry on the search; so that either in the case of her coming home this year or not, you could get no help from her; none, I mean, independently of her delivering of stores to the "Investigator," or in such other place as circumstances may render necessary as the general depôt for Sir James Ross's Expedition.

It is therefore perfectly clear to my mind, that your prospect of being provided for during the winter must depend upon your reaching the "Investigator," or some known depôt of provisions, either at Port Leopold, or some point on the south shore of Lancaster's Sound, before the winter sets in. I feel confident that if you trust to any other resource, you will be disappointed.

It follows, then, in my view, that you must leave the "North Star" at the entrance of Lancaster's Sound with what your boat will stow, and that you must return in time to some known depôt of provisions, independently of anything to be specially deposited for you, for it is impossible for the "North Star" to execute a third object this season.

If, therefore, the "North Star" should succeed in reaching Lancaster's Sound (as I once did) in the early part of August, you might do a great deal in the six weeks following, and secure your own retreat; if much later, you could do so much the less, and perhaps incur so much the greater risk.

These are my general views, and I do not entertain them lightly.

Upon the whole, I do think it would be worth while to let you have a boat to make the attempt; this would cost little, in any way, even if it failed, and I

No. 11.  
Dr. McCormick's  
Plan of a Boat  
Expedition.

should be glad to see so much ardour as you possess employed in this humane and noble cause.

R. McCormick, Esq.

I have, &c.  
(signed) W. E. Parry.

Enclosure 2, in No. 11 (B.)

MEMORANDUM enclosed in Dr. McCormick's Letter of 1 January 1850.

In the month of April last, I laid before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty a plan of search for the missing Expedition under the command of Captain Sir John Franklin, by means of a Boat Expedition up Jones' and Smith's Sounds, volunteering myself to conduct it.

In that plan I stated the reasons which had induced me to direct my attention more especially to the openings at the head of Baffin's Bay, which at the time were not included within the general scheme of search.

Wellington Channel, however, of all the probable openings into the Polar Sea, possesses the highest degree of interest, and the exploration of which is of paramount importance; I should most unquestionably have comprised within my plan of search, had not Her Majesty's ships "Enterprize" and "Investigator" been employed at the time in Barrow's Straits for the express purpose of examining this Inlet and Cape Walker, two of the most essential points of search in the whole track of the "Erebus" and "Terror" to the westward; being those points at the very threshold of his enterprise, from which Sir John Franklin would take his departure from the known to the unknown, whether he shaped a south-westerly course from the latter, or attempted the passage in a higher latitude from the former point.

The return of the Sea Expedition from Port Leopold, and the overland one from the Mackenzie River, both alike unsuccessful in their search, leaves the fate of the gallant Franklin and his companions as problematical as ever: in fact, the case stands precisely as it did two years ago; the work is yet to be begun; everything remains to be accomplished.

In renewal of the search in the ensuing spring, more would be accomplished in boats than in any other way, not only by Behring's Straits, but from the eastward. For the difficulties attendant on icy navigation, which form so insuperable a barrier to the progress of ships, would be readily surmounted by boats; by means of which the coast line may be closely examined for cairns of stones, under which Sir John Franklin would most indubitably deposit memorials of his progress in all prominent positions, as opportunities might offer.

The discovery of one of these mementos would, in all probability, afford a clue that might lead to the rescue of our enterprising countrymen, ere another and sixth winter close in upon them, should they be still in existence; and the time has not yet arrived for abandoning hope.

In renewing once more the offer of my services, which I do most cheerfully, I see no reason for changing the opinions I entertained last spring; subsequent events have only tended to confirm them. I then believed, and I do so still, after a long and mature consideration of the subject, that Sir John Franklin's ships have been arrested in a high latitude, and beset in the heavy polar ice northward of the Parry Islands, and that their probable course thither has been through the Wellington Channel, or one of the Sounds at the northern extremity of Baffin's Bay.

This appears to me to be the only view of the case that can in any way account for the entire absence of all tidings of them throughout so protracted a period of time (unless all have perished by some sudden and overwhelming catastrophe).

Isolated as their position would be under such circumstances, any attempt to reach the continent of America at such a distance would be hopeless in the extreme; and the mere chance of any party from the ships reaching the top of Baffin's Bay at the very moment of a whaler's brief and uncertain visit would be attended with by far too great a risk to justify the attempt, for failure would ensure inevitable destruction to the whole party; therefore their only alternative would be to keep together in their ships, should no disaster have happened to them, and

and by husbanding their remaining resources; eke them out with whatever wild animals may come within their reach.

Had Sir John Franklin been able to shape a south-westerly course from Cape Walker, as directed by his instructions, the probability is, some intelligence of him would have reached this country ere this (nearly five years having already elapsed since his departure from it). Parties would have been sent out from his ships, either in the direction of the coast of America or Barrow's Straits, whichever happened to be the most accessible. Esquimaux would have been fallen in with, and tidings of the long absent Expedition have been obtained.

Failing in penetrating beyond Cape Walker, Sir John Franklin would have left some notice of his future intentions on that spot, or the nearest accessible one to it; and should he then retrace his course for the Wellington Channel, the most probable conjecture, he would not pass up that inlet without depositing a further account of his proceedings, either on the western or eastern point of the entrance to it.

Therefore, should my proposal meet with their Lordships' approbation, I would most respectfully submit, that the party I have volunteered to conduct should be landed at the entrance to the Wellington Channel, or the nearest point attainable by any ship that their Lordships may deem fit to employ in a future search, consistently with any other services that ship may have to perform; and should a landing be effected on the eastern side, I would propose commencing the search from Cape Riley or Beechey Island in a northerly direction, carefully examining every remarkable headland and indentation of the western coast of North Devon for memorials of the missing Expedition; I would then cross over the Wellington Channel, and continue the search along the northern shore of Cornwallis Island, extending the exploration to the westward as far as the remaining portion of the season would permit, so as to secure the retreat of the party before the winter set in, returning either by the eastern or western side of Cornwallis Island, as circumstances might indicate to be the most desirable at the time, after ascertaining the general extent and trending of the shores of that island.

As, however, it would be highly desirable that Jones' Sound should not be omitted in the search, more especially as a whaler, last season, reached its entrance and reported it open, I would further propose, that the ship conveying the exploring party out should look into this opening on her way to Lancaster's Sound, if circumstances permitted of her doing so early in the season; and, if found to be free from ice, the attempt might be made by the Boat Expedition to push through it to the westward in this latitude; and should it prove to be an opening into the Polar Sea, of which I think there can be little doubt, a great saving of time and distance would be accomplished. Failing in this, the ship should be secured in some central position in the vicinity of the Wellington Channel, as a *point d'appui* to fall back upon in the search from that quarter.

(signed) R. McCormick, R. N.

Twickenham, 1 January 1850.

#### Enclosure 3, in No. 11 (B.)

#### OUTLINE of a PLAN of an Overland Journey to the Polar Sea, by the Way of the Coppermine River, in Search of Sir John Franklin's Expedition, 1847.

IF Sir John Franklin, guided by his instructions, has passed through Barrow's Straits, and shaped a south-westerly course, from the meridian of Cape Walker, with the intention of gaining the northern coast of the continent of America, and so passing through the Dolphin and Union Straits, along the shore of that continent, to Behring's Straits;

His greatest risk of detention by the ice throughout this course would be found between the parallels of 74° and 69° north latitude, and the meridians of 100° and 110° west longitude, or, in other words, that portion of the North-west passage which yet remains unexplored, occupying the space between the western coast of Boothia on the one side, and the island or islands forming Banks' and Victoria Lands on the other.

No. 11.  
Dr. M'Cormick's  
Plan of a Boat  
Expedition.

Should the "Erebus" and "Terror" have been beset in the heavy drift ice, or wrecked amongst it and the broken land, which in all probability exists there, whilst contending with the prevalent westerly winds in this quarter;

The Coppermine River would decidedly offer the most direct route and nearest approach to that portion of the Polar Sea, and, after crossing Coronation Gulf, the average breadth of the Strait between the Continent and Victoria Land is only about 22 miles.

From this point a careful search should be commenced in the direction of Banks' Land; the intervening space between it and Victoria Land, occupying about 5 degrees, or little more than 300 miles, could, I think, be accomplished in one season, and a retreat to winter quarters effected before the winter set in. As the ice in the Coppermine River breaks up in June, the searching party ought to reach the sea by the beginning of August, which would leave two of the best months of the year for exploring the Polar Sea, viz. August and September.

As it would be highly desirable that every available day, to the latest period of the season, should be devoted to the search, I should propose wintering on the coast in the vicinity of the mouth of the Coppermine River, which would also afford a favourable position from which to re-commence the search in the following spring, should the first season prove unsuccessful.

Of course the object of such an Expedition as I have proposed is not with the view of taking supplies to such a numerous party as Sir John Franklin has under his command; but to find out his position, and acquaint him where a depôt of provisions would be stored up for himself and crews at my proposed winter quarters, where a party should be left to build a house, establish a fishery, and hunt for game, during the absence of the searching party.

To carry out this plan efficiently, the Hudson's Bay Company should be requested to lend their powerful co-operation in furnishing guides, supplies of pemmican, &c., for the party on their route and at winter quarters. Without entering into details here, I may observe, that I should consider one boat, combining the necessary requisites in her construction to fit her for either the river navigation or that of the shores of the Polar Sea, would be quite sufficient, with a crew one-half sailors, and the other half Canadian boatmen; the latter to be engaged at Montreal, for which place I would propose leaving England in the month of February.

Should such an Expedition even fail in its main object, the discovery of the position of the missing ships and their crews, the long sought-for Polar Passage might be accomplished.

Woolwich, 1847.

(signed)

R. M'Cormick, R. N.

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#### No. 11 (C.)

#### MEMORANDUM by the Hydrographer of the Admiralty on Dr. M'Cormick's proposed Boat Expedition.

DR. M'Cormick has shown so much heart and perseverance in urging his project for the relief of the "Erebus" and "Terror," that there can be no doubt that he would execute it with commensurate zeal and resolution; and though it does not appear to me that Jones' Sound or the Wellington Channel are the most likely places to find those ships, yet in the fifth year of their absence every place should be searched, and I therefore submit that this plan would cost but little, as a rider upon some other Expedition by the eastern route. If their Lordships should consent to Captain Penny's offer of proceeding to Lancaster Sound in his whaling vessel, perhaps the doctor might be despatched with him, according to the position they might find occupied by the ice: they would be able to determine at which point of his proposed circuit it would be most prudent for him to land, and they would arrange at what place he should be picked up.

(signed)

F. B.



No. 11 (D.)

No. 11.  
Dr. M'Cormick's  
Plan for a Boat  
Expedition.

COPY of a LETTER from Dr. M'Cormick to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

11, Apsley Cottages, Twickenham Green,  
20 February 1850.

Sir,

I BEG leave to transmit herewith, for the approval of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a list of the crew, gear and provisions and clothing requisite for the equipment of the Boat Expedition, which I have volunteered to conduct in search of Her Majesty's ships "Erebus" and "Terror," under the command of Captain Sir John Franklin.

The boat I should prefer for this service would be one similar, in the materials of its construction, to the boat used by Sir Edward Parry, in his attempt to reach the North Pole in the year 1827; but this I must leave to the superior judgment of their Lordships. The timbers in that boat were of tough ash and hickory, with Mackintosh's waterproof canvas, and oak and fir planking over all, and having a runner on each side of the keel shod with smooth steel. The boat I would propose should be built after the model of a whale-boat, 25 feet in length and 5 feet beam in the extreme breadth; the crew to consist of a petty officer, a carpenter, and four able seamen.

The route which I am the most desirous and anxious to follow is by the Wellington Channel; so strongly impressed am I with the conviction, that it affords one of the best chances of crossing the track of the missing Expedition, for the reasons already stated in my plan, now under their Lordships' consideration.

To carry out this plan efficiently, the boat should be dropped by the ship conveying the searching party out at the entrance to the Wellington Channel in Barrow Straits; from this point one or both sides of that channel and the northern shores of the Parry Islands might be explored as far west as the season would permit of. But should the ship be enabled to look into Jones' Sound, on her way to Lancaster's Sound, and find that opening free from ice, an attempt might be made by the Boat Expedition to push through it into the Wellington Channel. In the event, however, of its proving to be merely an inlet, which a short delay would be sufficient to decide, the ship might perhaps be in readiness to pick up the boat on its return, for conveyance to its ultimate destination through Lancaster's Sound; or as a precaution against any unforeseen separation from the ship, a depôt of provisions should be left at the entrance to Jones' Sound for the boat to complete its supplies from, after accomplishing the exploration of this inlet, and to afford the means, if compelled from an advanced period of the season or other adverse circumstances of reaching some place of refuge, either on board a whaler or some one of the depôts of provisions on the southern shores of Barrow Straits.

I have, &amp;c.

(signed) R. M'Cormick, R. N.

*Equipment for the Boat.*

Boat's gear, awning, tarpaulings, &c.  
Carpenter's tools and vulcanised Indian rubber for repairs.  
Six fowling-pieces and ammunition  
Arm chest and magazine.  
Harpoons and net.  
Compass, chronometer and quadrant.  
Thermometers and aneroid barometer.  
Box of stationery.  
Tent and Shuith's Orion belts.  
Halkett's boots (large and small sizes).  
Two of Sir Edward Parry's sledges.  
Cooking apparatus, and knives, forks and spoons.  
Gutta percha cups and plates.  
Weighing dial and measures.

*Provisions.*

(Rations for each man per diem.)

Pemmican - 12 oz.  
Preserved meats, soups and vegetables 12 „

*Provisions—continued.*

|                          |   |   |   |   |         |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---------|
| Biscuit                  | - | - | - | - | - lbs.  |
| Cocoa powder, sweetened  | - | - | - | - | 1 oz.   |
| Chocolate                | - | - | - | - | 1 „     |
| Tea                      | - | - | - | - | 1 „     |
| Sugar                    | - | - | - | - | 1 „     |
| Rum                      | - | - | - | - | 1 gill. |
| Tobacco                  | - | - | - | - | 1 oz.   |
| Spirits of wine for fuel | - | - | - | - | 1 pint. |

*Clothing.*

|                                      |           |
|--------------------------------------|-----------|
| Fur caps and south-westerns, of each | 7 no.     |
| Fur dresses for sleeping in          | 7 „       |
| Suits of pilot cloth                 | 7 „       |
| Cloth boots and moccasins            | 14 pairs. |
| Mittens and stout stockings          | 14 „      |
| Guernsey frocks and flannel shirts   | 14 „      |
| Flannel drawers and comforters       | 14 „      |
| Blanket bags for sleeping in         | 7 „       |

(signed) R. M'C.

— No. 12. —

LIEUTENANT *Sherard Osborn's* PLAN of a BOAT EXPEDITION in Search of  
Sir John Franklin's Arctic Expedition.

(A. and B.)

No. 12 (A.)

COPY of a LETTER from Lieutenant *Sherard Osborn* to the Right honourable  
Sir Francis T. Baring, Bart.

Her Majesty's Steam Vessel "Dwarf,"  
Cove of Cork, Ireland, 29 January 1849.

My Lord,

No. 12.  
Lieut. Osborn's  
Plan of a Boat  
Expedition.

1. FEELING a strong interest in the success and safety of the Polar Expedition under Sir John Franklin, as well as in the various measures adopted during the past year to open a communication with his party;

2. I am induced, in furtherance of that object, to offer my services to lead a party in the summer of the present year from Hotham's Inlet, Kotzebue Sound, (in Behring's Straits), across the American continent, towards the River Colville, which empties itself into the Arctic Ocean, in longitude 151° west; descend it, and examine the coast eastward to the mouth of the Mackenzie River, and ascend that river to winter at Fort Good Hope or Franklin.

3. We should thus be certain of having that dangerous portion of the American continent between Harrison Bay and Ellice Island carefully examined, should any unforeseen obstacles be found by the party that has already started from the eastward.

4. Her Majesty's steamer at present in the Pacific might easily carry the proposed party to their starting point by the 1st of June, by embarking them at Panama, steaming to the Sandwich Islands, coaling and taking advantage of the westerly winds, from thence northward; but should it be thought too late in the season to attempt to land a party so far to the northward, I would propose that the party start from the neighbourhood of Mount Elias, latitude 16° 14' north. and 141° west longitude, strike across for the mouth of the Mackenzie River, trace the coast to Cape Anxiety in longitude 148° west; and in the event of nothing being there found of Captain Franklin's party, to return to Hotham's Inlet before the winter set in, and there winter on board one of Her Majesty's vessels.

5. In 1850, if necessary, the same party might return overland to Cape Anxiety, and continue the examination of the coast towards Cape Barrow, taking care again to return to their wintering post before the month of October.

6. By the enclosed track chart and notes, your Lordship will observe that the daily distance to be travelled by either of these proposed parties, in order to accomplish their task, is remarkably small, and the whole distances far within what was travelled by either Franklin or Richardson.

7. As an unknown officer, I feel much diffidence in thus craving your Lordship's sanction to a step attended with so great a responsibility; but the importance of the safety of the Polar Expedition, both in a professional and national point of view, will, I trust, be found to justify me in volunteering my willing aid towards its accomplishment; and if a hearty confidence in my ability to overcome difficulties, and a sanguine belief in the success that will attend the undertaking, be any proof of my competency to be entrusted with such a duty, your Lordship may rest assured that I shall not disappoint your expectations.

8. For character and qualifications I would beg to refer your Lordship to Rear-Admiral Sir G. Seymour, Captain R. Smart, K. H., Captain W. Warren, C. B., Captain Burgess Watson, C. B., W. H. A. Morshead, C. B., and Captain Henry Broadhead, under all of whom I have served.

I have, &amp;c.

(signed)

*Sherard Osborn*

Lieut. Commanding.

Enclosure

## Enclosure to No. 12 (A.)

PROPOSITIONS for Overland Parties from the Pacific Ocean to the Arctic Ocean, in Search of Sir *John Franklin's* Expedition, by Lieutenant *Sherard Osborn*, commanding Her Majesty's Steam Vessel "*Dwarf*."

THAT a party consisting of 12 persons, as follows,

- 1 Commissioned officer,
- 1 Subordinate officer,
- 4 Seamen or marines,
- 6 Men hired in the Russian settlements as guides or interpreters,

be landed, equipped for an overland journey, carrying 50 days' provisions, sledges, dogs, and six of Lieutenant Halkett's cloak boats.

That either of the two following routes be adopted:--

To land in the immediate neighbourhood of Kotzebue Sound, and travel overland, in a north-easterly direction, for a stream which descends from the northern spurs of the Rocky Mountains, called "*The River Colville*," at its mouth (or sooner, if possible) embark in the Indian-rubber boats, and, favoured by the prevailing winds and current, examine the coast to the mouth of the Mackenzie River, ascend it, and winter at one of the Company's posts, or with Richardson's party: Or, otherwise, for the party to leave the neighbourhood of Mount Elias or Cook's Inlet, with the first break of winter in May, and travel overland to the mouth of the Mackenzie River, trace the coast from thence to Cape Anxiety, and return to Hotham's Inlet within Kotzebue Sound, in order to be re-shipped before the winter sets in.

*Distances*

|                                   | Geographical<br>Miles. |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|
| Hotham's Inlet to River Colville  | 390                    |
| River Colville to Mackenzie River | 420                    |
| Distances to Fort Good Hope       | 300                    |
|                                   | <hr/> 1,110            |
| Mount Elias to Mount Gilbert      | 477                    |
| Mount Gilbert to Cape Anxiety     | 220                    |
| Cape Anxiety to Hotham's Inlet    | 190                    |
|                                   | <hr/> 1,187            |

At 100 days' travelling, gives a daily average of 11.1 miles per diem, and 11.8 miles per diem.

Franklin travelled 2,048 miles in 90 days.

Richardson travelled 1,709 miles in 69 days.

Reasons adduced in favour of an attempt being made to reach Sir John Franklin from the westward:

1st. Supposing Franklin to have reached the western side of the Mackenzie River, he would naturally look for assistance or communication from the direction of Behring's Straits, and in struggling onward to meet it, might possibly, in those high latitudes, make as much daily progress as the relieving parties of Ross or Richardson, advancing likewise from the eastward, and thus maintain his distance from them.

2d. Should Franklin be overtaken by Richardson to the west of the Mackenzie River, the former can hardly be expected to retrace his steps, and an overland journey into Canada would be a severe trial to men who have already endured four winters in Polar Regions.

3d. The "*Plover*" being in the neighbourhood of Behring's Straits, if Franklin could be informed to a certainty of her position, he might (should it be thought preferable to passing another winter in the ships) disembark his people, and strike across overland for Kotzebue Sound, a short distance of less than 400 miles.

4th. The shortness of the distance to be travelled by either of the proposed parties renders the performance of the journey a perfect certainty; the main difficulty of crossing the mountain range, which runs parallel to the shores of the Arctic Ocean west of the Mackenzie, would be overcome by following down the

stream of the Colville; and although it is very possible that some of the parties despatched last year (1847) may succeed in reaching Franklin, nevertheless a probability of the proposed party being essentially useful exists, and it would be a consolation to feel that every means of affording assistance had been attended to.

5th. The bad character of the natives in Russian America may be advanced as an objection to the proposed route; but as there are chances existing of Franklin's Expedition having to quit their vessels and may be journey to the Russian posts, it would assuredly be proper for us, who are so far better prepared to struggle with the difficulties arising from the habits of the natives, to attempt to open a road for him and his gallant companions: that it can be done is proved by the fact of a Russian party having some years ago travelled by land from Sitka to Point Barrow, the extreme northernmost cape of the American continent.

(signed) *Sherard Osborn*,  
Lieutenant Commanding.

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No. 12 (B.)

COPY of a LETTER from Lieutenant *Sherard Osborn* to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords,

Ealing, Middlesex, 4 January 1850.

A SECOND attempt to reach Sir John Franklin's Expedition being about to be tried during the present year, I take the liberty of calling your attention to the enclosed proposition for an overland party to be despatched to the shores of the Polar Sea, with a view to their traversing the short distance between Cape Bathurst and Banks' Land. My reasons for thus trespassing on your attention are as follows:

1st. General opinion places the lost Expedition to the west of Cape Walker, and south of the latitude of Melville Island:

The distance from Cape Bathurst to Banks' Land is only 301 miles, and on reference to a chart it will be seen that nowhere else does the American continent approach so near to the supposed position of Franklin's Expedition.

2d. As a starting point, Cape Bathurst offers great advantages; the arrival of a party sent there from England may be calculated upon to a day; whereas the arrival of Captain Collinson in the longitude of Cape Barrow, or that of an Eastern Expedition in Lancaster Sound, will depend upon many uncontrollable contingencies. The distance to be performed is comparatively little, and the certainty of being able to fall back upon supplies offers great advantages. Captain Collinson will have 680 miles of longitude to traverse between Cape Barrow and Banks' Land. An Eastern Expedition, if opposed by the ice (as Sir James Ross has been), and unable to proceed in their vessels farther than Leopold Harbour, will have to journey on foot 330 miles to reach the longitude of Banks' Land, and if any accident occur to their vessels they will be in as critical a position as those they go to seek.

3d. Banks' Land bears from Cape Bathurst N. 41° 49' E. 302 miles, and there is reason to believe that in the summer season a portion of this distance may be traversed in boats.

4th & 5th. Dr. Richardson confirms previous reports of the ice being light on the coast east of the Mackenzie River to Cape Bathurst, and informs us that the Esquimaux had seen no ice to seaward for two moons.

6th. Every mile traversed northward by a party from Cape Bathurst would be over that unknown space in which traces of Franklin may be expected.

7th. It is advisable that such a second party be despatched from Cape Bathurst, in order that the prosecution of Dr. Rae's examination of the supposed Channel between Wollaston and Victoria Lands may in no way be interfered with by his attention being called to the westward.

8th. The *caches* of provisions made at different points of the Mackenzie and at Cape Bathurst, would enable a party to push down to their starting point with great celerity directly the River Mackenzie opens, which may be as early as May.

9th. I have not laid this before your Lordships without in the first place inquiring into the various obstacles that may exist, should your Lordships be pleased to take a favourable view of the subject; and having heard the difficulties advanced

advanced by the Hudson Bay Company's officers, I feel assured that those difficulties will eventually resolve themselves into a mere question of extra trouble and expense, neither of which, I feel assured, will have weight with your Lordships on so important a question as the rescue of Sir John Franklin and his party.

I would also remind your Lordships that the proposed Expedition would carry into execution a very important clause in the Instructions given to Sir James Ross; viz., that of sending exploring parties from Banks' Land in a south-westerly direction towards Cape Bathurst or Cape Parry. In conclusion, I beg to offer my willing services towards the execution of the proposed plan; and seeking it from no selfish motives, but thoroughly impressed with its feasibility, you may rest assured, my Lords, should I have the honour of being sent upon this service, that I shall not disappoint your expectations.

I have, &c.

(signed) *Sherard Osborn*, Lieut. R.N.

#### Enclosure to No. 12 (B)

##### PROPOSITION for an Overland Party in search of *Sir John Franklin*.

1st. THAT a party of two officers and two seamen be forwarded by the steamer which leaves Liverpool for America on the 11th January 1850, and be instructed to reach Montreal, Upper Canada, with all possible despatch.

2d. That Sir George Simpson (the territorial governor of the Hudson's Bay Company) be instructed to afford the utmost possible facility to enable the said party to reach one of the affluents of the Mackenzie River by the month of May next, and that he cause two voyageurs, as well as an Esquimaux interpreter of known good character and merit, to be attached to the said party.

The party will then consist as follows, of—

- 1 Naval officer commanding.
- 1 Medical officer from England, or else a Hudson Bay Company's servant.
- 2 English seamen.
- 2 Voyageurs.
- 1 Esquimaux interpreter

TOTAL 7 in one boat.

3d. That the said party be authorized to consume any necessary portion of the provision deposited by Sir John Richardson and the Hudson's Bay Company for the use of other relieving parties or Franklin's Expedition.

4th & 5th. A (twenty-six foot) whale-boat, procured from a whaler should none be in store, and of the lightest material, will be conveyed by the party from England; but should there be a light whale-boat on the Mackenzie River, or in its immediate neighbourhood, the same should be ordered to be given up for the use of the said party, and thereby save trouble and delay. Under any circumstances, a light sledge should be carried out.

6th. The party shall be instructed to use every possible endeavour to reach Cape Bathurst by the first week in July, and there leaving directions as to the probable site of their winter quarters, they should take advantage of the first appearance of open sea, and push across in the direction of Banks' Land; the officer commanding using his judgment, in the event of being impeded by islands or continuous ice, &c., as to quitting the boat for awhile, and travelling on foot with two or three men.

7th. The personal equipment of this party to be as light as possible, taking that of Sir John Richardson as a guide, it being understood that their winter clothing shall follow them to the winter quarters at Cape Bathurst. Tea and pemmican to be their sole provision, except in winter quarters, where biscuit and anti-scorbutics may be laid in.

8th. Two of Lieutenant Halkett's Mackintosh boats of the large size to be carried out by the party, so as to ensure their safety in the event of the loss of the whale-boat, (two of these boats would be available for this purpose, by delaying

the completion of the order for those of Captain Collinson's party until the 15th instant.)

9th. The officer in command to be instructed to have with him, when starting from Cape Bathurst, not less than 60 days' provisions for his party.

10th. Should any extraordinary circumstances prevent this proposed party from reaching Cape Bathurst until the close of the fine season, it would be advisable for them to winter at that spot, and in the early spring commence their operations over the ice.

11th. In either case the Hudson's Bay Company should replenish all the depôts and send a sufficiency of provisions, clothing, &c. to Cape Bathurst, to support the party from the autumn of 1850 to the summer of 1851. If possible, a couple of dog sledges and two teams of dogs ought to be forwarded to Cape Bathurst during the summer of 1849, to be used at the discretion of the officer in command of the proposed party.

As it is imperatively necessary for the successful issue of the proposed plan that the party should, under all circumstances, winter at Cape Bathurst, it will be for the Hudson's Bay Company to send one of their clerks, and other necessary persons, say two hunters and two fishermen, to establish winter quarters at the said point.

12th. In the event of an Expedition by way of Lancaster Sound, or that under Captain Collinson's command from the westward, reaching Melville Island or Banks' Land, it would be more than probable that their exploring parties to the south-west would meet the proposed party from the American continent, and thus materially shorten their respective journeys, and afford a means of communicating the progress of the vessels to England.

13th. Should, by any unforeseen accident, Captain Collinson's Expedition fail to reach to the eastward of Cape Barrow during the summer of 1850, the proposed party would at any rate ensure that one searching party be on the Polar Sea westward of Banks' Land.

#### OUTFIT of proposed Party.

##### *Stores:*

One light whale-boat.  
Six ash oars (one steer one).  
One mast.  
One yard.  
One lug-sail.  
One boat-hook.  
One water-proof sheet to cover provisions, &c.  
One anchor.  
One whale line.  
One small-arm chest and magazine.  
Four light and good fowling-pieces.  
One cwt. of fine gunpowder, and caps in proportion.  
50 lbs. of mixed shot.  
Two of Lieutenant Halkett's boats, of 32 lbs. each.  
One tool chest, complete, with necessaries for repair, &c.  
One light sledge.  
Two leads and four lines marked.  
Two axes, two pikes and two white ensigns.

##### *Provisions:*

Four cwt. of pemmican, in four waterproof bags.  
30 lbs. of tea, in a secure box.

##### *Instruments, &c.:*

Two pocket chronometers.  
Two good compasses.  
Sextant, artificial horizon.  
Tables, journal and work-book.

##### *Clothing.*

Each person, in a waterproof bag, large enough to enable one person when sleeping to use it as covering.  
One change of woollen clothing, and few sundries, soap, &c.  
One complete suit of waterproof clothing.  
Two blankets, thickest description.  
One Scotch cap.  
One north-wester.  
Two pairs of boots.

In addition to the above, the party can, at Montreal, supply themselves with buffalo robes dresses, or any other essential articles of winter clothing; and during the summer of 1849 fresh supplies may be sent up to Cape Bathurst.

(signed) *Sherard Osborn.*

Lieutenant, Royal Navy.

4 January 1850.



— No. 13. —

OFFER of Mr. *William Penny*, Commander of the "Advice" Whaler, to be employed on a Search for Sir *John Franklin's* Arctic Expedition.

(A. to C.)

No. 13 (A.)

COPY of a LETTER from Mr. *William Penny*, Commander of the "Advice" Whaler, to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords,

Aberdeen, 22 December 1849.

No. 13.

Offer of Service of  
Mr. William Penny.

It is my most anxious desire to be employed in the search for Sir John Franklin, and I beg to offer you my services, which if you are pleased to accept, all that man can do to save that gallant officer and his companions shall be done by me. I have been engaged 28 years, since the age of 12, in the whale trade, and in command of vessels for 14 years, and your Lordships may command my testimonials, if you think proper.

Last summer, as your Lordships are aware, I went up Lancaster Sound, with the view of communicating with Sir James Ross, and gaining some intelligence of the discovery ships; I also landed the Admiralty cylinders entrusted to my care at Navy Board Inlet. Duty to my owners forbade me to penetrate further, which I would gladly have done on my own account.

I now beg to make the following proposition. It is, to be put in command of one or two small vessels, of from 150 to 200 tons; the crews to be of my own selection, picked men, whom I can trust, and with these to proceed in company with the other whalers in March next, or not later than 1st of April, to Davis Straits; at all events, I would desire by 20th of May to be at Baffin's Islands, in order that, if possible, an early passage may be obtained through Melville Bay before the prevailing south-west gales set in. If an early passage be obtained, I would examine Jones' Sound, as I have generally found in all my early voyages clear water at the mouth of that sound, and there is a probability that an earlier passage by this route might be found into Wellington Strait, which outlet by all means to be thoroughly examined at the earliest opportunity, since, if Sir J. Franklin has taken that route, with the hope of finding a passage westward, to the north of the Parry and Melville Islands, he may be beyond the power of helping himself. No trace of the Expedition, or practical communication with Wellington Strait, being obtained in this quarter, I would proceed in time to take advantage of the first opening of the ice in Lancaster Sound, with the view of preceeding to the west and entering Wellington Strait, or, if this should not be practicable, of proceeding farther westward to Cape Walker, and beyond, on one or other of which places Sir John Franklin will probably have left some notices of his course.

Supposing, however, that no such trace is to be found the first year, the vessels to be wintered in separate positions, so as to commence the search westward and northward as early as possible the ensuing year; and since Sir John Franklin may have gone in several other directions, for one seems almost as probable as another, no two vessels, unless very much favoured by circumstances, could accomplish the search of the various inlets in one season. Therefore, if your Lordships have resolved upon a more extended search, I would beg leave still to offer my services for any branch of the searching Expedition from the eastward, so that I may have the command of my own vessel, and am allowed to conduct the particular search committed to my charge, according to the best of my ability, and with full power to act according to the circumstances; and your Lordships shall not have reason to repent of accepting my services, if determination, zeal and long experience can avail.

And although I would be sorry to excite hopes in your Lordships' minds which may not be realised, I cannot at the same time avoid thinking, and that with confidence, that if this plan, or some other of extended search from the eastward, was carried out with that determination, energy and perseverance particularly requisite in the navigation of these seas, some traces of the Expedition must be found, to the satisfaction of your Lordships' minds, and of the nation in general.

When your Lordships are pleased to call upon me, I will enter into further details. I consider that there is no reliance to be placed upon the "North Star" as a depôt of provisions to fall back upon, till it has been ascertained that she is

No. 13.

Offer of Service of  
Mr. William Penny.

safe in Lancaster Sound, which I trust she is, and I shall be most happy, if I am honoured by your Lordships' command, to carry out to her your further instructions.

Should your Lordships wish to send any gentleman to make more scientific observations than I can undertake, or to keep a scientific journal of the voyage, I shall feel it my duty to afford him every facility, according to the instructions given me.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *Wm. Penny.*

## No. 13 (B.)

MEMORANDUM made by Rear-Admiral Sir *Francis Beaufort*, Hydrographer of the Admiralty, with reference to the Letter from Mr. *Penny*.

THE daring but prudent conduct that Mr. Penny is said to have evinced on many occasions, together with the large experience that he must have gained during a whole life among the ice, as well as the ambition he expresses to distinguish himself in this noble enterprise, on which all eyes are turned, lead me to think that it would be wise to let loose his energy, and to give him the opportunity for which he begs. I may add, that I believe this would sensibly gratify Lady Franklin.

I would therefore submit that he be desired to look out for a suitable vessel of the size he has specified, to transmit to their Lordships' Secretary the terms on which she could be chartered or bought, and to state the number of hands he would require, as well as all such other particulars as will enable their Lordships to give him a decided and immediate answer.

(signed) *F. B.*

He is very anxious for an early reply before the captains are appointed to the whale ships.

## No. 13 (C.)

COPY of a LETTER from Mr. *William Penny* to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords,

Aberdeen, 30 January 1850.

IN reply to your Lordships' letter of the 14th instant, directing me to give your Lordships any observations in my power respecting the searching Expedition for Sir John Franklin, I beg to state, that for the conduct of that part of the Expedition mentioned in my former letter, viz. Jones' Sound, Wellington and north shore of the Parry Islands, I would propose to your Lordships that two small square-rigged vessels of from 150 to 200 tons, with decked boats for each, be employed.

The cost and outfits of the above vessels and boats would be, after the best calculations I have been able to make, about - - - £.4,500 - -

The number of officers and men would require to be for each vessel 25 men; wages for 18 months for that number - - - 4,000 - -

Provisions for the same for two years - - - 3,738 - -

TOTAL - - - £.12,238 - -

But, if I am rightly informed, there is a class of vessels in Her Majesty's dock-yards, namely, dockyard lighters, strongly built, of a light draft of water, and well suited for your Lordships' purpose, and if your Lordships are pleased to make use of these, you will be spared the cost of purchasing what may not be so well fitted for the purpose, and would take longer to equip.

The crews best fitting for these vessels would be men accustomed to the hardships of Arctic voyages, whom nothing comes amiss to, and Hudson Bay travellers intermixed. In reference to this I beg to say that I have already taken pains to inquire for the best men of this class in Orkney, and have an answer from Mr. Clouston, connected with the Hudson's Bay Company, which is favourable. I also humbly beg leave to state, that since it has appeared in the newspapers that I

was

was amongst the candidates for search under your Lordships, I have been, I may say, beset with applications to serve under me. I would also beg to urge upon your Lordships' attention the great necessity there is of the vessels leaving England at latest by the first week in April, that they may have every opportunity of obtaining an early passage round Melville Bay before the prevailing south-west winds set in.

In conclusion, I take the liberty to repeat my earnest hope, that I may be employed in command of a branch of the service whenever your Lordships have decided upon it.

I have it so much at heart, that I have sacrificed my usual engagement with my owners on the uncertainty, and nothing shall be wanting to make me deserving of your Lordships' confidence.

I have, &c.

(signed) *William Penny.*

— No. 14. —

LETTERS from Lady *Franklin*, forwarding Offers of Service from Mr. *Charles Reid*, the Rev. Dr. *Wolff*, Mr. *Penny* and Mr. *Goodsir*.

No. 14 (A.)

COPY of a LETTER from Lady *Franklin* to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

No. 14.  
Letters from Lady  
*Franklin*.

Sir,

33, Spring-gardens, 13 January 1850.

I BEG to enclose to you, for the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the following letters:

1. From Captain *Charles Reid*, lately commanding the whaling ship "*Pacific*," and brother to the ice-master on board the "*Erebus*." He is a man of great experience and respectability, and I am informed was only prevented from making active efforts to seek for the lost Expedition by the stringent restrictions laid upon him by his owners, which obliged him to confine himself exclusively to his fishing.

2. From the Rev. Dr. *Wolff*. To this letter I have recently replied that I would lay it before the Lords of the Admiralty.

3. From Captain *Penny*, late of the "*Advice*," received on Saturday last.

I shall esteem it a favour if you will return to me Dr. *Wolff*'s note.

I am, &c.

(signed) *Jane Franklin.*

Enclosure 1, to No. 14 (A.)

12, St. Clement's-street, Aberdeen,

11 January 1850.

Honoured Lady,

I TAKE the liberty of writing you to request, if there is a Northern Expedition going out this year in search of Sir John Franklin, as there is some misunderstanding among the owners of the "*Pacific*," and it is not likely I will go in her, if there is an ice-master wanted, perhaps you would use your influence in procuring me the situation to go in search of my absent brother. I have been 34 years going to that country, and I trust by this time I have some experience. I hope you will excuse me for troubling you, and will feel honoured by your answer in course of post.

I am, &c.

(signed) *Charles Reid.*

Lady *Franklin*.

No. 14.  
Letters from Lady  
Franklin.

Enclosure 2, to No. 14(A.)

Vicarage of Jobe Brewers, near Langport,  
in Somersetshire, Jan. 3, 1850.

My dear Madam,

YOUR Ladyship will be acquainted with the fact, that I went to Bokhara in behalf of Colonel Stoddart and Captain Conolly. There are among the Esquimaux German missionaries, and I, being a German by birth, offer my services by accompanying the Expedition to the North Pole, or go by land to the Esquimaux, and make inquiry after Sir John Franklin. Besides this, though 53 years of age, I learn any language in two months, so that I might make inquiry after your Ladyship's husband in those cold regions. In case that you wish me to go, you ought to apply to the Admiralty to get a curate for my parish until I return, and give to my wife per annum 200 £. until I return.

Yours truly,  
(signed) *Joseph Wolff.*

My curate would cost also 100 £.

The whole journey might last one year six months, even if I was to make it by land.

Enclosure 3, to No. 14 (A.)

Dear Madam,

Polmuir, 10 January 1850.

I AM duly honoured with yours of 7th instant, and feel very anxious that their Lordships would come to a decision about this all-important matter of time.

These delays are dangerous to the object in view. If you would only think proper to write Mr. Hume, requesting of him to allow me to come to London, I would do more with one hour's conversation than months of correspondence. Your Ladyship's friends would then see whether I was fit to be entrusted with such a command.

I am sorry to say I have no faith in the flagstaff, for had anything tended in the least to throw a doubt on my mind, I would not have rested until I had seen whether it was an illusion or reality.

Lady Franklin

I remain, &c.  
(signed) *Wm. Penny*

No. 14 (B.)

COPY of LETTER from Lady *Franklin* to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

Sir,

33, Spring-gardens, 23 January 1850.

I BEG you to do me the favour of laying before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty a letter which I have received from Mr. Robert Goodsir, late surgeon of the "Advice" whaling-ship, Capt. Penny, and brother to the assistant-surgeon of the "Erebus," and I must express my earnest hope that their Lordships will be pleased to enable me to afford that encouragement to his request for which he looks with so much earnestness.

In connexion with this subject, I take the liberty of adding, that I have within the last two or three days received a letter from Captain Penny, expressing with much anxiety his fears that any farther delay in the preparations for the renewed search from the east must be fatal to its success.

I had the pleasure of receiving, yesterday, through the kindness of the Lords Commissioners, the copy of an abstract made by Captain Kellett of his voyage, for which I beg to return my best acknowledgments.

I am, &c.  
(signed) *Jane Franklin.*

Enclosure to No. 14 (B.)

Dear Madam,

I OUGHT to apologize for having been so long of writing to you, but I have been so busy for some time back, that I have almost unconsciously allowed the time to slip by until now.

I trust

I trust you are not allowing yourself to become over-anxious; I know that although there is much cause to be so, there is still not the slightest reason that we should despair.

It may be presumptuous in me to say so, but I have never for a moment doubted as to their ultimate safe return, having always had a sort of presentiment that I would meet my brother and his companions somewhere in the regions in which their adventures are taking place. This hope I have not yet given up, and I trust that by next summer it may be fulfilled, when an end will be put to the suspense which has lasted so long, and which must have tried you so much.

I need not say how anxious I am that I may have an opportunity of devoting my services to the cause during the ensuing season; and I hope I am not asking too much in requesting your good offices in obtaining me an appointment of any kind in any of the Expeditions that may be sent out during the next season.

We have heard nothing here, as yet, of what are the intentions at the Admiralty with regard to what may be done by way of Baffin's Bay and Lancaster Sound. From a letter which I had from Mr. Penny a few days ago, I learn that there is a chance of his being employed; I was glad to see this, for I think that the employment of a person of his experience and skill in the navigation of these regions may be productive of much good.

I am exceedingly anxious to hear what is likely to be done by the Admiralty, and whether there is any chance of their sending out special vessels, or merely employing a whale ship or ships for the purpose. The latter I think would be a most advisable plan, particularly if the Commander is unrestricted by unnecessary instructions, and left to the guidance of his own good sense and experience, with only one object in view, that of obtaining information of, and rendering assistance to, the Expedition.

May I take the liberty of requesting from your Ladyship any information you can give me on these points?

My brother joins me in best respects, and remain,

Dear Madam, your most obedient Servant,

(signed) *Robert Anstruther Goudish.*

George-square, Edinburgh,  
18 January 1850.

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No. 15.—

COPY of the latest CHART of the *Polar Sea*, compiled by Order of the Board of Admiralty.

No. 15.  
Chart of the Polar Sea. *Viz* the end.

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— No. 16. —

COPY of a LETTER from Lady *Franklin* to the Secretary of the Admiralty, dated 11 February 1850; forwarding Communications from *William Snow*, Esq., *John M-Lean*, Esq., *Silas E. Burrows*, Esq., *Millard Fillmore*, Esq., Vice-President of the United States, *Lieut. Sherard Osborn*, R.N., and *John Russell Bartlett*, Esq.

No. 16.  
Letter from Lady Franklin to the Secretary of the Admiralty (with Enclosures).

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No. 16 (A.)

COPY of a LETTER from Lady *Franklin* to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

Sir, 33, Spring-gardens, 11 February 1850.

I BEG to lay before the Lords Commissioners the enclosed letters, in case any of them should be deemed worthy of attention.

I am, &c.

(signed) *Jane Franklin.*

No. 16.  
Letter from Lady  
Franklin to the  
Secretary of the  
Admiralty  
(with Enclosures)

Enclosure 1, in No. 16 (A.)

Madam,

THE accompanying letter I address to you, with a sincere hope that it may afford some useful hints concerning any new Expedition to the Polar Seas. If your Ladyship will favour me with a reply, as to whether my humble services may be required, I shall feel greatly obliged, as I only wait such reply to leave New York, which I am about to do as soon as possible.

Most respectfully, &c.

(signed) W<sup>m</sup> Snow.

My address is, care of Messrs. Willmer and Rogers, New York.

To Lady Franklin.

Enclosure 2, in No. 16 (A.)

Honoured and esteemed Lady,

New York, 7 January 1850.

AMONG the numerous letters which no doubt are addressed to you from all quarters, it is probable that many contain suggestions of great value concerning the object most near to your heart, and the heart of every one alive, not only to the sentiments of humanity, but to esteem for the noble and brave. Perhaps much that is far superior to what I am now about to speak of may have already been submitted to you; but as no man, however humble his position in the world may be, is entirely incapacitated from proving of some service to his fellow-man, so the thoughts and ideas of all men, whatever be their station in life, must tend to some good, if properly directed and made available. In the present instance it is possible that such may be the result; and if, Madam, you should conceive it likely to be so, I can only say, that my plans and myself are entirely at your service.

I will not trouble your Ladyship with a long letter, entering into minute details, which would be wholly unnecessary should you think my plans of no avail. I will only briefly allude to them, and trespass no further on your time than to give the substance of what I have been led to conceive as perhaps one of the most sure means of discovering the fate of the brave arctic voyager, and also of examining the line of coast yet unexplored.

In most, if not all, of the Expeditions hitherto sent out, for either discovery or relief, in the northern regions, it appears to me that one great oversight has been committed at the commencement, and that is, as to the time when such Expeditions should start on their journey. If I am not mistaken, rarely do they leave before spring, and the consequence is, that the summer is far advanced before they arrive on the ground where their intended operations begin. Little or nothing material, therefore, can be done that year; and the following winter has to be passed in bleak and dreary regions, cramping the energies of the men, and exhausting their strength, until the spring again comes round. Now, where the result is merely scientific research and geographical discovery, it is of but little moment; but when time is all important,—when the lives of human beings are at stake, and, above all, the lives of men who have nobly perilled everything in the cause of national, and, I might say, universal, progress,—of men who have evinced the most dauntless bravery that any men can evince,—it seems to me very essential that an Expedition should be already on the spot to commence operations at the earliest opening of summer; and that it should, if at all possible, begin the journey to reach that spot even, if necessary, in the previous winter. Wiser and more experienced heads than mine can say how much or how little of this can be done; but it is not a little, no, nor a great deal, that should deter any one from, at all events, attempting something like what I now must humbly and respectfully suggest to your Ladyship's consideration, as a possible means of speedily and effectually reaching the various localities in the Arctic Sea where the missing voyagers may be heard of.

My plan is this:—your Ladyship, it appears by the public prints, has already had some idea of crossing the Atlantic—do so, then, at once; and, for a season, establish yourself at one of the principal towns in Canada, where you can be enabled to personally superintend the carrying out of whatever may be anew attempted. Let a well-organized Expedition of as many men as could be pro-

vided



vided with the funds at disposal, if the Expedition is at private expense, start with as little delay as possible on some of the northern tracts already explored. For instance, let a party of 100 picked men, well-disciplined and officered as on board a ship, and accompanied with all the necessary food, scientific instruments, and everything usual on such Expeditions, proceed immediately by the shortest and most available route to the lands in the neighbourhood of the unexplored regions. If practicable, I would suggest that they should proceed, first, to Moore Fort, on the southern part of Hudson's Bay, and thence by small craft to Chesterfield Inlet, or otherwise by land reach that quarter, so as to arrive there at the opening of summer. From this neighbourhood let the party, minus 10 men, be divided into three separate detachments, each with specific instructions to extend their researches in a northerly and north-westerly direction. The westernmost party to proceed as near as possible in a direct course to the easternmost limits of discovery yet made from Behring's Straits, and on no account to deviate from that course on the western side of it, but, if necessary, to the eastward. Let the central party shape a course as near as possible to the position of the Magnetic Pole; and the easternmost division direct to Prince Regent's Inlet, or the westernmost point of discovery from the east, and not to deviate from that course easterly. Let each of these detachments be formed again into three divisions, each division thus consisting of 10 men. Let the first division of each detachment pioneer the way, followed on the same track by the second and the third at stated intervals of time. On the route let the pioneers, at every spot necessary, leave distinguishing marks to denote the way, and also to give information to either of the other two principal detachments as may by chance fall into their track. To second the efforts of the three detachments, let constant succours and other assistance be forwarded by way of Moose Fort, and through the 10 men left at Chesterfield Inlet; and should the object for which such an Expedition was framed be happily accomplished by the return of the lost voyagers, let messengers be forwarded with the news, as was done with Captain Back, in the case of Captain Ross. Let each of the extreme detachments, upon arriving at their respective destinations, and upon being joined by the whole of their body, proceed to form plans for uniting with the central party, and ascertaining the results already obtained by each by sending parties in that direction. Also, let a chosen number be sent out from each detachment as exploring parties, wherever deemed requisite; and let no effort be wanted to make a search in every direction where there is a possibility of its proving successful.

If a public and more extensive Expedition be set on foot, I would most respectfully draw attention to the following suggestions:—Let a Land Expedition be formed upon a similar plan, and with the same number of men, say 300 or more, as those fitted out for sea. Let this Expedition be formed into three great divisions: the one proceeding by the Athabasca to the Great Slave Lake, and following out Captain Back's discoveries; the second, through the Churchill district; or, with the third, according to the plan laid out for a private Expedition alone, only keeping the whole of their forces as much as possible bearing upon the points where success may be most likely attainable.

Each of these three great divisions to be subdivided and arranged also as in the former case. The expense of an Expedition of this kind, with all the necessary outlay for provisions, &c. &c., I do not think would be more than half what the same would cost if sent by sea; but of this I am not a competent judge, having no definite means to make a comparison. But there is yet another, and, I cannot help conceiving, a more easy way of obviating all difficulty on this point, and of reducing the expense considerably.

It must be evident that the present position of the arctic voyagers is not very accessible, either by land or sea, else the distinguished leader at the head of the Expedition would long ere this have tracked a route whereby the whole party, or at least some of them, could return.

In such a case, therefore, the only way to reach them is by, if I may use the expression, *forcing* an Expedition on towards them; I mean by keeping it constantly upheld and pushing onward. There may be, and indeed there are, very great difficulties, and difficulties of such a nature that, I believe, they would themselves cause another great difficulty in the procuring of men. But, if I might make another bold suggestion, I would respectfully ask our Government at home,

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why not employ picked men from convicted criminals, as is done in exploring Expeditions in Australia? Inducements might be held out to them; and by proper care they would be made most serviceable auxiliaries. Generally speaking, men convicted of offences are men possessed of almost inexhaustible mental resources; and such men are the men who, with physical powers of endurance, are precisely those required. But this I speak of, merely, if sufficient free men could not be found, and if economy is studied. Indeed, as the matter now stands, in regard to the criminals of England, it might not be a bad idea sending several of the best of them on an exploring Expedition of this kind. I have often wondered that nations do not always employ their criminals in the more hazardous undertakings which lead to the advancement of science or public good, instead of uselessly incarcerating them for years, at an unprofitable expense, or sending them where the laborious and industrious freeman has already pioneered his way, and by the hard "sweat of his own brow" chalked out for himself a new home. I could, perhaps, say more on this point as to the opportunity thus afforded such a class of men in again becoming useful members of society; and, also, of constantly sending any convicts who would take the choice offered to them of entering upon such Expeditions for the advancement of science, &c. to the northern portions of the American\* continent until the great problem is at length solved, and all is obtained that has been sought for; but such would be irrelevant to the present subject. Suffice it merely to observe, that the expense to Government would be no greater; and no obloquy could be thrown upon the affair if the men themselves accepted it.

Surely if such a scheme as this be followed out with the readiness, vigour and determination that is requisite to it, it could not fail of success; and not only success in the principal object for which it was formed, but also in regard to scientific discovery. To say that it is impossible, I think would be wrong. In my humble opinion, nothing is impossible for man to accomplish that is rightly within his sphere as a mortal being to attempt. All previous plans to discover the North-West Passage, no doubt, were looked upon as impossible to accomplish, even as far as they have been accomplished. Everything out of the common order of things is looked upon as impossible, until the impossibility is negatived by the unexpected realization. In affairs of this kind, it is never thought impossible to attempt it by sending more than the number of men I have named in ships: why not try the same by land? The other day California was a desert in comparison; now, by the enterprise and energy of a remarkable, industrious and fearless people, it is becoming a populous and a mighty state in the western world. Nothing that is at all possible but may be made practicable, if the full power of the human mind, and the full extent of human means, be made to bear upon it. Man is a mighty and a wonderful creature. Few know their own power, but knowing it, they become astonished, and are lost in amaze, while they humbly bend in adoration of Him who has thus so strangely and mysteriously made them. Let this power be now exercised; never can it be done in a more godlike and noble way. Who can tell what may not be accomplished? Truly it is worth an effort. Perseverance, energy of mind, even more than physical capacity, fearless mental courage, aptitude of resource, bold determination, accompanied by the fullest financial means, are what is required.

I have now, Madam, given you the substance of my plan, and the ideas I have formed in connexion with it. I do not presume to offer it in the face of any advice or other plans tendered by more learned and wiser men than myself, but I merely venture to throw it out as a suggestion for them to act upon if, considered sufficiently available. For myself, I am actuated solely by the best of motives in thus coming forward, and, though with ties which make a home dear to me, will freely give my services in any way they may prove of use; and look for no other reward than the satisfaction my own heart would give in the knowledge that I had been in some measure instrumental in restoring, or attempting to restore, the long-lost voyagers to their home and mourning friends. A rough life in many parts of the world has long been mine. Alike acquainted with the snowy Alps and the icy regions of the southern seas, I should not hesitate upon a journey to the arctic shores if ever required to undertake it. In the plan I have suggested, the various estimates and details may be easily arranged and brought within a very small compass. To be engaged in that, or any other scheme, for affording relief to those locked up in the polar seas, must

be

be always looked upon as one of the greatest honours, and as such I should regard it.

With every respectful sentiment of esteem, I now subscribe myself your Ladyship's most obedient humble servant,

(signed) *Wm. Snow.*

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Enclosure 3, in No. 16 (A.)

Guelph, Canada West.  
11 January 1850.

Madam,

REGARDING with the deepest sympathy and admiration the zeal, perseverance and conjugal affection displayed in your efforts to relieve or to discover the fate of your distinguished husband, and the gallant party under his command, despite the difficulties, disappointments and heart-sickening hope deferred with which these efforts have been attempted, I have been led to give the painfully interesting subject a serious and careful consideration, in the view of ascertaining the most suitable and most likely means of obtaining intelligence of the long-absent party, in whose fate all men must feel a lively interest, and towards whose restoration to their country and their homes all must be desirous to contribute. Having passed some five-and-twenty years of my life (of which a narrative has lately been published in London) as an officer and partner of the Hudson's Bay Company, by whom the talents and courage of Sir John Franklin are alike well known and appreciated, I may not be wholly incompetent to the task; and it being rumoured that the British Government are about to fit out another Expedition to the North-west, my long experience of the country and its inhabitants may serve as my apology for offering the following suggestions.

From the total failure of every attempt hitherto made by sea by men of undoubted zeal and devotedness, I entertain but slight hopes of future attempts on the same element being more successful. Far be it from me, however, to condemn any attempt that may afford the slightest glimmering of hope: let every measure be adopted that may tend to a discovery of the Expedition, or tend to throw the least ray of light on the fate of those who composed it. The following plan suggests itself to my mind as likely to produce some intelligence, if not to lead to a discovery of the party.

Let a small schooner of some 30 or 40 tons burthen, built with a view to draw as little water as possible, and as strong as wood and iron could make her, be despatched from England in company with the Hudson's Bay ships. This vessel would, immediately on arriving at York Factory, proceed to the Strait termed Sir Thomas Rowe's Welcome, which divides Southampton Island from the mainland; then direct her course to Wager River, and proceed onward until interrupted by insurmountable obstacles. The party being safely landed, I would recommend their remaining stationary until winter travelling became practicable, when they should set out for the shores of the Arctic Sea, which by a reference to Arrowsmith's map appears to be only some 60 or 70 miles distant; then, dividing in two parties or divisions, the one would proceed east, the other west; and I think means could be devised of exploring 250 or 300 miles in either direction; and here a very important question presents itself,—how and by what means is this enterprise to be accomplished?

In the first place, the services of Esquimaux would be indispensable, for the twofold reason, that no reliable information can be obtained from the natives without their aid, and that they alone properly understand the art of preparing snow-houses, or "igloes," for winter encampment, the only lodging which the desolate wastes of the arctic regions afford. Esquimaux understanding the English language sufficiently well to answer our purpose frequent the Hudson's Bay Company's post in Labrador, some of whom might be induced (I should fain hope) to engage for the Expedition; or probably the "half breed" natives might do so more readily than the aborigines. They should, if possible, be strong, active men, and good marsknien, and not less than four in number. Failing in the attempt to procure the natives of Labrador, then I should think Esquimaux might be obtained at Churchill, in Hudson's Bay: the two who accompanied Sir John in his first Land Expedition were from this quarter.

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Should these suggestions be considered worthy of notice, I would recommend immediate application being made to the Hudson's Bay Company for assistance in the matter, as also for a supply of provision, according to the annexed list. These supplies to be forwarded to York Factory by the earliest opportunity in summer. Information could probably be obtained at the Company's house in London, whether these supplies could be furnished in whole or in part. Orders should be sent through the Hudson's Bay Company to procure 20 strong Esquimaux dogs in Labrador or Churchill, together with four or five Esquimaux sledges, 10 men's seal-skin coats and mitts, Esquimaux boots, made large, for Europeans, six large seal-skin tents, such as the natives use in autumn and in spring, and material for making a couple of *odmiako*, or large skin-boats, to provide for the escape of the party in case any misfortune happened to the vessel at the breaking up of the ice in the spring. A couple of females ought to accompany their husbands, for various reasons that need not here be detailed. One hundred and fifty gallons of oil would also be required; a dozen of lamps, such as the Esquimaux use, and snow shoes, the latter article to be supplied at York Factory. The Esquimaux and so much of the above supplies as can be obtained at the Company's post in Labrador being procured, I would recommend their being forwarded to Akak, one of the Moravian Brethren's settlements in Labrador (with whom, by the way, a communication ought also to be opened on the subject), where the vessel from England would touch on her way to Hudson's Bay. A couple of scientific men would be required for the Expedition, who would make up their minds to face every hardship and privation without flinching.

As few hands as possible would be engaged in the overland journey, the saving of provisions being a most important consideration.

Persons travelling in the arctic regions in winter are subject to a disease of the eyes, termed "*mal de neige*" by the Canadian voyagers, with which, I perceive by the narrative of the last Expeditions, some of those engaged in them were afflicted, and prevented from prosecuting their land journey. To obviate this very serious difficulty, which I know it to be from my own painful experience, a very simple precaution is required:—a pair of green or shaded goggles effectually protects the sight; these goggles ought to be fixed in Morocco or chamois leather (and tied behind the head), and not in metal, which freezes the part coming in contact with it. A variety of minor details connected with the general arrangement of the Expedition I shall defer for the present. I would suggest, however, that officers of the Hudson's Bay Company, inured to the climate, and who may have had personal experience of nearly similar exploratory Expeditions, would be the most suitable persons from among whom to select individuals competent to conduct the enterprise to a successful termination.

I nearly omitted to mention, that material for a building 24 feet by 34 ought to be sent out to serve as a store-house. In conclusion, I desire this communication to be considered private, in so far as regards the Press, and would wish it to be submitted to the consideration of persons who might be qualified to pass judgment on the propositions it contains. That Almighty God may vouchsafe an answer to your earnest prayers, by directing to the adoption of measures by which your husband may be restored to you, is the sincere prayer of,

Madam, your very humble Servant,

Lady Franklin.

(signed) John M'Lean.

Required from the Hudson's Bay Company—

- 150 bags of good pemican.
- 150 bales of dry meat.
- 10 bags of pounded meat.
- 10 bags of tallow.
- 30 pairs of leather trowsers.
- 25 pairs of snow shoes.
- 100 large poles for Esquimaux tents.

Enclosure 4, in No. 16 (A.)

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Letter from Lady  
Franklin to the  
Secretary of the  
Admiralty  
(with Enclosures).

My dear Madam,

11 A.M., 23 January 1850.

I HAVE this moment received the enclosed communication from Washington, as presented to Congress by the President; also a letter from my most intimate friend, the Vice-President of the United States, who thinks as I do, that your presence here is important.

The mail is just closing.

Most truly yours, &amp;c.

(signed) *Silas E. Burrows.*

Enclosure 5, in No. 16 (A.)

My dear Sir,

Washington, 21 January 1850.

AGREEABLE to your request of the 19th instant, I herewith send you the message of the President, communicating copies of a correspondence with the lady of Sir John Franklin.

\* \* \* \* \*

Yours truly,

(signed) *Millard Fillmore.*

MESSAGE from the PRESIDENT of the UNITED STATES, communicating Copies of a Correspondence with the Lady of Sir *John Franklin*, relative to the Expedition to the Arctic Regions under the Command of her Husband.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States.

I HEREWITH submit to you copies of a correspondence with the lady of Sir John Franklin, relative to the well-known Expedition under his command to the Arctic Regions, for the discovery of a North-west Passage. On the receipt of her first letter, imploring the aid of the American Government in a search for the missing ships, engaged in an enterprise which interested all civilized nations, I anxiously sought the means of affording that assistance, but was prevented from accomplishing the object I had in view in consequence of the want of vessels suitable to encounter the perils of a proper exploration, the lateness of the season, and the want of an appropriation by Congress to enable me to furnish and equip an efficient squadron for that object. All that I could do, in compliance with a request which I was deeply anxious to gratify, was to cause the advertisements of reward promulgated by the British Government, and the best information I could obtain as to the means of finding the vessels under the command of Sir John Franklin, to be widely circulated among our whalers and seafaring men, whose spirit of enterprise might lead them to the inhospitable regions where that heroic officer and his brave followers, who perilled their lives in the cause of science and for the benefit of the world, were supposed to be imprisoned among the icebergs, or wrecked upon a desert shore.

Congress being now in session, the propriety and expediency of an appropriation for fitting out an Expedition to proceed in search of the missing ships, with their officers and crews, is respectfully submitted to your consideration.

(signed) *Z. Taylor.*

Washington, 4 January 1850.

The Lady of Sir *John Franklin* to the President.

Sir,

Bedford-place, London, 4 April 1849.

I ADDRESS myself to you as the head of a great nation, whose power to help me I cannot doubt, and in whose disposition to do so I have a confidence which I trust you will not deem presumptuous.

The name of my husband, Sir John Franklin, is probably not unknown to you.

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It is intimately connected with the northern part of that continent of which the American republic forms so vast and conspicuous a portion. When I visited the United States three years ago, amongst the many proofs I received of respect and courtesy, there was none which touched and even surprised me more than the appreciation every where expressed to me of his former services in geographical discovery, and the interest felt in the enterprise in which he was then known to be engaged.

The Expedition fitted out by our Government for the discovery of the Northwest Passage (that question which, for 300 years, has engaged the interest and baffled the energies of the man of science and the navigator), sailed, under my husband's command, in May 1845. The two ships, "Erebus" and "Terror," contained 138 men (officers and crews), and were victualled for three years. They were not expected home, unless success had early rewarded their efforts, or some casualty hastened their return, before the close of 1847, nor were any tidings expected from them in the interval. But when the autumn of 1847 arrived without any intelligence of the ships, the attention of Her Majesty's Government was directed to the necessity of searching for and conveying relief to them, in case of their being imprisoned in ice, or wrecked, and in want of provisions and means of transport. For this purpose an Expedition, in three divisions, was fitted out in the early part of last year, directed to three different quarters simultaneously; viz., 1st, to that by which, in case of success, the ships would come out of the Polar Sea to the westward, or Behring's Straits; 2d, to that by which they entered on their course of discovery on the eastern side, or Davis's Straits; and 3d, to an intervening portion of the arctic shore, approachable by land from the Hudson's Bay Company's settlements, on which it was supposed the crews, if obliged to abandon their ships, might be found. This last division of the Expedition was placed under the command of my husband's faithful friend, the companion of his former travels, Dr. Sir John Richardson, who landed at New York in April of last year, and hastened to join his men and boats, which were already in advance towards the arctic shore. Of this portion of the Expedition, I may briefly say, that the absence of any intelligence from Sir John Richardson at this season proves he has been unsuccessful in the object of his search.

The Expedition intended for Behring's Straits has hitherto been a complete failure. It consisted of a single ship, the "Plover," which, owing to her setting off too late, and to her bad sailing properties, did not even approach her destination last year.

The remaining and most important portion of the searching Expedition consists of two ships under the command of Sir James Ross, which sailed last May for Davis's Straits, but did not succeed, owing to the state of the ice, in getting into Lancaster Sound until the season for operations had nearly closed. These ships are now wintering in the ice, and a store ship is about to be despatched from hence with provisions and fuel to enable them to stay out another year; but one of these vessels is, in a great degree, withdrawn from active search by the necessity of watching at the entrance of Lancaster Sound for the arrival of intelligence and instructions from England by the whalers.

I have entered into these details with the view of proving that, though the British Government has not forgotten the duty it owes to the brave men whom it has sent on a perilous service, and has spent a very large sum in providing the means for their rescue, yet that, owing to various causes, the means actually in operation for this purpose are quite inadequate to meet the extreme exigence of the case; for, it must be remembered, that the missing ships were victualled for three years only, and that nearly four years have now elapsed, so that the survivors of so many winters in the ice must be at the last extremity. And also, it must be borne in mind, that the channels by which the ships may have attempted to force a passage to the westward, or which they may have been compelled, by adverse circumstances, to take, are very numerous and complicated, and that one or two ships cannot possibly, in the course of the next short summer, explore them all.

The Board of Admiralty, under a conviction of this fact, has been induced to offer a reward of 20,000*l.* sterling to any ship or ships, of any country, or to any exploring party whatever, which shall render efficient assistance to the missing ships, or their crews, or to any portion of them. This announcement, which, even if the sum had been doubled or trebled, would have met with public approbation, comes, however, too late for our whalers, which had unfortunately sailed before



before it was issued, and which, even if the news should overtake them at their fishing-grounds, are totally unfitted for any prolonged adventure, having only a few months' provision on board, and no additional clothing. To the American whalers, both in the Atlantic and Pacific, I look with more hope, as competitors for the prize, being well aware of their numbers and strength, their thorough equipment, and the bold spirit of enterprise which animates their crews. But I venture to look even beyond these. I am not without hope that you will deem it not unworthy of a great and kindred nation to take up the cause of humanity which I plead, in a national spirit, and thus generously make it your own.

I must here, in gratitude, adduce the example of the imperial Russian Government, which, as I am led to hope by his Excellency the Russian Ambassador in London, who forwarded a memorial on the subject, will send out exploring parties this summer, from the Asiatic side of Behring's Strait northward, in search of the lost vessels. It would be a noble spectacle to the world, if three great nations, possessed of the widest empires on the face of the globe, were thus to unite their efforts in the truly Christian work of saving their perishing fellow-men from destruction.

It is not for me to suggest the mode in which such benevolent efforts might best be made. I will only say, however, that if the conceptions of my own mind, to which I do not venture to give utterance, were realized, and that, in the noble competition which followed, American seamen had the good fortune to wrest from us the glory, as might be the case, of solving the problem of the unfound passage, or the still greater glory of saving our adventurous navigators from a lingering fate which the mind sickens to dwell on, though I should in either case regret that it was not my own brave countrymen in those seas whose devotion was thus rewarded, yet should I rejoice that it was to America we owed our restored happiness, and should be for ever bound to her by ties of affectionate gratitude.

I am not without some misgivings while I thus address you. The intense anxieties of a wife and of a daughter may have led me to press too earnestly on your notice the trial under which we are suffering, (yet not we only, but hundreds of others), and to presume too much on the sympathy which we are assured is felt beyond the limits of our own land. Yet, if you deem this to be the case, you will still find, I am sure, even in that personal intensity of feeling, an excuse for the fearlessness with which I have thrown myself on your generosity, and will pardon the homage I thus pay to your own high character, and to that of the people over whom you have the high distinction to preside.

I have, &c.

(signed) *Jane Franklin.*

I beg to annex some explanatory papers:—

#### NOTICE of the EXPEDITIONS of Discovery and Search now in the Arctic Seas.

In the year 1845, Her Majesty's Government sent out an expedition for the purpose of discovering a North-west Passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, along the northern coast of America, or between Davis's and Behring's Straits. The expedition consisted of two ships, the "Erebus" and "Terror," under the command of Sir John Franklin and Captain Crozier—the complement of officers and men in the two ships being about 138. They were victualled for three years. Their instructions were, to proceed to Baffin's Bay, and, as soon as the ice permitted, to enter Lancaster Sound, and proceed westward through Barrow's Strait, in the latitude of about 74½, until they reached the longitude of Cape Walker, or about 98 west. They were then to use every effort to penetrate southward and westward towards Behring's Strait; and it was in this part that their greatest difficulties were apprehended. If these proved to be insurmountable, they were next directed to return to Barrow's Strait, and proceed northward by the broad channel between Devon and Cornwallis Islands, commonly called Wellington's Strait, provided it appeared open and clear of ice. It is evident that their ability to follow either of these courses must have depended upon local circumstances of which we have no cognizance.

The discovery ships sailed from England on the 19th of May 1845, and were last



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last seen on the 26th of July of the same year, in latitude  $74^{\circ} 48'$  North, longitude  $66^{\circ} 13'$  West, fastened to an iceberg, waiting for the opening of the ice to cross into Lancaster Sound.

These ships have never since been heard of; and it was for the purpose of relieving them, and at least of ascertaining their fate, that, in 1848, Her Majesty's Government again fitted out an expedition. It was in three divisions.

The first (in point of time) consisted of a single ship, called the "Plover," commanded by Captain Moore, which left England in the latter end of January, for the purpose of entering Behring's Strait, or the westward passage. It was intended that she should arrive there in the month of July, and, having looked out for a winter harbour, should send out her boats northward and eastward, in which directions the discovery ships, if successful, would be met with.

Unfortunately, the "Plover" never even approached last year the place of her destination, and whatever search she may yet be able to make has to be accomplished this summer. The "Herald" surveying vessel in the Pacific has orders, if possible, to supply her with additional stores.

The second division of the expedition was one of boats, to explore the coast of the Arctic Sea between the Mackenzie and Coppermine Rivers, or from the  $135^{\text{th}}$  to the  $115^{\text{th}}$  degree of West longitude, together with the south coast of Wollaston Land—it being supposed, that if Sir John Franklin's party had been compelled to leave the ships and take to their boats, they would make for this coast.

The non-arrival by this time (April 1849) of an express from Sir John Richardson, proves that his last summer's search was fruitless.

The third portion of the expedition of search consists of two ships, the "Enterprise" and "Investigator," under the command of Sir James Ross and Captain Bird, which sailed in May 1848 for Lancaster Sound. They were last heard of on the 28th of August last, when they were at the entrance of this Sound.

Sir James Ross intended to proceed in the "Enterprise," carefully examining the shores of Lancaster Sound and Barrow's Strait on his way to Melville Island or to Banks' Land, and thence to send out exploring parties in boats.

This second ship, the "Investigator," under command of Captain Bird, appears to have received instructions from Sir James Ross to watch Lancaster Sound, for the purpose both of communicating with the whaling ships from England this summer, and of looking out for stragglers from the "Erebus" and "Terror," should any be endeavouring to reach the neighbourhood of the fishing grounds.

From the late period of the season, however, at which the "Enterprise" and "Investigator" reached Lancaster Sound, it is calculated that they can scarcely have had more than a fortnight for their operations during the last summer, and that a wide field for search remains open during the approaching season, for which, however, the means at present in activity are by no means adequate. It is the general belief of those officers who have served in the former Arctic Expeditions, that the discovery ships "Erebus" and "Terror," whatever accident may have befallen them, cannot have wholly disappeared from those seas; and that some traces of their fate, if not some living remnant of their crews, must eventually reward the search of the diligent investigator. It is possible that they may be found in quarters the least expected; but, in the first instance, the attention of ships engaged in the search should be directed to the quarters pointed at in the Admiralty instructions given to Sir John Franklin, and especially to the channels leading out of Barrow's Strait to the north. The chief of these is that called Wellington Strait, which it is probable Sir James Ross has not yet explored, and where, if entangled in the ice, and exhausted for want of provisions, their condition must be in the highest degree dangerous. It is also very desirable that the coasts of Boothia and North Somerset should be carefully examined, as well as the shores of the Gulf of Boothia and Regent's Inlet, and the coast eastward of the Coppermine to Great Fish or Back's River; also the sounds and inlets north and west of Baffin's Bay, which are supposed to communicate with Wellington's Channel to the West. Some of these parts might be explored by boats or land parties, as would all that part, also unprovided for, which lies between the Mackenzie River and Icy Cape to the west.

It is the opinion of several experienced officers, that two small vessels, of the size of 150, or 180, and of 80 tons respectively, drawing not above 10 feet water, might answer the purpose of careful search in these seas, as well as larger vessels.

Mr. Clayton to Lady Jane Franklin.

No. 16.  
Letter from Lady  
Franklin to the  
Secretary of the  
Admiralty  
(with Enclosures)Department of State, Washington,  
25 April 1849.

Madam,

Your letter to the President of the United States, dated April 4, 1849, has been received by him, and he has instructed me to make to you the following reply.

The appeal made in the letter with which you have honoured him, is such as would strongly enlist the sympathy of the rulers and the people of any portion of the civilised world.

To the citizens of the United States, who share so largely in the emotions which agitate the public mind of your own country, the name of Sir John Franklin has been endeared by his heroic virtues, and the sufferings and sacrifices which he has encountered for the benefit of mankind. The appeal of his wife and daughter, in their distress, has been borne across the waters, asking the assistance of a kindred people to save the brave men who embarked in his unfortunate expedition; and the people of the United States, who have watched with the deepest interest that hazardous enterprise, will now respond to that appeal, by the expression of their united wishes that every proper effort may be made by this government for the rescue of your husband and his companions.

To accomplish the objects you have in view, the attention of American navigators, and especially of our whalers, will be immediately invoked. All the information in the possession of this government, to enable them to aid in discovering the missing ships, relieving their crews, and restoring them to their families, shall be spread far and wide among our people; and all that the executive government of the United States, in the exercise of its constitutional powers, can effect, to meet this requisition on American enterprise, skill and bravery, will be promptly undertaken.

The hearts of the American people will be deeply touched by your eloquent address to their Chief Magistrate, and they will join with you in an earnest prayer to Him whose spirit is on the waters, that your husband and his companions may yet be restored to their country and their friends.

I have, &amp;c.

(signed) John M. Clayton.

THE Lady of Sir John Franklin to Mr. Clayton.

Sir,

Bedford-place, London, 24 May 1849.

THE letter with which you have kindly honoured me, conveying the reply of the President of the United States to the appeal I ventured to address to him in behalf of the missing Arctic Expedition under my husband's command, has filled my heart with gratitude, and excites the liveliest feelings of admiration in all who have had an opportunity of seeing it.

Relying upon the reports in the American papers just received, I learn that the people of the United States have responded, as you foresaw they would, to the appeal made to their humane and generous feelings, and that in a manner worthy of so great and powerful a nation,—indeed, with a munificence which is almost without a parallel.

I will only add, that I fully and firmly rely upon the wisdom and efficiency of the measures undertaken by the American government.

I beg you to do me the favour of conveying to the President the expression of my deep respect and gratitude, and I trust you will accept yourself my heartfelt acknowledgments for the exceedingly kind and feeling manner in which you have conveyed to me his Excellency's sentiments.

I have, &amp;c.

(signed) Jane Franklin.

No. 16.  
Letter from Lady  
Franklin to the  
Secretary of the  
Admiralty  
(with Enclosures).

Mr. Crampton to Mr. Clayton.

Sir,

Washington, 9 June 1849.

I HAVE been directed by Her Majesty's Government to lose no time in communicating to the Government of the United States the printed papers which I have the honour to enclose herewith, in case an intention on their part, referred to in a statement which appeared in the "Times" newspaper, of the 22d ultimo, of sending two ships in search of Sir John Franklin's expedition is really entertained, it having been suggested by the Lords of the Admiralty, that, in that case, it may be useful that the United States Government may be in possession of these papers, containing the views of officers competent to give an opinion as to the best measures for affording relief to the expedition, and the steps taken by Her Majesty's Government for that purpose.

Her Majesty's Government are ere this apprised of the reality of the liberal and philanthropic intention of the President with regard to the expedition in question, which I had the honour of reporting to Viscount Palmerston, in a despatch, dated the 14th ultimo. I have, therefore, the satisfaction of being enabled now to fulfil the instruction which has been addressed to me in anticipation of the correctness of the statement which had already reached Her Majesty's Government, by expressing to you, Sir, their full appreciation of the generous and humane motives which have induced the Government of the United States to send an expedition to the Arctic Seas.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Hon. John M. Clayton,  
&c. &c. &c.

(signed) John F. Crampton.

- \* THREE Thousand Pounds, or a Proportion thereof, according to the Services rendered, offered by Lady *Franklin* to such of the *Whaling Ships* as shall be generously inclined to assist the Search for Sir *John Franklin* and his gallant Companions.

WITH the view of inducing any whaling ships which shall resort to Davis's Strait and Baffin's Bay to make special efforts in search of the expedition under the command of Sir John Franklin, I hereby offer the sum of three thousand pounds (3,000 £.), or a proportion thereof, according to the services rendered, to such ship or ships as, departing from the usual fishing-grounds, shall discover, and, if needed, afford effectual relief to the above expedition, or to any portion of it.

- \* It is proposed that the amount of reward, according to the efforts made, and services performed, shall be determined by the following gentlemen, who have kindly consented to act as referees; viz.—

Rear-Admiral Sir Francis Beaufort, K. C. B.  
Captain Sir W. Edward Parry, R.N.  
Thomas Ward, Esq., Hull.

In regard to the distribution of the sum awarded among owners, captains, officers and seamen, the amount to each to be adjusted in the same proportions as if similar value of produce from the fishing had been obtained.

In the event of more than one ship making special efforts to give succour to the expedition, each ship is to receive its proportion of the reward agreeably to the decision of the referees.

The attention of whalers disposed to aid in this service is particularly directed to the Gulf of Boothia, within Regent's Inlet, or to any of the inlets or channels leading out of Barrow's Strait, or the sea beyond, either northward or southward, as also to any sounds or inlets in the north and western sides of Baffin's Bay, above the 75th degree of latitude.

Should it be clearly proved and ascertained that any whaler has made extraordinary efforts or special researches in quarters remote from the ordinary fishing-grounds, for the purpose designated, though no success may have attended their endeavours, the case of such whaler, with a view to reward, will be taken into favourable consideration by the referees.

For

For the greater satisfaction of parties claiming reward, the owners and captains shall be authorized, if they desire it, to nominate one additional referee, who shall act and vote in all respects as the standing referees in the special case for which they may be nominated. The referees, being then increased to four, will, according to the usual order of business, choose for themselves a fifth as umpire.

Twenty thousand pounds sterling (\$100,000) reward to be given by Her Britannic Majesty's Government to such private ship, or distributed among such private ships, or to any exploring party or parties of any country, as may, in the judgment of the Board of Admiralty, have rendered efficient assistance to Sir John Franklin, his ships, or their crews, and may have contributed directly to extricate them from the ice.

(signed) \* *H. G. Ward,*

Secretary to the Admiralty.

London, 23 March 1849.

The attention of whalers, or of any other ships or parties disposed to aid in this service, is particularly directed to Smith's Sound, and Jones' sound, in Baffin's Bay, to Regent's Inlet, and the Gulf of Boothia, as well as to any of the inlets or channels leading out of Barrow's Straits, particularly Wellington Strait, or the sea beyond, either northward or southward.

Vessels entering through Behring's Straits would necessarily direct their search north and south of Melville Island.

*Note.*—Persons desirous of obtaining information relative to the missing expedition, are referred to Edmund A. Grattan, Esq., Her Britannic Majesty's consul, Boston, Massachusetts, or Anthony Barclay, Esq., Her Britannic Majesty's consul, New York.

*Mr. Bancroft to Mr. Clayton.*

(Extract.)

United States Legation, London, 15 June 1849.

Sir,

THE newspapers having announced that it is the President's intention to fit out two ships to go in search of Sir John Franklin, the Royal Society have passed a vote on the subject, which the Earl of Rosse, President of the Royal Society, has communicated to me by a letter, a copy of which is enclosed. Not having any official knowledge of the President's intention, I have taken care, when appealed to, to say that I knew nothing on the subject beyond what was before the world. You will observe, also, that the subject has engaged the attention of the House of Commons. I was present, and heard Sir Robert Inglis, Lord Palmerston, and Mr. D'Israeli speak upon it in the handsomest manner.

I am, &c.

(signed) *George Bancroft.*

Hon. John M. Clayton,  
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

*The Earl of Rosse to Mr. Bancroft.*

My dear Sir,

13, Connaught-place, 9 June 1849.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, at the annual meeting of the Royal Society, held the 7th instant, a communication was read from Admiral Sir F. Beaufort, in which he apprized the Society that the American government had nobly undertaken to send an expedition in search of Sir John Franklin; upon which, a vote of thanks was moved by Sir Charles Lemon, seconded by Lord Northampton, and carried with the utmost enthusiasm, expressive of the gratitude of the Royal Society to the American government, and of their deep sense of the kind and brotherly feeling which had prompted so liberal an act of humanity.

Allow me to assure you, that it is peculiarly gratifying to me to have the honour

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Letter from Lady  
Franklin to the  
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of being the humble instrument in conveying to you the thanks of the Royal Society on this occasion; and permit me to express a hope that this most generous act of the United States may, if possible, draw closer the bonds of friendship between the two kindred nations. That the United States may continue to progress with the same extraordinary rapidity in the arts of peace and civilization, and to hold the same high place in the science and literature of the world, is, I am sure, the anxious desire of the Royal Society.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *Rosse.*

His Excellency George Bancroft, Esq.  
&c. &c. &c.

*Mr. Smyth to Mr. Bancroft.*

Dear Sir,

3, Cheyne Walk, Chelsea, 20 June 1849.

HAVING notified to a general meeting of the Royal Geographical Society of London, holden on Monday, the 11th instant, that the government of the United States, with noble feeling and generous liberality, ordered an expedition, under the command of a very distinguished officer, to assist in the search, in the Arctic regions, for Captain Sir John Franklin (late a Vice-president of the said Society) and his brave companions, it was resolved unanimously to transmit an expression of the Society's gratitude to the American government, and their full sense of the benovolent impulse which prompted so admirable an act of humanity.

On so deeply interesting an occasion, I beg to be allowed to assure you of the gratification I feel on being made the instrument of this expression; and believe me, very sincerely, dear sir,

Your faithful and obedient servant,

*W. H. Smyth,*  
President Royal Geographical Society.

His Excellency the Hon. George Bancroft,  
&c. &c. &c.

*The Lady of Sir John Franklin to the President.*

Sir,

Spring-gardens, London, 11 December 1849.

I HAD the honour of addressing myself to you, in the month of April last, in behalf of my husband, Sir John Franklin, his officers and crews, who were sent by Her Majesty's government, in the spring of 1845, on a maritime expedition for the discovery of the North-west Passage, and who have never since been heard of.

Their mysterious fate has excited, I believe, the deepest interest throughout the civilized world, but nowhere more so, not even in England itself, than in the United States of America. It was under a deep conviction of this fact, and with the humble hope that an appeal to those generous sentiments would never be made altogether in vain, that I ventured to lay before you the necessities of that critical period, and to ask you to take up the cause of humanity which I pleaded, and generously make it your own.

How nobly you, sir, and the American people, responded to that appeal, how kindly and courteously that response was conveyed to me, is known wherever our common language is spoken or understood; and though difficulties, which were mainly owing to the advanced state of the season, presented themselves after your official announcement had been made known to our Government, and prevented the immediate execution of your intentions, yet the generous pledge you had given was not altogether withdrawn, and hope still remained to me that, should the necessity for renewed measures continue to exist, I might look again across the waters for the needed succour.

A period has now, alas! arrived, when our dearest hopes as to the safe return of the discovery ships this autumn are finally crushed by the unexpected, though forced return of Sir James Ross, without any tidings of them, and also by the close of the arctic season. And not only have no tidings been brought of their

their safety or of their fate, but even the very traces of their course have yet to be discovered; for such was the concurrence of unfortunate and unusual circumstances attending the efforts of the brave and able officer alluded to, that he was not able to reach those points where indications of the course of the discovery ships would most probably be found. And thus, at the close of a second season since the departure of the recent expedition of search, we remain in nearly the same state of ignorance respecting the missing expedition as at the moment of its starting from our shores. And in the meantime our brave countrymen, whether clinging still to their ships, or dispersed in various directions, have entered upon a fifth winter in those dark and dreary solitudes, with exhausted means of sustenance, while yet their expected succour comes not!

It is in the time, then, of their greatest peril, in the day of their extremest need, that I venture, encouraged by your former kindness, to look to you again for some active efforts which may come in aid of those of my own country, and add to the means of search. Her Majesty's Ministers have already resolved on sending an expedition to Behring's Straits, and doubtless have other necessary measures in contemplation, supported as they are, in every means that can be devised for this humane purpose, by the sympathies of the nation and by the generous solicitude which our Queen is known to feel in the fate of her brave people imperilled in their country's service. But, whatever be the measures contemplated by the Admiralty, they cannot be such as will leave no room or necessity for more, since it is only by the multiplication of means, and those vigorous and instant ones, that we can hope, at this last stage, and in this last hour, perhaps, of the lost navigators' existence, to snatch them from a dreary grave. And surely, till the shores and seas of those frozen regions have been swept in all directions, or until some memorial be found to attest their fate, neither England, who sent them out, nor even America, on whose shores they have been launched in a cause which has interested the world for centuries, will deem the question at rest.

May it please God so to move the hearts and wills of a great and kindred people, and of their chosen Chief Magistrate, that they may join heart and hand in the generous enterprise! The respect and admiration of the world, which watches with growing interest every movement of your great republic, will follow the chivalric and humane endeavour, and the blessing of them who were ready to perish shall come upon you!

I have, &c.

(signed) *Jane Franklin.*

His Excellency the President of the United States.

The Lady of Sir John Franklin to Mr. Clayton.

Sir.

Spring-gardens, London, 12 December 1849.

I BEG to transmit, through you, to the President of the United States, the accompanying letter, trusting to that same kindness on his part of which you have already been the feeling and eloquent exponent, that it will be received with an indulgence similar to that which I met with before.

Sir John Richardson informs me that the interest felt in the United States for the unfortunate missing expedition under my husband's command is as lively and deep as ever; and in this feeling, and in the benevolent disposition of the President, I place my humble confidence.

I have, &c.

(signed) *Jane Franklin.*

Enclosure 6, in No. 16 (A.)

Great Ealing, Middlesex,

6 February 1850.

My dear Lady Franklin,

It is of course of vital importance that the generous co-operation of the Americans in the rescue of Sir John Franklin and his crews be directed to points which call for search, and at the same time give them a clear field for the exercise of their energy and emulation. It would be a pity, for instance, if they should be



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Admiralty  
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merely working on the same ground with ourselves, whilst extensive portions of the Arctic Sea, in which it is equally probable the lost Expedition may be found, should be left unexamined; and none, in my opinion, offers a better prospect of successful search than the coasts of Repulse Bay, Hecla and Fury Strait, Committee Bay, Felix Harbour, the Estuary of the Great Fish River, and Simpson's Strait, with the sea to the north-west of it. My reasons for saying so are as follows:—

Suppose Sir John Franklin to have so far carried out the tenor of his orders as to have penetrated south-west from Cape Walker, and to have been either "cast away," or hopelessly impeded by ice, and that either in the past or present year he found it necessary to quit his ships, they being any where between 100° and 108° west longitude, and 70° and 73° north latitude. Now, to retrace his steps to Cape Walker, and thence to Regent's Inlet, would be no doubt the first suggestion that would arise. Yet there are objections to it; firstly, he probably would have to contend against the prevailing set of the ice, and currents, and northerly winds; secondly, if no whalers were found in Lancaster Sound, how was he to support his large party in regions where the musk ox or reindeer are never seen? thirdly, leaving his ships in the summer, he knew he could only reach the whaling ground in the fall of the year; and, in such case, would it not be advisable to make rather for the southern than the northern limit of the seas visited by the whalers? fourthly, by edging to the south rather than the north, Sir John Franklin would be falling back to, rather than going from, relief, and increase the probabilities of providing food for his large party.

I do not believe he would have decided on going due south, because the lofty land of Victoria Island was in his road, and when he did reach the American shore, he would only attain a desert, of whose horrors he no doubt retained a vivid recollection, and a lengthy land journey of more than 1,000 miles to the Hudson's Bay settlement was more than his men were capable of.

There, therefore, remained but one route for Sir John under such circumstances to follow; and it decidedly has the following merit, that of being in a direct line for the southern limit of the whale fishery; that of leading through a series of narrow seas adapted for the navigation of small open boats; that of being the most expeditious route by which to reach Fort Churchill, in Hudson's Bay; that of leading through a region visited by Esquimaux and migratory animals; and this route is through the "Straits of James Ross," across the narrow isthmus of Boothia Felix (which, as you reminded me to-day, was not supposed to exist when Sir John Franklin left England, and has been since discovered), into the Gulf of Boothia, where he could either pass by Hecla and Fury Strait into the fishing-ground of Hudson's Strait, or else go southward down Committee Bay, cross the Rae Isthmus into Repulse Bay, and endeavour from there to reach some vessels in Hudson's Bay, or otherwise Fort Churchill.

It is not unlikely either, that when Franklin had got to the eastern extremity of James Ross's Straits, and found the land to be across his path where he had expected to find a strait, that his party might have divided, and the more active portion of them attempted to ascend the Great Fish River, where we have Sir George Back's authority for supposing they would find, close to the Arctic shores, abundance of food in fish, and herds of reindeer, &c. whilst the others travelled on the road I have already mentioned.

To search for them, therefore, on this line of retreat I should think highly essential, and if neglected this year, it must be done next; and if not done by the Americans, it ought to be done by us.

I therefore suggest the following plan. Suppose a well-equipped expedition to leave America in May, and to enter Hudson's Straits, and then divide into two divisions. The first division might go northward, through Fox Channel to Hecla and Fury Straits, examine the shores of the latter carefully, deposit provisions at the western extreme, erect conspicuous beacons, and proceed to Melville or Felix Harbour, in Boothia, secure their vessel or vessels, and despatch, as soon as circumstances would allow, boat parties across the neck of the isthmus into the western waters. Here let them divide, and one party proceed through James Ross's Straits, carefully examining the coast, and push over sea, ice or land, to the north-west as far as possible. The other boat party to examine the estuary of the Great Fish River, and thence proceed westward along the coast of Simpson's Strait, and, if possible, examine the Broad Bay, formed between it and Dease's Strait.



The second division, on parting company, might pass south of Southampton Island, and coast along from Chesterfield Inlet (northward) to Repulse Bay. At Repulse Bay, a boat party with two boats might cross Rae Isthmus into the bottom of Committee Bay, with instructions to visit both shores of the said bay, and to rendezvous at the western entrance of Hecla and Fury Strait. The second division (be it one or more vessels) should then pass into Fox Channel, and, turning through Hecla and Fury Strait, pick up the boats at the rendezvous; and thence, if the first division have passed on all right, and do not require reinforcement, the second division should steer northward along the unknown coast, extending as far as Cape Kater; from Cape Kater proceed to Leopold Island, and, having secured their ships there, despatch boat or travelling parties in a direction south-west from Cape Rennell, in North Somerset, being in a parallel line to the line of search we shall adopt from Cape Walker, and at the same time it will traverse the unknown sea beyond the islands lately observed by Captain Sir James Ross.

Some such plan as this would, I think, ensure your gallant husband being met or assisted, should he be to the south or the west of Cape Walker, and attempt to return by a south-east course, a direction which, I think, others as well as myself would agree in thinking a very rational and probable one.

I will next speak of an argument which has been brought forward in consequence of no traces of the missing Expedition having been discovered in Lancaster Sound; that it is quite possible, if Franklin failed in getting through the middle ice from Melville Bay to Lancaster Sound, that, sooner than disappoint public anxiety and expectation of a profitable result arising from his Expedition, he may have turned northward, and gone up Smith's Sound; every mile beyond its entrance was new ground, and therefore a reward to the discoverer. It likewise brought them nearer the Pole, and may be they found that open sea of which Baron Wrangel speaks so constantly in his journeys over the ice northward from Siberia.

It is therefore desirable that some vessels should carefully examine the entrance of this Sound, and visit all the conspicuous headlands for some considerable distance within it; for it ought to be borne in mind, that localities perfectly accessible for the purpose of erecting beacons, &c., one season, may be quite impracticable the next, and that Franklin, late in the season, and pressed for time, would not have wasted time, scaling bergs to reach the shore and pile up cairns, of which, in all the sanguine hope of success, he could not have foreseen the necessity.

Should any clue be found to the lost Expedition in this direction, to follow it up would, of course, be the duty of the relieving party, and everything would depend necessarily on the judgment of the commanders.

In connexion with this line of search, I think a small division of vessels starting from Spitzbergen, and pushing from it in a north-west direction, might be of great service; for, on reference to the chart, it will be seen that Spitzbergen is as near the probable position of Franklin (if he went north about), on the east, as Behring's Straits is upon the west; and the probability of reaching the meridian of 80° west from Spitzbergen is equally as good as, if not better than, from Behring's Straits, and, moreover, a country capable of supporting life always in the rear to fall back upon.

I do not enter into the details; but there is one point that I think cannot be too much impressed on the Government of the United States, the necessity of their expeditions being aided by steam in some shape or other. It alone can ensure their reaching their various destinations this season; it will compensate for any delay that may arise in the equipment, and it will prevent the zeal and enthusiasm of those employed being wasted in battling with currents and calms, the most disheartening obstacles, it appears to me, that Arctic relieving parties can have to encounter.

Yours, &c.

(signed) *Sherard Osborn*,  
Lieutenant, Royal Navy.

To Lady Franklin.

No. 16.  
Letter from Lady  
Franklin to the  
Secretary of the  
Admiralty  
(with Enclosures).

Enclosure 7, in No. 16 (A.)

Providence, Rhode Island,  
27 November 1849.

Honoured and dear Sir,

I SENT you a few days since the "Providence Journal," containing a plan for an Expedition to go in search of Sir John Franklin, the principal feature of which was to send a steam-boat propelled by a screw, &c. &c.

Among other remarks and letters which my plan brought forth, was a letter from Captain Lynch, late of the Dead Sea Expedition, by which it appears that this officer has tendered his services to the Government, and proposes even to fit out a steamer by private subscriptions in case the Government will sanction it, &c. &c.

By the way, I ought to mention that Captain Wilks has also tendered his services to go in search of Sir John.

With high respect,

I am, &c.

(signed) *John Russell Bartlett.*

To the Rev. Dr. Scoresby.

LETTER of Captain *Lynch* (above alluded to).

Sir,

Baltimore, Maryland, 17 November 1849.

AN article copied from your Journal into the columns of the "Home Journal" of the present week, respecting Sir John Franklin, jumps so accordant with my own ideas, that I take the liberty of addressing you, for the article proves you to be an intelligent observer.

Nearly six months ago, when an expedition in quest of that intrepid navigator was contemplated, I conceived the idea of volunteering to head it. On reaching Washington, I learned that Captain Wilks was about to be appointed; and as he is far more competent, I withheld my application, and did not ask for a subordinate position, as I had no faith whatever in either of the two modes then under consideration, which were either small fishing-vessels or sloops of war. I then stated to Commodore Skinner, Chief of the Bureau of Construction, that, in my opinion, sailing-vessels, *i. e.* vessels propelled alone by canvas, would not answer. I suggested a strong steam-ship, to be immediately sent to Nova Scotia, to fill in with fuel, from whence two vessels laden with coals would also proceed as soon as possible—one to a designated point in Greenland, and the other to one in Baffin's Bay.

Not knowing that the "Princeton" was defective, I thought her exactly suited to the purpose.

After wasting time in fruitless deliberation, the contemplated attempt was abandoned, much, I am told, to the chagrin of General Taylor.

When, last month, the country was electrified by intelligence (apocryphal, it is true, but possible) of the position of Sir John, I made a written application to the Navy Department, to head an Expedition to start as early as practicable next year, stating that if it were undertaken, there are some arrangements which cannot be too soon made. I further said, that should there be a question as to expense, I thought that if he would sanction the attempt, and promise officers and men (all volunteers), and provisions, I could raise sufficient from private sources to charter, strengthen and equip a steamer. I have received no reply to that application; but it may be that the Secretary awaits Congressional action, for I am sure that he would rather foster than frown upon such an undertaking. It is not impossible, therefore, that something may yet be done; and in order that I may be prepared to sustain my application, should none more deserving offer, I beg you, at your convenience, to give me some information on a subject you seem to understand so thoroughly. Our concurrent opinion as to Baffin's Bay and Greenland induces me to believe that I will comprehend all the views you may be pleased to present.

As a very slight amends for the liberty I take, I request your acceptance of a route-map of the late Expedition to Syria, just issued from the press.

Your obedient Servant,

(signed) *W. F. Lynch*, U. S. Navy.

No. 17.—

COPY of a LETTER from Dr. *Richard King* to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

Sir,

17, Saville-row, 18 February 1850.

No. 17.  
Letter from Dr.  
*Richard King* to  
the Secretary of  
the Admiralty.

THE period having arrived when a search may be made for the Franklin Expedition by an overland journey across the continent of America, I am anxious to refer my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty for reconsideration to my plan, dated February 1848, and published in a Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons of the 21st of March following.

The opinion of Captain Sir E. Parry, published in that Return, was highly favourable to the position I assigned to the lost Expedition, the western land of North Somerset, and to the mode in which I proposed to reach it by the Great Fish River; "but the gallant officer, agreeing thus far, was compelled to differ with me as to the readiest mode of reaching that coast, because he felt satisfied that with the resources of the Expedition then equipping under Sir James Ross, the energy, skill and intelligence of that officer would render it a matter of no very difficult enterprise to examine the coast in question with his ship's boats or travelling parties."

In the plan to which I am now asking their Lordships' reconsideration, this question, which I premised might be raised, is thus argued by me:—"Does the attempt of Sir James Ross to reach the western land of North Somerset in boats from his station in Barrow Strait render that proposal unnecessary?—(to reach the western land of North Somerset by the Great Fish River). Here the facts will speak for themselves; 1st. Barrow Strait was ice-bound in 1832; it may therefore be ice-bound in 1848. 2d. Sir James Ross is using the same means to relieve Sir J. Franklin which have led the gallant officer into his difficulty; the relief party may therefore become a party in distress. 3d. The land that is made on the south shore of Barrow Strait will be of doubtful character, the natural consequence of discovery in ships; the searching party at the end of the summer may therefore find they have been coasting an island many miles distant from the western land of North Somerset, or navigating a deep bay, as Kotzebue navigated the sound named after him, and as Sir J. Franklin navigated the sea called Melville Sound."

"The plan which I have proposed is to reach the Polar Sea across the continent of America, and thus to proceed from land known to be continent, where every footstep is sure." "If that plan be laid aside, the lives of our lost countrymen will depend upon a single throw in the face of almost certain failure."

This only point of difference between Sir E. Parry and myself, in 1848, is now, in 1850, at an end. Barrow Strait was ice-bound; the single throw fell far short of its mark; Captain Sir James Ross failed in affording the least succour to the lost Expedition; and I am thus spared the painful necessity of replying to the gallant officer's remarks, expressed to their Lordships in no measured terms, upon that plan, which in fact Sir E. Parry has done for me; the plan of one who learnt his lesson in Arctic discovery in an overland journey in search of the gallant officer, when the whole civilized world was as anxious for his fate as it is now for the gallant Sir J. Franklin.

All that has been done by way of search since February 1848 tends to draw attention closer and closer to the western land of North Somerset, as the position of Sir John Franklin, and to the Great Fish River, as the high road to reach it. Such a plan as I proposed to their Lordships in 1848 is, consequently, now of the utmost importance. It would be the happiest moment of my life (and my delight at being selected from a long list of volunteers for the relief of Sir John Ross was very great), if their Lordships would allow me to go by my old route, the Great Fish River, to attempt to save human life a second time on the shores of the Polar Sea. What I did in search of Sir John Ross is the best earnest of what I could do in search of Sir John Franklin.

That the route by the Great Fish River will sooner or later be undertaken in the search for Sir John Franklin, I have no doubt. That high road to the land where I have all along maintained that Sir John Franklin would be found, and in which opinion I am now associated with many others, including Sir E. Parry himself, cannot much longer be neglected.

For some time past it has been the cry, even in the highest official quarters, that the Government will not again attempt the discovery of the North West

No. 17.  
Letter from Dr.  
Richard King to  
the Secretary of  
the Admiralty.

Passage, and the fate of Sir John Franklin is invariably referred to as an example of the fruitlessness of such an attempt.

The fruitlessness of Sir John Franklin's attempt ought not entirely to discredit the service in which he has been engaged, but rather to awaken us to the grievous error committed in the instructions which he received, and upon which it is impossible to look back without the most painful feelings. The gallant officer was in fact instructed to lead a forlorn hope. The discovery of the North West Passage is the certain result of so overwhelming a catastrophe.

In the absence of authentic information of the fate of the gallant band of adventurers, the *terra incognita* of the northern coast of North America will not only be traced, but minutely surveyed, and the solution of the problem of centuries will engage the marked attention of the House of Commons and the Legislative Assemblies in other parts of the world. The problem is very safe in their hands—so safe, indeed, that I venture to assert five years will not elapse before it is solved.

I may be allowed to state, in urging my claims to conduct an expedition down the Great Fish River, whenever such a service is determined by their Lordships, that, in addition to my intimate knowledge of that stream, I persisted almost single-handed for several years prior to the discovery, for three most important features of the northern coast of North America: the Peninsula of North Somerset, the Great Bay of Simpson, and Cape Britannia, all of which are now established geographical facts.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *Richard King.*

— No. 18. —

COPY of a LETTER from Mr. *Thomas Ward*, of Hull, Owner of the “*Truelove*,” Whaler, to Captain *Hamilton*, Secretary of the Admiralty.

No. 18.  
Letter from Mr.  
*Thomas Ward* to  
Captain *Hamilton*.

Sir,

Hull, 28 February 1850.

WITH reference to the last conversation I had the honour to hold with you, I now beg to say that I have spoken several times to Mr. Parker (of the “*Truelove*”) since my return home, relative to the expediency of taking Esquimaux, with their dogs and sledges, on board the ships now fitting for Davis Straits.

He continues to entertain the opinion of such a measure being absolutely necessary, in order to carry out a proper search, and considers that what may be requisite will be easily obtainable at the neighbourhood of “*South-east Bay*,” at the southern part of Disco, where there are several settlements belonging to the Danes and Moravians, at or near which the natives are always to be found; and if a sufficient supply could not be had there, it might and could be made up at Openniwick.

He advises that 12 dogs at least should be taken in each ship, and two sledges; the natives commonly run eight dogs in a sledge; but the extra number might be desirable, in case any should fall lame, or die; and he strongly recommends that each ship should have a moderate supply of implements (harpoons, lances, &c.), for taking a whale now and then, which would furnish ample food for the dogs, and also make ready and excellent fuel for the steamers. At particular seasons of the year, harpoon guns are used by the whalers, and it might be well for each ship to have two, with proper harpoons and lances to fit them.

The rate of travelling with dogs and sledges, when the ground is favourable,—I mean when the ice is tolerably level by the frozen snow,—is 35 to 40 miles per diem; the distance from Openniwick to Leively is generally done in the winter in three days, over the ice which adjoins the main land.

The Moravian missionaries which are located at various places would be most useful in selecting such Esquimaux as were to be depended upon; and perhaps, if permission were given by their managers or directors in London, obtained from Germany (for which there is time), one or two of those excellent men would not be unwilling to go with them, and would form good interpreters, in case of falling in with other tribes near Lancaster Sound.

I particularly allude to Mr. Kleinschmidt; but I cannot say what station he is at.

**Enclosure No. 2.**

**THE MINUTES OF EVIDENCE  
TAKEN BEFORE THE COMMITTEE.**

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*First Day. October 27, 1851.*

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles, M.P., C.B., Chairman,  
Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,  
Captain Sir Edward Parry,  
Captain Beechey,  
Mr. Fegen, Secretary to the Committee.

CAPTAIN PENNY called.

*Mr. Penny.*

27th Oct. 1851

THE CHAIRMAN.—The Committee wish me to say in the first instance that there is not the slightest intention on the part of this Committee to bring any accusation or crimination against any of the officers of the expedition. They are quite certain that you have all acted to the best of your ability during the expedition with which you were connected. We are about to inquire rather with a view to the future than to the past, although our inquiries must naturally embrace the past as well as the future. There is nothing alleged either against you or Captain Austin. We are anxious that that circumstance should be perfectly understood in the course of the proceeding to-day.

1. *Chairman.*—The first question we should like to ask you is, upon what grounds you consider it would have been practicable to proceed farther in the Wellington Straits during the autumn of this year?

*Captain Penny.*—I have to state that the ice was broken up in Wellington Strait as far on the 25th day of July 1851 as it was on the 8th of September last year. At the time we left that country it was too early to decide whether the channel would clear away or not. We could have stopped there one month longer, and had strong north-east winds come it would have cleared away the ice through Queen Victoria's Channel. By having a steamer up at the edge of the ice in Wellington Strait we could have been watching for such an event. Do you understand? as they say I sometimes put in a word that completely changes the sense of a sentence.

2. *Chairman.*—We quite understand you. Now, tell us your own opinion as to the probability of the ice clearing away?

*Captain Penny.*—I have seen as great changes take place in forty-eight hours with a strong favourable wind in that country.

3. *Chairman.*—At what date did you see the edge of that barrier last?

*Captain Penny.*—On the 25th of July. After that, about the 14th of August, Captain Austin passed over Wellington Channel. I did not see the bar later than the 25th of July. In the year 1850, on the 9th of September, from thirteen to fifteen miles of ice came out of that channel.

4. *Chairman.*—You had better not remark upon Captain Austin's proceedings, as we shall hear him afterwards. It was in 1850 you saw what you have described?

*Captain Penny.*—I will tell you. Last year in crossing this channel, we left Beechey Island to cross over to the west side of the channel; it came on thick with a strong northerly wind, and we were obliged to make fast to the ice. A strong northerly wind came on, and from thirteen to fifteen miles of ice broke away and drove out of the channel, and I passed to the northward of this floe of ice. Captain Austin was on the south side of this floe, and I was on the other; this floe left fifteen miles of water behind it.



*Mr. Penny.*  
27th Oct. 1851.

5. *Chairman.*—That was on the 8th or 9th of September of last year, 1850?  
*Captain Penny.* I merely mention it to show how rapidly changes take place.

6. *Chairman.*—Do you believe the channel cleared at all last year?

*Captain Penny.*—I do not think it did. It was my opinion as well as the officers whom I requested to examine the ice, that fifteen miles of old ice remained in that channel.

7. *Sir E. Parry.*—I think you said in your evidence at Woolwich that about fifteen miles of ice were left at the last time?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes; Dr. Sutherland was the officer who was appointed to examine that ice, and it was his opinion also that fifteen miles remained.

8. *Chairman.*—Do you say that in 1850 the channel was never opened at all?

*Captain Penny.*—Such is my opinion.

9. *Chairman.*—Was there any possibility of a vessel going up the channel last year?

*Captain Penny.*—No possibility of any.

In reference to some conversation which took place,

The *Chairman* said, I think it would be convenient if you were to distinguish the two channels, Queen Victoria's Channel from the Wellington Strait, or some confusion may ensue.

*Sir E. Parry.*—It is a very important thing to make the distinction. Wellington Strait may be compared to the door into the Queen's Channels shown on your chart; but those channels should not be called Wellington Strait.

10. *Chairman.* Have you any reason to say, of your own knowledge, that a passage for a ship has been opened into this channel?

*Captain Penny.*—I have no doubt of its having been opened, but I cannot say of my own knowledge.

11. *Chairman.*—But from your own observation, as an experienced man, you have come to the conclusion you have stated?

*Captain Penny.*—I should say that once in two years this channel is opened. In 1850 we can only speak with certainty of it; this year we left too early to judge.

12. *Chairman.*—Where was it you reached the water with your boat?

*Captain Penny.*—About ten miles east of Disappointment Bay, on the 17th of June, into clear water. Wind came from the westward, and brought in all the broken and detached ice upon us. We continued to struggle through this ice, and examine the various islands. The wind continued adverse for thirty-three days, less about thirty hours, and the tide kept the ice bound in the channel, which prevented us from reaching the water until the 19th of July. All our provisions were expended.

13. *Chairman.*—Could a vessel of larger size navigate the waters your boat was in?

*Captain Penny.*—With perfect safety.

14. *Chairman.*—Do you think Sir John Franklin went through this channel?

*Captain Penny.*—I have no doubt on my mind that he went through it in clear water; my conviction has always been so. Nobody has heard me say anything else.

15. *Chairman.*—Did you sound going through it?

*Captain Penny.*—No, we did not sound. If the water had been shallow the ice would have grounded. All the three channels were deep in the middle. What is to be guarded against in limestone formation is, the bolder the land the shallower the water. There was only one small shallow in the middle channel, and it was close in shore and covered with pressed-up ice, which prevents ships grounding upon these shores.

16. *Sir E. Parry.*—How many soundings did you get?

*Captain Penny.*—In consequence of the sea being covered with ice we had no time to take the soundings. Had there been any shallows the ice would have told us of them by grounding upon it.

*Mr. Penny.*

27th Oct. 1851.

17. *Chairman.*—Had you any line with you?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes, we had a line with us, but it was not very often used. I have no doubt that in the centre of all the channels the water was very deep.

18. *Sir E. Parry.*—Are you speaking of the middle channel now?

*Captain Penny.*—I am speaking of all three.

19. *Chairman.*—That you rather conjectured from the formation of the land than from any experience of your own?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes; both from the formation of the land, and my own experience.

20. *Chairman.*—From the 17th June to the 20th July what instrument had you with you?

*Captain Penny.*—My sextant and artificial horizon. I have a great many observations.

(Captain Penny produced the observations, and handed them to the Chairman.)

21. *Chairman.*—You wrote to the Admiralty for your journals; did they return them to you?

*Captain Penny.*—No, they did not.

22. *Chairman.*—Have you any other memorandum of your proceeding?

*Captain Penny.*—The journals are here (in the Admiralty).

23. *Chairman.*—Did you write them every day?

*Captain Penny.*—Every day they were dotted down at the time when travelling. The observations for longitude were rendered useless in consequence of the timepieces not keeping equal rate. I am confident of the latitudes. Could a man be in command of a ship for sixteen years and not take a correct observation?

24. *Chairman.*—Was the weather sufficiently fine to enable you to make these observations?

*Captain Penny.*—We had the latitude as often as three times in one place in consequence of being beset with the boat. The longitude was by a dead reckoning, and could not have been far out.

25. *Sir E. Parry.*—Had you to alter any of the officers' observations?

*Captain Penny.*—Being young travellers, we all over estimated our distance, and had to reduce them, some nearly eighty miles. Having gone so frequently over the distance we could judge within a very little.

26. *Chairman.*—Then of the latitudes you can speak with certainty?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes; I can speak with perfect confidence of the latitudes.

27. *Sir E. Parry.*—Is there not a discrepancy between Mr. M'Dougall and Dr. Goodsir as to some of their latitudes?

*Captain Penny.*—I can explain that. I was deceived myself at the time. It was a low shingly isthmus covered with snow, which the best surveyor must have taken for ice. Mr. M'Dougall made his observation while it was covered with snow, and he was deceived, as I was, from a distance. I think from Dr. Goodsir's description some of his little islands were only hills on this flat. Dr. Goodsir passed over it.

28. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you think Cornwallis Island and Bathurst Island join there?

*Captain Penny.*—I have not the slightest doubt of it.

*Sir E. Parry.*—When in the hydrographical office they put Mr. M'Dougall's and Dr. Goodsir's surveys together, the land overlapped. All who know what travelling is upon low flats know how easy it is to make such mistakes. That was the case, I understand, when Captain Ommanney and Lieutenant Osborne travelled towards Banksland; they did not know whether they were on land or ice.

29. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Do I understand you that your journals from the Admiralty have not been returned to you?

*Captain Penny.*—They have not been returned.

*Mr. Penny.*  
27th Oct. 1851.

30. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you not come near Wellington Strait in 1851?  
*Captain Penny.*—No; we passed off from Cape Hotham, about ten miles on the outside of a floe. I did not go up the Wellington Channel.

31. *Sir E. Parry.*—In 1851 you were not able to see anything of Wellington Strait?

*Captain Penny.*—Not after the 25th of July, when we left the edge of the ice with the boat.

32. *Captain Beechey.*—The farthest point you reached up the channel was Cape Beecher in the Queen Victoria Channel?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes.

33. *Captain Beechey.*—What was the latitude?

*Captain Penny.*—It was  $76^{\circ}25'$  N.

34. *Sir E. Parry.*—Mr. Stewart gave me a long list of latitudes that he took. He travelled round the east side of this channel, and came to Cape Beecher.

35. *Chairman.*—Did you observe at this point?

*Captain Penny.*—No, but Captain Stewart did; and I could depend upon his observation.

36. *Chairman.*—Which side of the channel was that?

*Captain Penny.*—That was on the north-east side.

37. *Chairman.*—How far did you get on the south-west side?

*Captain Penny.*—I could not get farther than Baring Island.

38. *Chairman.*—Then before you turned about to return how far did you consider yourself from the main points of Sir John Franklin and Cape Lady Franklin?

*Captain Penny.*—No one can judge well of distances without knowing the height of the land; probably sixty or seventy miles.

39. *Chairman.*—Do you think the water was all clear and open?

*Captain Penny.*—I have no doubt of it from the way the winds prevailed.

40. *Chairman.*—What sort of weather was it when you turned back?

*Captain Penny.*—It was a clear day when we turned, but came on very moist weather afterwards. We had some days clear, but the greater part of them were moist.

41. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you think a ship could have navigated any of these channels?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes, in clear water I have no doubt of it. I have navigated worse.

42. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—I think you expressed your opinion that Sir John Franklin passed that way?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes, that was my conviction, and has ever been.

43. *Chairman.*—There is another question that you must expect to be asked. How was it you wrote a letter to Captain Austin stating that Wellington Channel was thoroughly searched and that nothing more could be done?

*Captain Penny.*—Wellington Channel was searched, but not beyond Wellington Channel.

See *Mr. Penny to Captain Austin*,  
11th August 1851,  
*Answer to No. 336*,  
page 56.

44. *Chairman.*—Let us just read the letter from you to Captain Austin?

(*The letter was here read by the Chairman.*)

*Captain Penny.*—Captain Austin knew very well what I had done in Wellington Channel. I had expressed to him my conviction that Franklin had gone away through the channel in clear water. I could do no more with my means.

45. *Chairman.*—It is necessary that you should explain this. What do you mean when you say, "I could do no more with my means?"

*Captain Penny.*—I meant what I had told Captain Austin before, that I could do no more with the means I had at command.

46. *Chairman*.—You meant then by that expression to separate Wellington Channel from the Upper Channel?

*Captain Penny*.—Will you allow me to ask you a question?

*Mr. Penny.*

27th Oct. 1851.

47. *Chairman*.—I think you had better answer mine first.

*Captain Penny*.—I told Captain Austin I could not undertake the fearful responsibility of saying beyond the channel was searched; why ask me what I could not tell? I mean, why should Captain Austin ask me what I could not tell?

48. *Chairman*.—All we want is an explanation; you had better confine yourself to that?

*Captain Penny*.—In that remark I confined myself to Wellington Channel.

49. *Chairman*.—Very good. Did you explain to Captain Austin at that time that a search should be made higher?

*Captain Penny*.—I asked him for a steamer, and would pilot her up the channel to the ice, and wait till the ice should clear away. I would have waited there a month.

50. *Chairman*.—That was your reason for asking for a steamer?

*Captain Penny*.—Yes; most undoubtedly.

51. *Chairman*.—And you are still of opinion that if the ice had cleared away you could have gone up?

*Captain Penny*.—Most unquestionably.

52. *Chairman*.—Did you explain that to Captain Austin at the time?

*Captain Penny*.—Yes, and he refused me that steamer to go up with.

53. *Chairman*.—Did you explain to Captain Austin at that time that Sir John Franklin had gone up that channel?

*Captain Penny*.—Most unquestionably.

*Chairman*.—That is a sufficient answer.

54. *Chairman*.—You meant by asking for a steamer that it would be the best vessel to prosecute the discoveries if the ice had cleared away?

*Captain Penny*.—Yes, the only vessel.

55. *Chairman*.—And you offered to pilot the steamer on account of your own experience?

*Captain Penny*.—Yes.

56. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you ask for a steamer to command it yourself?

*Captain Penny*.—To pilot it.

*Sir E. Parry*.—Piloting through the ice I hardly understand. We are so much at the mercy of the ice that we can hardly call it piloting.

57. *Captain Beechey*.—If you were so certain of the ice going away from that channel and the water clearing, by waiting a few days, could you not consistently with your orders have waited that period?

*Captain Penny*.—My vessel was not suited to go further than I did. Before I could have gone any distance the season would have gone; whereas in a steamer 500 miles could have been gone over in a week, as it was very likely we should have had to proceed that distance before we obtained any fresh traces.

58. *Captain Beechey*.—How long are those seas navigable?

*Captain Penny*.—It depends greatly upon the seasons. In Barrow's Straits last year the frost set in on the 13th of September, but this year there was more water in Barrow's Straits, and it may be later before the frost sets in.

59. *Chairman*.—There is another expression in Captain Austin's letter to you of the 11th August last, to which I must call your attention. He requests you to acquaint him "whether you consider that the search of Wellington Strait, made by the expedition under your charge, is so far satisfactory as to render a further prosecution in that direction, if practicable, unnecessary." What did you do in consequence of this?

*Captain Penny*.—I would not take upon myself the fearful responsibility of saying whether the channel was sufficiently searched. I am free to confess that I was very angry at being written to at all by Captain Austin when we had conversed so long upon the very same subject, and I had told him all in my power,

*Mr. Penny.*  
27th Oct. 1851.

giving him my chart, and begged him to let me pilot one of his steamers up Wellington Channel. Had I been cool I should have used better words.

60. *Chairman.*—What I mean by the last question is this: In the letter Captain Austin sent to you he meant to ask you whether the search up the channel was practicable,—advisable, or not?

*Captain Penny.*—I explained my views to Captain Austin, and still he sent me that letter. Captain Austin was competent to judge for himself. I am not accustomed to write official despatches, or probably I should have been more cautious. Captain Austin ought to know what to do.

61. *Chairman.*—It was hardly fair to Captain Austin not to give a full opinion on the subject. Your letter was so short that any one on reading it would suppose you intended to express your opinion that it was useless to wait for the breaking up of the ice, and that you were convinced no further search was necessary,—that all that could be done was done, and that no further traces could be found?

*Captain Penny.*—Nothing of the sort could have been intended; and Captain Austin could not have put that interpretation upon the letter, as he well knew my previous opinions. That letter was written under strong feelings of irritation and in answer to a note from Captain Austin.

62. *Chairman.*—Instead of exciting yourself why did you not explain to Captain Austin that further search ought to be made in the direction where you had been?

*Captain Penny.*—I asked him for a steamer in order to prosecute that search.

*Captain Austin* rose and said, After sending Captain Penny that note I sat down and wrote him a calm request on the subject, (knowing that he was an experienced person,) urging him to let me have an answer. I think Captain Penny must have had my letter eight hours. It was two o'clock in the morning when I received his answer. I wrote a private note to Captain Penny which he must have.

*Captain Penny.*—I have not got it; I have searched for it in every quarter. I sent down to Aberdeen for it on my arrival here in London, but it is not to be found anywhere. I am not accustomed to tie up all my letters, and many official despatches have been destroyed.

63. *Chairman.*—Have you had any further correspondence with Captain Austin than that which appears in print?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes; there was another letter in which I stated that I had expressed my opinion to him. I told Captain Austin what I had done; I told him that my orders were not such as would allow me to run the risk of another Arctic winter without some prospect of success.

*Vide Answer to  
No 336, where this  
is explained.*

*Captain Austin* said he had not received such a letter from Captain Penny.

*Captain Penny.*—Captain Stewart was present when Captain Austin got the letter.

64. *Sir E. Parry.*—When was it?

*Captain Penny.*—About the 11th of August.

65. *Chairman.*—The letter which appears in print is dated 11th of August; was it before or after that?

*Captain Penny.*—After that.

66. *Sir E. Parry.*—Captain Stewart was there, you say?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes; and he knows that I delivered it to him.

67. *Chairman.*—Have you the letter with you?

*Captain Penny.*—It is in London now, and I can send for it.

68. *Captain Austin.*—I do not exactly understand what is the question; is it that a letter was delivered to me?

*Sir E. Parry.*—It is that there was a letter delivered to you (as an answer to your first letter) by Captain Penny, in the presence of Captain Stewart and Captain Ommanney.

69. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you ever in writing state to Captain Austin your recommendation to him to go up Wellington Strait?

*Captain Penny*.—Certainly not. What was the use of writing when I was telling him what I had done?

(Captain Stewart was called in, and was sent for the despatch alluded to by Captain Penny.)

70. *Chairman*.—What quantity of provisions do you consider you had left when you determined to give up all further search?

*Captain Penny*.—About fourteen months provision for the two vessels at the rate we were going on; but the search assumed a new feature. I had nothing to carry out the search.

71. *Chairman*.—Supposing the barrier had not cleared away, what would you have proposed to do?

*Captain Penny*.—If the barrier had not cleared away the search must be carried out with boats and sledges.

72. *Chairman*.—Do you think that it would have been possible to carry out the further search with your provisions?

*Captain Penny*.—Certainly not; I was unprepared with travelling equipment to carry out the search, and vessels not well adapted to go up the channel at that late season.

73. *Chairman*.—When you asked for a steamer, did you ask for one steamer, or more?

*Captain Penny*.—Only one.

74. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you intend to pass another Arctic winter if you could have obtained a steamer and got up the channel?

*Captain Penny*.—That would be the advantage of a steamer. We could have proceeded 500 miles up the channel if the way had been clear.

75. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you contemplate being detained another winter?

*Captain Penny*.—Yes. If traces had been got unquestionably we should have stopped.

76. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Suppose that the ice in the Wellington Strait had cleared away, and Captain Austin had been able to afford you a steamer; where would you have thought of wintering?

*Captain Penny*.—If we could have got 500 miles up the channel, we should have wintered there, if more traces had been found. It would have been of no use going there unless we had wintered there.

77. *Captain Beechey*.—Where were the limits of the ice in 1851?

*Sir E. Parry*.—He never saw it in the best portion of 1851.

(Captain Penny explained this matter to the committee).

78. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was the water open as far up Wellington Strait in 1851 as in 1850?

*Captain Penny*.—Yes; it was in the same spot in 1851 as in 1850; it was as far up in 1851, on the 25th day of July, as it was on the 9th day of September 1850.

79. *Captain Beechey*.—In 1851 Captain Stewart in returning walked over the ice from his furthest, which was Cape Becher, and found it much decayed. Now did that ice clear away in 1851?

*Captain Penny*.—I was there on the 22d of July, and that was the last I saw of it. It was then broken and much decayed, and only wanted a strong north-east wind to clear it away. On the 5th September 1850 I saw clear water in that channel.

80. *Captain Beechey*.—Was this ice more or less broken in 1851?

*Captain Penny*.—The last time I saw the Queen Victoria Channel was on the 23d day of July; it was then much decayed and broken, and would not allow an empty boat to be launched over it.

81. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—And referring to your own two ships, you say you had not sufficient provisions to prosecute the search?

*Captain Penny*.—I had not the means in my power to carry the search out,

*Mr. Penny.*  
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and I would never for one moment think of stopping out there without sufficient means to carry out the search.

82. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—You say you had not sufficient provisions and means to carry out the search?

*Captain Penny.*—Certainly.

83. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Before you came away did you ask Captain Stewart, of the *Sophia*, or any of the officers, their opinion about the further prosecution of the search in Wellington Strait?

*Captain Penny.*—Certainly not; the masters of our vessels take all that responsibility upon themselves.

84. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—I understand you did not take Captain Stewart's opinion about further search in the channel?

*Captain Penny.*—No; he might have had an opinion on the subject, but I did not ask him; the responsibility was mine, not his.

85. *Sir E. Parry.*—When you started to come home, did you contemplate asking for a steamer to go out again?

*Captain Penny.*—No, but I was prepared to do so.

86. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you and your officers contemplate going out again?

*Captain Penny.*—No, not when I first returned.

87. *Sir E. Parry.*—What made you propose it afterwards?

*Captain Penny.*—It struck me that if I had the means I could prosecute the search to advantage. I was prompted to make the proposal in consequence of its having been said that more might have been done than was done.

88. *Sir E. Parry.*—Was that what led you to propose to the Admiralty to go out in a steamer? Was it in consequence of what was said when you came home?

*Captain Penny.*—I found that everybody was disappointed, and I wished to have the means of going out again.

*Vide p. 35.*  
*Ans. 336.*

(Captain Stewart here brought in the letter referred to in the previous part of the inquiry, and it was read.)

89. *Sir E. Parry.*—Explain that expression in the letter, “I can only judge when I see Wellington Channel.” What is the meaning of that?

*Captain Penny.*—The meaning is, that if Wellington Channel is open, I would proceed up it with my two vessels. I never intended to answer Captain Austin's letter.

90. *Sir E. Parry.*—Surely it was incumbent upon you to answer so important a question?

*Captain Penny.*—I do not justify that portion of the letter, written, as I have before stated, under feelings of irritation. Captain Austin came, and I told him everything that had taken place about the Wellington Channel, which would have been worth fifty letters from me.

91. *Sir E. Parry.*—I think Captain Austin had a right to have an answer to the question. When an officer in his position put a specific question to you so cautiously, surely it demanded an answer?

*Captain Penny.*—Captain Austin is perfectly well aware that he had his answer, and he understood it very well, but it was not what he wanted.

92. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do not you think *now* it would have been better to give a specific answer to Captain Austin's inquiry?

*Captain Penny.*—Any one can see under what circumstances it was written, and the intention of it.

93. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Suppose Captain Austin had died, nothing would have been in writing to pass to the second in command?

*Captain Penny.*—I have said before, that it was not my intention to give an answer to this despatch.

94. *Chairman.*—We must put on record the answer to the question put to you. The question was this, “Do you not think on further consideration that it



" would have been better if you had answered Captain Austin's note more explicitly, taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case ?

*Captain Penny.*—In the position I occupied, I think I pursued the right course. I told Captain Austin what I had done, but he would not avail himself of it.

95. *Chairman.*—Would it not have been better for you to have said you would not take upon yourself the responsibility ?

*Captain Penny.*—That is precisely what I said. I said that I would not take any further responsibility upon myself.

96. *Captain Beechey.*—On what day was it that you told Captain Austin your views with respect to the channel ?

*Captain Penny.*—It was on the 11th of August.

97. *Captain Beechey.*—Then on the 11th of August you told Captain Austin that the strait ought to be better examined, and that if he would give you a vessel you would go up there ?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes, I asked him for a steamer to go up there. The very last words I used to him were, " Now, Sir, go up there, and do the cause some " service."

98. *Captain Beechey.*—Had you at that time received Captain Austin's official letter ?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes, that was after all the other letters had passed.

99. *Captain Beechey.*—Was it after you explained your views to Captain Austin that you received his letter ?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes, it was.

100. *Chairman.*—Had you any conversation about this letter ?

*Captain Penny.*—No, no conversation whatever. The last thing I said was, " Go up into the Wellington Channel, and you will do good service to the " cause."

101. *Chairman.*—On what day was that ?

*Captain Penny.*—I think it was on the morning of the 12th of August.

102. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—I think your opinion was that Sir John Franklin went through the channel to the north-west ?

*Captain Penny.*—I am convinced of that. I always had that impression, and I have never had occasion to alter it. I do not think he could have gone any other way.

103. *Sir E. Parry.*—Why not go any other way ? Why not go the way I went ? Why do you think he might not have gone that way ? Why might he not have gone by Cape Walker and the south-west ?

*Captain Penny.*—Why then he would have reached the American shore, and we should have had him long ago. Travelling parties belonging to the north-west companies would have seen him.

104. *Sir E. Parry.*—But you said he could not have gone another way ?

*Captain Penny* having handed in a paper,

The *Chairman* said, I suppose your object in giving me this paper is that it should appear in evidence, so that I must ask you some questions upon it, and then you will have an opportunity of recording it if you like.

105. *Captain Beechey.*—We do not expect from you any scientific matter beyond what you have given us with respect to the latitudes ; but I may ask you whether you put the work together yourself (*adverting to a chart which was placed on the table*) ?

*Captain Penny.*—Captain Stewart did a great portion of it, but I was present when it was done.

106. *Captain Beechey.*—When you were at Cape Becher did you get the bearing of these distant points ?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes.

*Mr. Penny.*  
27th Oct. 1851.

*Mr. Penny.*  
27th Oct. 1851.

107. *Captain Beechey.*—When you saw Sir John and Lady Franklin points, was the weather clear?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes, the weather was perfectly clear. I am accustomed to take heights, and by computation I imagine that 500 or 600 feet might have been the measurement.

108. *Captain Beechey.*—With fourteen months provisions on board, do not you think you would have been justified by your orders in remaining to see whether the ice would break away or not?

*Captain Penny.*—I do not think it would have been of the slightest use with a sailing vessel.

109. *Captain Beechey.*—Do not you think you ought to have stopped to see whether the ice cleared away?

*Captain Penny.*—I might have been justified in that, but not in going up the channel.

110. *Captain Beechey.*—Could you have stopped with the amount of provisions you had?

*Captain Penny.*—Oh yes.

111. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you understand that Captain Austin meant to come home about the 12th of August?

*Captain Penny.*—I thought so.

112. *Sir E. Parry.*—How did you ascertain the fact that Captain Austin was coming home; you were right enough, but how did you ascertain it? The reason why I ask is this; knowing that Captain Austin was going away to Jones's Sound, would it not have been desirable to stop and see what became of the ice in the Wellington Channel?

*Captain Penny.*—It would have been of no use stopping there; if the idea had struck me at the time it is possible I might have remained there some time.

113. *Chairman.*—One thing more occurs to me to ask you. You were quite aware from Captain Austin's letter to you of the 12th of August that he had determined (in consequence probably of the letter he had received from you) that he did not consider it necessary to prosecute the search further, even if it were practicable, in that direction. Now after all you have said it is hardly worth while to ask you any more questions, but were you not then fully aware that that was the last opportunity you would have of urging upon him a further search in that direction?

*Captain Penny.*—The last thing I said to Captain Austin was, "Go up the Wellington Channel, and do the cause good service."

114. *Chairman.*—What course did you take to explore Jones's Sound?

*Captain Penny.*—When we came there we fell into a body of ice, and we could proceed no further.

115. *Chairman.*—You say you found it so blocked up with ice that you could not proceed?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes.

116. *Chairman.*—Do you think that later in the year that might have been accomplished?

*Captain Penny.*—It might have been, but everything depends upon the winds.

117. *Chairman.*—It is in the same category as the Wellington Strait, that may open sometimes and close sometimes?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes, I think it is very likely.

118. *Chairman.*—We are directed to inquire not only into the past but in reference to the future. Will you tell us what are your opinions concerning operations next year?

*Captain Penny.*—I will tell you. The first and most important thing is that the party who goes out must be the responsible party.

119. *Captain Beechey*.—When you came to Cape Becher, your furthest distance northwards from Queen Victoria's Channel, in what state did the waters appear to you?

*Captain Penny*.—In the north-west nothing but clear water as far as the eye could reach; a water sky bound it. The height of Cape Becher was about 500 feet.

120. *Captain Beechey*.—In the north and south channel was there a strong current?

*Captain Penny*.—Yes, there was.

121. *Captain Beechey*.—How strong did the currents run?

*Captain Penny*.—Not less than four miles in the hour.

122. *Captain Beechey*.—On what day was that?

*Captain Penny*.—I could not tell without reference. I think it was at the full moon.

123. *Captain Beechey*.—Then it was about the time of the springs?

*Captain Penny*.—Yes.

124. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you think it was a regular tide?

*Captain Penny*.—It was the regular tide, but running from the westward longer than from the eastward.

125. *Captain Beechey*.—I find from your evidence before the Committee at Woolwich that you make the following remarks:—"At Point Surprise and Disappointment Bay there was about four feet rise and fall, a pretty regular tide. The water on the ledge of grounded ice on Cape Benjamin Smith was low about the 16th of July, lower than usual; a greater fall than we had observed in other parts. Full moon having occurred on the 13th, the spring tide may have accounted for this. In the Queen's Channel the current ran to the eastward not less than four miles on the 16th of July, the wind being fresh from the westward. Thinks the stream came most from the westward; the stream of tide was not regular. Different observations were made to ascertain which way the flood tide came. As seen from Assistance Harbour, the currents seemed to be influenced principally by the winds." Do you assent to all this?

*Captain Penny*.—Yes.

126. *Chairman*.—You have given it in evidence before the Woolwich Committee that you met with wood and foreign substances in the channel?

(The Chairman read a list of the articles which had been found by Captain Penny as stated before the Committee at Woolwich.)

127. *Chairman*.—Is all that correct?

*Captain Penny*.—Yes, it is.

128. *Chairman*.—In your journeys and voyages along the shores of the Queen Channel what animals did you meet with and in what quantities?

*Captain Penny*.—In our travelling parties we met with thirty-four bears.

129. *Chairman*.—White polar bears?

*Captain Penny*.—Yes.

130. *Chairman*.—Any seals?

*Captain Penny*.—Yes, a great many, and two were killed.

131. *Chairman*.—Any other animals?

*Captain Penny*.—Several walruscs; one of them was killed. I think we saw about fourteen deer, mostly down upon the islands. Thousands of birds might have been easily approached and killed.

132. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you eat any of the walruscs?

*Captain Penny*.—Yes, and I thought them as good as the seals. The men did not eat them.

133. *Chairman*.—On Baillie Hamilton Island you found more birds than anywhere else, did you not?

*Captain Penny*.—Yes.

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*Mr. Penny.*  
 27th Oct. 1851.

134. *Sir E. Parry.*—What would be your view,—the public feeling in England makes it desirable to ask it,—suppose you had been left there with your guns and ammunition, to what extent could you have supplied provisions, anything, for instance, that starving people would eat?

*Captain Penny.*—We might have supplied abundance of food. The very exertion to produce food would be conducive to health.

135. *Chairman.*—Could fish be procured in any quantity?

*Captain Penny.*—There are some crawfish, but they are small and very few in number.

136. *Sir E. Parry.*—There are some small fish in the lake near Assistance Bay, are there not?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes, some trout, but very few.

137. *Chairman.*—Had you a thermometer with you?

*Captain Penny.*—No. Captain Ommanney had it much colder down his part than we had. I had a thermometer the first time, but not the second.

138. *Sir E. Parry.*—Dr. Sutherland had one, had he not?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes.

139. *Sir E. Parry.*—Who first landed at Beechey Island and discovered the traces of the “Erebus” and “Terror”?

*Captain Penny.*—All my officers and some of the men went down together and discovered winter quarters.

140. *Chairman.*—You mean that they discovered the winter quarters of the “Erebus” and “Terror”?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes.

141. *Chairman.*—We are directed to inquire into the conduct of the officers in the expedition. Have you any complaints to make against them, or did they conduct themselves to your satisfaction?

*Captain Penny.*—They performed their duties creditably throughout the expedition.

*Mr. A. Stewart.*

CAPTAIN STEWART, late of Her Majesty's Ship “Sophia,” called.

142. *Chairman.*—Did you command the “Sophia” under Mr. Penny's orders?

*Captain Stewart.*—Yes, I did.

143. *Chairman.*—Are you aware of all the transactions during the summer of this year when in the Queen's Channel and the Wellington Strait?

*Captain Stewart.*—Yes.

144. *Chairman.*—Did you consider the ice likely to clear this year at the mouth of Wellington Strait?

*Captain Stewart.*—There was a chance.

145. *Chairman.*—It was all firm when you last saw it?

*Captain Stewart.*—When I last saw it it was quite firm.

146. *Captain Beechey.*—When was that?

*Captain Stewart.*—About the middle of July.

147. *Chairman.*—Have you been accustomed to polar navigation, and to ice?

*Captain Stewart.*—Yes.

148. *Sir E. Parry.*—How many voyages have you been in the Polar Seas?

*Captain Stewart.*—Six or seven.

149. *Chairman.*—What is your own opinion on the subject; do you think that it was fast ice or not?

*Captain Stewart.*—I do not think it is fast ice.

150. *Chairman.*—Was there any appearance this year of its being likely to break up?

*Captain Stewart.*—It was breaking up from the southward as far as the line marked by Mr. Penny on this chart, (signed by Mr. Fegen,) between Cape Bowden and Separation Point.

151. *Captain Beechey*.—At what time did you see that appearance of the ice ? *Mr. A. Stewart.*

*Captain Stewart*.—About the 17th of July. 27th Oct. 1851.

152. *Captain Beechey*.—How far north did that ice extend ?

*Captain Stewart*.—It extended to the line marked Sept. 5, 1850. It was very sound ice, and to the north-westward of that it was more broken.

153. *Captain Beechey*.—How far did it extend to the westward ?

*Captain Stewart*.—I do not know.

154. *Sir E. Parry*.—Between Baillic Hamilton Island and Baring Bay, was ice there ?

*Captain Stewart*.—Yes.

155. *Captain Beechey*.—You were on Cape Becher; what was the appearance of the sea and ice from Cape Becher on the 1st of June ?

*Captain Stewart*.—I could have gone anywhere to the westward with a ship from the edge of the ice.

156. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was it perfectly clear to the north-west as far as you could see ?

*Captain Stewart*.—It was, and we could have sailed anywhere. The ice was very much broken up.

157. *Sir E. Parry*.—What was the nature of the sailing ice ?

*Captain Stewart*.—About the same ice as in the channel, about five feet thick.

158. *Sir E. Parry*.—You would call it very light ice ?

*Captain Stewart*.—Yes.

159. *Captain Beechey*.—You travelled over part of this ice at the north-east part of Wellington Channel in your outward journey ?

*Captain Stewart*.—Yes.

160. *Captain Beechey*.—Of what thickness did the ice appear to you ?

*Captain Stewart*.—We travelled over some very heavy pieces of ice, quite distinct from the other sort of ice.

161. *Captain Beechey*.—It appeared to be the ice of one winter, with heavy masses frozen on it ?

*Captain Stewart*.—Yes, that was the case exactly.

162. *Captain Beechey*.—On returning you thought to pass over part of this ice, and found it so cracked that it was not safe to walk over it ?

*Captain Stewart*.—Yes.

163. *Captain Beechey*.—What time was that ?

*Captain Stewart*.—About the middle of June ?

164. *Captain Beechey*.—Did you see the clear water in 1850 to the north of Wellington Channel ?

*Captain Stewart*.—Yes.

165. *Sir E. Parry*.—Where from, and when ?

*Captain Stewart*.—From Cape Spencer, and about the first week in September.

166. *Sir E. Parry*.—How much ice do you think remained in Wellington Strait ? What breadth of ice remained unbroken there in 1850 ?

*Captain Stewart*.—I should say from twenty to thirty miles.

167. *Sir E. Parry*.—So much as that ?

*Captain Stewart*.—Yes.

168. *Sir E. Parry*.—From your own observation in 1851, when you were travelling, do you think there were from twenty to thirty miles of old ice not broken up in the autumn of 1850 ?

*Captain Stewart*.—I think it was broken up, but it did not come out.

*Mr. A. Stewart.*  
27th Oct. 1851.

169. *Captain Beechey*.—Did you make any observations on the tides in the Queen's Channel? Did you notice any regular rise or fall?

*Captain Stewart*.—No, I did not. I had no opportunity of doing so on account of the old ice.

170. *Captain Beechey*.—Did you see the ice in motion in the Northern Channel going to and fro with the tide?

*Captain Stewart*.—Yes.

171. *Captain Beechey*.—At what rate do you suppose?

*Captain Stewart*.—At three or four miles an hour.

172. *Captain Beechey*.—Did it go to the westward or to the eastward, in your opinion?

*Captain Stewart*.—I do not know; it came longer from the westward.

173. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you think there is a set or current from any particular direction?

*Captain Stewart*.—Yes, from the westward, independently of the tides.

174. *Captain Beechey*.—Did there appear to be any pressure of ice in any particular direction south or west?

*Captain Stewart*.—There was a heavy pressure of ice at Cape Beecher from the south and west.

175. *Captain Beechey*.—That refers to the same ice you before spoke of?

*Captain Stewart*.—That formed no part of the sailing ice, but remained fixed to the land.

176. *Chairman*.—You were not in the boat with Captain Penny?

*Captain Stewart*.—I was not with the same party, but had charge of another, and had Dr. Sutherland with me.

177. *Chairman*.—Did you see any animals?

*Captain Stewart*.—Yes, a good many.

178. *Chairman*.—Describe what quadrupeds?

*Captain Stewart*.—About a dozen bears and one deer.

179. *Chairman*.—Any walruses?

*Captain Stewart*.—None.

180. *Chairman*.—Any seals?

*Captain Stewart*.—Yes.

181. *Chairman*.—Any white bears?

*Captain Stewart*.—Yes.

182. *Chairman*.—Any ducks' eggs?

*Captain Stewart*.—No, because we were too soon there.

183. *Chairman*.—At that time it would have been impossible for any person; not having the means of subsistence to supply themselves from such sources?

*Captain Stewart*.—Quite impossible.

184. *Chairman*.—They could make up something to increase their stores?

*Captain Stewart*.—Oh yes.

185. *Chairman*.—Did you shoot any bears?

*Captain Stewart*.—Yes, I fired at one or two, but we did not want them.

186. *Chairman*.—There was a letter sent by Captain Penny to Captain Austin on the 12th of August. Do you know anything about it?

*Captain Stewart*.—Yes.

187. *Chairman*.—State what you know about it?

(The letter addressed by Captain Penny to Captain Austin was handed to Captain Stewart.)

188. *Chairman*.—Is that the letter?

*Captain Stewart*.—Yes, that is the letter sent by Captain Penny from Assistance Bay.

189. *Chairman*.—Had you had any conversation about it with Captain Penny previously?

*Captain Stewart*.—Not about this one.

*Vide page 36,  
Ans. 336.*

190. *Chairman*.—Do you say you know the contents of the first letter written to Captain Austin in Assistance Bay, or did you see Captain Austin's letter to Captain Penny about further search up Wellington Strait? *Mr. A. Stewart.*  
30th Oct. 1851.

*Captain Stewart*.—Yes, I did.

191. *Chairman*.—Did Captain Penny consult the officers of his vessel on the subject of further search?

*Captain Stewart*.—The matter was mentioned, but I cannot say he consulted the officers on the subject.

192. *Chairman*.—What was your opinion on the subject? Did you think the bar of ice would clear away sufficiently to enable any vessels to get up Wellington Straits?

*Captain Stewart*.—That is a very difficult question to answer. I should say it was not at all impossible.

193. *Chairman*.—Do you think there would have been time to pass up the Straits after the ice had cleared away?

*Captain Stewart*.—I think it is quite possible.

194. *Chairman*.—Possible that it might have cleared away?

*Captain Stewart*.—Yes.

195. *Chairman*.—If you had had charge of the expedition, do you think you would have been induced to wait there to see whether it would clear away?

*Captain Stewart*.—We could not have done it with our little ships.

196. *Sir E. Parry*.—Could you not have waited?

*Captain Stewart*.—We might have waited, but it would have been impossible to have done any good.

197. *Chairman*.—State why it would have been impossible to have done any good?

*Captain Stewart*.—We might have got into the loose ice, and our two small vessels could not have effected any good.

198. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did the advisability of remaining there ever occur to you?

*Captain Stewart*.—I was quite in doubt whether Penny would remain there or not.

199. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Is it your own opinion, under all the circumstances of the position of your vessel, and the stores you had, that you might have stopped another month?

*Captain Stewart*.—I think not, certainly.

200. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—There was not then any possibility of prosecuting any further search?

*Captain Stewart*.—We had nothing to search with.

201. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Suppose you had not fallen in with Captain Austin's expedition, and you had found those relics of Sir John Franklin, would you have prosecuted the search through the Wellington Strait and the Victoria Channel, or would you have returned?

*Captain Stewart*.—We should have returned, most certainly, under the circumstances.

202. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you form any opinion as to the way Sir John Franklin had passed?

*Captain Stewart*.—He could not have gone by the south-west.

203. *Sir E. Parry*.—Why do you think so?

*Captain Stewart*.—It is scarcely possible that a vessel could come all that distance without some one hearing of it. I think he went by the Wellington Strait. My reasons for thinking so are on account of the water discovered in the north-west, and were I sent to look for a north-west passage I would go up Wellington Strait.

204. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you express any wish to remain in the *Sophia* for that investigation?

*Captain Stewart*.—No.



*Mr. A. Stewart.* 205. *Chairman.*—You speak confidently of Sir John Franklin taking the north-west passage. You cannot state whether any obstacles exist that way or not?

*Captain Stewart.*—No, I cannot.

206. *Sir E. Parry.*—After the travelling parties returned, was there not a meeting between Captain Penny and Captain Austin to talk over the matter?

*Captain Stewart.*—Yes, there was such a meeting.

207. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you know what was the result of that meeting? What did you understand to be the result of it?

*Captain Stewart.*—I don't think there was any understanding come to.

208. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you not suppose some understanding must have been come to?

*Captain Stewart.*—I heard Captain Penny ask Captain Austin for the steamer to go up the channel with.

209. *Chairman.*—Repeat, as nearly as you can recollect, what he said on that occasion?

*Sir E. Parry.*—Did not Captain Penny at the same time express his opinion that further search was unnecessary?

*Captain Stewart.*—Captain Penny wrote a letter to that effect; but I believe it was contrary to his convictions.

*Sir E. Parry* read from Captain Stewart's journal of the 28th July 1851 as follows:

“ Communication was held with Captain Austin, and an exchange of proceeding took place between the two commodores. The result was that Captain Austin considered the search to the westward was done, and Captain Penny that further search in the Wellington Channel was unnecessary, to which every one agreed. After having been so far in it without having got any trace, I had no hesitation in giving my opinion that further search in that direction was unnecessary, and, as far as I know, it was the opinion of every one. Nothing was then left for us to do, and after some ten days in the ice in the bay, we broke adrift, and were once more free.”

210. *Chairman.*—Were these your opinions at the time?

*Captain Stewart.*—Yes.

211. *Chairman.*—Have you seen any cause to alter them?

*Captain Stewart.*—I did not know at that time that traces had been found in any other direction.

213. *Sir E. Parry.*—At that time you understood that nothing more was to be done?

*Captain Stewart.*—Yes.

214. *Sir E. Parry.*—Could anything more have been done than *was* done?

*Captain Stewart.*—If we could have traced him, more could have been done.

215. *Captain Beechey.*—You say that if you had been at Wellington Strait, and it had been clear, you could have gone up to examine it?

*Captain Stewart.*—We could have gone if it had not been blocked up.

216. *Captain Beechey.*—Was it blocked by sailing ice?

*Captain Stewart.*—It was sailing ice we met with.

217. *Captain Beechey.*—If there had been no sailing ice would you have gone up it?

*Captain Stewart.*—Yes.

218. *Sir E. Parry.*—If you could not have got up there, why could Sir John Franklin? If you think he is gone up there, he must have got through. If *he* could not get through, how could *you* get through?

*Captain Stewart.*—He might have got through, but of course there is a great deal of chance-work in it. It is a very difficult navigation.

219. *Sir E. Parry.*—The tides make it difficult?

*Captain Stewart.*—Yes.

220. *Captain Beechey*.—Then we are to understand that from Cape Becher to Baring Island and Houston Stewart Island there is a great deal of packed ice that was driven to the eastward and blocked up the channel?

*Mr. A. Stewart.*

27th Oct. 1851.

*Captain Stewart*.—Yes.

221. *Captain Beechey*.—Will you mark the line where you saw the ice packed when you were there in June?

*Captain Stewart*.—It was to the westward of Bailey Hamilton and Dundas Island. The ice was loose ice as far as the eye could reach.

222. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Have you expressed any opinion since your return to England about a steamer going out this winter?

*Captain Stewart*.—I was quite willing to go out.

223. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—But have you volunteered your services in a steamer?

*Captain Stewart*.—No.

224. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was anything of the sort spoken of by any of you before you came home?

*Captain Stewart*.—No; I often thought a ship would go out again but not this winter. If a vessel had been going I should have been very happy to go again.

225. *Chairman*.—I dare say you are aware that Captain Penny wrote a letter to the Admiralty volunteering to go out, and stating that the officers who had been connected with him would follow him?

*Captain Stewart*.—Yes; I and others would have done so.

226. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Do you know what amount of provisions you had when you turned about to come home?

*Captain Stewart*.—Yes, we had provisions for about 13 months.

227. *Captain Beechey*.—Do you know what answer Captain Austin gave Captain Penny about the steamer?

*Captain Stewart*.—I do not recollect that any answer was given by Captain Austin about the steamer.

228. *Chairman*.—And you do not know anything more of any conversation that took place between Captain Penny and Captain Austin?

*Captain Stewart*.—No; I never was on board after that.

229. *Sir E. Parry*.—Are you aware of letters that passed between Captain Penny and Captain Austin, in which Captain Austin requested Captain Penny to acquaint him, whether in his opinion, "the search of the Wellington Strait had been so far satisfactory as to render a further prosecution in that direction, if practicable, unnecessary?"

*Captain Stewart*.—I am not acquainted with such a letter, but the conversation I have often heard.

230. *Sir E. Parry*.—If you had been in Captain Austin's place, and had received such a letter as Captain Penny sent, what should you have supposed it meant?

*Captain Stewart*.—If I had known what Captain Austin knew, I should never have asked anything of the sort.

231. *Sir E. Parry*.—No, that is not what I meant. What would you have understood by that answer?

*Captain Stewart*.—There was considerable doubt at the time whether the Wellington Channel was navigable, and Captain Penny in a state of irritation sent his letter, after a conversation of many hours with Captain Austin. If it had been my case I should not have answered Captain Austin.

232. *Chairman*.—Do you think you would have been justified in refusing to answer a letter from an officer in such a position?

*Captain Stewart*.—He had received the information already. He had the same amount of information and the same chart up to this time.

233. *Captain Beechey*.—In your own journal you state that further search was quite unnecessary?

*Captain Stewart*.—I scarcely knew Captain Penny's opinion at that time.

*Mr. A. Stewart.*

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234. *Sir E. Parry.*—Captain Austin's question was as plain as man could put it. The question is, what Captain Penny's answer meant? ●

*Captain Stewart.*—Captain Penny meant to say no search was required beyond the Wellington Channel under the circumstances. Neither myself nor Captain Penny have been much accustomed to these sort of despatches, and perhaps have not been cautious enough in framing them. We did not think such letters would be brought forward in this investigation.

235. *Sir E. Parry.*—When did you first hear of a steamer going out this year? When did you first hear it suggested?

*Captain Stewart.*—I never heard of it until I arrived at Woolwich.

After some consideration, the Committee adjourned.

*Second Day. October 28, 1851.*

Present, Rear-Admiral William Bowles, C.B., M.P., Chairman,  
 Rear-Admiral Arthur Fausshawe, C.B.,  
 Captain Sir Edward Parry,  
 Captain F. W. Beechey,  
 Mr. Fred. J. Fegen, Secretary.

Dr. SUTHERLAND called.

236. *Chairman.*—You were Surgeon of the “Sophia,” I believe, under Captain Penny? *Dr. Sutherland.*

*Dr. Sutherland.*—Yes. 28th Oct. 1851

237. *Chairman.*—You were one of the officers who explored the coast of the Wellington Strait, and higher up?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—Yes.

238. *Chairman.*—Did you make any observation on the barrier of ice that you found at the mouth of Wellington Strait?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—Not that we found at the entrance of the strait, but between Cape Bowden and Point Separation.

239. *Chairman.*—It was a complete barrier of ice that no one could get through, was it not?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—At what time?

240. *Chairman.*—When you travelled over it?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—Yes; it rose and fell with every motion of the tide, but there was no open water in it.

241. *Chairman.*—Were you present when the open water was first discovered in June?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—I was at Prince Alfred's Bay when Captain Penny discovered the open water to the west of us.

242. *Chairman.*—But you did not see it yourself?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—No, I did not, except that intense refraction was observed to the westward, which, under the circumstances, I was disposed to attribute to the presence of open water.

243. *Chairman.*—So that you cannot give the Committee, of your own knowledge, any information on that point?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—No; except that I found the ice broken in the channel,—that is, it had parted,—on my return.

244. *Sir E. Parry.*—What part of the channel do you mean?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—At the north headland, in latitude  $75^{\circ} 30'$  or  $75^{\circ} 25'$ . I found a crack two feet wide, and several smaller ones, on the 6th of June, extending at right angles with the land, and going across to the westward.

245. *Sir E. Parry.*—On which shore were you?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—On the east shore. The crack in the ice might have been two feet wide. It was about seven feet thick there.

*Dr. Sutherland.*

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246. *Sir E. Parry.*—How long do you think that ice had been there?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—It was that year's ice I am certain. From its thickness and structure I had no doubt it had been there only since the previous October.

247. *Chairman.*—How far to the north did you go?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—I accompanied Captain Stewart nearly to Cape Simpkinson.

248. *Captain Beechey.*—Then Captain Stewart left you and you returned, making the circuit of Prince Alfred's Bay, having previously crossed over the neck of it?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—Yes. I had orders to examine a portion of the coast in order to discover if there was an island there, of which we had some doubts. On our way back I found that island in  $75^{\circ} 49'$ , on the north side of Baring Bay.

249. *Captain Beechey.*—How far off the coast?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—Three miles.

250. *Captain Beechey.*—I do not find it marked down on the chart?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—No; but I have entered it down in my report.

251. *Captain Beechey.*—On your return what course did you take?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—From Baring Bay I made straight across to Cape Osborn.

252. *Chairman.*—Did you make any observation of the line of ice which is drawn on this chart from Cape Osborn? You saw that ice?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—Yes, we passed over it.

253. *Captain Beechey.*—There is a line drawn from Cape Osborn to Cape De Haven, 1850. Was there any difference between that ice and that to the northward?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—I can only speak of five miles along the land. I am sure it was all of one year's ice. I felt confident that it was of that year's formation. That was round Baring Bay. There were appearances of old ice mixed up with it.

254. *Captain Beechey.*—There was new ice, and extensive floes of old ice?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—Yes, there were large floes of a mile and a half in extent.

255. *Chairman.*—How far down your wintering place did this barrier of ice appear to extend?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—I saw no old ice in Wellington Channel below  $75^{\circ}$ ; but there might have been.

256. *Chairman.*—That is, from Cape Bowden to Point Separation?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—Yes; but a few miles to the southward of Cape Bowden.

257. *Sir E. Parry.*—You saw no old ice there?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—No.

258. *Captain Beechey.*—In your advances you walked over the ice across Prince Alfred's Bay. On your return, was there any reason why you could not go over there?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—It was very good ice all the way. It had severed a little from pressure, and it was very young ice. I felt convinced that a pressure must have taken place from the previous floes, and when the sun shone upon it it melted away, giving it the appearance of old ice, which it was not.

259. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you know what breadth of ice remained in Wellington Strait up to the end of the navigable season of 1850? Do you know what breadth of ice was supposed to remain there?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—I am afraid to say at what time the navigable season closed. I can feel confident to Cape Osborn, that being its northern limit—from Cape Osborn to Cape De Haven.

260. *Sir E. Parry.*—What breadth was there, north and south, of ice remaining in the channel the last time you saw it?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—On the 8th of September the line of ice extended from about two miles to the south of Cape Bowden to near Point Delay on the other side.

261. *Sir E. Parry*.—How much remained?

*Dr. Sutherland*.—I cannot say how much ice remained to the northward of the southern edge.

*Dr. Sutherland.*

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262. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you hear of any water to the north of it?

*Dr. Sutherland*.—Yes.

263. *Chairman*.—That was in 1850?

*Dr. Sutherland*.—Yes, in the first week in September.

264. *Sir E. Parry*.—Is it your impression, from what you saw in your journey, that Wellington Strait had been clear that year (1850) after you left?

*Dr. Sutherland*.—I am sure it was not clear of ice altogether, but I feel confident the ice in Wellington Channel had started, and that it was navigable at a period subsequent to our crossing it in the ships.

265. *Sir E. Parry*.—You think it might have been navigable even at that season?

*Dr. Sutherland*.—The navigable season was then too far advanced for sailing vessels.

266. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you think there was a navigable passage through Wellington Strait that season, as far as you can judge?

*Dr. Sutherland*.—If the navigable season extends only to the 11th of September it was not practicable for sailing vessels.

267. *Captain Beechey*.—What reason have you for believing that the ice was loose?

*Dr. Sutherland*.—From our observations the following year. In 1851 we found from Cape Separation new ice extending to President Bay, but old ice amongst it angled together as though the ice had been drifting about.

268. *Captain Beechey*.—Then to the northward of President Bay do you suppose that it was loose also?

*Dr. Sutherland*.—I am sure that it was loose also. There were five miles of ice extending along the land of one year's formation. From what I saw of the ice on my journey, subsequently to the visits of the ships in the autumn, there had been a disruption of the ice in Wellington Channel.

269. *Chairman*.—Do you think it possible to have made any advance through the Wellington Strait in the season of 1850?

*Dr. Sutherland*.—On the 8th of September 1850, when we left the Wellington Channel, we gave it up as hopeless. We were impressed by this, that the ships would be powerless amongst the ice. With steamers we should not feel powerless. On the 9th of September (Sunday) we found the sea in Wellington Channel covered in many parts with a film of bay ice—of pancake ice, which in a calm water so fastens our ships to the spot, that we must drift in any direction the wind may choose to blow. In about two days time our ships were so encumbered with new ice, that we found progress to be quite hopeless, but with steam power we felt that such would not have been the case. In a calm we could always be moving on in whatever direction we might choose.

270. *Sir E. Parry*.—Have you any personal experience of the effect of steamers? Have you seen the effect of steam power in the navigation amongst the ice?

*Dr. Sutherland*.—Yes; I have seen steamers working across the Wellington Channel. The day we crossed altogether the Resolute and Pioneer left us. We were nearly driven on Cape Spencer.

271. *Sir E. Parry*.—I want to know why it is, from your experience of steam in bay ice, that you attribute so much to it? What is your personal experience of it?

*Dr. Sutherland*.—I know two instances. One day our ships left Union Bay with Resolute and Pioneer. Resolute and Pioneer went out of sight to westward. We were detained at first in clear water with bay ice, and towards evening we were completely encumbered by the quantity of bay ice; both our ships were encumbered, the Lady Franklin and the Sophia; we were within about five or six miles of land, between Cape Spencer and Point Innes. The Resolute and Pioneer went out of sight to the westward, and we did not know where they might be, and we remained quite powerless. The bay ice cemented

*Dr. Sutherland.*  
—  
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our ships so much that they were quite powerless. If we had had steam power we could have gone on to the westward. There was no bay ice in the day, it formed at night time.

272. *Sir E. Parry.*—That is one instance; mention any other instance you may have witnessed?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—On the 9th of September (I do not feel confident of the date)—on the 9th or 10th of September, we observed the *Resolute* and *Pioneer* drifting to the east of Cape Hotham. At that time we believed these two ships to be encumbered amongst bay ice and the packed ice. With steam power they very soon got cleared, and proceeded to the westward at the rate of three or four miles an hour through bay ice; I cannot say how thick the ice might have been. Our two sailing vessels plied the American vessels, and kept a respectable distance ahead of the two ships that were advancing astern of us, the *Resolute* and *Pioneer*; but with our sailing vessels we were unable to get through the fast ice to the south-west of Griffith Island within perhaps half an hour of the time Her Majesty's ships arrived there. We felt powerless for want of steam, but now we felt that we were able to do as much as Her Majesty's ships. Had it not been for the power of steam the *Resolute* would not have done so much against the bay ice.

273. *Chairman.*—I asked you a question just now, which you have not answered. It is this: Do you think it possible to have made any advances through Wellington Strait in the season of 1850?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—With steam power my opinion is that it would. Taking advantage of the late opening with steam power, we might have been able to navigate through the Wellington Channel in the season of 1850.

274. *Chairman.*—Did you see any leads or lanes through the ice in Wellington Strait at that time, that a steamer might have gone through?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—We saw sufficient to induce us to leave Wellington Channel, and we saw sufficient to induce us to remain there had we had steam power.

275. *Chairman.*—I asked you whether you saw any opening in the ice, or leads or lanes in Wellington Strait at that time, that a steamer might have gone through?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—I must answer that in the negative. But at the same time I think it is not doing justice. The fact of the strait being navigable by a steamer —

276. *Sir E. Parry.*—We want a distinct answer to a distinct question.

*Dr. Sutherland.*—Then my answer is, No.

277. *Captain Beechey.*—From the state of the ice when you travelled over it in 1851 did you suppose that the Wellington Strait was navigable after the period when the expedition left it in 1850?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—Not for sailing vessels.

278. *Captain Beechey.*—But with steamers you think it was?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—Yes.

279. *Chairman.*—What experience have you in ice? How often have you gone to the polar regions? What experience have you to enable you to distinguish between the different sorts and appearances of ice?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—I have been two voyages.

280. *Sir E. Parry.*—To what part?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—To Baffin's Bay; two voyages previous to this expedition. One winter there is better than twenty summers to instruct any one of common observation on the character of the ice.

281. *Chairman.*—Did you make any observations on the tides or currents?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—No.

282. *Chairman.*—With respect to animals, did you see many animals in your journey in the early part of 1851, when you went up as high as Prince Alfred's Bay? Did you see any quadrupeds or birds which would enable you to exist without any other provisions?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—I saw birds, seals, foxes, ptarmigan, in May and April, and in June, ducks, geese, and two or three specimens of sandpipers.



283. *Chairman*.—Is it your opinion that party, left to their own resources, and without provisions, could possibly exist for any length of time on what they could take of those animals and birds? *Dr. Sutherland.*  
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*Dr. Sutherland*.—Not on the eastern side of the Wellington Channel, if left to their own resources. Previous to the 1st of June they might be enabled to increase their stock of food a little, but more so after that period, as the birds begin to migrate to the northward. It would depend a good deal upon whether any of the party were good marksmen. One might kill a bear where another would fail.

284. *Chairman*.—Take it in the most favourable point of view, that they were good hunters?

*Dr. Sutherland*.—We had hunters, who might be able in April and May to make the provisions of forty days last out fifty-five or fifty-six days. Good sportsmen, taking advantage of seal's flesh and bear's flesh, might eke out their provisions fifty-five or fifty-six days instead of forty.

285. *Sir E. Parry*.—There is another question I will ask you, as it is of importance in reference to the fate of Sir John Franklin's expedition. From what you saw, and from what you have heard from others, do you think it possible that parties of men entirely dependent upon their own resources could exist through the year by laying up in the summer season that which was to last them for the rest of the year?

*Dr. Sutherland*.—My own opinion is, that they would not be able; but if I give due weight to the opinions of others, I fear my own opinion would become of less weight.

286. *Sir E. Parry*.—From what you saw of animals, and the reports of others concerning animals, is it your opinion that parties could subsist upon their own resources by procuring in summer what was to last them during the rest of the year?

*Dr. Sutherland*.—From what I have seen myself I do not think they could; but judging from the reports brought home by others who had better opportunities of judging, I believe they could.

287. *Chairman*.—Did you keep a meteorological register in your journeys in 1851? Did you observe at the same periods what was the difference of temperature between your winter quarters and your furthest north-west?

*Dr. Sutherland*. I compared the register kept on board the ship with the register on the journey, and I found a difference of one, two, or three degrees colder to the north.

288. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you pick up any drift wood?

*Dr. Sutherland*.—Yes, between Cornwallis Land and Cape Hotham; but I believe it to have been left there by the Esquimaux. It had holes in it which appeared to have been burned.

289. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was it very old?

*Dr. Sutherland*.—Yes.

290. *Sir E. Parry*.—Could you form an opinion how long since the Esquimaux had been there, knowing how long that climate preserves wood?

*Dr. Sutherland*.—Not for many hundreds of years.

291. *Sir E. Parry*.—What is your opinion now as to the route Sir John Franklin has probably pursued?

*Dr. Sutherland*.—My opinion is, that Sir John Franklin pursued the route through the Wellington Channel.

292. *Chairman*.—What grounds have you for that opinion?

*Dr. Sutherland*.—The chances he saw before him, from his very great experience, of succeeding in making a north-west passage through the Wellington Channel.

293. *Chairman*.—How can you be certain that the barrier of ice that impeded you did not impede him?

*Dr. Sutherland*.—I cannot be certain of that.

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294. *Chairman.*—What grounds have you for thinking that Sir John Franklin, after wintering at Beechey Island, did not proceed, agreeably to his instructions, to the south-west by Cape Walker?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—Had he proceeded by that route traces of him would have been found by the parties who have explored those parts.

295. *Sir E. Parry.*—Then why were not traces found of him in the other direction, namely, to the northward and westward which you suppose he took?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—The extreme haste with which he might have found it necessary to proceed in that direction under the most favourable circumstances.

296. *Sir E. Parry.*—Then I return to the question. Why might he not have proceeded under the same haste in the south-western direction by Cape Walker?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—Before the expedition could have got clear of winter quarters the ice in Barrow Straits towards Cape Walker must have been broken up into a pack, which would drift about loosely and render the progress of the ships necessarily very slow. The ice in the Wellington Channel we know would retain its fixed position until late in the season, and, when the opening might have taken place, to allow the ships to proceed in that direction, the ice would not be in the form of a loose pack, but in the form of large floes that would permit of hasty and rapid progress close along the eastern shore of the Wellington Strait; that will account for the haste in one direction and the slowness in the other.

297. *Sir E. Parry.*—Am I to understand that it is your opinion that the ice breaks up sooner in the south-west direction than in Wellington Strait? I mean in the direction of Cape Walker?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—Two months sooner.

298. *Sir E. Parry.*—In the preceding year I believe it was not navigable to Cape Walker?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—Not when we arrived there; but it might have been earlier in the season. \*

299. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you know what was the state of the ice when you left it in August 1851? If you had been trying to get to Cape Walker this year, how far could you have got in the ships?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—It was much clearer of ice in July, when we could have got there, than it was in August, and more easily navigable.

300. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you find any traces of Sir John Franklin anywhere in your travelling party?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—No; not any traces.

301. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you consider that Beechey Island was thoroughly searched for records? \*

*Dr. Sutherland.*—Yes; thoroughly searched.

302. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Do you know anything of Cape Riley?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—Yes.

303. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Do you consider that that place was thoroughly searched?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—Yes. I went to examine Cape Riley and the immediate points, and no traces were discovered.

304. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—You were at Cape Riley yourself?

*Dr. Sutherland.*—Yes.

*Mr. Penny.*

CAPTAIN PENNY, who was examined yesterday, was recalled.

305. *Chairman.*—There was a question we omitted to put to you yesterday, Captain Penny, on which we should like to have some information. It is, whether you consider that the winter harbour of the Erebus and Terror has

been so thoroughly searched that it is not possible that any document left by Sir John Franklin there could have been overlooked.

*Captain Penny.*—I do not think it possible, for the ground was gone over as a bloodhound would go over it. Captain Austin and his party, myself, and others went over it and round about it, over and over again, so as to prevent any doubt upon the subject. My persuasion was very strong that Sir John Franklin would not leave without leaving some traces.

*Mr. Penny.*

29th Oct. 1851.

306. *Sir E. Parry.*—You are satisfied that this must have been the winter quarters of the *Erebus* and *Terror* in the winter of 1845–6?

*Captain Penny.*—I am perfectly satisfied of that.

307. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Were strict searches made on Cape Riley

*Captain Penny.*—Yes. Captain Stewart and Dr. Sutherland landed upon that cape, and examined it minutely, but they found no traces.

The Committee then adjourned.



*Third Day. October 29, 1851.*

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles, C.B., M.P., Chairman,  
Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,  
Captain Sir E. Parry,  
Captain Beechey,  
Captain Sir George Back,  
Mr. Frederick J. Fegen, Secretary.

CAPTAIN AUSTIN, C.B., called.

*Captain Austin.*

29th Oct. 1851.

*The Chairman* (addressing Captain Penny, who was present,) said,—  
Before we commence the proceedings I must inform you the Committee have determined on allowing you to be present during the examination of Captain Austin and his officers. We think it is rather a stretch of fairness, as no accusation is brought against any of the officers in your expedition; but it is proper that all parties should be in a position to correct any misrepresentations that may be made, and we therefore allow you to be present.

308. *The Chairman to Captain Austin.*—Are you prepared to go into your evidence now?

*Captain Austin.*—I am perfectly ready to answer any questions that may be proposed to me, reserving the privilege which I may hereafter have occasion for, of referring to my notes and to documents, some of which I shall refer to with great reluctance, if it become necessary. With that privilege I am ready to go into the examination.

309. *Chairman.*—The first question the Committee wish to put is in reference to your opinions respecting reports contained in your letter of the 11th August 1850 as to Adam Beck. Do you continue to consider that the examination at that time was a full and sufficient one, and do you still entertain the same opinion as to that story?

*Captain Austin.*—I do, precisely. I consider that everything was gone into, and that every one who was present agreed that the conduct of Adam Beck was most discreditable.

310. *Chairman.*—To what circumstances do you allude that have not been detailed in reference to Adam Beck?

*Captain Austin.*—Everything has since been borne out by the conduct of Adam Beck.

311. *Chairman.*—What do you allude to?

*Captain Austin.*—I allude to his stopping back, and to what passed when he was landed, which Captain Ominanney can speak of better than I can,—to his conduct when with Sir John Ross. He was a man in whom no faith could be placed from his irregular conduct and I believe drunkenness. I think he was about the worst description of a civilized savage I ever saw.

312. *Chairman.*—Do you consider, that from Ponds Bay on the south, to Cape Warrender on the north, have been properly searched, and all the points as far as Lancaster Sound?

*Captain Austin.*—Yes; I believe it has all been thoroughly examined.

*Captain Austin.*

29th Oct. 1851.

313. *Chairman.*—And you extend that answer both north and south as far as Lancaster Sound?

*Captain Austin.*—Yes; I believe that from Ponds Bay to Port Leopold has been thoroughly examined. Searching and examination are two different things; this coast has been most satisfactorily examined.

314. *Chairman.*—Do you consider that the whole of the south coast as far as Port Leopold and Ponds Bay has been thoroughly examined?

*Captain Austin.*—Yes, most thoroughly examined.

315. *Chairman.*—What were your proceedings after passing Port Leopold? Did you get to Cape Riley and find the first traces of the expedition?

*Captain Austin.*—We proceeded to Cape Riley rounding Beechey Island, where I was detained.

316. *Chairman.*—Give an account of your further proceedings. When did you receive information of the discovery of Sir John Franklin's winter quarters?

*Captain Austin.*—The moment I reached the fast ice at Union Bay where the vessels were lying, Commander Phillips came out and assisted in leading "Resolute" in, and from whom I heard of the graves. I was up all night and was unequal to go on shore. At length Captain Penny and I went together to the graves, and then considered that here were the winter quarters.

317. *Chairman.*—In fact you discovered undoubted traces of the missing expedition?

*Captain Austin.*—I saw that there were traces of the expedition having wintered there.

318. *Chairman.*—What was the next step you took?

*Captain Austin.*—I accompanied Captain Penny and some other officers to the top of the hill at Beechey Island; while there we went to a cairn, took it down and examined it to a certain extent, but not in the way we were satisfied it should be examined. We then returned to the ship. Both of our searches were made at this cairn. Nothing do I recollect being found at this moment more than a few shot. I beg to hand in my report.

319. *Chairman.*—In paragraph 8 of your letter to the Admiralty of the 14th of July 1851 you state that you consider that the departure of the expedition was somewhat sudden?

*Captain Austin.*—Yes, I am of that opinion. There was a number of coal bags and other materials left about which it is not probable would have been left, unless the missing expedition had gone away suddenly, or if they had been prosecuting. There was a great deal of burning material, coal bags, and other things which evidently proved to me that they had gone out rapidly or were not advancing.

320. *Chairman.*—What quantity of coal bags was there?

*Captain Austin.*—Perhaps a dozen altogether.

321. *Chairman.*—All empty?

*Captain Austin.*—Yes. I brought away four. There might have been more than a dozen.

322. *Chairman.*—What were your further proceedings afterwards?

*Captain Austin.*—I will go on with my narrative. I proceeded as far as was in my power. I will explain what I mean by the word power. I considered it was my duty to go to the westward, looking to the westward position as being one of difficulty, and that if anything should have to be done in the Wellington Strait I could return; and further, that it was necessary then, from what I saw of the state of the ice, to be prepared for making arrangements for the forthcoming season for action, the present season of navigation being evidently closing very fast. As soon as possible after opportunity offered we prosecuted to the westward.

323. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—When you speak of proceeding to the westward was it in pursuance of your orders to use every possible exertion to get to Melville Island?

*Captain Austin.*—Yes, most undoubtedly it was. I used every exertion to get to Melville Island.

324. *Captain Austin* continued his narrative.—We were stopped at the south

end of Griffith Island, and there the expeditions were together, with the exception of that of Sir John Ross in the *Felix*. After reaching this spot Captain Penny came on board, and conversed upon the matter fully, the subject being the operations that should now be entered into to ensure the accomplishment of our object, at the same time offering to convey Captain Penny or one of his officers to examine an apparent lead to the south-west. I refer to my circular which I addressed to Lieutenant De Haven in command of the American expedition. I think you will find that Captain Penny did not receive it.

*Captain Austin.*

29th Oct. 1851.

325. *Chairman*.—Is it dated the 11th of September 1850?

*Captain Austin*.—Yes, it is. The substance of it was a conversation between Captain Penny and myself when he came on board.

326. *Chairman*.—You had better read it, and it will become part of the evidence.

*Captain Austin*.—The substance of this circular was gone into in conversation with Captain Penny. Captain Ommanney came on board, and there was a question about some dark clouds in the south-west near Cape Walker. Looking to the state of the ice, which was drifting to the southward, and the weather generally, I thought it would be anything but the duty of an Arctic navigator to proceed. Captain Penny's vessels were moving about from one part of the ice to the other, and towards the evening they were at some distance from us. Captain Ommanney left early in the morning, with directions from me to give Captain Penny an opportunity to proceed to the south-west. When Captain Ommanney reached, the brigs were adrift, under sail, and there was a kind of race between the brigs and the *Intrepid*, between Captain Penny's two brigs and the *Intrepid*. Shortly after this the weather changed, a thick fog came on,—it was very severe weather,—and the *Intrepid* returned. I shall have to refer to Captain Ommanney's report as to what passed on that occasion. He came back with difficulty, and from that time until I sent a party out to examine if the ships were fast, and preparing themselves for the winter, I did not know where the brigs were, although I had certain apprehensions about them. The *Intrepid* returned. We had very severe weather at this period, and we were drifting with the ice to the southward. The first moment that admitted of it we cast off,—that is, our expedition, and one of the American vessels,—the other having broken adrift during the severe weather; and after as severe a day as ever I experienced in my life, we got into open water under the lee of Griffith Island. I considered that our situation at this moment was a very serious one, for every thing depended upon our reaching to the west of Griffith Island, and I thought that unless we came upon the remains of our fellow countrymen between that and Melville Island, nothing would have allowed me to have returned to England as long as I existed, for my orders were Melville Island. We thus arrived under lee of Griffith Island. Seeing, from the state of the season, the lowness of the temperature, that I had no dependence upon the steamers, on account of that low state of the temperature, as the injection of water from the sea could not be regularly supplied, (which I wish to be kept in view,)—seeing that if they stopped there was no moving again, and it would be sailing ships on which I should have to depend,—under these circumstances I must say that I felt very anxious. There was no ice to keep us off from Griffith Island, and therefore it was necessary to push for something in the shape of security. But to the eastward I would not go; I called for Captain Ommanney on board to inquire as to the state of the ice between Griffith Island and Cape Martyr, his report being that there were hopes of some fast ice being found there. We continued under a press of sail to make that ice. Whilst doing so the American vessels hoisted their colours, and bore up, and I was much pained at the moment by a supposition that they must be for America, and that they would have no report on board from me. But I felt at that moment that nothing would justify me in keeping the expedition without some holdfast. We pushed on, and reached the fixed ice at Griffith Island, which eventually became our winter quarters. As will be seen from my circular, I made up my mind that the "*Assistance*" should not advance; but I was anxious that she should remain to the latest moment, to see if we could get round Griffith Island. And again it required some little time carefully to think over the instructions necessary to give to Captain Ommanney, to ensure the operations being carried out to the utmost next spring. In the meantime a



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tender was despatched to look to the south end of Griffith Island, in the hope that there might be something in the shape of water that would admit of fifty miles more to the westward being obtained, as I must say that I had made up my mind, that, having the "Assistance" in her place, the "Resolute" should become a forlorn hope. However, as my report will show in detail, there was no hope, and the "Assistance" and her tender were sent off in the execution of her instructions to get into port. She made the attempt, but with her tender and her steam she became in such a helpless position that Captain Ommanney felt that the sooner he could get back into a channel of water to join us it was his duty to do so. The "Assistance" having returned, the temperature fell considerably. There was much ice and very little open water, and this state of things continued some days. At last I felt that there was no hope of getting this fifty miles, and in that case that both ships had better be together, for then we should have joint operations, which would be more successful. The ice had formed so strongly, and become so pressed, and the temperature so low, that I determined that both ships should go into winter quarters. I saw there was not the slightest hope of getting westward, and I began to cut through 300 and 400 yards in extent between us and the channel, which promised to lead us into a little bay to the eastward of Cape Martyr, but the ice again made so fast that I felt it was necessary to give up further operations in that direction. We then, considering the ships fixed, despatched parties in the hope of doing something, at the same time with the view of giving them some idea of what travelling would be. One of the party discovered the position of Captain Penny. I must say that the weather was so severe, the temperature being down to 17 below zero, that our advance parties were driven in. I would refer to their journals for the sufferings these people underwent at this period. Captain Penny came over in his dog sledge, and he cheerfully undertook to complete the search of Wellington Strait. He was two days' march nearer than we were. This brings us up to the commencement of the winter. We then commenced our operations for the health and exercise of the men during the winter season.

327. *Chairman.*—If you refer to your report of July for the proceedings of the winter, you can proceed at once to the spring, when you sent your parties out?

*Captain Austin.*—Yes. These papers will be produced. I have nothing to repeat further in that respect.

327 a. *Captain Austin continued.*—Winter commenced, and our great object was to establish health, improvement, and happiness amongst the men. So soon as the weather would admit of it we commenced training, which I consider a most important thing. It was most beneficial in this instance. It gave us, in the first place, confidence in the men; and, secondly, by testing their strength, it enabled us to form an opinion as to the extent of labour they could endure. This was continued as far as the weather would admit. Previous to this I assembled all the officers together, and gave them the plan of operations, which I take the opportunity of saying were wholly my own; for my occupation during the winter was having my instructions before me, as well as all the best works which had been written on the subject of Arctic travel. All the officers to whom I communicated my opinions appeared satisfied with their destinations, and I called upon them to give me their views and their anticipations, to name their sledges, select their men, their flag, and their motto, and they were to be brought to me on a certain day. This was done, and received my approval. I never met with so much earnestness as was exhibited on that occasion by the officers and men in training for that work. At the same time I consulted all the authorities as to the time I could ensure safety in departure, because I felt that we could not go away too early; first, that we should avoid the risk of the ice being disrupted in the strait on our return, and second, because as the season advanced the labour of proceeding would become so much greater. Everything worked well, and was highly satisfactory. During the period of detention from the weather, seeing that there was great anxiety, I addressed one of the best petty officers of the division, and asked him how he felt about the weather, and he said he thought the sooner we were off, the better. My attention was rather called to this remark of his, and I asked him why? His reply was, I feel assured that we

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shall find it much worse as the season advances than the severity we have now. That convinced me that the men were reasoning and reflecting, and I derived considerable satisfaction from the circumstance. The time had arrived for an inspection of the parties as arranged for departure, and I must say that I never witnessed anything equal to it in my life. The earnestness, determination, and general conduct of all afforded me the highest gratification. I addressed them on the spot and issued a memorandum. I felt it due to them to embody my opinions in a document so that they might stand on record as a public document; that document will be amongst the papers to be produced. They departed, and from that time until they returned not one of the arrangements we had made failed. When they returned they did so, just as was anticipated, and the greatest confidence existed in the abilities of all to accomplish what they had undertaken. I had almost forgotten to state that as the parties came in I again despatched what I considered the limited and auxiliary parties; first, in order that in the event of anything happening to the distant parties they should be there to bring them in; and, second, in order that what had been discovered should be satisfactorily laid down, that is, that the positions should be fixed, and that all should be surveyed that could by any possibility be accomplished. Captain Penny reached the "Resolute," and communicated to me that he had discovered a large space of water up the Wellington Strait. At this time I really had no assistance to give to Captain Penny, but I am by no means prepared to admit that Captain Penny asked me for it. My impression is, that I observed to Captain Penny that I regretted that I had not the means, but that we must have a boat in that water. What I meant by that was, that Captain Penny and myself, that is with my assistance, should have a boat in that water, and I recollect also that Mr. Allen, the master of the "Resolute," said to me, "Why, Sir, I should be glad to go under Captain Penny if it is only to do the astronomical part." I said, "You have gratified and pleased me much; we must talk that over." This conversation occurred after our dinner on, I believe, a Royal birth-day. I have no very full recollection of this, but I may refer to my notes, and, if necessary, I will return to the subject hereafter. Previous to this in the afternoon Captain Penny and myself were walking before dinner, and I desired to elicit from Captain Penny, if I could, what really was the state of the case as to the water, for round about me there was nothing but ice, and I could not well understand that he had been in an open sea, circumstanced as we were. I put some close questions to Captain Penny, but not by any means so close as I should have put to Captain Ommanney, or any one of his rank who had come to me with that report. I found that Captain Penny was angry, and I felt that he would not allow me to make such inquiries. My object was most certainly not to create any bad feeling, and therefore I can say little more about the questions. We went to dinner then. I have related the conversation before dinner. In the evening, finding Captain Penny in conversation with my officers, as he was my guest I did not wish to interrupt his conversation with them, considering it was not in good taste to do so. I descended the cabin two or three steps, and it occurred to me I must say good night to Penny. I went up and asked him if he would take anything. Knowing him to be a very abstemious man, I might have asked him if he would take a glass of water. The conversation proceeded and I went away. To my astonishment,—for I must say I was looking forward to the Sabbath passing with a view to some determined arrangement as to what was to be done in the Wellington Strait,—to my astonishment the bombardier came to me at twelve o'clock at night to say that Captain Penny had gone. I think he said to the "Assistance," but I am not positive. I know that Captain Penny had an invitation to dine on board the "Assistance" on Sunday, for I was invited to meet him. I never made it a practice to accept invitations on Sunday, but out of compliment to Captain Penny I determined on going. I said, "I think Captain Penny is in want of meat for his dogs; I should not be at all surprised if he is gone towards Griffith's Island." I declare that from that time to this I have endeavoured to account for it. However, among other things, I afterwards became impressed that Captain Penny was angry with me, perhaps because I had not returned his visit.

*Captain Austin.* He had offered me his dog sledge, and I am sure I should have been very happy there; I am sure of that, for I have always considered him a very generous man; but there were a hundred of my people out. My mind was on the stretch, causing me great care and anxiety; under such circumstances I could not think of leaving the ships. However, there was an interval between what may be called the limited and the extended parties. I determined to walk over to Captain Penny's, and found it a most tiresome journey,—a most laborious journey of from eight to nine hours. I thought of catching Captain Penny before he went out, but when I arrived, unhappily I found that Captain Penny had gone up Wellington Channel. I was detained there. My intention was to remain there forty-eight hours, but, in the hope of some one coming back, my stay extended over six days at Captain Penny's winter quarters on board the "Lady Franklin." During the time I was there the extended party came back a little earlier than they expected. I was away during the arrival of Captain Ommanney, Aldridge, and Osborne. While on board the "Lady Franklin" thinking that there must be some mistake between myself and Captain Penny, I wrote him a letter. I cannot recollect the substance of it, for I never intended it to be produced at such an inquiry as this. I apologized to him, and desired that there should be no coolness between us for the good of the cause. I then returned to the expedition.

328. *Chairman.*—Had you not better say what you apologized for?

*Captain Austin.*—I think I said, "If you are offended, the desire of an honourable mind must be to make an apology. If I have offended you I never intended it."

*Captain Austin* continued.—I came back to the ship after another very laborious journey, and the parties came in unhappily without finding traces, having looked most carefully and minutely for any trace.

329. *Sir E. Parry.*—Will you state about the time of this?

*Captain Austin.*—All the parties were in by the 4th of July. I cannot, without notes, speak now, but after minutely considering with my colleague, and receiving the officers journals and reports, I felt satisfied that there was nothing more to be done to the southward and westward, and I decided accordingly.

330. *Chairman.*—You had better explain here what had been done?

*Captain Austin.*—Nothing more could be done to the northward and westward by Lieutenant Aldridge and Lieutenant M'Clintock, Mr. Bradford the Surgeon, and Mr. M'Dougall the second master; and to the southward and westward by Captain Ommanney, Lieutenant Osborne, Lieutenant Browne, and Lieutenant Meehan, and also by Mr. Allen, who had searched Lowther Island and Garrett Island, and the ice generally in that direction, as shown in my outline chart.

331. *Chairman.*—That completes that part of your evidence. You say that those parts having been examined by such and such parties, nothing more could be done in that direction?

*Captain Austin* continued.—All returned unhappily without traces of the missing expedition. Having maturely weighed and considered the matter, I now felt that all had been done that could be done to the westward and south-westward of the Wellington Channel. I must say I became very anxious at this period to be able to make known generally what was to be the plan of future operation. At the earliest moment I sent my track chart to Captain Penny who was away, and to Sir John Ross. During this period I had occupied my mind with plans for going overland in case of hearing from parties coming in from Captain Penny, so that in the event of anything being found I might send a party across the land at the head of the bay; my calculations were that, taking the best people I had, I must devote three weeks in order to do it. I mean to say I would send across the head of the bay surveyed by Mr. M'Dougall. I had reports, and I suppose that I must have had something from Sir John Ross or some of the parties connected with Captain Penny who had gone to the westward. Perhaps I had better tell exactly what I felt. If it had not been

for delicacy in the one case, and having a doubt about land travelling at the time of the year, I might have made an attempt to cross there; but that would have been mere hydrography, and would not have accomplished my object. I thought, also, that it would be going over ground my colleague was doing, and that I had better wait till he returned, having the full determination in my mind that I would never allow a word to pass by which it might be inferred that I had any intention of returning to England. It was well known that I had determined on waiting until Captain Penny returned. Captain Penny returned about 25th July, and I received a note from him, but no official letter. That note, with other things that occurred to me, fully impressed me that the search had been carefully made, that no traces had been found, and that so far as the sea was spoken of it was not a navigable sea. The note I received from Captain Penny was as follows:—

*Captain Austin.*

29th Oct. 1851.

“ Dear Sir,

August 4, 1851.

“ Your first note, written on board the “Lady Franklin,” escaped my notice by some overlook for four days; the language it conveys is sufficient apology to any generous-minded man, however much his feeling had been injured by expressions and marked neglect.

“ And believe me, Austin, when I state it, that Penny has been all his lifetime accustomed to speak the language of the heart.

“ You, as well as myself, has very great reason to be thankful to our Maker for His manifold mercy to us and all those under our command for the high state of health they enjoy after an arduous and prolonged duties (*sic*).

“ The result of my boat expedition as far as the fate of Sir John and the brave men under his command are satisfactory, for what other conclusion could we arrive at after visiting Duck Island and Bird headlands with hundreds of nests, and no trace,—likewise water about these islands for two months, and latterly, beyond the pack ice nothing but water as far as the eye could reach from the highest mountain; but the fearful rate the tide runs (not less than six knots) through the sounds that divide the channel renders it dangerous even for a boat, much more so a ship, unless clear of ice, which from the appearance of the ice here will not be clear this season.

“ The conclusion I have arrived at after what has passed under my observation is to return to England after I have had an interview with you.

“ Poor Lady Franklin, and the friends of those brave men whose fate will ever remain in oblivion! Was it not a strong conviction of my sense of duty, the very thought of meeting any of them without intelligence would almost tempt me to another winter.

I remain,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) WM. PENNY.”

“ Captain H. T. Austin.”

*Endorsement in pencil.*

“ Rec<sup>d</sup> by Captain St. “Sophia,” the 11th August, Monday, at anchorage off Penny’s winter quarters, just before anchoring.”

332. *Chairman*.—You received that letter on the 11th of August?

*Captain Austin*.—Yes; it was received by me on the 11th of August.

333. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was that endorsement placed on it at the time?

*Captain Austin*.—Yes; it was not touched from that time until it was taken out on our return.

334. *Sir E. Parry*.—How do you account for the delay between the 4th of August, which date the letter bears, and the 11th of August when you received it?

*Captain Austin*.—My impression why I did not receive the letter for a week was, that the party intrusted with it could not reach me. There was an attempt on the part of Captain Penny to reach me at Griffith Island, although an engineer came from Captain Penny’s vessel after his return, and also after that again, the Esquimaux Adam Beck came over the ice. At the same time my first lieutenant who was on board Captain Penny’s ship did not come, and there was therefore considerable difficulty; that is to say, that the first

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lieutenant of the "Resolute" was on board the "Lady Franklin" when Captain Penny returned from his second trip. On the 11th of August I came to the winter quarters of Captain Penny; Captain Stewart was on board. I cannot trust my memory for details of my visit. Captain Stewart came on board. My belief is, he gave me that private note and also an official letter from Captain Penny with an outline chart. Why I say I believe this, is that it will be before you on record, and therefore that will determine it. It will be produced. This is the letter:—

"Her Majesty's Brig, Lady Franklin,  
 Assistance Bay, August 4, 1851.

"Sir,

"I forward an outline of search by the expedition under my charge. There are no traces of Her Majesty's ships 'Erebus' and 'Terror' further than a bit of English elm. As soon as I am at liberty I will come to Griffith Island and wait an interview.

I have the honour to be, Sir,  
 your most obedient servant,  
 WILLIAM PENNY."

"To Captain Horatio T. Austin, C.B.,  
 commanding Her Majesty's ship  
 'Resolute,' and the Expedition to the Arctic."

*Endorsement.*—"Received on the 11th of August, dated the 4th of August 1851, on the arrival of the 'Resolute' at the winter quarters of Captain Penny's Expedition."

*Captain Austin continued.*—Shortly after Captain Stewart delivered this letter Commander Phillips and the first lieutenant of the "Resolute" came on board the "Resolute." Shortly after anchoring Captain Penny came on board. Sir John Ross came on board; that is to say, Sir John Ross and Captain Penny were in my cabin of the "Resolute" together, as far as I believe; that is my impression. There was conversation going on between Captain Penny and myself and Sir John Ross, all connected with the search of the Wellington Channel, all connected with the service which was at our hearts, I believe. Captain Ommanney came on board. My impression is, that I could not reason with Captain Penny. I could not get anything that was satisfactory. It was a sort of rambling conversation of which I could make nothing. Sir John Ross and Captain Ommanney may recollect more of the affair than I can. This I am quite prepared to recollect, that when Captain Penny left the ship I went to the side and endeavoured in every possible way to be polite and attentive, and to cause him to be treated in the manner which his position demanded. I could not but say to Captain Ommanney, "Did you see Penny's conduct to me, is it not distressing?" I was pained in the extreme, but never mentioned the circumstance to any one but Captain Ommanney. Now with respect to the letter which I sent to Captain Penny, requiring him to state to me officially the result of his search for Sir John Franklin, the date of it was as follows:—

"Captain Austin to Captain W. Penny, Her Majesty's Brig 'Lady Franklin,' and in charge of an expedition searching for the expedition of Sir John Franklin.

"Her Majesty's ship 'Resolute,' off the Winter Quarters of Captain Penny's expedition, 11th August."

*Captain Austin continued.*—My belief is, that this letter was sent by my clerk to Captain Penny, Captain Ommanney remaining on board with me. Mr. Lewis was the clerk of the "Resolute." I cannot at this moment remember the hour, that is, whether Captain Ommanney and I dined first, but my impression is, that Captain Ommanney and I dined together from about three to four o'clock. My dinner hour was generally three, but of course in this service I took it when I required it to sustain me. Dinner being over, it was arranged that we should go and pay a complimentary visit to Captain Penny and Sir John Ross. We proceeded on board the "Lady Franklin," and in the cabin were assembled Captain Penny, Captain Stewart, Captain Ommanney, and myself. I said to Captain Penny, "Now, Penny, let us set aside all feeling," or words to that effect. "We are going home non-successful. Depend

upon it we shall be called upon closely," or words to that effect. "It is now necessary that we should take upon ourselves a certain amount of responsibility, and there must be a little official correspondence pass between you and me. You see that I have told you that I am satisfied, after mature consideration, with what has been done by my own officers, and it is now for you to tell me in some way what you think of your work," or words to that effect.

335. *Chairman*.—You state that you received an outline chart from Captain Penny communicating his discoveries. Did you communicate your exploring operations to him?

*Captain Austin*.—Directly after my exploring parties came in I sent to Sir John Ross and Captain Penny with a view of informing them of what had been done, and eliciting from them at the earliest opportunity what they had accomplished. The date of my communication was the 4th of July 1851.

336. *Chairman*.—How soon after that did you receive Captain Penny's outline chart?

*Captain Austin*.—I received it on the 11th of August.

*Captain Austin* continued.—Captain Penny then, I think, said, "Oh, I have answered that," and turned to the back of the cabin and gave me a letter. I opened the letter and found it was not at all an answer to the questions I put. He gave me the letter which he has now put in. Until I saw that letter here I forgot it, for I never noticed it in any other way than that I have mentioned.

The letter was as follows :

" Sir, Assistance Bay, 11th August 1851.

" I have this moment received your despatch. I beg to state that you have already my chart and expressed opinions; which I again send you in writing; i. e. that I have not found any trace otherwise than a bit of elm, which you have seen, and I only can judge when I see Wellington Channel what course I will then pursue.

" My orders are such as would not justify me in passing another winter in the Arctic seas.

" I have the honour to be, Sir,

" Your most obedient servant,

" WILLIAM PENNY."

" To Captain Austin,  
Her Majesty's ship 'Resolute,' and in charge  
of Her Majesty's expedition in search  
of Sir John Franklin."

*Captain Austin* continued.—I took this letter, and I said: "This is not a reply to my question;" and I believe I put it in my pocket. After reasoning a little Captain Penny became more cool; and I then took the letter out and said, "Well, I do not mean to say that if the Wellington Channel was opened, and I believe that two days would accomplish it, that I would not proceed up with a steamer and get some soundings, some angles and observations." But I said, "Penny, I will tell you what; if you will tell me, and give me from under your hand that you are satisfied with the work you have performed, I will not go up the Wellington Channel. Geography is not our object, and therefore I should tell you I am satisfied if you are satisfied; but if you give me this letter I must write to you again, and it will not be satisfactory before the public that we are altercating," or something to that effect. I am ready to declare that I gave that letter to Captain Penny again. I cannot say he was unwilling to receive it; I do not know. How I was able to maintain myself as an officer and a gentleman under the circumstances I cannot tell. I then said to Captain Penny, "Now reflect, as soon as you give me your answer you may rely upon it that I shall not look over your work, and you will then know what are my plans for the future." I then bade him good-bye, and went on board the "Felix." Sir John Ross had been kind enough to supply us with five tons of coals, and my anxiety to get them on board kept me there a little longer than I might otherwise have been. On returning to the ship I passed with Captain Ommanney under the stern of the "Lady Franklin." Captain Penny was on deck, and, I believe, kindly asked me to come on board. I said, "No, I thank you." Several of

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our officers were on board, and I think I said to Captain Ommanney, "All I want is his reply, and if we go on board it will only delay us. I have reasoned with him, and the sooner I get on board the better." I said to Captain Ommanney, "You must remain on board, because I shall have an answer to that letter, for till that comes not a word can I say as to what we are going to do." I must refer to some notes I made at that time. I waited up until midnight for Captain Penny's answer. Being much fagged, I went to bed. Captain Ommanney was on board the "Resolute" until midnight, when I requested him to go to his ship. Previous to going to bed I wrote a note to Captain Penny, most kindly, for an official answer. The substance is this:—first of all the note was very kindly written, appealing to Captain Penny as an active and energetic Arctic navigator for a reply to my official letter. I impressed upon his mind that the expedition I was charged with was lying in that bay in the midst of straggling ice. At that time I did not know but that I was going to remain out another winter. Up to that moment I meant to say that not a soul had any reason to expect that he was to go to England before I had a satisfactory answer from Captain Penny; therefore it was a very anxious moment for me from the time I came on board the "Resolute." At two o'clock on the morning of the 12th of August 1851 Captain Penny's reply came on board; at that time I was really too tired to get up and close my report. The following is Captain Penny's reply:—

"Sir,

Assistance Bay, 11th August 1851.

"Your question is easily answered. My opinion is, Wellington Channel requires no further search; all has been done in the power of man to accomplish, and no trace has been found. What else can be done?

"I have the honour to be,

"Your most obedient servant,

"WM. PENNY."

*Captain Austin continued.*—Shortly after the receipt of this letter the "Lady Franklin" and "Sophia" were making preparations to move. I sent a letter to Captain Penny, dated "Her Majesty's Ship 'Resolute,' off Captain Penny's Winter Quarters, 12th April 1851." It was as follows:

"Sir,

"I beg leave to acknowledge the receipt of your letter making known to me the result of the search in Wellington Strait by the expedition under your charge. I have now to inform you that I do not consider it necessary to prosecute (even if practicable) a further search in that direction, with the expedition under my orders. It is now my intention to proceed to attempt the search of Jones's Sound.

"I have the honour to be, Sir,

"Your obedient servant,

"HORATIO T. AUSTIN."

*Captain Austin continued.*—On sending this letter on board I sent also my compliments, I think by Mr. M'Dougall, the second master, with an offer to tow the brigs out by the steamers. I now closed the report for the Admiralty for Sir John Ross, and wrote to him privately, telling him my plans, with an offer to tow him in the "Felix." Sir John Ross closed, and he was taken in tow, and proceeded, the "Sophia" and "Lady Franklin" having previously sailed out. We proceeded to the eastward, the wind being very light. We came up with the "Lady Franklin" and "Sophia," and I went on board the "Lady Franklin" with my report, and an outline chart accompanying it, showing the proceeding of the expedition under my care.

337. *Sir E. Parry.*—In Captain Penny's letter to you of the 11th of August 1851, and put into your hand that day by him in the cabin of the "Lady Franklin," he speaks of his chart, and expressed opinions, which he again sends you in writing; now I want to know what opinions those were that Captain Penny had before expressed to you?

*Captain Austin.*—I suppose it refers to Captain Penny's letter of the 4th of August 1851, addressed to me, and received on the 11th of August.



338. *Sir E. Parry*.—Previously to Captain Penny putting that letter into your hands on the 11th of August, had he ever expressed an opinion to you that you ought to go up Wellington Strait?

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*Captain Austin*.—Never, to the best of my belief.

339. *Sir E. Parry*.—Can you conjecture what Captain Penny meant by the following expression in his letter of the 11th of August put into your hand:—“and I only can judge, when I see Wellington Channel, what course I will then pursue?”

*Captain Austin*.—No, not any more than I can of much more that passed in conversation between Captain Penny and myself.

*Captain Austin* continued.—I came up to the “Lady Franklin” and “Sophia,” and went on board with my chart and report to the secretary of the Admiralty. Captain Ommanney joined. I was most guarded in what I said and did. Captain Penny was quite dissatisfied. He said something about,—had I not heard or understood from some of my officers that had we not got clear, meaning of our frozen-in position, he intended waiting until the 13th of August for us. I replied, Certainly it had never been intimated to me, but I was quite satisfied he would have been ready to help us if he could. In the presence of Captain Ommanney I said, “Penny, I suppose it would be a bad compliment to ask you if we can give you anything,” meaning provisions or anything of that sort, “although I cannot say we are off,” meaning going home. He expressed something in reply, which I do not recollect; but his manner was so unpleasant that I cannot recollect what he said. After trying to be civil, and getting his letter, I took my leave.

340. *Chairman*.—You are aware of the evidence which Captain Penny gave the day before yesterday?

*Captain Austin*.—Yes, I was present during his examination.

341. *Chairman*.—Captain Beechey asked Captain Penny whether, on the 11th of August, he said to you “Go up there (Wellington Channel), and do the “cause some service?” Referring to Captain Penny’s examination, will you admit that that conversation passed between him and you, as there stated; and that he asked you for a steamer to go up the Wellington Channel, and that the last words he used to you were “Go up there, and do the cause some “service?”

*Captain Austin*.—No such thing, or any thing like it, was ever expressed.

342. *Chairman*.—Was anybody present at the time you were conversing with Captain Penny on that occasion?

*Captain Austin*.—Yes, Captain Ommanney, and my own boat’s crew, but none of Captain Penny’s officers, of whom I was anxious to take leave.

343. *Sir E. Parry*.—Captain Penny in his evidence has made use of these words:—“The last thing I said was, Go up into Wellington Channel, and you will do good service to the cause.” This was on the morning of the 12th of August. Do you admit that Captain Penny said those words to you?

*Captain Austin*.—I declare he did not do so.

345. *Captain Beechey*.—Captain Penny states also, “On the 11th of August “I told Captain Austin that the Strait ought to be better examined, meaning “Wellington Channel, and that if he would give me a steamer I would go up “there.” Did he say that?

*Captain Austin*.—No, never.

346. *Captain Austin* continued.—I received a sealed letter from Captain Penny for transmission, addressed, I believe, to the Secretary of the Admiralty. I took my leave, and towed Sir John Ross up to Beechey Island. I went on with Sir John Ross, taking some supplies for him. I wished to keep him in tow, but he desired particularly to go on in the neighbourhood of Beechey Island. I then cast him off, and proceeded.

The Committee then adjourned.



*Fourth Day. October 30, 1851.*

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles, C.B., M.P., Chairman,  
Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,  
Captain Sir Edward Parry,  
Captain F. W. Beechey,  
Captain Sir George Back,  
Mr. F. J. Fegen, Secretary.

On the assembling of the Committee this morning,  
*The Chairman*, addressing Captain Penny, said,—The Committee have looked over the corrections you have made in your printed evidence, and they think that some of them are so extensive that they could not allow them to stand in that way without confusion to the examination generally. It will be open to you to offer any explanations you may think proper, and they will be added to the printed report.

CAPTAIN AUSTIN'S examination resumed.

*Captain Austin*  
30th Oct. 1851  
— — — — —

346. *The Chairman to Captain Austin*.—Will you now continue your narrative from the point at which we broke off yesterday until the period at which you determined to return to England?

*Captain Austin*.—Without having had an opportunity of examining the printed evidence of yesterday, I feel that I could not enter into a continuous detailed narrative from memory, and I therefore beg to refer you to my official report to the Admiralty, dated at anchor off Winterton, 30th September 1851, for all my explanations on that part of the subject. I put it in as a narrative of my further proceedings, this report being brought down to my arrival off Winterton.

347. *Chairman*.—Very well; then we must proceed to examine you upon the different points. If you look to paragraph 46 of your despatch to the Admiralty, dated the 12th of August 1851, off the winter quarters of Captain Penny's expedition, you use the following words:—"Having yesterday been released from our winter quarters, and most unexpectedly reached to those of Captain Penny, I have now the honour to state, that having maturely considered the directions and extent of the search (without success) that has been made by this expedition, and weighed the opinions of the officers when at their extremes, I have arrived at the conclusion that the expedition under Sir John Franklin did not prosecute the object of its mission to the southward and westward of Wellington Strait; and having communicated with Captain Penny, and fully considered his official reply to my letter relative to the search of Wellington Strait by the expedition under his charge (unhappily without success), I do not feel authorized to prosecute (even if practicable) a further search in those directions." Will you state your reasons for determining that, even if practicable, you did not feel authorized to prosecute any further search in those directions?

*Captain Austin*.—My feeling was that Captain Penny, being the leader of an expedition authorized by the Admiralty, having expressed to me, officially, as well as verbally, that all the search that could be made had been made

*Captain Austin.*  
 30th Oct. 1851.

without any traces, I considered that I was not justified in going over ground again that I had every reason to believe had been well searched by a person as responsible to his country as I was; and again, that in navigating such regions as we were then in, that there was not time to deliberate and defer. I felt that there was only one other step, which was to proceed in what I considered the further execution of my orders, being satisfied that everything had been done that could be done in the other direction,—to proceed in the direction of Jones's Sound. I refer to the orders which were given to Sir James Ross, a copy of which was sent to me for my guidance and instruction by an Admiralty letter, which called especial attention to Sir James Ross's orders. The orders to Sir James Ross were as follows:—

“ Sir,

Admiralty, 15th May 1849.

“ Herewith you will receive a copy of the instructions which have been delivered to the commanding officer of the ‘North Star,’ together with a complete set of the printed papers referred to in those instructions. From the former you will see that, judging from the lateness of your arrival in Lancaster Sound, and your instructions to Captain Bird in your memorandum of 12th February 1848, there is every probability of the ‘Investigator’ returning to England this summer, and it being, in the opinion of the Lords of the Admiralty, most inexpedient that you should be left to prosecute the search with the ‘Enterprise’ only, and with the possible contingency of your having to receive on board of her the whole of Sir John Franklin's party, the ‘North Star’ has been equipped for the double purpose of preventing the return of the ‘Investigator,’ and of furnishing the ships under your orders with the necessary supplies for the continuance of your search during the summer of 1850. The orders given to the ‘North Star’ will furnish you with their Lordships opinion as to the quarter and direction in which they think it desirable the search for Sir John Franklin's party should be prosecuted, especially in the Wellington Channel and Prince Regent's Inlet, as well as in Jones's and Smith's Sounds, and their wishes in that respect, on the perusal of these orders, may appear to you to be more extended than those expressed in their original instructions to yourself. My Lords are aware that no pains or exertions will be spared by you to carry out these views to the utmost; but they cannot too strongly urge upon you the necessity of using all your judgment and ability to prevent your ships being detained the winter of 1850 in the ice, to the imminent hazard of the people under your command. It will be needless in this communication to revert to the steps now taken for replenishing your ships,—the papers accompanying this will put you in possession of all that has been done in that respect and the grounds on which those steps have been taken,—and it is equally unnecessary to repeat their Lordships anxious desire for your welfare and success. They would, however, take this occasion to assure you of their entire confidence in your ability to conduct a service to which such increasing and universal interest is attached.

“ I am, Sir,

your obedient servant,

(Signed) W. A. B. HAMILTON.”

348. *Chairman.*—You see your attention was directed in the first place to the Wellington Strait as well as to Jones's Sound. Will you explain why the examination of Wellington Strait was not further prosecuted when you joined Captain Penny at that time, and when you had heard from him that open water had been found above the Strait?

*Captain Austin.*—I think I have answered that.

349. *Chairman.*—You have stated in your last despatch to the Admiralty that you did not feel authorized to examine the Wellington Strait further. You were directed to attend to these instructions of Sir James Ross which included Wellington Channel as well as Jones's Sound. Be good enough to explain this?

*Captain Austin.*—Looking to the position of Captain Penny as the responsible leader of an expedition, I think I discharged my duty.

350. *Chairman.*—The instructions to Sir James Ross having comprehended the search of the Wellington Strait, why did you not, being off that strait on the

12th of August, proceed to the further examination of the barrier which prevented the search?

*Captain Austin.*—I went across the barrier. Wellington Strait was ablock when I passed it.

*Captain Austin.*

30th Oct. 1851.

351. *Chairman.*—Did you go up yourself and see the barrier of ice?

*Captain Austin.*—I did not go up for the purpose of examining it; but the strait was blocked up when I passed in 1851.

352. *Chairman.*—Why did you not examine the barrier for the purpose of ascertaining whether it was likely to give way, and the Wellington Strait to become navigable during the season of 1851?

*Captain Austin.*—My conviction was on crossing the Wellington Strait that there was a considerable barrier of fixed ice in that strait as well as a large quantity of ice in a state of disruption, consisting of large floe pieces and pressed up; and this generally was the state of the ice in Wellington Strait, as far as the eye could see from the crow's nest. On this subject I put in the report of two officers I sent to the crow's nest, the position of the ship being at that time (11th August 1851) a little to the northward of Barlow Inlet. The reports of these two officers are as follow:—

“As far as the eye can reach from the crow's nest, the Wellington Strait is filled with ice, consisting of large floe pieces and loose and pressed-up ice; the whole of it appears to be detached from the land, and lanes of water stretch across from side to side.

“To the eastward, Barrow Strait is quite clear of ice, right across so far as can be seen.

“To the southward, also, there is a great deal of water mixed with the ice.  
(Signed) ROBERT C. ALLEN, Master.”

“In compliance with your request that I should observe from the crow's nest the state of the ice to the northward of us whilst crossing Wellington Channel, I have to report that at 1.30. p.m. I went aloft to examine, and observed large floes and quantities of loose sailing ice in the centre and body of the channel, and a continued floe from side to side as far as the eye could reach, about 10 or 12 miles up, rendering it perfectly unnavigable at the present time, and apparently likely to continue so some weeks to come.

(Signed) ROBERT D. ALDRICH, Lieutenant.”

353. *Chairman.*—State what was the position of the ship at that time; whether it was half way across the strait, or a third, or two thirds, or how? *Vide chart, position marked A.*

*Captain Austin.*—I have marked on the chart what I consider to have been about the position of the ship at the time these observations were made.

354. *Sir E. Parry.*—The report of Mr. Allen states that the whole of the ice in Wellington Strait appears to be detached from the land, and lanes of water stretched across from side to side. Do you understand by that, that it was navigable?

*Captain Austin.*—No; nor do I consider that it was so.

355. *Captain Beechey.*—What was the direction of the wind?

*Captain Austin.*—At the time of the report the wind was light, and from the northward, but increased rather as we neared Beechey Island from the northward.

356. *Captain Beechey.*—Then by packed ice we are not to understand that it was fast ice?

*Captain Austin.*—No. For a certain distance I think it was fast ice. I did not consider that the distance of the disrupted ice was for more than three or four miles.

357. *Captain Beechey.*—Then you did not consider that the further examination of the state of the ice in Wellington Channel of sufficient importance to induce you to search the lanes of the water reported to you by Mr. Allen?

*Captain Austin.*—I did not, as I saw and judged for myself.

*Captain Austin.*  
 30th Oct. 1851.

358. *Sir G. Back.*—You say that the wind was from the northward at the time you went towards Becchey Island. Did the ice drift past you to the south?

*Captain Austin.*—I cannot say I observed it. My impression is that the ice was generally connected with the ice in Barrow Straits, and that in getting across we were navigating through ice. So that there was a pack of moving ice some distance to the southward of the entrance of Wellington Channel. I am not prepared to say that the ice was in motion any way. If it was it was not considerable.

359. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Have you any report of the state of the ice in Wellington Channel in 1851 from the officers of any of the other vessels under your command?

*Captain Austin.*—I have no report from any officer, except those of the master and first lieutenant of the ship I commanded, as to the state of the ice in Wellington Channel in 1851. The "Felix," with Sir John Ross, was in tow at the stern of the "Resolute," having on board a most experienced arctic navigator, Mr. Abernethy; as was the "Assistance" following in tow of the "Intrepid."

360. *Sir E. Parry.*—From your experience of steam vessels in the navigation amongst the ice, are you of opinion that such vessels afford the power of continuing the navigation later in the season than the sailing vessels?

*Captain Austin.*—Yes, when separated from the sailing vessels.

361. *Sir E. Parry.*—How much later?

*Captain Austin.*—For a short time; depending on temperature.

362. *Sir E. Parry.*—At about how low a temperature would you say they might continue to navigate?

*Captain Austin.*—I think I can state that by referring to my documents, which are not here at present. One day may make the most important difference; and, as a proof of this, when the American expedition bore up from us I observed to Captain Ommanney, who came on board, that I very much doubted whether that expedition would be able to reach America this year, on account of the sudden changes that were taking place with regard to the formation of the bay ice.

363. *Sir E. Parry.*—With what thickness of young ice, according to your experience, could the steamers you had succeed in navigating those seas?

*Captain Austin.*—To answer that question satisfactorily I must refer to documents which I have not here; but I may observe, that there is scarcely such a thing as one plain sheet of bay ice to be met with in the course of a few hours navigation.

364. *Sir E. Parry.*—For how many days later in the season of 1850 could your steamers pursue the navigation with safety beyond the time that your sailing vessels could?

*Captain Austin.*—As far as my impression at present goes, a very few days; but on reference to my notes, which I have not got here, I hope to be able to answer that question more satisfactorily.

365. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—After the diligent examination of the shores of the Wellington Channel, made and reported to you by Captain Penny and his officers, and of the coast about Cape Walker and Melville Island, by your own officers, and the statement of your conclusion that Sir John Franklin did not proceed to the southward and westward of the Wellington Strait, what opinion did you form as to the best course to be pursued for the rescue of the missing expedition?

*Captain Austin.*—I had not the slightest hope of a rescue. Looking to my orders, there appeared to be something left undone. Captain Penny not having searched Jones's Sound for which service he was equipped I proceeded there, although, I am free to admit, with scarcely a hope.

366. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did you entertain at that time any conviction that Sir John Franklin had passed through Wellington Strait and the channel to the north-west of it?

*Captain Austin.*—I did not.

367. *Chairman*.—We are directed by the Admiralty to inquire into your opinion as to the conduct of the officers and men under your command. Was their conduct satisfactory, or have you any exceptions to make? *Captain Austin*  
30th Oct. 1851.

*Captain Austin*.—As regards that question I have to refer in reply to my report already made to the Admiralty, dated 30th September 1851.

368. *Captain Beechey*.—In your despatch to the Admiralty you say that you had weighed well the opinions of the officers at their extremes. Did you call upon the officers for their opinions as regarded a further search?

*Captain Austin*.—No.

369. *Captain Beechey*.—Did they give you their opinions?

*Captain Austin*.—I am under the impression that I alluded to their journals.

370. *Captain Beechey*.—But had you the journals at that time?

*Captain Austin*.—Yes. I had the substance of their journals directly they arrived.

371. *Captain Beechey*.—After you quitted the country, did you call upon the officers to give you any opinion as to whether you should continue the search, or to proceed to England?

*Captain Austin*.—No.

372. *Captain Beechey*.—Then what do you allude to in your despatch?

*Captain Austin*.—These allusions must be to the official opinions of the officers, stated in their reports of their proceedings to me during their travels.

373. *Captain Beechey*.—Did they report their opinions to you in writing?

*Captain Austin*.—Yes.

374. *Captain Beechey*.—Then you allude to those reports?

*Captain Austin*.—Yes; and in general conversation with the superior officers of the expedition. My firm belief is that they were convinced that nothing more was to be done in the direction that I have stated myself.

375. *Captain Beechey*.—You say, “I much regret that our remaining strength did not admit of my placing at the disposal of Captain Penny sufficient aid to convey a boat to ascertain its nature and extent,” alluding to the water discovered in the Queen’s Channel. Why did you feel that you had not the power of placing these means at his disposal?

*Captain Austin*.—In consequence of the number of persons absent, and of those who remained being appointed as succour to those who were away, I could not afford him any assistance.

376. *Captain Beechey*.—Had you been applied to on or previous to the 23d of May 1851 by Captain Penny for a boat?

*Captain Austin*.—No, certainly not.

377. *Captain Beechey*.—By being applied to by Captain Penny, I mean had he sent any message to you by any other person to the same effect?

*Captain Austin*.—No.

378. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—During the co-operation between the two expeditions did you at any time decline any application of Captain Penny or his officers for aid or assistance?

*Captain Austin*.—Never. On the contrary, I have rendered every assistance in my power. I have towed Captain Penny’s brigs through the ice, and have at other times given aid whenever I could do it in the execution of my orders.

379. *Sir G. Back*.—In answer to a question from the Chairman, Whether Captain Penny had at that time explained to you that a search should be made higher in Wellington Straits, Captain Penny afterwards says, “I asked him for a steamer, and he refused me that steamer to go up.” Was that the case?

*Captain Austin*.—No.

380. *Chairman*.—You have read two letters from Captain Penny to the Admiralty which appear on page 47, No. 21., dated September 15th, 1851, and the other at page 50, dated 10th October 1851. In the first of these letters Captain Penny makes the following statement:—“I stated verbally to Captain Austin that it was my conviction that Sir John Franklin had gone through the strait



*Captain Austin.*  
 30th Oct. 1851.

leading north-west out of Wellington Channel (which I have for the present named Queen Victoria Channel), and that he had gone off in clear water, and that he was beyond our reach. I meant, of course, beyond the reach of my parties and my means. He did not seem disposed to credit my statement. I begged him to give me one of his steamers, and I would take the "Sophia" and would act as pilot, and go up the Channel, and wait to see if the ice would clear away." Now what is your explanation of that?

*Captain Austin.*—There was a sort of rambling conversation, but certainly not to the effect that Sir John Franklin had gone there, but that if he had gone there he was out of our reach. It was a rambling conversation that I never thought worthy of consideration. This I declare, that Captain Penny never asked me for a steamer, nor did he ever assert to me that Sir John Franklin had gone away in clear water.

381. *Chairman.*—Turn to page 50, No. 29., Captain Penny to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 10th of October 1851. You abide by your former answer that Captain Penny did not ask you for a steamer which he would pilot out?

*Captain Austin.*—Yes, I abide by that answer, most certainly.

382. *Chairman.*—Did he say to you, when you were separating, and you were going up Jones's Sound, "Go up Wellington Channel, and you will do the cause some service?"

*Captain Austin.*—No.

383. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Your orders called upon you to renew your search in the open season of 1851, connected with your return to England in that year. Was it your conviction, from your own observation; and all the reports you had received at the time of quitting Wellington Channel, that every hope of rescuing the missing expedition in that direction was past, and that therefore delay was useless?

*Captain Austin.*—My impression was, that there was no hope of a rescue in any way; and further, that not to have returned forthwith might have led to a detention of the expedition another winter.

384. *Chairman.*—Nothing particular occurred, as we understand, during your passage from Cape Riley to Jones's Sound?

*Captain Austin.*—Not anything.

385. *Chairman.*—Will you state to the Committee what your proceedings were in the execution of that part of your instructions?

*Captain Austin.*—On this subject I again refer to my report to the Lords of the Admiralty, which gives an account of my proceedings in reference to my labours in the north of Baffin's Bay, dated 30th September 1851, at anchor off Winterton, Norfolk.

*Capt. Ommanney.* CAPTAIN OMMANNEY, late of Her Majesty's Ship "Assistance,"  
 called.

386. *Chairman.*—Have you read Captain Austin's despatches to the Admiralty, containing a full report of his proceedings, dated the 12th of August 1851 and the 30th of September 1851?

*Captain Ommanney.*—Yes, I have read them.

387. *Chairman.*—Do you concur in opinion, that they contain a full and correct report of the expedition during the time you were second in command?

*Captain Ommanney.*—Yes, I consider them perfectly correct.

388. *Chairman.*—As far as you know of the reports of the exploring parties during the spring of 1851, under the command of the different officers of the squadron, do you consider them correct?

*Captain Ommanney.*—Yes.

389. *Chairman.*—The point to which the Committee chiefly direct their attention at this moment is grounded on letters of Captain Penny which will be put before you; the first is dated the 12th of April 1851; the next, the 8th of September 1851; the next the 15th of September 1851; and there are

some subsequent ones, which I need not now recapitulate. Have you read all that correspondence? *Capt. Ommanney.*

*Captain Ommanney.*—No, I have not read it.

30th Oct. 1851.

390. *Chairman.*—Were you on board the “Resolute” on the 23d of May of this year, when Captain Penny reached that ship, and made known to Captain Austin that he had discovered a large space of water above Wellington Strait?

*Captain Ommanney.*—No, I was travelling at that time.

391. *Chairman.*—At what time did you return?

*Captain Ommanney.*—On the 14th of June.

392. *Chairman.*—What was the first communication from Captain Penny to Captain Austin on the subject of the discovery of open water above Wellington Strait that came under your own personal knowledge and observation?

*The Chairman* here mentioned that he had received a note from Captain Penny, objecting to Captain Austin being present during Captain Ommanney’s examination, to which the Chairman replied that this objection had been already anticipated by the Committee, and that they had determined that Captain Austin had a right to be present during the examination of his officers.

*Captain Ommanney.* (In reply to the Chairman’s question.)—On my return to the ship on the 14th of June I was informed that Captain Penny had reached Baillie Hamilton, and the adjacent islands, that he had found a considerable space of water there, and had consequently returned to his vessel with a view of taking a boat up there.

393. *Chairman.*—Are you aware of his having asked for any assistance from Captain Austin at that time?

*Captain Ommanney.*—No, I never heard of it.

394. *Chairman.*—When did you see Captain Penny first after he had returned from his exploring expeditions above Wellington Strait?

*Captain Ommanney.*—I had no opportunity of seeing Captain Penny until we all broke out of our winter quarters, when the expedition repaired to Assistance Bay on the 11th of August.

395. *Chairman.*—Will you state what took place at that time with respect to any report or communication made by Captain Penny on the subject of his discoveries?

*Captain Ommanney.*—We anchored in Assistance Bay about 2.30 p.m. on the 11th of August, when we were glad to find Captain Penny’s expedition and Sir John Ross’s were free from the ice, ready to go to sea. As soon as the ship was secured, I went on board the “Resolute” to wait upon Captain Austin, as is customary in the service. I found that Captain Penny had been there some time before me; so I understood from Captain Austin. I went down in the cabin, and Captain Penny showed me his chart. We had some conversation, congratulating each other on what we had done, or something to that effect. Captain Austin came down afterwards,—followed me almost. They (Captain Penny and Captain Austin) entered into a long conversation; the subject referring generally to what Captain Penny had seen, and the navigation. I cannot remember the exact words that transpired; but I will, if you please, read from my notes, made at the time, the substance of what I gathered on the 11th August 1850. “Our further operations now depended upon the opinion of Captain Penny respecting the necessity of a further search into the straits discovered by him during his search. The ship being secured I proceeded to the ‘Resolute’ to wait upon Captain Austin, and found Captain Penny with him giving an account of his search and opinions respecting the necessity of prosecuting it in the direction of his discovery. His firm conviction was, that there was nothing to justify the risk of incurring another winter,—expressed his great anxiety to act in concert, and requested that one of his brigs might accompany a steamer if it was requisite to make a further examination. Captain Penny did not consider the straits a safe navigation for any vessel, a strong current of five and a half miles per hour setting between the islands (Baillie Hamilton and the adjacent islands), which narrowed the straits to small passages.\* The

*Capt. Ommanney.* " islands abound with wild fowl. Penny examined the shores of them most  
 30th Oct. 1851. " thoroughly, without meeting a trace. Penny could hardly suppose it pos-  
 " sible that Sir John Franklin's expedition could have gone by those islands  
 " without meeting some traces or record of their progress. Penny picked up  
 " a piece of elm; one side of it had been painted lead colour, the other side  
 " was bleached by exposure. Captain Penny could not state decidedly to  
 " Captain Austin whether it was his opinion that a further examination was  
 " required, but stated that even if there was clear water he would not extend  
 " his search up the Wellington Channel beyond the 20th of August. He  
 " was also of opinion, that from the accumulation, and from there being a  
 " barrier of ice extending across the Wellington Straits, they would not be  
 " clear of ice this year." These were the only remarks I took down at the  
 time that were impressed upon my memory.

396. *Chairman.*—Did you hear Captain Penny use any expression tending to urge a further search of the open sea in the Wellington Strait, or express an opinion to Captain Austin that Sir John Franklin had gone that way?

*Captain Ommanney.*—No, decidedly not; I never heard anything of the sort from him.

397. *Chairman.*—Had you an opportunity yourself of seeing the state of the ice in Wellington Strait in 1851,—I mean at the time you were crossing from your own winter quarters to the eastern side of the straits?

*Captain Ommanney.*—Yes, I saw the ice on crossing it, and observed it attentively.

398. *Chairman.*—What opinion did you form at that time?

*Captain Ommanney.*—On crossing the Wellington Strait it was full of very extensive floes, close along the western shores up to Cape Hotham, quite impenetrable, in my opinion. I could not have got to Barlow Inlet if I had wished to do so. On passing round the edge of the ice to cross the channel, I remarked that we went considerably to the southward of what we had done the previous year; that was on account of the ice extending seven or eight miles further southward than it had done in September 1850. As we approached the eastern shores of the straits, making across to Cape Riley, there was more water on that side. Union Bay was full of ice, but there was a considerable quantity of water extending to Point Innes, at which point, in my opinion, the ice packed close into the land. This occurred on the 12th of August 1851. I was aloft myself in crossing the channel on that day, for the purpose of ascertaining the nature of the ice; and I called the second lieutenant up (Mr. Elliott) to bear witness to what I saw on that occasion,—the extensive floes with which the channel was filled.

399. *Chairman.*—Then it was your opinion that the fast ice at that time rendered the Wellington Strait impossible to navigate?

*Captain Ommanney.*—At that time we certainly could not have proceeded to the northward.

400. *Chairman.*—Was there any appearance of the ice breaking up before the close of the season, so as to render Wellington Strait navigable?

*Captain Ommanney.*—The changes are so very sudden that such a thing might have happened.

401. *Chairman.*—In putting the question I only speak of reasonable expectations?

*Captain Ommanney.*—There was sufficient time for such a thing to have happened between that and the close of the navigation season. At the same time, I could not say positively, unless I had gone to the northward.

402. *Chairman.*—If you had been in command of the expedition, should you have thought it your duty to wait, and until what period, in the hope that if the barrier broke up,—in the event of your having been convinced that further search ought to be made in that direction?

*Captain Ommanney.*—Had I been convinced that further search was necessary, I should have held on to the very last, and made up my mind to pass another winter.

403. *Chairman.*—What was the impression you received yourself from the information that had been communicated by Captain Penny?

*Captain Ommanney.*—After the receipt of Captain Penny's letter to Captain

Austin I did not trouble my head further about it, the answer was so satisfactory. The letter I allude to is No. 5, dated 11th of August 1851. I agreed with Captain Austin that we were satisfied with Captain Penny's opinion. *Capt. Ommanney.*  
30th Oct. 1851.

404. *Chairman.*—What was your view of that answer?

*Captain Ommanney.*—I considered it perfectly satisfactory.

405. *Chairman.*—In what respect satisfactory? I suppose you had been in doubt whether the search ought to be continued or not. What effect would that communication have had upon your mind?

*Captain Ommanney.*—I certainly should place every reliance on Captain Penny's opinion. The construction that I put upon it was, that nothing was to be done, either by the one or the other expedition.

406. *Chairman.*—Are you aware of a further communication from Captain Penny to Captain Austin, dated the 4th of August, and received by Captain Austin on the 11th?

*Mr. Fegan*, the Secretary to the Committee, read the letter alluded to by the Chairman. *Vide ante, p. 33.*  
*Ans. 331.*

407. *Chairman.*—Had you any previous knowledge of that letter?

*Captain Ommanney.*—Yes; that is one of those which Captain Austin showed me.

408. *Chairman.* Would that have corroborated the impression that the letter dated the 11th of August had already given you as to the prosecution of the search above Wellington Strait?

*Captain Ommanney.*—I consider that it does corroborate that opinion; the opinion, I mean, that nothing more was to be done.

409. *Chairman.*—What do you consider to be the close of the navigable season in those seas?

*Captain Ommanney.*—From the 15th to the 20th of September.

410. *Chairman.*—How soon do you think,—if the strait broke up at all,—it would have broken up after the 12th of August, when you left it all fast?

*Captain Ommanney.*—There was such a space of water then in Barrow's Straits, that any day, any hour almost, might have effected a great change. Changes are so sudden that we can never tell when they are likely to come about. Watching for these changes is a constant source of anxiety when navigating.

411. *Captain Beechey.*—Captain Penny says, in one of his letters to Captain Austin, "My opinion is, that Wellington Channel requires no further search." What do you suppose him to mean when he says Wellington Channel? *Mr. Penny to Captain Austin,*  
11th August 1851.

*Captain Ommanney.*—I suppose he alludes to the whole of Wellington Channel, described by Captain Penny, because I consider that that was the portion where Captain Penny had been, for that part had formed the subject of conversation on the 11th of August,—more especially the open water.

412. *Captain Beechey.*—You do think Captain Penny would have limited that to the narrow part of the channel merely, in the chart produced as Wellington Channel?

*Captain Ommanney.*—No; that never entered my mind.

413. *Captain Beechey.*—You said you founded your opinion of the state of the ice in Wellington Channel from what Captain Penny had said. What had he said, to your knowledge?

*Captain Ommanney.*—In the conversation he said to Captain Austin that even if he wished to go up this year he did not think that barrier would clear away. I heard that in the course of the conversation on the 11th of August 1851.

414. *Sir E. Parry.*—Was Captain Austin in the habit of communicating freely to you his views and intentions with respect to the service in which you were engaged?

*Captain Ommanney.*—Yes, at all times.

*Capt. Ommanney.*

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415. *Sir E. Parry.*—Were you aware of Captain Austin's reason for relinquishing further search, either in the direction of Cape Walker and Melville Island, or in the north-west route by Wellington Channel?

*Captain Ommanney.*—From the previous reports of the officers under his command, and the report of Captain Penny.

416. *Sir E. Parry.*—What was your own individual impression at that time as to the probable route which Sir John Franklin's expedition had pursued in 1846?

*Captain Ommanney.*—There are two opinions which I hold, and have always held. In the event of its having been an extraordinary clear season, and very much favoured, he may have got through Captain Penny's Queen's Channel, to a position difficult of access; or the ships may have foundered on their way to England. The latter was a very general opinion in both expeditions.

417. *Sir G. Back.*—In that case do you consider that the coast from Ponds Bay up to the Beechey Island had been sufficiently examined to look for any relics?

*Captain Ommanney.*—It would require to walk the whole beach to do that.

418. *Captain Beechey.*—Had any piles of stones been erected on the coast to attract attention, as is the case in such expeditions, would you have seen them?

*Captain Ommanney.*—Yes. From Cape Warrender to Beechey Island I passed sufficiently near to that coast to have seen a top-gallant mast had it been lying there. I was never without the glass from hand to eye the whole time, and officers were directed to keep a look out.

419. *Captain Beechey.*—Were you present on the 11th or 12th of August when Captain Penny took his leave of Captain Austin? Did you hear Captain Penny say to Captain Austin, "Go up Wellington Channel, and you will do the cause some service"?

*Captain Ommanney.*—I never heard such an expression.

420. *Sir G. Back.*—You were present on that occasion when they parted?

*Captain Ommanney.*—Yes, I was.

421. *Captain Beechey.*—Was anybody else present?

*Captain Ommanney.*—No. Captain Penny was walking up and down the deck. Captain Austin went on board, for the purpose, I presume, of taking leave. I went and joined them there for the same object. The expression alluded to I never heard.

422. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—You were walking the "Lady Franklin's" quarter deck when the conversation between Captain Penny and Captain Austin took place?

*Captain Ommanney.*—Yes.

423. *Captain Beechey.*—Then did you hear what took place in the boat alongside on that occasion, or did you ever hear Captain Penny say to Captain Austin at any time, "Go up Wellington Channel, and you will do the cause some service"?

*Captain Ommanney.*—Never.

424. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you ever hear him say to Captain Austin, about that time, August 12th, That strait ought to be better searched, meaning Queen's Channel, and that if he would give him a steamer he would go up?

*Captain Ommanney.*—I never heard him say that.

425. *Captain Beechey.*—Do you happen to know that he did say that?

*Captain Ommanney.*—No. I think Captain Austin, who was in the habit of communicating to me almost everything that anybody told him, would have informed me of this if it had been the case.

426. *Sir E. Parry.*—When Captain Penny's expedition parted from yours, had you any impression on your mind that Captain Penny had expressed an opinion to Captain Austin, that he, Captain Austin, ought to take further measures then for the examination of Wellington Strait, and the channels connected therewith?

*Captain Ommanney.*—I had no such impression.

427. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you think it possible that such a communication could have been made by Captain Penny to Captain Austin without your being aware of it? *Capt. Ommanney.*  
30th Oct. 1851.

*Captain Ommanney*.—I do not think it possible. I am quite sure, if such a communication had been made, Captain Austin would have told me. If such a communication had been made, Captain Austin knew that I was ready to go. I said I was ready to go up with steamers as soon as Captain Penny gave his opinion. I was ready to go at any time Captain Austin wished. Captain Austin and I had frequently talked about going up with the steamers when we met Penny, should it be considered desirable.

428. *Sir G. Back*.—Did it ever occur to you that there was any misunderstanding existing between Captain Penny and Captain Austin?

*Captain Ommanney*.—Yes. Captain Austin told me so himself on my return from travelling, that there had been some misunderstanding. I believe Captain Penny was on a visit to Captain Austin, and went away hastily. Captain Austin told me, and the other officers informed me of it also. Captain Penny was invited to dinner on board the "Assistance." He came at midnight to my officers and asked to be excused, as he wished to return to his ships. The reason was unknown, but it was supposed there was some difference between him and Captain Austin. Captain Austin's subsequent visit to Captain Penny was with a view of effecting a reconciliation. That is all I know about it.

429. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you examine Cape Riley and the circles of stones on it?

*Captain Ommanney*.—Yes; I discovered the first traces there on the 23d August 1850.

430. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—So completely to satisfy yourself that no record was left there of the missing expedition?

*Captain Ommanney*.—Perfectly so. I spent some hours there myself several officers with me, for the purpose of finding records, but all in vain; and on the 24th of August 1850 I sent Mr. McClintock from the ship with a party of men for the purpose of digging out any place where he might possibly find anything.

431. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Were you also present at an examination at the winter quarters of Sir John Franklin at Beechey Island?

*Captain Ommanney*.—On the 23d of August 1850, after the search of Cape Riley, we proceeded across the bay to Beechey Island for the purpose of examining a cairn that we had seen on the summit, fully convinced that it contained some records which would throw a light on the relics I had found. We had some difficulty in pressing the steamer through the ice. After great exertion we proceeded through to the west side of Beechey Island. On first landing we pulled up a piece of rope which had become firmly fixed in the ground, and found a few preserved meat tins. We then all ascended to the summit, racing almost, so eager were we to see what the cairn contained. On reaching it it was carefully pulled down. In the upper stone of this cairn, in the hollow part of it, were contained some loose shot. We removed it carefully stone by stone to the very ground without seeing anything. With pickaxes we dug as far as we could, as the ground was very hard; afterwards placed a record, and rebuilt the cairn.

432. *Captain Beechey*.—How far away from the centre of the cairn did you dig?

*Captain Ommanney*.—Immediately under.

433. *Captain Beechey*.—You are aware that it was an arrangement of Sir John Franklin, in another expedition, to bury his information at a distance from the pile. Did you dig in any direction from it?

*Captain Ommanney*.—I did not know of such an arrangement. We walked round about the cairn for some distance, carefully examining the ground. After we had spent the whole of the day in searching Cape Riley and Beechey Island, a change took place in the ice; the wind had shifted northwards, and the ice was drifting out of the Wellington Channel. I was eight or ten miles from the ship, and the ice was coming out in such great masses that I was



*Capt. Ommanney.*—afraid of being separated from the ship. I returned in the tender, and joined the ship, with the intention of making another examination on the following day. That examination was made on the 24th by Lieutenant M'Clintock; that was at Cape Riley; for I had no implements for digging about Cape Riley when I was there on the previous day.

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434. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Do you consider that the examination of the whole of the winter quarters of Sir John Franklin was so complete as to leave an impression on your mind that no record was left there?

*Captain Ommanney.*—Yes, I do, from all I have heard from Captain Austin and the officers of both expeditions that were there.

435. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did you form any opinion of Sir John Franklin having quitted his winter quarters hastily?

*Captain Ommanney.*—I have often thought of it. The number of things left there induced me to think that he left hastily or intended to return home.

436. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Do you know the number of coal bags found there?

*Captain Ommanney.*—No; but I think naval officers prosecuting would not have left such things there. I would not have left so many things behind.

437. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—It appears, on reference to the journals, that your exploring parties suffered more from frost-bites than either Lieutenant M'Clintock's or Captain Penny's. Can you assign any reason for that?

*Captain Ommanney.*—The temperature was lower; we had worse weather, more wind; we were a longer time confined to our tents; for two or three days at a time I could not show my face outside the tent.

438. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Was there any difference of clothing?

*Captain Ommanney.*—No, the clothing was the same.

439. *Sir E. Parry.*—In Captain Austin's instructions from the Admiralty their Lordships desire that he will render to Captain Penny any aid and assistance in his power, so far as he may be able to do so without risk of crippling the resources of the vessels under his own command. Are you of opinion that Captain Austin fully complied with those instructions?

*Captain Ommanney.*—Most fully.

440. *Sir E. Parry.*—Having had some experience of steam vessels in the navigation of the ice, is it your opinion that they afford an opportunity of prolonging the season of navigation in those seas comparatively with sailing vessels?

*Captain Ommanney.*—No, not if all seasons were like the autumn of 1850.

441. *Sir E. Parry.*—Why are you of that opinion?

*Captain Ommanney.*—I was on board the "Intrepid" on one occasion when the engines brought up, and on inquiry being made it was found that the injection cocks were choked by an accumulation of ice in them. I was sent down to look towards Cape Walker. The engines were going at full speed with all sail set, which would have propelled the vessel in open water seven or eight knots an hour. Our way was almost stopped by this young ice forming on the surface of the water.

442. *Sir E. Parry.*—About what thickness might that young ice be, when you were stopped on that occasion?

*Captain Ommanney.*—Not more than six inches.

443. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you know what was about the temperature of the atmosphere at that time?

*Captain Ommanney.*—About fifteen above zero.

444. *Captain Beechey.*—The ice that impeded your progress on that occasion, —was it ice or sludge?

*Captain Ommanney.*—Sludge, not more than six inches thick.

445. *Captain Beechey.*—How low down were your injection cocks?

*Captain Ommanney.*—About six feet below the surface of the water. They were choked up.

446. *Sir E. Parry.*—Then, Captain Ommanney, you are distinctly of opinion that the season of navigation in these seas is not likely to be prolonged by the use of steam vessels?

*Captain Ommanney.*—Certainly not. Another reason is, that if you could



use steam vessels, still the men could not be exposed to the severity of the climate. The hawsers could not be used. They become under such circumstances as stiff as bars of iron.

*Capt. Ommanney.*

30th Oct. 1851.

447. *Captain Beechey*.—On the 11th of August a letter was delivered to Captain Austin by Captain Penny in the cabin of the “Lady Franklin,” in which he says, “and I can only judge when I see Wellington Channel what course I shall then pursue.” You had overheard the previous conversation between Captain Penny and Captain Austin. What, in your opinion, did that expression refer to?

*Captain Ommanney*.—I remember a letter being given to Captain Austin which was not considered an answer to the question Captain Austin had put, and it was returned to Captain Penny. The letter was read at the time; but there was nothing in it that made an impression on my mind.

The letter which appears in the Evidence, page 35, was then put in, and read.

448. *Sir G. Back*.—Was that the letter you heard read?

*Captain Ommanney*.—Yes. There was nothing in it that impressed my mind, except that it was not a distinct answer.

449. *Captain Beechey*.—Are you of opinion that at that time Captain Penny entertained any opinions in regard to that strait which he would have expressed under different circumstances?

*Captain Ommanney*.—I do not understand what other circumstances there could be, because Captain Austin was frequently asking him for his opinions.

450. *Captain Beechey*.—It is implied in that letter that Captain Penny delivered an opinion which was not his real opinion. Do you believe that Captain Penny had any reserved opinion?

*Captain Ommanney*.—No, I do not, because his answer to Captain Austin’s inquiry was so very decided.

451. *Captain Beechey*.—He says, “When I see Wellington Channel I shall be able to judge what course I shall pursue.” It is implied by Captain Penny that he had expressed some opinions to Captain Austin which were not agreeable to him. Do you know anything of it?

*Captain Ommanney*.—No.

452. *Captain Beechey*.—He had not expressed then in your hearing any opinion to Captain Austin as to the advisability of going up Wellington Channel?

*Captain Ommanney*.—In the evening I accompanied Captain Austin to Captain Penny’s for a reply, which Captain Penny seemed disinclined to give. Captain Austin remonstrated, and after some discussion Captain Penny agreed to give it.

The Committee then adjourned.



*Fifth Day. October 31, 1851.*

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles, C.B., M.P., Chairman,  
Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,  
Captain Sir Edward Parry,  
Captain F. W. Beechey,  
Captain Sir George Back,  
Mr. F. J. Fegen, Secretary.

REAR-ADMIRAL SIR JOHN ROSS called.

*Rear-Admiral  
Sir John Ross.  
31st Oct. 1851.*

453. *Chairman.*—I believe you wintered at the same spot as Captain Penny's expedition?

*Sir John Ross.*—Yes.

454. *Chairman.*—And you had a personal knowledge of everything that occurred during the winter and spring to the expedition?

*Sir John Ross.*—Certainly.

455. *Chairman.*—When did you first hear of the discovery of the open water to the north of Wellington Strait in May 1851?

*Sir John Ross.*—It was on the 2d of June 1851. I have here Captain Penny's letter giving me the information.

456. *Chairman.*—Was it not in May when the open water was discovered?

*Sir John Ross.*—Captain Penny's letter is dated the 2d of June. He mentioned the circumstance before that. I think it must have been about the last of May.

457. *Chairman.*—When did you hear of his subsequent proceedings,—when he took the boat and launched into the open water?

*Sir John Ross.*—It must have been in the first week of July.

458. *Chairman.*—What was the impression on your mind at the time, as to the state of that open water? Did it appear to you from what you heard, that it was an open and navigable sea, and that there was any probability that Sir John Franklin passed that way?

*Sir John Ross.*—No.

459. *Chairman.*—State your reasons?

*Sir John Ross.*—Other water of the same description was found in another part, occasioned by the rapidity of the tide coming into these great channels.

460. *Chairman.*—Do you consider that Captain Austin would have been justified in continuing the expedition in the hope of penetrating the water so discovered?

*Sir John Ross.*—Certainly not. Captain Austin and Captain Penny were both right in coming home; there was no chance of doing any good at that time.

461. *Chairman.*—Can you give the Committee any information on the subject of that report of the loss and murder of the crew of Sir John Franklin's ships that you received from Adam Beck?

*Sir John Ross.*—I did not consider it to be true after Peterson had contra-

*Rear-Admiral  
Sir John Ross.*

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dicted it; but after Beck had been discharged, and swore that it was true, and being authorized by the Resident at Godhavn to say that he believed it, I believe it to be true also.

462. *Chairman*.—Do you continue to believe it to be true, that that occurrence took place?

*Sir John Ross*.—Most certainly I do.

463. *Chairman*.—Upon the faith of what Adam Beck has said?

*Sir John Ross*.—Yes.

464. *Chairman*.—Were you present when the examination took place by Captain Austin and the officers of his expedition?

*Sir John Ross*.—I was not present then.

465. *Chairman*.—Are you aware of what passed at that time?

*Sir John Ross*.—Perfectly.

466. *Chairman*.—And you are aware that they (Captain Austin and his officers) are of an entirely different opinion?

*Sir John Ross*.—Yes, and that they all believe that Adam Beck had been telling a story. I believed so at the time, and I wrote home to that effect. I believed that he was not telling the truth until he was sworn. When he came home, he came and voluntarily made his depositions. The Resident at Godhavn informed me that this man was born in Greenland, had been brought up to the Christian religion by the missionaries, that he had never known a man under these circumstances speaking falsely, and that he believed every word he said was true. Speaking of Peterson, Captain Humble, of a Danish ship, said he had written to his wife, stating that he had made an excellent bargain with Captain Penny; that he would winter in some snug place; that he would have plenty of money to get himself and his wife home to Copenhagen, and desired his wife to sell his things to enable him to go. In another letter, either by himself or his wife to her sister, who is married to one of the mates, a hope was expressed that Peterson would go to England, because the Government would be obliged to pay him two winters instead of one, and that he would come out with Captain Penny next year and be able to go to Copenhagen. I asked the Resident about Peterson. He said he was a man who was dissatisfied with his situation, and said that he did not care whether the Government gave him leave or not, because he would go back to Copenhagen.

467. *Chairman*.—Did you bring home any depositions of Adam Beck?

*Sir John Ross*.—Yes; I brought home his depositions, and sent them to the Hudson's Bay Company, who sent them to Copenhagen to be translated. There is every reason to believe they will be returned in the course of a month. I know that the depositions were to be sent for translation to persons in Copenhagen well qualified to perform the duty.

468. *Chairman*.—Have you anything further to communicate that you think interesting on the subject of the search for Sir John Franklin?

*Sir John Ross*.—I consider it will be of no use going into the Wellington Channel until there has been a favourable winter previously. The navigation of the Arctic seas mainly depends upon the previous winter, which has not been duly thought of by Arctic navigators. Unless there is a mild winter this year it will be quite useless to go out there. Captain Austin towed my vessel to the mouth of Wellington Channel. I went up and saw the barrier of ice. It was just as it was the year before, and it will remain there until there is a mild season to melt it. The great mistake, in my opinion, is, that they have not sufficiently studied the previous winter. When I went last (expedition of 1829), my only object in proceeding after the meeting of the store ships was on account of my letters from Sweden and Denmark having assured me that there never had been so mild a winter. When I went to Holsteinberg, the clergyman, who had been resident there twenty years, told me he had kept a comparative account of the temperature, and found that when it was mild in Baffin's Bay it was mild in Denmark, and that when it was severe at Baffin's Bay it was severe in Denmark. He added that it would depend upon the previous winter what success we should have in Baffin's Bay. I think, therefore, that in all such expeditions it is highly advisable,—absolutely

necessary indeed,—to consult the previous winter. I have been fourteen times frozen up, and I have examined the records of Sweden, Russia, and Denmark. I have invariably found that when there is a mild winter in these parts there is the same mild winter in the parallel latitudes throughout the globe. With respect to Adam Beck's report, that is a thing very easily ascertained any year, for an expedition might sail in June and be back in October.

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Sir John Ross.*  
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469. *Chairman*.—What measures would you take to ascertain the truth or falsehood of Adam Beck's relation?

*Sir John Ross*.—I should send an expedition consisting of two small vessels with a steamer in the month of June, which might ascertain it and return in the month of October. This might be done any year.

470. *Chairman*.—But to whom would you apply for information?

*Sir John Ross*.—I would carry an interpreter with me. It is absolutely necessary that some person should go who understands the Danish language, for the way in which they speak to Greenlanders is in Danish, and then they answer in the language of Greenland. I used to speak to my interpreter in Danish, and I believe I am the only officer in the navy who speaks Danish.

471. *Chairman*.—Do you think the best way would be to apply to the Danish governor at Disco?

*Sir John Ross*.—Yes; for an order to send some person with an expedition to determine that question, and the Danish Government should be applied to.

472. *Chairman*.—You think that when the translation is received in England it will throw considerable additional light upon the subject?

*Sir John Ross*.—Yes, I do think so, most certainly.

473. *Chairman*.—Did you understand that Captain Penny had urged Captain Austin to persevere in an endeavour to go up through Wellington Strait in 1851, with a view to continue the search after Sir John Franklin's expedition?

*Sir John Ross*.—I did not.

474. *Chairman*.—Do you think you should have known if Captain Penny had so urged Captain Austin?

*Sir John Ross*.—I think I should have known it. What Captain Penny said to me was, that if the ice broke up in the channel, that he could do a great deal with a steamer; but it was conditionally, if the ice broke up; and he once mentioned that if this was the case, he would apply for a steamer to assist him, but he did not say that it was to Captain Austin he would apply. To apply to Captain Austin would have been absurd, for none of his officers could do duty under Captain Penny. It was quite evident then that there was no probability of a steamer, or anything else, getting up Wellington Channel. I went up after Captain Austin cast me off, and saw the barrier that had been there all the year before, and there is no doubt that it is there now.

475. *Captain Beechey*.—You are aware that Captain Penny reported the discovery of a large space of open water in the Queen's Channel, and that he had not gone to the extent of the open water or examined the shores around it, except those which bordered on the south-east part of it. Taking this state of things into your consideration, is it your opinion that the examination of the further part of the strait was necessary?

*Sir John Ross*.—It was unnecessary.

476. *Captain Beechey*.—Will you allow me to ask you what was the character of the barrier of ice in the Wellington Strait, whether it was old ice or not?

*Sir John Ross*.—I should say it was three years old.

477. *Captain Beechey*.—You said, that on sending out an expedition to that part, they had not sufficiently considered the importance of a mild previous winter. Whom do you mean by *they*?

*Sir John Ross*.—I mean the officers whom Government consulted.

478. *Captain Beechey*.—Then what means would you take of ascertaining if there had been a mild winter?

*Sir John Ross*.—I should ascertain it by sending to Denmark and Sweden.

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479. *Captain Beechey*.—Then two or three years must elapse before an expedition could reach?

*Sir John Ross*.—Oh no; it could reach the same year.

480. *Captain Beechey*.—Then you mean to say you would be guided by the winter in Denmark?

*Sir John Ross*.—Yes, certainly, by the previous winter at that place.

481. *Sir E. Parry*.—Will you state what you know about the piece of wood and the piece of tin, said to have been found by Adam Beck on the shore of the harbour in which Sir John Franklin's expedition is supposed to have wintered?

*Sir John Ross*.—Adam Beck found that piece two days after the other ships had left the bay. The piece of wood was four feet nine inches long, and three inches by four square. On the top it had been cut with a saw, and in that was a piece of tin. I saw that piece of tin. Adam Beck was carrying it along, when the tin dropped out and sunk into the snow which was very deep at the time; it could not afterwards be found. The man has sworn that on this piece of tin was "September 1846."

482. *Captain Beechey*.—Did I understand you to say you saw the tin?

*Sir John Ross*.—Yes, I saw him bringing the tin along with my spyglass. I was about a quarter of a mile away. This was on the north-east side of Union Bay. I considered it to be a meridian mark. There was a cairn that it had fallen from.

483. *Sir E. Parry*.—Will you point out where you were with the spyglass when you saw it?

*Sir John Ross*.—I was fast to the ice in the place have marked on the chart.

484. *Sir E. Parry*.—Can Adam Beck read English well?

*Sir John Ross*.—Yes, he can read it perfectly well, and write it.

485. *Chairman*.—Then what date did Adam Beck assign for the loss of Sir John Franklin's ships?

*Sir John Ross*.—He said it was in the winter; he could not say the month; they have no names for months.

486. *Sir George Back*.—Did he say what part of the winter?

*Sir John Ross*.—No; I do not think that was asked him.

487. *Chairman*.—Do you consider that the search after records in the wintering place of the *Erebus* and *Terror* in 1845-46 was so complete, that there is no probability of any records deposited there having been overlooked or left behind?

*Sir John Ross*.—That is possible but not probable. There is a tin containing some lines of poetry that I left on the top of the hill above Leopold Harbour, and although a hundred men have been there since it has never been found, and it is there yet. Almost all the ships companies of the *Investigator* and *Enterprise* have been there, and have never found it.

488. *Chairman*.—Do you consider that Cape Riley was also sufficiently searched for records or anything else that might have been left behind?

*Sir John Ross*.—Yes, I think a very strict search was made. There was a cairn, but there was nothing in it.

489. *Chairman*.—Do you think the cairn consisting of tin canisters on Beechey Island was sufficiently searched?

*Sir John Ross*.—Yes, I think so. I conceive that there having been no records left may be considered a proof that Sir John Franklin had given up all hope of proceeding further, had determined on proceeding home, and was lost. I think he was lost by getting into packed ice as Sir James Ross got into. That is one reason why I think Adam Beck's story probable. I agreed with Sir John Franklin before he went away that if he advanced he was to leave notices where he was going, and to make deposits. I did not require that the Government should make these deposits, but that Sir John Franklin should make them out of his own resources, as I did. I said to him, "I shall most likely be the person to come out for you if you are missed, so that we will

understand that you are to leave deposits at Cornwallis Island and Melville Island. State what your intentions are. If you do not leave anything I shall conclude that you are returning home, and that you consider it would be of no use to leave notices."

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490. *Chairman*.—Did Adam Beck say anything about the time the ships were lost?

*Sir John Ross*.—He said, upon his examination, he would be prepared to produce articles belonging to the vessels which would prove them to be Government ships, and that he was ready to go with the Government expedition. He is at present living at Holsteinberg on the western coast of Greenland. I should add that the class of persons to whom he belongs are perfectly insane when drunk.

491. *Chairman*.—Do you think there is a reasonable probability of Adam Beck being found to fulfil his promises by any expedition that may be sent next year?

*Sir John Ross*.—No doubt he would be found at Holsteinberg if sent for.

492. *Chairman*.—Do you know whether Captain Austin provided Captain Penny with every assistance in his power consistently with the safety of his own expedition?

*Sir John Ross*.—I think he did.

493. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Do you know to what extent Sir John Franklin's exploring parties had gone in any direction from their wintering quarters?

*Sir John Ross*.—I think they were traced up the Wellington Channel about thirty miles. They were upon sledges.

494. *Sir George Back*.—On which side?

*Sir John Ross*.—On the east side of the Wellington Strait.

495. *Chairman*.—Have you made any report of your proceedings?

*Sir John Ross*.—Yes, to the Hudson's Bay Company.

496. *Chairman*.—Will you furnish the Committee with a copy of it?

*Sir John Ross*.—The Hudson's Bay Company have already furnished the Admiralty with it.

497. *Sir George Back*.—From your experience in the Arctic seas do you think it likely that sufficient provision could be obtained, in any case, to support such a party as Sir John Franklin's, more particularly in the neighbourhood of the Wellington Strait and Channel?

*Sir John Ross*.—Most certainly not.

498. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you make any observations by which you could ascertain which way the flood tide probably came?

*Sir John Ross*.—We made no observations of that kind up the Wellington Channel.

499. *Captain Beechey*.—May I ask whether you found the tides to be much affected by the wind?

*Sir John Ross*.—There was a regular tide no doubt, but that tide was accelerated or retarded by the action of the wind.

500. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—During your experience in the navigation of these seas did you generally find the leads open on the eastern and northern shores of channels first?

*Sir John Ross*.—Yes, generally on the eastern shores, and upon the north side of Baffin's Bay particularly.

\*501. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you receive from Captain Austin every assistance you required consistently with his own resources and the safety of his own expedition?

*Sir John Ross*.—I certainly did.

502. *Chairman*.—Do you think that everything that was possible was done by the joint expeditions?

*Sir John Ross*.—I think that everything that could be done in that season was done.



*Rear-Admiral  
Sir John Ross.*

31st Oct. 1851.

503. *Chairman.*—Do you think that anything was left undone?

*Sir John Ross.*—Nothing. I think Captain Penny and Captain Austin were quite justified in coming home.

504. *Chairman.*—And you think that during the time they continued the search, they did all they could?

*Sir John Ross.*—I think they did everything that men could do.

*Capt. Ommanney.*

CAPTAIN OMMANNEY recalled: Examination continued.

505. *Captain Beechey.*—With reference to my question 452. yesterday, which was, “Captain Penny did not express in your hearing any opinion to Captain Austin as to the advisability of going up Wellington Channel.” What is your answer to that?

*Captain Ommanney.*—I never heard any.

506. *Captain Beechey.*—In Captain Austin’s letter of the 11th of August 1850 mention is made of some reports on the authority of Adam Beck. Do you believe in them?

*Captain Ommanney.*—No. I was present during the transaction at Cape York and Wolstenholme Sound in August 1850, and was satisfied the report was untrue. Referring to my letter sent to the Admiralty, I said “I abstained from making any reference to the story raised by Sir John Ross’s interpreter, as I considered that the matter had been completely placed at rest after my subsequent examination of the natives with Captain York and Penny on the 14th, of which you were informed, and more particularly finding that the “North Star” had wintered amongst these people without hearing of the circumstance; but I did not put any faith in the report itself. I was with Captain Penny, and we investigated it very closely.”

507. *Sir George Back.*—Then you do not believe Adam Beck’s story?

*Captain Ommanney.*—No, I do not. I have a native Esquimaux with me, who will be able to give some information upon the subject, and his evidence will be interpreted, as he is one of the party with whom I communicated at Cape York when Beck was present.

508. *Sir E. Parry.*—What is the age of the Esquimaux you have brought home?

*Captain Ommanney.*—He is nineteen or twenty years of age.

509. *Sir E. Parry.*—Is he an intelligent young man?

*Captain Ommanney.*—Yes, we all believe so. He is a person of observation, and is very quiet.

510. *Captain Beechey.*—You conducted an exploring party to the south-west, believe? What were the limits of your journey?

*Captain Ommanney.*—I commanded the division of sledges which proceeded to examine the coasts to the southward and westward of Cape Walker, and I was absent sixty days under great privations. From our winter quarters we went to Cape Walker across the ice, and thence I traced the coast to the west and south-west until I came to the gulf at the north-west extreme in  $73^{\circ} 5'$  north, and longitude  $101^{\circ} 55'$  W. When I crossed this I could not see the bottom of the gulf. I considered it my duty to ascertain what it was, and I found that it terminated in the gulf. On my return I made the circuit of this deep gulf which I had crossed the neck of on my outward journey.

511. *Captain Beechey.*—What was the state of the ice generally along that shore?

*Captain Ommanney.*—It was very heavy fixed ice; I considered a great portion of it had been fixed several years. Some pieces which pressed upon this coast must have been forty feet thick.

512. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you search minutely every part of the coast for traces of Sir John Franklin?

*Captain Ommanney.*—Most minutely.

513. *Captain Beechey.*—And is it your opinion, after your search, that Sir John Franklin did not pass that way?

*Captain Ommanney.*—I do not think he passed that way.

514. *Captain Beechey*.—Have you stated in your report every thing that would be useful in a further search, if desirable to renew it?

*Captain Ommanney*.—Yes, I believe I have told all.

*Capt. Ommanney*

31st Oct. 1851.

515. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—How many days longer do you consider your exploring party could have continued their labours under similar privations and difficulties?

*Captain Ommanney*.—Ten or twenty days longer.

516. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Had the provisions and fuel you took with you been expended could you have found other means of maintaining life?

*Captain Ommanney*.—None whatever.

517. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—You have expressed to us one of two opinions you have formed that Sir John Franklin's expedition may have passed through the Wellington Straits to the north-west. Supposing that to have been the case, do you now, from your experience in the Polar seas and in Arctic navigation, consider that if these people (Sir John Franklin's) had been obliged to quit their ships, any of them could be now alive in those regions looking for rescue?

*Captain Ommanney*.—Not one of them. I do not believe any of them could be alive.

518. *Captain Beechey*.—In your excursion from the ships to your south-western extreme did you see any tracks of animals?

*Captain Ommanney*.—I saw traces of rein-deer at about 74° N., and some down at the bottom of the gulf.

519. *Sir George Back*.—Under these circumstances, you could not have procured food?

*Captain Ommanney*.—Certainly not. I only shot three brace of ptarmigan during the whole sixty days. I did not even see the track of a bear along the whole of the coast which I travelled,—a proof of the absence of animal life.

520. *Sir E. Parry*.—What was the nature of the land you discovered to the southward of Cape Walker?

*Captain Ommanney*.—At Cape Walker the land is high, with precipitous cliffs. Proceeding south-west by west it declines and becomes very low. The whole of this land is of the same character, with shingle spits extending out into the sea.

521. *Chairman*.—You are fully conversant with the proceedings of the expeditions, not only of your own, but of Captain Penny's. What I wish to ask you in conclusion is, whether every thing was done by both expeditions that could be done, and whether anything was omitted that could be accomplished in furtherance of their instructions?

*Captain Ommanney*.—From all the circumstances, and from the position in which we were obliged to winter, I consider that more was done than the most sanguine of us ever anticipated. Before setting out travelling, the opinion was that any one going 200 miles in a direct line from the ship, or stopping out forty days, would be as much as any human beings could do. There was nothing omitted that could have been accomplished.

522. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you think Captain Austin and Captain Penny were fully justified in coming home this autumn?

*Captain Ommanney*.—Fully justified.

523. *Captain Beechey*.—If Captain Penny had thought the Queen's Channel ought to have been further examined, taking into your consideration the provisions and the steam vessel left by Sir James Ross at Leopold Island, could he have waited longer than he did at the entrance of Wellington Channel to await any change that might have taken place in the ice, to prosecute the search he states he was so anxious for?

*Captain Ommanney*.—From all I know of his resources I think he could have remained out if he had wished and determined to do so. I am not aware of what his resources were, further than having heard that his expedition was supplied for three years.

Mr. Penny.

CAPTAIN PENNY recalled.

31st Oct. 1851.

524. *The Chairman (addressing Captain Penny)* said,—We told you yesterday that we could not allow such large additions to be made to your evidence as you had proposed to insert by way of correction; but you are now at liberty to explain any part of your evidence you may wish?

*Captain Penny* proceeded as follows:—To the answer to the question on page 6, No. 62. beginning, "Instead of exciting yourself," &c., I wish to add these words, "Because I was too angry." To the answer to the question No. 70., commencing "What quantity of provisions did you consider," &c., I wish to add, "I was provided with no travelling equipment by the Admiralty. I had not one piece of spare wood on board my vessel; every bit of wood on board my expedition was used up in preparing my travelling equipment; therefore had that ice not cleared away I could have been of no further service to the search by continuing there, from the distance Sir John Franklin and his party must have been away." On page 7 the following question occurs, No. 80.: "Was the ice more or less broken in 1851?" At the commencement of the answer to the question I wish these words to be placed, "I cannot tell." At page 8 there is the following question, No. 85.: "When you started to come home did you contemplate asking for a steamer to go out again?" The addition I wish to make to the answer is, "On arriving at Aberdeen I mentioned it to Mrs. Penny." On page 8 the following question occurs, No. 86.: "Did you and your officers contemplate going out again?" The answer I have given only applies to my officers. At page 8 is the following question, No. 87.: "What made you propose it afterwards?" This does not imply that I did not think of this before, for I mentioned to my people, that if we got instructions and despatches at Disco, we should return to the search. I expected Mr. Saunders had landed his provisions there for the "North Star." In consequence of its coming on thick, and a little wind, we parted company with the "Sophia," he not being aware of my intention to come home. On page 8 is this question, No. 92.: "Do not you think *now* it would have been better to give a specific answer to Captain Austin's inquiry?" I wish to add to the answer already given these words, "Had Captain Austin not been present, I should have given another answer. I should have said, Most certainly, I am very sorry for it. I wish further to state, that when I was on board Captain Austin's ship, I laid my chart before him, and explained my ideas, that Sir John Franklin had pursued that route up Wellington Channel. At that time, I beg to state that Captain Ommanney was not present when this conversation took place. I was not long in his cabin, and I stated to Captain Austin that I requested a steamer to go up; of this I have no doubt. Lieutenant Aldrich, who was there on a visit, and was detained for three weeks previously, knew that it was my most anxious desire, if the channel opened, to go 500 miles further search, and that I never at any time changed my opinions in reference to Wellington Channel. At page 8 is the following question, No. 93.: "Suppose Captain Austin had died, nothing would have been in writing to pass to his second in command?" I wish to add to my answer that I did not consider the probability of Captain Austin dying, and I am sorry I gave Admiral Fausshawe that answer. On page 9 is the following question, No. 105.: "We do not expect any scientific matter beyond what you have given us with respect to the latitudes; but I may ask you whether you did this work yourself (*adverting to a chart which was placed on the table*)?" The answer was, "Captain Stewart did the great portion of it, but I was present when it was done." I wish to add to that these words: "This must not be understood that I could not make it myself, as their Lordships have charts of my construction, as have also the whalers, by which they have run for harbours in Cumberland Strait in a gale of wind." On page 10 I am asked, No. 110.: "Could you have stopped with the amount of provisions you had?" The answer I gave was, "Oh yes." I wish to add these words: "We could have lived on board our ships, but we could have done no good to the search." On page 10 is the following question, No. 112.: "How did you pick up that Captain Austin was coming home," &c. I wish to add to my answer,

"When I saw Sir John Ross taken in tow by Captain Austin, from this moment I was determined I should go home before him, and had great cause to be satisfied with the decision, for I had every reason to suppose that disrepute would be thrown upon what we had done, and I told this to my officers."

*Mr. Penny.*  
—  
31st Oct 1851.

*Sir E. Parry.*—I wish to ask some questions upon this supplementary evidence, as it has led us completely into another train.

525. *Sir E. Parry, to Captain Penny.*—Is the Committee to understand, that had your own expedition been supplied with more provisions and other necessary resources, you would, on the 12th of August 1851, have remained at Wellington Strait, with a view of watching the ice there, and proceeding up to the north-westward if it opened, so as to risk another winter, under your existing instructions?

*Captain Penny.*—Not under my existing instructions.

526. *Sir E. Parry.*—Supposing you had got into Disco on your return, and had found abundance of resources and no further instructions, what would you have done then?

*Captain Penny.*—I should not have felt justified in returning to the search without further instructions.

527. *Sir E. Parry.*—When you left England on your expedition in 1850 were you acquainted with the proceedings of the former expedition under the orders of Captain Sir James Ross?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes, I was acquainted with them.

528. *Sir E. Parry.*—Were you then aware of a considerable depôt of provisions and stores having been left by Sir James Ross at Port Leopold?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes, I was aware of that.

529. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did it ever occur to you to make use of these provisions to enable you to prolong your search?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes; I have often spoken of this depôt of provisions.

*Captain Penny continued as follows:*—During winter the steam launch left by Sir James Ross was frequently spoken of,—that if we got early clear, and I had been at ship all the time, and Barrow Strait opened,—we spoke of the steam launch, if it was possible to put her in order, to my armourer, but he said in consequence of the machinery being so long exposed it could not be put together in a way to be made useful.

530. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you examine it?

*Captain Penny.*—No, I did not examine it myself.

531. *Chairman.*—Do you recollect that in your journal of the 6th of August, before Captain Austin had joined you, you used this expression: "They are all so very anxious to get home," (that is, the crews of your vessels,) "as we have now no hope of being of any use to our missing countrymen, whose fate will for ever remain in obscurity"?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes. I felt convinced that they were so far beyond our reach, that with our means we could not reach them,—and the limited instructions we had.

532. *Sir E. Parry.*—You have stated in your letter to Captain Austin, dated the 4th of August 1851, that "the powerful rate the tide runs in the channels near the Queen's Channel, not less than six knots, renders it dangerous in a boat, much more a ship, unless clear of ice, which from the appearance of the ice here will not be clear this season." How do you reconcile that to the wish you have expressed to go up that season with a steamer?

*Captain Penny.*—When I returned I was very anxious about what more could have been done. I thought it was possible this ice might clear away, and that if we could get 500 miles further up there might be some further traces. I felt that in a short season of navigation that could only be accomplished with a steamer. Hence my anxiety to go up to pilot the steamer; being acquainted with the rapidity of the tides. I offered my assistance as pilot, because it would be less objectionable than asking for the command.

*Mr. Penny.*  
—  
31st Oct. 1851.

533. *Sir E. Parry.*—Are we to understand that you altered your opinion after you had written this letter on the 4th of August?

*Captain Penny.*—I was still anxious that something more was to be done, convinced that Sir John Franklin had pursued that route, and I was anxious that we should obtain further traces.

534. *Captain Beechey.*—You spoke to your people of the probability of returning to pursue the search, providing you got provisions at Disco. When did you make that known to the crew?

*Captain Penny.*—It was after we left Barrow's Straits.

435. *Captain Beechey.*—That is at variance with your amended evidence, in which you say that when you saw Sir John Ross in tow, you determined to be home first. Will you explain that, and then show how it was that you spoke to your people of the probability of returning, providing you got provisions at Disco? Do you mean that you determined to proceed home *if you did not find instructions at Disco?*

*Captain Penny.*—Yes, that was it.

536. *Sir G. Back.*—Did the idea of prosecuting the research for Sir John Franklin occur to you before you returned to England?

*Captain Penny.*—Yes, it did; it very often occurred to me.

*Mr. Marshall.*

Mr. MARSHALL called.

537. *Chairman.*—You were first mate on the *Lady Franklin*, I believe?

*Mr. Marshall.*—Yes.

538. *Chairman.*—Be good enough to give us an account of what you observed in your exploring expedition. Were you out twice or once?

*Mr. Marshall.*—Once.

539. *Chairman.*—You were not with Captain Penny when he launched his boat?

*Mr. Marshall.*—No; Captain Penny was going up, and I was coming down.

540. *Chairman.*—Did you find any traces of the missing ships?

*Mr. Marshall.*—We found no traces. There was a good deal of drift wood. One piece was about fifteen feet long and about eighteen inches round. It was quite wasted.

541. *Chairman.*—What was the date of your proceeding from the ship on the first journey?

*Mr. Marshall.*—We started on the 17th of April, returned to ship, and then started again on the 6th of May.

542. *Chairman.*—Did you find any open water when you got above Wellington Strait?

*Mr. Marshall.*—Yes, a good deal.

543. *Chairman.*—What sort of open water did you consider it to be?

*Mr. Marshall.*—It was clear water as far as the eye could reach, with a small portion of ice along the shore. From "Goodsir's and Marshall's farthest" I could see to the northward as far as my eye could reach.

544. *Chairman.*—How many islands did you discover there?

*Mr. Marshall.*—I could not tell how many, but there were many islands there. We took it at first for one island, because it was at such a distance.

545. *Chairman.*—Do you consider this chart to be correct, as far as your knowledge and observation go?

*Mr. Marshall.*—Yes.

546. *Chairman.*—By what route did you return?

*Mr. Marshall.*—We returned by the same route, following the western shore, by Cornwallis Island.

547. *Chairman.*—Was that the only land journey you made?

*Mr. Marshall.*—Yes, it was.

548. *Chairman*.—When was it you saw Wellington Strait last, the north end of it? *Mr. Marshall.*

*Mr. Marshall*.—On the 1st of June. 31st Oct. 1851.

549. *Chairman*.—What was your opinion of the state and character of the ice in the strait itself? Did you think it fast ice, likely to remain in the channel, or that it might come away with a strong breeze from the northward?

*Mr. Marshall*.—I believe the whole of it was one year's ice.

550. *Chairman*.—You had an opportunity of looking at the whole of it on the west side?

*Mr. Marshall*.—Not any further than through the cracks, just to see the thickness.

551. *Chairman*.—What did you think the probable thickness?

*Mr. Marshall*.—Not more than four and a half or five feet.

552. *Chairman*.—Have you been much accustomed to ice?

*Mr. Marshall*.—Yes.

553. *Chairman*.—How many voyages have you made?

*Mr. Marshall*.—Thirty-one to that country.

554. *Sir E. Parry*.—And in command of ships?

*Mr. Marshall*.—Yes; I commanded a ship one time.

555. *Chairman*.—Give the Committee your opinion of the ice which prevented navigation through that strait. Do you think that it is a barrier that remains three or four years, or is it one that opens every year?

*Mr. Marshall*.—I look upon it that it is not open every year, but at stated seasons; it is pressed into Barrow's Straits by strong northerly winds.

556. *Chairman*.—Do you consider that the Wellington Strait was navigable in 1850?

*Mr. Marshall*.—Yes; in the latter part I consider it was navigable.

557. *Chairman*.—You think all the ice came out of that year?

*Mr. Marshall*.—Yes; I am quite certain of it.

558. *Sir E. Parry*.—What! after the navigable season closed did the ice come out?

*Mr. Marshall*.—Yes.

559. *Chairman*.—But would it have been possible for any vessel to go up?

*Mr. Marshall*.—Nothing but steam would go up when there were light winds. Sailing vessels would be of no use.

560. *Chairman*.—All the vessels must have been already blocked up in the ice before the strait broke up, consequently neither expedition could have gone up the strait again at that time?

*Mr. Marshall*.—Yes, that is right.

561. *Sir G. Back*.—Then for any available purpose of navigation the opening was of no use?

*Mr. Marshall*.—No, of no use whatever.

562. *Chairman*.—Do you think there was any appearance of the ice coming away when you left the strait on the 12th of August 1851?

*Mr. Marshall*.—Well, I could not say, for I did not see the ice for about five weeks before that.

563. *Sir G. Back*.—Was there much floe ice at the entrance to Wellington Channel?

*Mr. Marshall*.—It was all floe.

564. *Sir G. Back*.—What was the size of the ice at the largest floe in 1850?

*Mr. Marshall*.—It was a floe piece as far as the eye could reach, from side to side.

565. *Sir E. Parry*.—What breadth of ice do you think remained in Wellington Channel when you left in 1850?

*Mr. Marshall*.—Not more than fifty miles.

*Mr. Marshall.*  
 31st Oct. 1851.

566. *Sir E. Parry.*—But you could not see water over that?

*Mr. Marshall.*—Oh yes; it was very high land.

567. *Sir E. Parry.*—From what point of land did you see it?

*Mr. Marshall.*—I did not see it myself.

568. *Admiral Faushaue.*—What do you consider was the height of the land at the farthest point?

*Mr. Marshall.*—From 500 to 600 feet.

569. *Admiral Faushaue.*—How far do you think you saw the open water?

*Mr. Marshall.*—I think I saw sixty miles from that height.

570. *Admiral Faushaue.*—Do you think you saw the two islands marked Barrow and Parker Islands in the chart?

*Mr. Marshall.*—I might have seen them, but I did not know them from the body of land. I saw land as far as my eye could see in that direction.

571. *Admiral Faushaue.*—Did you keep any register of the state of the temperature?

*Mr. Marshall.*—Yes; it was kept on board the *Sophia*.

572. *Admiral Faushaue.*—But in your journeys had you a thermometer?

*Mr. Marshall.*—Dr. Goodsir had one.

573. *Admiral Faushaue.*—Do you know on the day you turned back from Marshall's farthest point what was the state of the temperature?

*Mr. Marshall.*—No; but it was very warm.

574. *Admiral Faushaue.*—What was the date?

*Mr. Marshall.*—The 1st of June.

575. *Sir G. Back.*—Did you see any birds?

*Mr. Marshall.*—Yes, ducks and some others.

576. *Sir G. Back.*—Any animals?

*Mr. Marshall.*—Two days I had the opportunity of seeing rein-deer. I saw 20 on the first day and 19 on the second.

577. *Sir G. Back.*—Could you have got within shot of them?

*Mr. Marshall.*—Oh yes.

578. *Admiral Faushaue.*—Do you consider from your observation that there is a free channel to the north-west?

*Mr. Marshall.*—That I can hardly answer, but from what I know I think there is.

579. *Admiral Faushaue.*—Have you ever been employed in steam vessels?

*Mr. Marshall.*—No, always in sailing vessels.

580. *Captain Beechey.*—In the strait where you have been, Queen Victoria Channel, the tides are of interest. Did you take notice of the tides in that channel?

*Mr. Marshall.*—Yes, but I paid no particular attention to them, only just sufficient to ascertain which way they were going.

581. *Captain Beechey.*—Was there a rise and fall of the water?

*Mr. Marshall.*—Yes, between five and six feet.

582. *Captain Beechey.*—At what time of the moon was it, near the spring or otherwise?

*Mr. Marshall.*—Dr. Goodsir will answer that question.

583. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you notice any stream in the channel?

*Mr. Marshall.*—Yes, the stream went westward.

584. *Captain Beechey.*—Did it run fast or slow?

*Mr. Marshall.*—Three or four knots.

585. *Captain Beechey.*—When the water was rising, which way did the stream run?

*Mr. Marshall.*—I think it came from the eastward; but I cannot positively say.



586. *Captain Beechey*.—Are you tolerably confident of that?

*Mr. Marshall*.—Yes, I think so.

*Mr. Marshall*

31st Oct. 1851.

587. *Captain Beechey*.—Did you notice whether one stream ran longer than the other?

*Mr. Marshall*.—I consider that the water ran longer to the westward, tide and half tide.

588. *Captain Beechey*.—From what point did you make your observations?

*Mr. Marshall*.—From "Goodsir's and Marshall's farthest."

589. *Chairman*.—You are aware it has been said, that if the expeditions had not come away, it is very possible the ice might have broken up, and they might have proceeded through this new channel above Wellington Strait, which is called Queen's Channel. Do you think there was any probability after the twelfth of August of such an event occurring?

*Mr. Marshall*.—I was not there long enough to tell how the ice was. All I can say is, that it was open last year (1850), but I cannot venture to say whether it will be open this year.

590. *Chairman*.—In point of fact, do you consider that you came away too soon, and that you ought to have staid longer?

*Mr. Marshall*.—We might have staid there a considerable time longer, but we could not have gone up the channel, as far as I could see. I do not see how we could have got up, even if we had stopped longer.

591. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—If you had been master of the vessel, wishing to proceed to the northward in that direction, and you had seen the ice sufficiently clear, as in some years, would you have thought there was any difficulty in navigating the channel above?

*Mr. Marshall*.—Not the slightest difficulty as far as eye could see; so long as there was clear water there could be no difficulty in navigating a vessel.

592. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you see any floating ice drifting with the current?

*Mr. Marshall*.—Yes.

593. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you form any idea of the strength of the current from that floating ice?

*Mr. Marshall*.—I saw the ice going on the face of the water two knots.

594. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—How was the wind then?

*Mr. Marshall*.—It was from the westward, and the ice was going against it.

595. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Were you one of the officers who examined the winter quarters of Sir John Franklin at Beechey Island?

*Mr. Marshall*.—I was not there. It was my duty to attend to the ship.

596. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Were you at Cape Riley?

*Mr. Marshall*.—No.

597. *Captain Beechey*.—Can you call to mind, when the water was falling there, which way was the current?

*Mr. Marshall*.—It was going to the eastward, if I recollect rightly. I made no particular observation of it.

598. *Sir E. Parry*.—Considering all the circumstances that have come to your knowledge of the expeditions, which way do you think Sir John Franklin went from Beechey Island?

*Mr. Marshall*.—I think he went up Wellington Channel. That was always my thought.

599. *Sir G. Back*.—On what do you ground that opinion?

*Mr. Marshall*.—The year before, as I suppose, he had seen the water, and then he went up there. That is my opinion.

600. *Sir G. Back*.—Then you think that water was open in 1846?

*Mr. Marshall*.—I cannot undertake to say. I have no doubt it is open at certain points every year.

*Mr. Marshall.*  
31st Oct. 1851.

601. *Sir G. Back.*—In your opinion, that barrier of ice was not more than one year old, none of two or three years?

*Mr. Marshall.*—It is all ice of one year.

602. *Captain Beechey.*—Is it your impression that the open water in Queen's Channel is there every year, and that it is kept open by strong tides?

*Mr. Marshall.*—Yes, by the strength of the tides; at least, I suppose so.

The Committee then adjourned until Monday.

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*Sixth Day. November 3, 1851*

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles, C.B., M.P., Chairman.  
 Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,  
 Captain Sir Edward Parry,  
 Captain F. W. Beechey,  
 Captain Sir George Back,  
 Mr. F. J. Fegen, Secretary.

COMMANDER C. G. PHILLIPS called.

*Commander  
C. G. Phillips.*

603. *Chairman.*—I believe you were second in command of Sir John Ross's vessel "Felix?"

3d Nov. 1851.

*Commander Phillips.*—Yes, I was.

604. *Chairman.*—You wintered at the same spot as Captain Penny's expedition?

*Commander Phillips.*—Yes, we did.

605. *Chairman.*—Had you a personal knowledge of everything that occurred during the winter and the spring of that season?

*Commander Phillips.*—Yes, I had.

606. *Chairman.*—When did you first hear of the open water to the north of Wellington Strait, which was discovered in May 1851?

*Commander Phillips.*—On my return from land travelling, which was on the 16th of June 1851, I was informed that Captain Penny had returned to Assistance Bay, in consequence of having discovered water. He had returned to his own ships, prepared a boat, and started again.

607. *Chairman.*—When did you hear of any subsequent proceedings after he had taken the boat and launched it in the open water?

*Commander Phillips.*—Not until his return.

608. *Chairman.*—What was the impression on your mind after hearing that account? Did it appear to you to be an open and navigable sea, and that Sir John Franklin had passed that way?

*Commander Phillips.*—I heard very little upon the matter, for there was so much reserve on the part of Captain Penny's officers that I abstained from putting any questions, and as much as possible stopped away. All I know of Captain Penny's proceedings I have gleaned from the newspapers, and from the track chart of his discoveries which he was good enough to send to Sir John Ross.

609. *Chairman.*—Then you can give the Committee no information further than what you have heard and read?

*Commander Phillips.*—No, I cannot. As I have stated, there was so much reserve on the part of Captain Penny's officers that I abstained from putting any questions to them. I heard that Captain Stewart and Dr. Goodsir had been stopped by open water, and that Captain Penny had searched the islands that he had discovered (Baillie Hamilton, and others).

610. *Chairman.*—Then you are not able to give any positive answer to my question?

*Commander Phillips.*—Certainly not; I am not sufficiently well informed upon the subject.

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611. *Chairman*.—Do you consider, from all you have heard, that Captain Austin would have been justified in remaining there with the expedition, in the hope of penetrating up the channel so discovered?

*Commander Phillips*.—I think that the Wellington Channel is only clear once in a few years. I think that Captain Austin would not have been justified in prosecuting the search up the Wellington Strait and the seas beyond it without more positive evidence that Sir John Franklin had gone that way.

612. *Chairman*.—Can you give the Committee any information on the subject of the report in circulation with reference to the loss and murder of Sir John Franklin, and which you received from Adam Beck?

*Commander Phillips*.—Yes. I took Adam Beck on shore on 13th August 1850, on Cape York, when all the vessels were off there, except Captain Penny's. Captain Ommanney had landed from the "Intrepid," and Captain Forsyth from the "Prince Albert," about half an hour previously. They were in communication with three natives when I arrived in the "Felix's" boat with Adam Beck. A conversation took place between the natives and Adam Beck; but there was no emotion visible in the countenances of Adam Beck or any of the natives to induce me to think that there was anything they were anxious to report; so much so, that I remarked to Captain Ommanney, "Well, it is pretty clear that no vessel has been wrecked in this neighbourhood;" and we all quitted in the "Intrepid," to overtake our several vessels. Captain Ommanney got on board of his ship, and we proceeded in tow towards Captain Austin and the "Felix." I was on board the "Intrepid," endeavouring to rejoin my own ship. For six or seven hours Adam Beck never came near me to make signs, or to manifest that he had any information to disclose. About seven or eight o'clock I thought I should be better lodged on board Captain Forsyth's vessel, there being no chance of getting on board my own vessel for some time, and I dropped on board. Adam Beck came on board the same vessel, and found a man who spoke a good deal of Esquimaux. His name was John Smith, steward of the "Prince Albert." This man almost immediately afterwards came to Captain Forsyth, and, looking aghast, as you may suppose, he told us he had just been informed by Adam Beck that in the year 1846, when snow was falling, two ships (not whalers) had been broken by the ice in the direction beyond Cape Dudley Digges. The officers, he said, wore epaulettes and gold bands; and that they had guns, but no balls. Some of the crew were drowned, others lived in tents apart from the natives, and were eventually killed with darts and arrows. The figures were written very plainly by Adam Beck, and showed that snow was falling at the time. On receiving this information, Captain Ommanney was immediately hailed. The "Prince Albert" was in tow of the "Assistance," the "Assistance" being in tow of her steam tender, the "Intrepid." Captain Ommanney was immediately hailed, and Captain Forsyth and myself thought it was not proper to hail any intelligence of this story, but to ask him to come on board the "Prince Albert." He was made acquainted with this statement, and resolved immediately to cast off his own ship, and proceed in the "Intrepid," with Captain Forsyth, myself, and Adam Beck, and the steward who was the interpreter. We accordingly proceeded in the steamer as fast as we could to overtake Captain Austin. As soon as it was practicable, signals were made to the "Resolute," and at about one or two o'clock in the morning we had all assembled in Captain Austin's cabin. Sir John Ross came on board too. I reported to him, as my superior, and he immediately went on board Captain Austin's ship. Captain Austin was made acquainted with the circumstances. Captain Penny was recalled, and on the subsequent day I was left in charge of the "Felix" off the Crimson Cliffs near Dudley Digges. Then an investigation took place that I am not cognizant of. Sir John Ross, Captain Ommanney, and Captain Penny went back to Cape York and investigated the subject. On Sir John Ross returning after the second investigation, he told me there was some mistake, for that the story was now that one ship had been wintering round Cape Dudley Digges. The squadron having arrived off Cape Dudley Digges, Captain Austin hailed the "Felix," and asked Sir John Ross what he wished to do. Sir John said he should like to proceed into Wolstenholme Sound, to pursue this inquiry with Captain Ommanney, and the "Felix" was taken in tow by the "Assistance" and her tender, and these three vessels proceeded towards Wolstenholme Sound, Captain Austin and his tender and the "Prince

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Albert" going away to Lancaster Sound and Ponds Bay. Captain Ommanney was detached to investigate the truth of this report, and Sir John Ross took the advantage of the steam tow that was offered to us so kindly to go also. Having arrived off the entrance of Wolstenholme Sound, Captain Ommanney and myself and Adam Beck, and a young native called Erasmus York, embarked on board the "Intrepid," leaving the "Assistance" and the "Felix" outside of Wolstenholme Sound. We proceeded up the sound about five miles,—about halfway,—when we observed from the vessel some Esquimaux huts, two or three in number. We landed there, and the first things we saw were some preserved meat tins, bits of hoop, and undoubted evidence of a Queen's ship having been there. As we were still anxious about this massacre report, we were very much excited, and a very careful search was made in the neighbourhood. The huts were examined, and either in the first or second hut that we examined, I am not sure which, there were decomposing remains of human beings, which we were able to satisfy ourselves were Esquimaux, and Erasmus York manifested a great deal of emotion when an attempt was made to strip one of the bodies. It was covered with something like a blanket. He lifted up his hands, and cried pitcously, when he found we intended to strip the body. From what we heard from Adam Beck, we understood that the body was that of Erasmus York's brother. A harpoon and a bow were lying by the side of him. We were convinced that they were not Europeans, and therefore Captain Ommanney would not allow the bodies to be disturbed. Two or three clusters of huts were examined in this way. The steamer then proceeded further up the sound, and we saw three well built cairns, (mounds of stone about twelve feet in height,) the best built cairns I ever saw, and which must have taken a great deal of time and labour to put up. The first cairn was opened in my presence and that of Captain Ommanney, and we were all very much excited. Adam Beck was standing by at this time. The preserved meat tin was discovered in due course. It was secreted in the cairn. A paper was taken out of it, which I have since read in print. I have a memorandum of it, but I have not the original document with me. It was a memorandum from Mr. Saunders of the "North Star," stating that his ship had been beset on the 29th of July. The most important part that struck me in connexion with Adam Beck's story was reported to me by one of the officers. I did not hear it myself. As reported to me, Adam Beck used these words, "Adam Beck no good. I lie." After that we proceeded in a boat to examine cairns about two miles off, in another position. That was examined, and there we found a counterpart of the paper that we found in the first cairn. There then remained the third cairn to be examined, near the graves of the "North Star" people. Captain Ommanney and myself went, but Adam Beck wandered away, I imagined under the influence of shame. The third cairn contained a statement to the same effect as discovered in the two first. It was to mark the spot where the poor men of the "North Star" crew had been buried. Adam Beck would not come down to the boat, and we had to go off to the steamer without him. I was a little uneasy about him, not knowing what he might do under the influence of shame, as I fancied; but as I knew that the "Intrepid" would have to stop there two or three hours, to lodge particulars of our visit, I did not ask for a boat to be sent for him; it was not necessary, for he came on board two or three hours after in the boat sent to lodge the Intrepid's papers and rebuild the cairn. I had then come to the conclusion that this story of Adam Beck's was a fabrication, and I said so in the presence of Sir John Ross and Captain Ommanney. That, however, was merely an opinion I had formed. We then rejoined the "Felix," and Captain Ommanney was kind enough to tow us round the north end of the ice. As soon as we got to the north-west end, and the west land appeared in sight, a fresh breeze sprung up, and Captain Ommanney cast us off.

613. *Chairman*.—Are you aware that Adam Beck has since made a deposition which has been sent to Copenhagen to be translated?

*Commander Phillips*.—Yes, I know that to be the case.

614. *Chairman*.—That is all you know on the subject?

*Commander Phillips*.—Yes.

615. *Chairman*.—Did you yourself examine the barrier of ice in Wellington Strait?

• *Commander Phillips*.—We were not high enough up in the "Felix."

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616. *Chairman.*—You did not go there in the course of your land journey?  
*Commander Phillips.*—No; not further than Cape Hotham.

617. *Chairman.*—You saw the ice when you crossed Wellington Strait in 1851, did you not?

*Commander Phillips.*—We saw the ice when we came round Cape Hotham in tow of Captain Austin. Our course then lay towards Cape Riley, and led us into open water. We were not near enough to form any judgment upon the subject of barrier ice.

618. *Sir E. Parry.*—At the present moment, what is your impression as to the truth of Adam Beck's report?

*Commander Phillips.*—I think it is a fabrication of Adam Beck's.

619. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you know the story of that piece of wood (adverting to a piece of wood produced before the Committee on a previous day)?

*Commander Phillips.*—That piece of wood was brought on board the "Felix" on the 7th or 8th of September 1850. Adam Beck had got a little tipsy, and had run away from the vessel in the morning, just as she was getting ready to start, because he said if we went any further we should not come back. He was evidently much frightened. The vessel had to be made fast. We tried to catch him, but could not. He came on board in the evening, and a couple of days afterwards I was told he brought this piece of wood on board.

620. *Chairman.*—We should tell you that Sir John Ross has said that he saw Adam Beck from the "Felix" with the wood upon his shoulder?

*Commander Phillips.*—I heard some one say that he had got a piece of wood on his shoulder. I was below at tea when he brought it, and I did not see him.

621. *Sir G. Back.*—Do you know anything about the piece of tin said to have been found in that wood?

*Commander Phillips.*—I was sent to look for it a few weeks ago. On the 12th of August 1851, after we had been cast off by Captain Austin, the "Felix" made a visit to the land ice of Beechey Island within a mile of Franklin's Graveyard. Sir John Ross desired me to go with Mr. Abernethy,--the surgeon of the "Felix," two of the seamen, and Adam Beck, who was to show us the place where he had found this piece of wood, and where Adam Beck told us he had thrown a piece of tin away in 1850. We were accompanied by Adam Beck to a height of seven or eight or nine hundred feet, I think, of almost precipitous cliffs, overlooking the entrance to the bay in which no doubt the "Erebus" and "Terror" wintered in 1845. Adam Beck told us this was the spot, and we searched very carefully in every direction from the precipice, I may call it, fully 100 feet backwards and forwards in each direction.

622. *Sir G. Back.*—Was there any snow on the ground at that time?

*Commander Phillips.*—No snow. It was loose shingle and slate sandstone. The spot on which Adam Beck said the post had been set did certainly look as if a number of slates had been collected to form a mound in which to insert the post. That was all the evidence that I could gather there that a post had been set up. We searched diligently for papers, and for the piece of tin which he said he had thrown away. We found nothing whatever, and we returned on board again.

623. *Sir G. Back.*—Did Adam Beck notice any writing upon the tin?

*Commander Phillips.*—Yes; it had upon it the words, September 1846, according to Adam Beck.

624. *Chairman.*—And he can read and write?

*Commander Phillips.*—Oh yes; Esquimaux, or what he calls Esquimaux.

625. *Chairman.*—You are aware that there are letters cut upon this wood? Could Adam Beck have cut them?

*Commander Phillips.*—Adam Beck is quite capable of cutting those letters on wood.

626. *Sir E. Parry.*—Was Adam Beck in the habit of getting drunk?

*Commander Phillips.*—Whenever he could.

627. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you happen to know whether he was tipsy at the time he made the report respecting the crews of two ships in the north-east part of Baffin's Bay?

*Commander Phillips*.—Certainly not.

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628. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you think the fact of his getting drunk would throw discredit upon his statement?

*Commander Phillips*.—No. I think fear of being led by the voyage into danger induced him to fabricate this story.

629. *Sir E. Parry*.—You mean extending the length of your voyage?

*Commander Phillips*.—Yes; thinking that we were going too far, and that we should never come back again.

630. *Sir G. Back*.—Have you been employed in the Polar regions before you accompanied Sir John Ross?

*Commander Phillips*.—Not in the North Polar, but in the Antarctic regions.

631. *Sir G. Back*.—Then you have had experience amongst ice before?

*Commander Phillips*.—Yes; for four years.

632. *Chairman*.—Did you ever hear that Captain Penny had urged Captain Austin to persevere in his endeavour to search the Wellington Strait in 1851, with a view to find traces, if possible, of Sir John Franklin?

*Commander Phillips*.—No.

633. *Chairman*.—Do you think you should have known if Captain Penny had so urged Captain Austin?

*Commander Phillips*.—Yes; Captain Austin was very communicative to me.

634. *Chairman*.—Then you are sure that no such idea was prevalent in the part of the expedition in which you were?

*Commander Phillips*.—That Captain Penny had applied to Captain Austin to prosecute the search? That is the question, I believe. If such had been the case it would have been known to me, certainly. Captain Austin would have told me, for he had often told me previously that he could not decide upon anything with reference to his squadron until Captain Penny reported his opinions to him. It was a great source of anxiety among the officers, what were the Captain's opinions, and the exclamation was frequently made, "I wish Captain Penny was in;" for on his report appeared to hang the question, whether they were to stop out another winter or not. It was discussed as a very probable circumstance that the "Assistance" and her tender would go home, and that Captain Austin and his tender would remain out.

635. *Chairman*.—Did you see Captain Penny after he returned from his last expedition?

*Commander Phillips*.—Yes. I went out to welcome him in. I had come to the conclusion that it was not my place to ask questions. I said, "There are no traces, I suppose," and that "you are all well." He had walked forty or fifty miles that day, and I thought it would be out of place to trouble him.

636. *Chairman*.—At any subsequent period did you understand that it was Captain Penny's intention to urge Captain Austin to prosecute the search in Wellington Strait?

*Commander Phillips*.—Subsequent to the 25th of July 1851, I recollect Captain Penny said to me, as he was going up the ladder, "I shall ask Captain Austin to put a steamer under my orders," or words to that effect. I made no observation, because I knew there would be technical difficulties in the way, and I felt sure that if steam was wanted it would be sent.

637. *Chairman*.—Is that all you know upon the subject?

*Commander Phillips*.—That is all I know about the steamer.

638. *Chairman*.—This transpired after Captain Penny's return?

*Commander Phillips*.—Yes; two or three days.



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639. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—What are we to understand by technical difficulties?

*Commander Phillips.*—I mean that we could not put a naval officer in commission under Captain Penny.

640. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—It was not in reference to the steam?

*Commander Phillips.*—Oh no.

641. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—You were present on some of the occasions when search was made in the winter quarters of Beechey Island and Cape Riley?

*Commander Phillips.*—The winter quarters in Beechey Island, but not in Cape Riley.

642. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Do you consider that the search for records connected with the "Erebus" and "Terror" was so complete that there was no probability of any, if left by those ships, being overlooked and left behind?

*Commander Phillips.*—I am quite satisfied of that.

643. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did you make your search with the same object at any other places you visited with the "Felix"?

*Commander Phillips.*—Yes; in the neighbourhood of the winter quarters I went over myself. Whenever we walked or travelled it was always with eyes on the ground. We stopped nowhere else, except at Barlow Inlet.

644. *Sir G. Back.*—Will you point out how far you went on Cornwallis Island itself?

*Commander Phillips.*—75 degrees 29 minutes was the farthest I went.

645. *Sir G. Back.*—Did you see open water?

*Commander Phillips.*—No.

646. *Sir G. Back.*—Did you meet any animals in your way?

*Commander Phillips.*—Two deer.

647. *Sir G. Back.*—If you had been distressed for food, could you have supplied yourself and party with your guns?

*Commander Phillips.*—Not during the first eighteen days of our travelling; after the 3d of June we might possibly have got a few birds.

648. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Having been second in command under Sir John Ross, did you form any opinion of the course Sir John Franklin took after leaving his winter quarters at Beechey Island?

*Commander Phillips.*—I must confess that the opinion I have arrived at hardly satisfies myself, but I think Sir John Franklin and his crew perished on their way home. I will give my reasons for this conclusion: I think that no prudent man who had spent a winter in Barrow's Straits would attempt this unknown passage to Bhering Straits—the passage by the Wellington Strait to Bhering Straits—with two years provisions, some of them probably suspicious as to quality, and having experienced his full average of mortality,—three deaths out of 138. Under these circumstances, I think he would not have taken this passage without depositing documents in a conspicuous place to say where supplies and support might be passed on to him. And I do not think it quite agrees with the ordinary discipline of the navy that the beach of the winter quarters should be left as it was. Certainly the articles left were of no great value, but a man who was to make the north-west passage would not have left even a smith's block. An American officer remarked to me that there was no sign of the people being in want who wintered there. The absence of any document to indicate his proceedings makes me fear that he left Beechey Island to come home.

649. *Sir E. Parry.*—From what you saw of the harbour in Beechey Island, do you think that ships could have been forced out of it with or by the ice?

*Commander Phillips.*—Not at all likely. There would be great trouble in getting out.

650. *Sir E. Parry.*—From what you saw, and from what you have heard from others, do you think it possible that parties of men entirely dependent upon their own resources could exist through the year by laying up in the summer season that which was to last them for the rest of the year, supposing them to have arms and ammunition?

*Commander Phillips.*—I do not think they could. I have heard Captain Penny

express his conviction that life could be sustained under such circumstances. I have often heard it, but I doubt it. Deer are difficult to take in an open country. In answer to the question, I must say I think not.

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651. *Sir E. Parry*.—Had you been in command of either of these two expeditions that went out under Captain Austin and Captain Penny, should you have felt justified in prosecuting this search further in the autumn of 1851?

*Commander Phillips*.—From what I recollect of the Admiralty orders to both of those officers, and Captain Penny's emphatic reply contained in his letter to Captain Austin of the 11th August last, (I mean that in which Captain Penny says, "Wellington Channel requires no further search," and that "all has been done in the power of man to accomplish,") I should say certainly not. I do not think there was any strong probability that the "Erebus" and "Terror" went up the Wellington Channel. The piece of wood that Captain Penny picked up I suppose is accounted for now by the position into which the American vessels are said to have been driven.

The evidence of this witness having closed, and another witness being about to be called,—

*Captain Penny* asked whether he should remain in the room while his officers were being examined, and was informed by the Chairman that he might do exactly what he liked in the matter. The Committee had not the slightest wish that he should withdraw.

*Captain Penny* said, that, having objected to Captain Austin being present during the examination of his officers, he thought it right to withdraw. He then left the room.

Mr. GOODSIR called.

*Mr. Goodsir.*

652. *Chairman*.—I believe you were the principal medical officer on board the "Lady Franklin?"

*Mr. Goodsir*.—Yes, I was.

653. *Chairman*.—And you commanded the exploring expedition to the west side of Wellington Strait?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—Yes, I did.

654. *Chairman*.—Be good enough to give the Committee an account of what you know in reference to the open water?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—The first appearance of open water we noticed was on the 17th of May 1851. We were then up the eastern headland of Abandon Bay. We merely noticed the water sky then; we did not see the water itself to the eastern end of Hamilton Island. It was a heavy black sky. On the 19th of May we found the ice very much decayed, and had great difficulty in dragging our sledges over it. That was in the south channel. At the latter part of that day's journey, where the ice was completely decayed, we found it full of seal holes and saw walruses in the open water. On the 20th we were storm-stayed. On the evening of the 21st I went with one of the men to the top of the eastern headland of Disappointment Bay, and then saw the open water plainly for the first time. There were long lanes stretching from east to west in the south channel. We then proceeded to the westward, and every day saw more and more open water. When we got to the farthest west, which was "Goodsir's and Marshall's Farthest," marked on the chart, the water was evidently increasing. There was not much water to the north of Milne Island at that time, but the ice was fast decaying. That was on the 1st of June, the thermometer being at that time 45 plus. The ice was drifting so fast that we thought it prudent to return on the 1st of June, having been out 27 days.

655. *Chairman*.—Did you consider that the water was sufficiently open for navigation?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—I consider that the water was sufficiently open. It would have been navigable by a boat if we had had one. I could have examined Houston Stewart Island, Milne Island, Baring Island, and Hamilton Island.

656. *Chairman*.—Did you, either in going or in returning, examine the ice in Wellington Strait, properly so called,—the line of ice marked above and below in the chart?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—Yes, we did.

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657. *Chairman.*—What was your opinion of it?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—I saw no ice of the previous season until I came to the westward of Point Decision, between Point Decision and Point Phillips, where we passed over detached pieces of ice two years old. All the other was of the formation of 1850–1851, as far as I am able to judge; indeed I am almost confident of it. I may mention, that Peterson the interpreter held the same opinion, that it was the ice of one season.

658. *Captain Beechey.*—From what did you form your opinion of its being the formation of 1850 and 1851?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—One who has been accustomed to see ice can easily form such an opinion. The ice of two years is of a peculiar wavy appearance, in consequence of its having been honeycombed by the heat of the previous summer; the ice of one season being level on its general surface.

659. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you ascertain the thickness of the ice?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—Yes; the average thickness of the ice must have been between five and six feet between Point Decision and Point Phillips. In the south channel it was not more than three feet thick.

660. *Captain Beechey.*—Have you had much experience in polar seas?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—I have been two voyages to the Arctic regions; in the summer of 1849 before the last.

661.—*Captain Beechey.*—Can you give us the date about which you were at your farthest point in Victoria Channel, where Mr. Marshall made the observations on the tides?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—That would be on the 4th or 5th of June, north-west of Cape Austin.

662. *Sir G. Back.*—Did you see any animals?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—We saw upwards of twenty bears and thirty rein-deer during the whole journey, and some of both were shot. The first ptarmigan we saw was on the 15th of June.

663. *Sir G. Back.*—Any birds?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—Yes; a great number of long-tailed ducks in particular, and of gulls, guillemots, &c.

664. *Sir G. Back.*—Not over the ice?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—No, at the open water.

665. *Sir E. Parry.*—From what you saw, and from what you have heard from others, do you think it possible that parties of men entirely dependent on their own resources could exist through the year by laying up in the summer season that which was to last them for the rest of the year, supposing them furnished with arms and ammunition?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—They might, with difficulty, if they had plenty of ammunition.

666. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you see much drift wood in your journey?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—Not much, in consequence of its being so early in the season. The beaches were found to be deeply covered with snow. We did find drift wood on the eastern side of Lady Hamilton Bay. We found a rough spar of pine without bark twelve feet long.

667. *Sir G. Back.*—Much blanché?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—Yes; very much blanché, and evidently of a great age.

668. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did you at the farthest point you reached ascend the highest land of “Goodsir’s and Marshall’s Farthest” as marked in the chart?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—Yes; from about 150 to 180 feet high was the highest point we ascended;—it was the highest ground in the neighbourhood, the coast being very low;—to a low round-topped hill.

669. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—At what distance did you see the water to the north-west?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—Not further than the north end of Milne Island. We could see a faint loom to the north-west after that.

670. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—What do you think was the extent of your vision?

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*Mr. Goodsir*.—From twenty-five to thirty miles.

671. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you yourself distinguish the islands, Parker's and Barrow's Islands, marked on the chart?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—No; I cannot say I did.

672. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—From your observation, did you form an opinion that there was a free channel to the north-west?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—Yes, I did.

673. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you take notice of the strength of the tide in the south channel?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—The only way I had of judging of the tides was, when leaving Cape Austin, on the 4th and 5th of June, by the extra rapidity with which the ice flowed out of the south channel into the Queen's Channel. The ice was going at that time at five or six miles an hour.

674. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—You found no traces of Sir John Franklin's expedition through all your travels?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—No.

675. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—I think you said you had entered in your journal the state of the temperature?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—Yes. I sent my journals on that subject to Sir Edward Parry.

676. *Sir E. Parry*.—Have you any reason to think the climate is better in the neighbourhood of the Queen's channel than at Assistance Harbour?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—No.

677. *Sir E. Parry*.—You landed at Beechey Island, and saw the things left by Sir John Franklin?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—Yes.

678. *Sir E. Parry*.—From what you saw, do you think the Franklin expedition departed hastily from that harbour?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—I do not think there is any evidence of that, except the few things that were left behind.

679. *Sir E. Parry*.—From what you have seen of the arctic regions, do you believe that it was possible that a ship could have been forced out of that harbour by or with the ice?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—No, I do not.

680. *Sir E. Parry*.—Considering all the circumstances that have come to your knowledge, which way do you think the Franklin expedition went, on leaving Beechey Island?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—Since the journey I made up there, I always had an idea that he went up Wellington Channel to the Queen's Channel.

681. *Sir E. Parry*.—On what do you ground that opinion?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—That in the summer of 1846 Sir John Franklin had found Wellington Channel open, and that, having gone up there, he found Queen's Channel in the same state as we found it in 1851. At different times Wellington Channel has been seen,—twice by Sir Edward Parry,—clear of ice, and although it was blocked with ice when we passed it in 1850, still, as far as I was able to judge, when travelling over the ice of Wellington Channel in May 1851, I formed the idea that it had been clear of ice in the autumn of 1850. Taking all these things into consideration, it is probable that Sir John Franklin found it clear of ice, and proceeded up in that direction.

*Mr. Manson.*

682. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you make any observations for latitude yourself?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—No; we had no artificial horizon with us.

683. *Sir E. Parry*.—How did you determine the position of the places where you were? What means did you use?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—The position of the farthest point we reached was laid down by that of Houston Stewart Island according to Captain Penny's position.

*Mr. Goodsir.*  
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684. *Sir E. Parry.*—How did you determine the other distances and positions? Was it by “dead reckoning”?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—Yes. At the end of every day’s journey I consulted with Mr. Marshall and one or two of the seamen as to the distances they thought they had travelled, and I generally took the mean of the different opinions.

685. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—You were at the winter quarters of Beechey Island?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—Yes.

686. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Do you consider the search for records at winter quarters at Beechey Island was so complete as to render it improbable that Sir John Franklin had left any there?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—I think it improbable that Sir John Franklin could have left any there, because there would be no necessity for concealing them. So many people landed there that there was a great deal of confusion, and no method in the search, so that it is possible some document might have been turned over, and thus escaped notice; but it is not very likely. Directly it was known that we had found anything, the whole of the crews, Americans and our own, and Sir John Ross’s, were on the spot. I should add that Captain Austin’s ships were not there at the time I am speaking of.

687. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Were you present at any examination at Cape Riley, of the circle of stones?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—No; I was not at Cape Riley.

688. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Captain Penny, I believe, returned before you?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—Yes.

689. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did you ever hear of Captain Penny applying to Captain Austin for assistance with a steamer to proceed up the Wellington Channel?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—I heard of it on the 12th of August. I merely heard the report.

690. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—From whom did you hear it?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—It was a vague rumour, spreading very much amongst the crews of the “Lady Franklin” and the “Sophia.” Captain Penny did not tell me that he had made such an application. Captain Penny had frequently spoken of proposing to Captain Austin to have a steamer.

691. *Sir G. Back.*—Did you hear Captain Penny say that he must have a steamer?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—Yes; that he must proceed up Wellington Channel in a steamer.

692. *Chairman.*—Did you notice the barrier of ice on your return as well as on your progress out?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—Yes; it was decaying, and it was covered with water between Cape De Haven and Barlow Inlet from six inches to a foot in depth.

693. *Sir E. Parry.*—Was that in consequence of the melting of the snow on the ice?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—Yes.

694. *Sir E. Parry.*—Was there much snow upon it?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—Yes; and at the outlet of all the streams in the land there were large cracks. To the north of Dépôt Point we passed many cracks on the ice. It was very difficult to get our sledges over, the cracks being five or six feet broad. We could just leap them, and get our sledges over. It extended to the eastward as far as we could see.

695. *Sir E. Parry.*—That was about what season?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—It was on the 14th of June 1851.

696. *Chairman.*—Had you any further opportunity of examining the ice in that direction?

*Mr. Goodsir.*—The ice to the south of Barlow Inlet was not so much decayed, and the whole way to Assistance Harbour; there was no water on it.

697. *Chairman*.—Have you any reason for believing that during the autumn of 1850 Wellington Strait was clear of ice?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—I say it was clear, for I have every reason to believe that all the ice we passed over in Wellington Channel was ice of the previous winter's formation.

*Mr. Goodsir.*

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699. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you find any old Esquimaux traces?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—Yes; a few at Abandon Bay, and even there, they were so faint that I was doubtful whether they were remains; they might have been formed by natural causes.

700. *Sir E. Parry*.—But if they were Esquimaux traces, they must have been very old?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—Yes; very ancient. Others were found on the south coast of Cornwallis Island, about Cape Hotham and Cape Martyr.

701. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you leave any of your own traces as you returned?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—Yes; at Cape Austin a large cairn, and another at the farthest point reached called "Goodsir's and Marshall's Point."

702. *Sir G. Back*.—In your opinion was everything done that was possible to prosecute the search for Franklin?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—For that season, everything that could possibly be done, unless we had remained a little longer in Beechey Island.

703. *Sir G. Back*.—When you say that season, did you mean 1851?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—Yes.

704. *Chairman*.—In what manner would you have proposed to proceed if you had remained there?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—By endeavouring to carry out the search in Queen's Channel, although I do not think much good would have been done. Of course it would depend upon how the ice cleared out of Wellington Channel.

705. *Chairman*.—You think there was a fair probability of the ice clearing out of Wellington Strait?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—From what has been seen of it on previous occasions, I think there was.

706. *Chairman*.—Do you think you could have waited to see whether the ice would clear out of the strait without incurring the risk of passing another winter in that vicinity?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—We might have waited for a month longer.

707. *Chairman*.—It would appear that Captain Penny had made up his mind to return before he communicated with Captain Austin?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—I do not know. He was not much in the habit of communicating his intentions.

708. *Chairman*.—The day he communicated with Captain Austin (on the 12th of August) he sailed for England; did he not?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—Yes; he sailed that very day for England.

709. *Chairman*.—Does not that show, in your opinion, that he had made up his mind to return to England?

*Mr. Goodsir*.—Yes, I think so.

Mr. MANSON called.

*Mr. Manson.*

710. *Chairman*.—What situation did you fill?

*Mr. Manson*.—That of chief mate of the "Sophia."

711. *Sir E. Parry*.—And I believe you were third in command of the expedition?

*Mr. Manson*.—Yes, I was.

712. *Chairman*.—How many Arctic voyages have you made?

*Mr. Manson*.—Forty-two. I made twenty to Greenland and twenty-two to Davis's Straits.

*Mr. Manson.*  
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713. *Chairman.*—You remained in charge of the ship when the exploring expeditions were sent out?

*Mr. Manson.*—Yes; I was in charge of both ships.

714. *Chairman.*—You made observations with respect to the ice?

*Mr. Manson.*—That was under my notice.

715. *Chairman.*—And you delivered in these observations?

*Mr. Manson.*—Yes.

716. *Chairman.*—Had you any opportunity of examining the fast ice in Wellington Strait?

*Mr. Manson.*—No. I was not in the travelling parties; I was in charge of the ships.

717. *Chairman.*—Did you see the ice in the Wellington Strait in the autumn of 1850, when you were in Beechey Island? What is your opinion of that ice, and how long do you think it has been there?

*Mr. Manson.*—I cannot with any confidence say how long it has been there.

718. *Sir G. Back.*—Not whether it was old or new ice?

*Mr. Manson.*—It might have been two years. I was only passing along, and did not observe it accurately.

719. *Chairman.*—Can you give a decided opinion how long it was since the straits were opened?

*Mr. Manson.*—No; I cannot, positively.

720. *Chairman.*—Did Captain Penny ever consult you as to the steps he should take, after having discovered open water above the ice in Wellington Strait?

*Mr. Manson.*—Repeatedly.

721. *Chairman.*—What did you consider to be his opinion of the open water?

*Mr. Manson.*—Captain Penny's opinion, when he returned, was, that there was a probability of getting a boat into that water; that was his first impression.

722. *Chairman.*—Then he did get a boat into the water?

*Mr. Manson.*—Yes, he did.

723. *Chairman.*—Well, he came back after that expedition after having had a boat in the open water, what was your impression of the state of the ice, and sound altogether?

*Mr. Manson.*—As to the probability of getting up the Wellington Strait, one of the ships was to be left behind, and one was to go up the Wellington Strait. One vessel was to remain behind at some convenient point; Beechey Island, for example. Captain Penny was to proceed up the channel with the "Sophia," with Mr. Stewart as well as Captain Penny.

724. *Chairman.*—Do you think such an opportunity offered when you were there?

*Mr. Manson.*—Not that I am aware of.

725. *Chairman.*—If you had to give your advice on the subject, how much longer would you have remained to see whether the channel would have cleared or not?

*Mr. Manson.*—We might have remained there until the 12th of September; but I do not know. We were fixed in our winter quarters at that time in 1850.

726. *Chairman.*—You might have had a reasonable expectation that you would have been frozen up?

*Mr. Manson.*—Yes; and we had to guard against it.

727. *Chairman.*—Do you think you might have remained a fortnight with safety?

*Mr. Manson.*—I do not know; the seasons differ so.



728. *Sir G. Back*.—With your great experience of the ice, does your knowledge of it enable you to say whether it was likely to continue open?

*Mr. Manson*.—I assure you the seasons differ so very much that I can give no positive answer on the subject; but I think we might have remained about a fortnight.

*Mr. Manson.*

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729. *Chairman*.—Had not Captain Penny made up his mind to return to England without any communication with Captain Austin?

*Mr. Manson*.—I cannot say that.

730. *Chairman*.—On what day did you communicate with Captain Austin?

*Mr. Manson*.—On the 11th of August.

731. *Chairman*.—On what day did you sail for England?

*Mr. Manson*.—On the 12th of August.

732. *Sir E. Parry*.—You have said that Captain Penny mentioned at one time that he would leave one ship somewhere about Beechey Island, and would take the other ship himself up Wellington Strait. When did he alter that view?

*Mr. Manson*.—He never altered it, to the best of my knowledge. There was not an opportunity of doing so. Captain Penny's opinion was formed when in winter quarters; when liberated from winter quarters, if there was a probability of proceeding with one of the ships he would have done so. I was to remain behind.

733. *Sir E. Parry*.—Why did he not do it?

*Mr. Manson*.—Because there was not a probability of getting up.

734. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you think there was not a probability of getting up?

*Mr. Manson*.—None, when we left on the 12th of August.

735. *Sir E. Parry*.—How much of the navigable season was remaining then?

*Mr. Manson*.—That is a quarter of the Arctic seas that I have not much experience of. Perhaps a fortnight would be about the time.

736. *Sir E. Parry*.—Then if you had wished to get up Wellington Channel would you have stopped that fortnight to look at it, and to see what chance there was?

*Mr. Manson*.—There was a probability, if I may use such an expression, of the ships being beset. Again I do not think there was sufficient provisions in the ships to carry on another winter. I think that Captain Penny and Captain Austin did well in coming home.

737. *Sir E. Parry*.—With respect to the tides which you have particularly observed, was there anything by which you could judge which way the flood tide came?

*Mr. Manson*.—My impression was, that, during the time of the water flowing, the tide went to the westward; but we were so far embayed that we could not positively say.

738. *Sir George Back*.—Could you judge of the rise and fall?

*Mr. Manson*.—Yes; the rise was about six feet two inches.

*Sir E. Parry* said, Nothing could be more creditable than the manner in which *Mr. Manson* observed the tides, judging from his journals. The manner in which he did this was highly ingenious and useful.

739. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you search Beechey Island?

*Mr. Manson*.—No, I did not. I was in charge of the ships.

740. *Sir E. Parry*.—What is your impression now, as to the probable course the Franklin expedition took after leaving Beechey Island?

*Mr. Manson*.—The only impression I have is, that they have gone up the Wellington Channel; but really I have no very great reasons to assign for it; but that is my opinion as to the way the expedition went.

*Mr. Manson.*

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741. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you think, from what you know of Beechey Island and the harbour there, that ships could be forced out by or with the ice?

*Mr. Manson.*—I had not an opportunity of judging, never having been on it.

742. *Sir E. Parry.*—You think that Wellington Channel is occasionally navigable?

*Mr. Manson.*—Well, I should think so. My reason is, that the ice, as far as we saw, never attained to extraordinary thickness, and must disappear occasionally, although perhaps not every year.

743. *Sir E. Parry.*—You think that occasionally it is navigable?

*Mr. Manson.*—Yes, I suppose so.

744. *Sir G. Back.*—Will you state what thickness the ice was?

*Mr. Manson.*—Every season, in my opinion, there is about a quarter of the ice which attains to a thickness of from five to eight feet. I mean by an extraordinary thickness, that in two or three years it would amount to a thickness of from 12 to 14 feet by accumulation.

745. *Sir G. Back.*—Under these circumstances, do you consider that everything was done that was possible to be done for the search of Sir John Franklin?

*Mr. Manson.*—Yes, there was, in my opinion, for that season, (1851,) by both expeditions.

746. *Chairman.*—When did you begin making the boat sledges on board the “Lady Franklin” after Captain Penny’s return?

*Mr. Manson.*—As soon as Captain Penny returned, it was set in agitation about the boat sledges. Captain Penny went over and called upon Captain Austin, and upon his return preparation was continued for a new sledge. The first preparation for the boat was meant for Ponds Bay, and when Captain Penny returned it was intended then for the water Captain Penny had seen.

*Mr. J. Stuart.*

Mr. JOHN STUART called.

747. *Chairman.*—You were assistant surgeon and third officer on the “Lady Franklin,” I believe?

*Mr. Stuart.*—I acted as third mate at the request of Captain Penny. I went out as assistant surgeon.

748. *Chairman.*—Had you ever been in the Arctic seas before?

*Mr. Stuart.*—Never before.

749. *Chairman.*—So that you cannot speak as to the age of the ice?

*Mr. Stuart.*—No, I cannot, any more than a person who was out a single season.

750. *Chairman.*—You took an exploring party by yourself?

*Mr. Stuart.*—Yes, I did.

751. *Chairman.*—How far did you go?

*Mr. Stuart.*—We started from Assistance Harbour, and proceeded up the Wellington Strait as far as Point Separation, crossed over a little to southward of Cape Grinnel, and then proceeded along the shores of North Devon to Cape Hurd.

752. *Chairman.*—Describe the appearance of the ice in Wellington Strait?

*Mr. Stuart.*—It was perfectly smooth; covered with deep snow. We met at different parts as we crossed over what we thought to be old ice, but they were detached pieces apparently left there, and the new ice formed around them.

753. *Chairman.*—How far north and south did the ice extend, as far as you could judge?

*Mr. Stuart.*—When we crossed there was ice in every direction as far as we could see. That was from the 10th to the 13th of May 1851.

754. *Chairman.*—State how far you went eastward?

*Mr. Stuart.*—As far eastward as longitude 90°.

755. *Chairman*.—And then did you return for want of provisions, or because there were no traces, and you thought it useless to go on?

*Mr. Stuart*.—I was ordered to return on reaching that point. I found no traces to the north of Cape Spencer; but at Caswall's Tower there were traces of a party from the Franklin expedition having been there.

*Mr. J. Stuart.*

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756. *Chairman*.—What were those traces?

*Mr. Stuart*.—The arrangement of stone usual in putting up tents, several tin canisters marked "Goldner", a few glass bottles, and remains of a fire.

757. *Sir G. Back*. Did you look for any document near that spot?

*Mr. Stuart*.—There were two cairns, but no documents.

758. *Sir G. Back*.—And you saw no further traces as far as Cape Hurd?

*Mr. Stuart*.—Not any.

759. *Sir G. Back*.—In going along the coast, did you perceive any animals?

*Mr. Stuart*.—Yes; five hares at Cape Bowden, and one hare at Cape Riley.

760. *Sir E. Parry*.—You found an apparent encampment near Caswall's Tower.

*Mr. Stuart*.—Yes.

761. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you meet with any cairns of stone about there?

*Mr. Stuart*.—Yes; there were two near where the party was supposed to have encamped.

762. *Sir G. Back*.—If you had not been provided with food, do you consider that you could have supplied yourselves and party with the aid of your guns?

*Mr. Stuart*.—I do not think we could.

763. *Sir E. Parry*.—Were you among the party at Beechey Island, searching for records?

*Mr. Stuart*.—Yes.

764. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you consider that the island was well searched?

*Mr. Stuart*.—Yes; thoroughly searched.

765. *Sir E. Parry*.—Were you on shore at Cape Riley?

*Mr. Stuart*.—Not during the autumn of 1850. In the spring of 1851 I passed Cape Riley.

766. *Sir E. Parry*.—Had you an opportunity of searching it?

*Mr. Stuart*.—I had, and saw a cairn that had been put up by Captain Ommanney, which had not been noticed by a former party from the "Sophia."

767. *Sir E. Parry*.—Is there anything else you wish to state?

*Mr. Stuart*.—Not at all.

768. *Sir E. Parry*.—No other information that would be of interest?

*Mr. Stuart*.—I think I stated I saw no animals but five hares; at Cape Ricketts, near Radstock Bay, I saw a number of mollymoks.

769. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you see any traces of Esquimaux?

*Mr. Stuart*.—There was a large Esquimaux encampment near Caswall Tower.

770. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you think it recent?

*Mr. Stuart*.—I should think it was not less than 100 years old.

Mr. HARWOOD called.

*Mr. Harwood.*

771. *Chairman*.—You were the chief engineer of the "Pioneer."

*Mr. Harwood*.—Yes.

772. *Chairman*. Had you ever been in the Arctic regions before this voyage?

*Mr. Harwood*.—No.

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773. *Sir E. Parry.*—You had an opportunity of seeing the effect of steam power in the navigation of those seas?

*Mr. Harwood.*—Yes.

774. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you think it was a very valuable assistance?

*Mr. Harwood.*—Yes, very valuable indeed.

775. *Sir E. Parry.*—Explain your own experience of it.

*Mr. Harwood.* On the 1st and 2d of September we were packed in the ice for some miles, and we were two days forcing our way through. If it had been a sailing vessel, we could not have done it.

776. *Sir E. Parry.*—But after the young ice begins to form, in consequence of the temperature falling, is steam power very valuable in prolonging the season of navigation?

*Mr. Harwood.*—We had one trial of that kind in the autumn of last year. We went round Griffith's Island, and the ice was three quarters of an inch thick. We forced through by steam, whereas a sailing vessel would, in all probability, not have accomplished it. But it was very calm then.

777. *Sir E. Parry.*—But in calm weather, when the young ice is formed, is steam power of great value?

*Mr. Harwood.*—Yes.

778. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you find any difficulty in respect to the ice getting into any of the pipes?

*Mr. Harwood.*—I found when the temperature was very low, the injection pipe froze so as not to be able to work.

779. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did it freeze when the loose ice got in?

*Mr. Harwood.*—The injection pipes froze so that we could not do any good with the vessel.

780. *Sir E. Parry.*—At what temperature do you recollect that that occurred?

*Mr. Harwood.*—2°+. It was on the 30th September when I had to get the steam up, to disconnect the screw, and to clear the engines and boiler from water.

781. *Sir E. Parry.*—When that is the case, the injection pipe becomes useless?

*Mr. Harwood.*—Yes.

782. *Sir E. Parry.*—Under these circumstances it would not be safe to keep a steamer at sea?

*Mr. Harwood.*—We could not obtain water for the boiler.

783. *Sir E. Parry.*—Have you any difficulty in clearing your pipes when they are not quite clear?

*Mr. Harwood.*—On the 26th June I got steam up to try the machinery, and found the water between the gratings in the bottom of the ship and Kingston's valves had frozen, so as to prevent pushing the valves down, which I easily cleared; this was about six weeks before we got clear of our winter quarters. I found no difficulty in clearing the pipes in the spring, because in the autumn I ran all the water out of them.

784. *Sir E. Parry.*—Is there anything you can suggest, as to the improvement of the steam machinery for the Arctic navigation?

*Mr. Harwood.*—Nothing further than that the expansion gear might be fitted. It would be a great saving of fuel, which, in such a place, is of great importance.

785. *Chairman.*—Then your vessels were not fitted with expansion gear?

*Mr. Harwood.*—No.

786. *Chairman.*—Supposing the injection pipes perfect, would the severity of the weather sometimes become so great that you would not venture your people on deck without danger to their lives?

*Mr. Harwood.*—Nothing in the temperature would be dangerous, provided the men were well clothed. It was not so cold at the time I spoke of. If it had been and a case of necessity arose, we could have fed the pipes with hot cinders.

787. *Sir G. Back*.—What is your opinion of the size of a steamer for navigating amongst the ice with effect? About as large as the "Pioneer," or larger?

*Mr. Harwood*.—About that size. If it had more power there would be a great increase in fuel; but if there were expansion gear it would remove the difficulty.

788. *Sir E. Parry*.—How many boilers had you?

*Mr. Harwood*.—Only one.

789. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was the screw very effective?

*Mr. Harwood*.—Yes, very good, and worked well.

790. *Chairman*.—Did you find that the aperture for the screw got frozen or choked up?

*Mr. Harwood*.—On the 1st and 2d of September there was a great quantity of ice passed through with the screw, which bent the cross rods and the corner of the screw, but we received no further injury; I found the screw worked much better when the vessel was drawing more water.

791. *Sir G. Back*.—There is an impression abroad that a steamer of larger power would make more way and get on faster than the "Pioneer," taking the season of navigation. What is your opinion on that point?

*Mr. Harwood*.—I do not think the greater power would be of much assistance. I think that the power of the vessel to run at the ice is almost sufficient, and is as much as a vessel can stand.

792. *Sir E. Parry*.—Had you any apparatus for lifting the screw up?

*Mr. Harwood*.—Yes.

793. *Sir E. Parry*.—Had you occasion to lift it often?

*Mr. Harwood*.—Yes, a great many times.

794. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Was the rudder unshipped at the same time?

*Mr. Harwood*.—Yes, except when sailing.

795. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you find that the concussions the ship met with on striking were liable to injure the machinery?

*Mr. Harwood*.—No.

796. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was the machinery in good order when your ship returned to England?

*Mr. Harwood*.—Some of the cylinder facings wanted repair, and some other minor repairs are required.

797. *Sir E. Parry*.—But that might have occurred in any other service?

*Mr. Harwood*.—Yes, certainly.

798. *Sir E. Parry*.—Then could you have remained out another season effectively with your steamer if it had been necessary?

*Mr. Harwood*.—Yes.

799. *Sir E. Parry*.—What was the temperature of your engine room; when you got into Baffin's Bay, for instance?

*Mr. Harwood*.—95, 96, and 100. I have seen it at 105.

Mr. RYDER called.

*Mr. Ryder*.

800. *Chairman*.—What vessel were you chief engineer of?

*Mr. Ryder*.—Of the "Intrepid."

801. *Chairman*.—Did you find, when the temperature fell very much, in the navigation of the Arctic regions that the pipes got choked up or frozen?

*Mr. Ryder*.—Yes; one pipe particularly; the injection pipe.

802. *Chairman*.—And you had no means of remedying that difficulty?

*Mr. Ryder*.—The remedy for the future would be to pass the injection pipe through the boiler; but this need only be used when the temperature was reduced.

803. *Chairman*.—How much later do you think a steamer can navigate the Arctic seas than a sailing vessel, taking into consideration the loss of the temperature and the coldness of the weather?

*Mr. Ryder*.—In our own case, as far as I could see, not many days. The

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ice was too thick, and we could not break it. If we had a powerful steamer we might navigate two or three weeks later than sailing vessels; but the increased consumption of fuel would not warrant that.

804. *Sir E. Parry.*—Could you have navigated longer in your own vessel than you did?

*Mr. Ryder.*—I think not.

805. *Sir E. Parry.*—You had apparatus for lifting the screw?

*Mr. Ryder.*—Yes; and were obliged to lift it some scores of times.

806. *Sir E. Parry.*—Was it under the same circumstances that you lifted the rudder?

*Mr. Ryder.*—No; sometimes we lifted the screw for sailing purposes.

807. *Sir E. Parry.*—Can you suggest any improvements in the machinery?

*Mr. Ryder.*—No, I think not, with regard to the screw, the shaftings, and the steam arrangements.

808. *Sir E. Parry.*—Were the engines in good order when you came here?

*Mr. Ryder.*—Yes. I understood that the engineers' report of the engines at Woolwich was, that we could have gone out again immediately if it had been required.

809. *Sir G. Back.*—Then your engines would have been effective for another winter?

*Mr. Ryder.*—Yes; but the fuel would have been insufficient.

810. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did you experience any difficulty in freeing the "Intrepid" from the ice at her winter quarters? What is your opinion on that subject, as it affects a screw steamer?

*Mr. Ryder.*—I am of opinion that there would be no difficulty whatever.

811. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did the vessel suffer?

*Mr. Ryder.*—No, not that I am aware of.

812. *Sir G. Back.*—In navigating these seas would you prefer a larger steamer than the "Intrepid?"

*Mr. Ryder.*—With a larger steamer there would be a larger consumption of fuel, and that is not advisable. You would not get increased speed or power in correspondence with the amount of fuel consumed. A heavier vessel might break through the ice, but the collision with the ice would be much increased.

813. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did your machinery suffer in any degree by concussion with the ice?

*Mr. Ryder.*—One of our suspending rods of the screw frame was damaged by being forced upon the berg. By the concussion with the ice with the composition screw, the entering angle of one blade was slightly bent. The screw was replaced by the wrought iron one, coming home, through all the difficult passages of the ice.

814. *Chairman.*—How soon could you get your screw up in an emergency?

*Mr. Ryder.*—It has been got up in seven minutes, and we can get it down in about eight or nine minutes. That is the shortest time.

815. *Sir E. Parry.*—Could you suggest any better mode of raising the screw than that which you had?

*Mr. Ryder.*—I dare say I might, upon consideration.

The Committee then adjourned.

*Seventh Day. November 4, 1851.*

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles, C.B., M.P., Chairman,  
 Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,  
 Captain Sir Edward Parry,  
 Captain F. W. Beechey,  
 Captain Sir George Back,  
 Mr. F. J. Fegen, Secretary.

LIEUTENANT M'CLINTOCK, late of the "Assistance," called.

*Lieut. M'Clintock.*

816. *Chairman.*—Were you on shore when the first traces were found of the wintering places of the "Erebus" and "Terror"?

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*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—No.

817. *Chairman.*—You have no personal knowledge of the search?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—No; I landed subsequently at Cape Riley.

818. *Chairman.*—From what you know, do you think the search for records was complete, and that there is no reason for apprehending that anything was overlooked or left behind?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—I think everything was quite complete.

819. *Chairman.*—Did you, in passing to the westward in September 1850, observe the Wellington Strait in such a manner as to be able to judge whether it was blocked up with ice at that time?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—We passed along the edge of the fixed ice.

820. *Chairman.*—What is your opinion of that barrier? Was it old ice or ice of the preceding year?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—It was ice of different formations, most of it was two or three years at the least.

821. *Chairman.*—Then it had been fixed in that place two or three years?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—Yes, I think so.

822. *Chairman.*—Do you consider yourself sufficiently competent to speak of the different sorts of ice that you observed?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—I think so; but there is a great deal of uncertainty as to the age of ice, which no amount of experience can remove.

823. *Sir E. Parry.*—How many voyages have you been?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—I have been out two winters and four summers in the Arctic seas.

824. *Chairman.*—Then it was your opinion that Wellington Strait had not been opened for any purposes of navigation during the preceding year 1849?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—Just so.

825. *Chairman.*—Have you any reason to believe that it opened in 1850?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—I think it did open.

826. *Chairman.*—You think it opened completely for navigation in 1850?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—I cannot say to what extent, perhaps about thirty or forty miles.



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827. *Chairman.*—What I ask you is, whether the Wellington Strait was navigable during 1850, whether the ships could go in?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—Yes, from what I have been told by Captain Penny, and from what I have heard of the American expeditions having drifted up, I think so.

828. *Chairman.*—What did you know of the American expeditions drifting up?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—They drifted up to 75° 25' from the published account.

829. *Chairman.*—Do you know from your own knowledge what progress the Americans made to the northward?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—No, I do not.

830. *Chairman.*—Can you speak of your own knowledge further about the navigation of Wellington Strait at that time?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—No.

831. *Chairman.*—When you returned this year, after you got out of your winter quarters, what was the state of Wellington Strait?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—We could see no ice along the eastern shore northwards of Beechey Island. We could see eight or ten miles to the north of Beechey Island in 1851.

832. *Chairman.*—State the date of that?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—I think it was on the 13th of August 1851.

833. *Chairman.*—You naturally saw the west first; what was the appearance of the channel on its western side?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—It was completely blocked with ice from Cape Hotham, about three quarters across the Wellington Channel.

834. *Chairman.*—Then in your opinion was there any reasonable hope that the strait might have become navigable during any part of the remaining season for navigation in those seas?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—Yes, I think so.

835. *Chairman.*—Do you think that if the expeditions had remained at the mouth of the strait about a fortnight longer, the strait might have cleared sufficiently to enable them to get into the open sea discovered by Captain Penny?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—I can only say that it is probable they would.

836. *Chairman.*—Why do you think it probable?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—From the portion I saw clear on the 13th of August, and from the forward state of the season in 1851.

837. *Chairman.*—Then with respect to the land journeys that you made during the early part of the year 1851, you are quite convinced that you searched every part of the Melville Island, and the whole coast between your wintering places and Sir Edward Parry's at Winter Harbour, as well as the whole of the coast marked as searched by you on this chart. You are quite convinced that your examination was so exact in that part that no traces of Sir John Franklin's expedition could have been overlooked?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—Yes, I am quite convinced of that. My examination commenced on Byam Martin Island; all that I examined confirms my belief that it would have been impossible that we could have passed any conspicuous traces of the Franklin expedition.

838. *Chairman.*—And there was no trace of anybody having been at Sir Edward Parry's wintering place until you arrived there yourself?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—None.

839. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did you trace any lane or lead in Wellington Strait at the time you spoke of, and how far?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—My answer was, that there was no ice observed from the crow's nest along the eastern shore; there was no obstruction to navigation at that time.

840. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you express to Captain Ommanney any opinion as to the probability of the passage through the strait at that time? *Lieut. M. Clintock*.—No.

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841. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—You were in the "Assistance" with Captain Ommanney?

*Lieutenant M. Clintock*.—Yes; the state of the ice was reported from the crow's nest and entered in the ship's log.

842. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Are you giving evidence of what was reported from the crow's nest, or what you saw yourself?

*Lieutenant M. Clintock*.—What was reported from the crow's nest. I am giving evidence from the report that was communicated to me, and not from my own observation.

843. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Then your opinion of the ice was not from your own observation but from the report from the crow's nest?

*Lieutenant M. Clintock*.—Yes, so far as regards the position of the ice.

844. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Who made the report from the crow's nest?

*Lieutenant M. Clintock*.—I do not recollect; there was constantly one of the petty officers in the crow's nest.

845. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Was it seen by the master or any other officers of the ship?

*Lieutenant M. Clintock*.—I am almost certain it was seen by Lieutenant Meecham, the third lieutenant of the ship.

846. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Were you at Cape Riley also?

*Lieutenant M. Clintock*.—Yes.

847. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—And took part in the search there of the cairns?

*Lieutenant M. Clintock*.—Yes.

848. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—There were some stones placed in circles, I believe?

*Lieutenant M. Clintock*.—Yes.

849. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Was such a search made of Cape Riley as to convince you that no record was left?

*Lieutenant M. Clintock*.—Yes.

850. *Sir E. Parry*.—Are you acquainted with the harbour of Beechey Island?

*Lieutenant M. Clintock*.—No.

851. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you know the form of it?

*Lieutenant M. Clintock*.—Yes, I think I do.

852. *Sir E. Parry*.—Is it your opinion that any ships could be forced out by or with the ice?

*Lieutenant M. Clintock*.—No.

853. *Sir E. Parry*.—When you were at Melville Island your resources would not permit you to go to the northward of Bushnan Cove, so that you had not any opportunity of seeing anything of the north shore of Melville Island?

*Lieutenant M. Clintock*.—No.

854. *Sir E. Parry*.—What was the state of the ice between Cape Dundas and Banks's Land?

*Lieutenant M. Clintock*.—It was remarkably heavy and closely packed.

855. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was it heavier ice than, generally speaking, you had seen to the eastward?

*Lieutenant M. Clintock*.—Yes, much heavier.

856. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was there any appearance of the probability of an opening in that ice up to the time you saw it?

*Lieutenant M. Clintock*.—The appearance of the ice was such as to indicate motion at some period of the year, but there was not the slightest appearance of its having been navigable to the westward of Melville Island.

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857. *Sir E. Parry.*—Was that the case also to the south of, where you were off Cape Dundas?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—Yes; it refers to the ice between Cape Dundas and Banks's Land.

858. *Sir E. Parry.*—Does that remark apply to the whole of the ice to the southward of Melville Island?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—No.

859. *Sir E. Parry.*—State whereabouts in your opinion it was likely to be navigable to the south of Melville Island?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—I think to the east of Winter Harbour.

860. *Sir E. Parry.*—What appearances gave you reason to suppose that?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—The much less crushed up appearance of the ice; and from the extensive floes there could not be so much pressure as there was off Cape Dundas.

861. *Sir E. Parry.*—Then you think a ship could probably get to the southward and westward more easily to the eastward of Winter Harbour than by going on to the west part of Melville Island?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—Yes.

862. *Sir E. Parry.*—You saw Banks's Land pretty clearly, did you not?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—Yes.

863. *Sir E. Parry.*—What sort of land did it appear?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—It was high land, similar in character to the land about Cape Dundas.

864. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you distinguish any capes?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—No.

865. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you see any ravines?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—Yes, several.

866. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you see any appearance of a water sky in that direction anywhere to the southward and westward of Melville Island?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—No.

867. *Sir E. Parry.*—What was the date at which your best view in that direction was obtained?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—It was on the 28th of May 1851.

868. *Sir G. Back.*—Where was your position?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—It was in about  $74^{\circ} 40'$  latitude (to the north of Cape Dundas) and  $114^{\circ} 28'$  longitude.

869. *Sir E. Parry.*—About what height were you above the sea?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—600 or 700 feet.

870. *Sir E. Parry.*—You said your examination of the coast began at Byam Martin Island; where did you end?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—My examination of the coast included the south part of Byam Martin Island, and then from Point Griffiths the whole of the southern coast of Melville Island to Cape Dundas, then along the west coast into Liddon's Gulf into Bushnan Cove, from which I returned over land to Winter Harbour, and then from Winter Harbour nearly the same course back to the ship. Returning from Byam Martin Island I followed round the shore of Graham Moore Bay to Cape Cockburn, and thence along the shores to the ship at Griffith's Island.

871. *Sir E. Parry.*—Had you an opportunity of noticing the rise and fall of the tides in any part of your voyage?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—No, except the indications along the shore.

872. *Sir E. Parry.*—You had no opportunity of noticing from which direction the flood tide came?

*Lieutenant M'Clintock.*—No.

873. *Captain Beechey*.—Did you make any observations on the stream outside Beechey Island? *Lieut. M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.

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*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—No.

874. *Captain Beechey*.—You do not know whether there was any stream probably?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—We made no observations on it, but we could not help remarking that the ice set to the eastward; that was independent of the wind I think.

875. *Captain Beechey*.—Then you are of opinion that the prevailing stream is to the southward and eastward out of Wellington Strait?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—Yes.

876. *Sir G. Back*.—May I ask you whether you saw any Esquimaux encampments on Melville Island?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—Yes, there were three or four different positions along the south shore.

877. *Sir G. Back*.—Were they old encampments, or of recent date?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—They were very old.

878. *Sir G. Back*.—Did you see any animals on the coast, more particularly on Melville Island?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—Yes.

879. *Sir G. Back*.—What were they?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—I saw four bears, forty-six musk oxen, twenty reindeer, seventy hares, one wolf, about fifty ptarmigan, many large flocks of Brent geese, and many ducks in large flocks.

880. *Sir G. Back*.—Of those how many did you kill?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—One bear, four musk oxen, one reindeer, five hares, twelve ptarmigan, thirteen ducks, and one Brent goose.

881. *Sir G. Back*.—Could you have killed more than that if your necessities had required it?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—Yes.

882. *Sir G. Back*.—How many more do you think you could have killed; could you have doubled or trebled the number?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—I think that nearly two thirds of the animals might have been killed, and a large number of ducks and geese.

883. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you notice which way the ducks and geese were flying?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—I think they generally came from the westward, and were going to the eastward.

884. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you at that time form any idea of any open water in the direction in which they were flying?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—No.

885. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was there any indication of open water to the north when you were upon Melville Island?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—No.

886. *Sir E. Parry*.—From what you saw do you think it possible that parties of men entirely dependent upon their own resources could exist through the year by laying up in the summer season that which was to last them for the rest of the year, supposing them to be well supplied with arms and ammunition?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—I think there was sufficient game for that purpose, but I think they would be short of fuel with which to cook it. The scarcity of fuel would render it impossible for them to maintain themselves although there was plenty of game.

887. *Sir G. Back*.—Did you leave any notices of your travels as you proceeded by Cape Dundas?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—Yes.

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888. *Sir G. Back.*—Will you state where?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—In several positions; the principal were in Skene Bay, Winter Harbour, and Bushuan Cove. Also one on the western extremity of Melville Island reached.

889. *Sir G. Back.*—For that purpose, did you erect cairns or any conspicuous objects that could be seen?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Yes.

890. *Sir G. Back.*—What were they?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Cairns of stone.

891. *Sir G. Back.*—May I ask you how many days you were out on this journey altogether, from the time of your leaving your ship till your return?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Eighty days.

892. *Chairman.*—Had you expressed any opinions as to the probability of Sir John Franklin having passed through the western strait, early in the year before the search was commenced, or in the paper that was edited in the squadron at that time, the *Aurora Borealis*?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Yes.

893. *Chairman.*—Did you think at that time that Sir John Franklin had gone up the Wellington Channel?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Yes.

894. *Chairman.*—Did the subsequent proceedings confirm you in the belief that that was the course of Sir John Franklin's expedition?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Yes.

895. *Chairman.*—Will you state your reasons?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Sir John Franklin probably found the ice to the westward fast, as we found it, and that then he retraced his steps to try Wellington Channel. Secondly, that his travelling parties from Beechey Island would have got as far as Captain Penny's, and would have received the same encouragement; also from the fact of the workshop on shore, they seem to have left rather hastily, as if a favourable opportunity had presented itself, and they lost no time in availing themselves of it.

896. *Chairman.*—These were your reasons for thinking that he had gone up Wellington Strait?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—I think another may be added, not having found any record at Beechey Island.

897. *Chairman.*—Do not you consider, on the contrary, if he had taken the new channel that he would have left at his wintering place some information of the route he had taken, to guide others in the search for him?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—I think not.

898. *Chairman.*—Why do you think so?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—I think it was in accordance with his instructions that he made the second attempt by Wellington Channel.

899. *Chairman.*—Then if Sir John Franklin took that direction, can you tell why no traces were found of his previous exploring parties which he had sent out to discover the channel that he afterwards took himself?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Some traces were found, I believe, as far as Cape Bowen on the east side. These journeys were accomplished when the snow was on the ground, and one could hardly expect to find traces of him two or three years after.

900. *Chairman.*—Do not you think they would do as subsequent explorers have done, set up cairns in conspicuous places?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—I have no doubt they did on reaching the farthest point, as Sir James Ross did. I think his travelling parties put up cairns before they commenced the return to their ships.

901. *Chairman.*—Then you think cairns would have been discovered on either side of the Queen's Channel had Captain Penny's exploring parties

proceeded farther? How can you explain satisfactorily to us that Sir John Franklin's exploring parties should not have done the same thing as other explorers?

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*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—I think they did before they commenced their return, but I think that neither Captain Penny nor Mr. Goodsir got as far as the Franklin travelling parties may have attained.

902. *Chairman.*—Then under all these circumstances you are of opinion that further search ought to have been made in that direction before the return of the expedition to England?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Yes.

903. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did you form the opinion you have given that Sir John Franklin had ascertained by his exploring parties the appearances of the sounds and islands and open water beyond Wellington Channel which were seen by Captain Penny before Captain Penny's return?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Yes.

904. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—That was your previously formed opinion?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Yes.

905. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Were your men much exhausted when you returned?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—No.

906. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—How much longer do you imagine they could have sustained the same labour and privations; how much longer than the eighty days you were out?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—I believe that they could have gone on three or four weeks longer if it had been necessary to do it.

907. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—How long after the summer commences, do you think it practicable to travel over the ice by sledges?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—I think travelling becomes almost impracticable in that locality after the 15th of June.

908. *Captain Beechey.*—Do you think you could have reached Banks's Land, as marked on the chart, if you had been left to your discretion?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Yes.

909. *Captain Beechey.*—What distance did it appear to you that Banks's Land was from Cape Dundas?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—About fifty miles.

910. *Sir E. Parry.*—Is that about the distance that I made it?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Yes. I consider it about fifty miles.

911. *Sir E. Parry.*—Does my idea of the distance coincide with your own?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Yes.

912. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—You have stated the number of days you were out; will you state the number of miles you travelled, and the daily average?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—My sledge travelled 900 statute miles; the daily average was twelve miles. I walked considerably more than 900 miles.

913. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—What was your longest day's journey?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Twenty-four statute miles.

914. *Captain Beechey.*—Could you have commenced your journey earlier than you did?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Under the circumstances of our equipment, I think not.

915. *Captain Beechey.*—Why could you not?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Because we were not prepared to meet so great a degree of cold.

916. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you see any land to the westward of your position to the west of Melville Island?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Yes.

917. *Captain Beechey.*—Will you state how far it appeared to you to extend?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—It was land extending from the north shore of Liddon Gulf westward to longitude 117° 40', in northern latitude 75

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918. *Sir E. Parry.*—Between that and Banks's Land you saw no land?  
*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—None.

919. *Captain Beechey.*—Was the ice in motion any time during your journey?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—No.

920. *Admiral Fausshawe.*—How many men of the sledge crews returned to the ships, by the arrangements made by Captain Austin, sick or frost bitten during your exploration?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—From the division of sledges under my orders ten men were sent back disabled by frost bites, illness, and debility. From my own party two were sent back disabled by severe frost bites.

921. *Chairman.*—You have said that you think further search ought to be made in the direction of Wellington Strait. Will you tell us in what way, had you commanded the expedition, you would have prosecuted that search, taking into consideration the quantity of provisions you had left?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—It is impossible to say what I should have done had I the command of the expedition.

922. *Chairman.*—You must take into consideration the instructions from the Admiralty, which were, that unless some traces of Sir John Franklin were found, to return to England at the end of the season of 1851; you must take into consideration also your provisions, and that you were then at the 13th of August?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—I think I should have done my utmost during the navigable season of 1851, and that I should have come home in obedience to my orders.

923. *Chairman.*—You are speaking of 13th August. You got out of your winter quarters as soon as you could. You were off the straits on the 13th of August. How would you have proceeded, and in what direction, to make the further search which you considered necessary?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—I said, I think, I would have done my utmost during the navigable season of 1851 by sending one or more vessels up Wellington Strait, but to return in time so as not to risk another winter, in compliance with the Admiralty orders.

924. *Chairman.*—You mean, I apprehend, that you would have sent a steamer up to the open water you saw off Cape Bowden?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Yes.

925. *Chairman.*—Supposing the steamer had found open water?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—I would have proceeded as far as possible in that direction.

926. *Chairman.*—In that case, supposing that you had found the strait open, you would have gone forward with the whole expedition?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—I would send up one or more vessels, and if the strait had opened I would have gone further, but still bearing in mind that if no further traces were found it was our duty, in compliance with our orders, to return.

927. *Chairman.*—All that you know on the subject at present of the navigable water is, that there is an open lead ten miles up. All the evidence we have had states that the ice across the strait extends twenty or thirty miles up the strait, so that this open water reported to you could not have been more than one third of the whole barrier?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Yes.

928. *Chairman.*—Then do you think that it would have been prudent with only two years provisions left to have risked passing a winter in the upper part of this strait, not knowing where it might lead to, and having no certain traces that Sir John Franklin went that way?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—It is a risk which I would try to avoid by returning before the winter set in, but I think it is only a risk which it would have been my duty to run were I placed in such a position.



929. *Chairman*.—How much more of the navigable season remained to you on the 13th of August? *Lieut. M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—Three weeks.

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930. *Chairman*.—If you had ascertained, on a further examination of the barrier, that it still continued fast to the northward, how much longer would you have remained off Cape Riley?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—In any delay that I might have made there I would have been governed by the appearance of the ice.

931. *Sir E. Parry*.—What records did you find of my expedition of 1819 and 1820?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—The first record found was at Bushnan Cove, and consisted of writing on parchment deposited in a tin cylinder beneath a cairn of stones; the tin cylinder was very much corroded and the writing nearly obliterated. The next trace found of the expedition of 1819 and 1820 was a monument on Table Hall near the Winter Harbour, but we had not time to search for the record beneath it. The third record found was an inscription upon a rock at Winter Harbour, on a sandstone rock. The fourth and last record found was on a point south of Fife Harbour; it was a paper document in a sealed bottle, buried beneath a cairn of stones; it was in perfect preservation; it was replaced together with the record of the expedition of 1850 and 1851.

932. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you consider bottles better than tins for that purpose, from what you saw?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—Yes, much better.

933. *Sir E. Parry*.—What records did Captain Austin leave at his winter quarters?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—Two monuments; one on the south point of Griffith's Island, the other on Cape Martyr. They were built with stone from ten to fifteen feet in height, and in each a record was placed.

934. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you know whether in bottles or cylinders?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—I do not know.

935. *Sir E. Parry*.—You were with Sir James Ross in his last expedition, were you not?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—Yes.

936. *Sir E. Parry*.—What record did you leave at your winter quarters at Port Leopold?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—The paper which was subsequently found, I think, by the North Star.

937. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was there more than one record left there?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—Not that I am aware of.

938. *Sir E. Parry*.—As it appears to have been the general practice to leave records at all the places wintered in by our ships, why do you think Sir John Franklin deviated from that practice?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—I think his deviation from that practice was not intentional, but that it was overlooked in the excitement of leaving his winter quarters hastily.

939. *Sir E. Parry*.—As you have said that it was not likely that ships could be forced out of the harbour of Beechey Island, have you formed any idea as to what circumstances led to so sudden a departure of Sir John Franklin's expedition as not to give time for leaving a record at so important a station as that?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—I suppose that a favourable opportunity presented itself for prosecuting his voyage which hastened his departure, and that not having left a record was an oversight.

940. *Sir E. Parry*.—You think then that under some such circumstances you might have omitted to leave the records there yourself?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock*.—Yes, I think so.

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941. *Chairman.*—Are you aware that on the 12th of August 1851, when the ships were crossing the mouth of Wellington Channel, Captain Ommanney went aloft himself for the purpose of ascertaining the nature of the ice, and that he called Mr. Elliott, the second lieutenant, to witness what he saw on that occasion?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—I was not aware of that.

942. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you meet with any drift wood on your journey?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Only one small piece in Graham Moore Bay. It appeared to be decayed fir.

943. *Sir G. Back.*—There were no indications of its having been cut or charred?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—No.

944. *Sir G. Back.*—Was there any ice blink at your extreme point of view westward from Cape Dundas?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Yes.

945. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Were you present at any interview between Captain Austin and Captain Penny in 1851?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—No. I have not seen Captain Penny this year until to-day.

946. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Have you any suggestion to offer to the Committee as to any improvement in the fitting-up or equipment of sledges for ice travelling, from your experience?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—I think our equipments might be considerably improved.

947. *Chairman.*—Will you send into the Committee any suggestions you may have to make on this subject?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—Yes.

948. *Chairman.*—In what time could you prepare those suggestions?

*Lieutenant M<sup>c</sup>Clintock.*—I will draw them up, and send them in on Friday.

*Mr. Abernethy.*

Mr. ABERNETHY called.

949. *Chairman.*—You were in Sir John Ross's expedition?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—Yes.

950. *Chairman.*—When you passed from Cape Riley to the western side of Wellington Straits, did you make any observations upon the nature and quantity of the ice in September 1850? Were you near enough to make correct observations?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—It came under our observation, because we were the first vessel that came into what we call Union Bay; that was on the 27th of August 1850, the day on which we went in there.

951. *Chairman.*—Did you see the ice in Wellington Strait on that day?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—Yes, it was so closely packed. I saw Captain Penny and the two Americans working to the northward. There was no other way for them to go at that time.

952. *Chairman.*—What was your opinion of the ice at that time? Were the straits navigable or blocked up?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—Not navigable.

953. *Chairman.*—What sort of ice was it?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—It was heavy floe ice.

954. *Chairman.*—Did you consider from the appearance of the ice on the 27th of August that it was likely to break up, and that the straits would clear before the end of the navigable season?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—My opinion is, from what I know and from what I have heard that it did not break up in Wellington Channel, and that Wellington Strait was not navigable during the year 1850.

955. *Chairman*.—What extent of ice north and south do you think remained at the conclusion of the navigable season in 1851?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—As far as I know from the report that I have had and my own experience I should say about twenty miles.

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956. *Chairman*.—Did you see any open water to the northward of the ice?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—I did not.

957. *Chairman*.—Do you think that, supposing the extent of ice up and down the strait, from north to south, was twenty miles, anybody could have seen open water on the other side at a distance of twenty miles?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—No, I think not. I know nobody could do that.

958. *Chairman*.—For what reason?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—From the ship's mast-head you could not see open water twenty miles.

959. *Sir G. Back*.—You could see whether there was an ice or a water blink?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—You might guess at it, but guessing is not what we want.

960. *Chairman*.—Can you give us any further particulars of the state of the ice that year before you crossed over and went into your winter quarters near Griffith's Island?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—It was a very open season, but when we crossed Wellington Strait we crossed to Cape Hotham between Griffith's Island and Cornwallis Island, and there we found the ice stationary, not broken up at all, and we could not get any further.

961. *Chairman*.—Then you went into your winter quarters?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—Yes, that was the only thing we could do.

962. *Chairman*.—Can you tell when you first heard of open water being discovered to the north of Wellington Strait?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—I think it was on the 10th May that I heard open water was found in Wellington Strait.

963. *Chairman*.—What opinion did you form from your own experience? Did you think it was part of the navigable channel?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—Yes, I was always of that opinion. The flood came from the westward, behind Cornwallis Island in the South Channel, whereas in Lancaster Sound and Barrow Strait the flood comes from the southward.

964. *Sir E. Parry*.—How do you know the flood comes from the westward to the north of Cornwallis Island?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—I heard from Captain Penny that the flood tide comes westward to the north of Cornwallis Island. I had always that opinion before Captain Penny told me.

965. *Chairman*.—You did not see the open water yourself; you know no more about it than you have heard?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—No.

966. *Chairman*.—And you did not make any inland journeys yourself?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—Yes.

967. *Chairman*.—How far?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—Forty miles, as near as I know.

968. *Chairman*.—But no journey that enabled you to see the open water and to judge for yourself?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—No.

969. *Chairman*.—Then you do not from your own personal knowledge know anything more till you got out of your winter quarters again, and came back to the entrance of Wellington Strait?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—Yes.

970. *Chairman*.—Will you tell us what you observed? Was the ice there still?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—The ice was there still, and if ever Wellington Strait was clear of ice it was clear last season, for I saw the ice coming down like

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stones down a hill, and there was water at the back of it; that was on the 12th of August 1851.

971. *Chairman.*—Where were you at that time?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—Crossing the mouth of Wellington Strait, within sight of land. It was quite clear; we could see from Cape Hotham to Beechey Island.

972. *Chairman.*—What situation did you fill in the “Felix”?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—Master.

973. *Chairman.*—Did you go up and examine the ice after you were cast off? You were coming across by Cape Hotham and Cape Riley, and saw the ice go out?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—Yes.

974. *Chairman.*—And when you got to the southward, the ice was still coming out?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—Yes.

975. *Chairman.*—And you think that if you had waited the ice would have cleared out entirely?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—My opinion is, that the ice was breaking up at that time in the strait.

976. *Chairman.*—How long do you think it would have taken to clear the strait?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—I do not know. I think we could have found a way past had we wanted to go up Wellington Strait.

977. *Chairman.*—From your knowledge of Arctic navigation do you think it would have been prudent, supposing you had found a way through the strait, to persevere in a search which must have involved the risk of passing a second winter there, with, at that advanced season of the year, only two years provisions on board?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—I would not risk that, for a different arrangement must be made. Wellington Strait is a dangerous navigable passage, particularly to go to Cornwallis Island, and the ice flowing about with the tide. It would not be safe for a ship to go up there.

978. *Chairman.*—Then you mean to say you would not have proceeded into Wellington Strait?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—No, not if I had wished to keep my head; nothing could be done, in my opinion, farther than was done.

979. *Chairman.*—Then you consider that both expeditions were justified in returning to England without making any further search this year?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—Certainly, I say so.

980. *Chairman.*—You would not have taken up your winter quarters again?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—No, certainly not.

981. *Sir E. Parry.*—Which way do you think Sir John Franklin was likely to have gone?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—I really do not know how to answer that question. I cannot answer it, because it is all guess work.

982. *Sir E. Parry.*—Were you ashore at Beechey Island?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—Yes.

983. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you think it was well searched for documents?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—I searched it myself; I turned up every stone, and I went to every place with a pickaxe, and overhauled it myself.

984. *Sir E. Parry.*—Were you on shore at Cape Riley?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—Yes.

985. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you think it was well examined?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—Yes, I have every reason to think so.

986. *Sir E. Parry.*—From your experience in the ice do you think that ships wintering in Beechey Island could have been forced out by the ice?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—No, I am quite sure they could not have been forced out; they might have been forced in, but not out.

987. *Sir E. Parry*.—The Committee have asked you these questions because they consider you an experienced person in navigation amongst ice. State to the Committee what your experience is?

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*Mr. Abernethy*.—I was six voyages in whalers before I went out with Sir E. Parry. I was two voyages with him. I was only one winter with him; in 1827 we did not winter. Since that I have been four winters and five summers with Sir John Ross. I was with Sir James Ross in the Antarctic regions four years. I was one voyage with Sir James Ross in Barrow Straits to Port Leopold. Then in the “Felix;” that was another winter.

988. *Sir E. Parry*.—When you returned in the “Felix” to the east side of Wellington Strait in 1851 did you see any lead or lane of water upon the east side of the strait?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—I do not exactly know about that, for I did not take much notice. I did not want to go that way.

989. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Do you know whether anybody in the “Felix” saw it?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—There was no one who had a better right to look after it than myself, but I did not want to go that way, the flocs were coming down.

990. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—What time elapsed from your leaving Assistance Harbour to your reaching the winter quarters of the “Erebus” and “Terror”?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—We left winter quarters on the 12th of August, and we went to Union Bay on the same day. We left it on the next morning at four o'clock.

991. *Sir G. Back*.—Do you know anything about a piece of tin said to have been found there by Adam Beck?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—No, I did not see it, although I went there to look for it. I went to the top of the hill to look for it. I heard there had been such a thing, and I went to look for it myself, but I did not see it.

992. *Sir G. Back*.—Was Adam Beck a man whose word you could rely upon?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—No, I should rather hesitate; he is not a person I would rely much upon.

993. *Sir E. Parry*.—Why?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—Because he equivocates so much; he would say one thing at one time, and at another time a very different thing.

994. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was he a sober man?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—No.

995. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you believe his story about the ships being lost up by Cape York?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—No, I do not believe that exactly, but, as I said to Captain Austin, “it was well to look into it, as it had been reported to us.”

996. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you believe it now?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—No, I do not. I never did believe it.

997. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you as an experienced man in Baffin's Bay think that two ships could be lost upon the north-east part of it, and the vessels destroyed, and the crews all murdered or perished?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—I think not.

998. *Sir E. Parry*.—You have known ships to be lost in Baffin's Bay?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—Yes, up in Melville Bay.

999. *Sir E. Parry*.—Have the crews escaped generally?

*Mr. Abernethy*.—Always escaped, because as long as there are ships there is no danger.

1000. *Sir G. Back*.—As you have had a great deal of experience amongst ice, you will be able to answer a question I am now going to put. It has been related by good authority that in the middle passage of Baffin's Bay, the ice has been known to run over a vessel, so that in a few minutes nothing was seen

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of her but the spanker boom. Do you think it possible that such an event might have happened to both Sir John Franklin's ships?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—It might have happened. I know that ice will walk over a ship, but to take the two at once is not probable.

1001. *Sir G. Back.*—But you know that ice will “walk over” a ship?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—Yes.

1002. *Sir G. Back.*—Have you in your experience ever known such a case to have happened to a ship?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—I saw a ship belonging to Aberdeen, called the “Elizabeth;” she was taken off by two floes of ice, the one floe walked up over her side, and the other cringed the other side, and the ship was lost, but the men were saved by jumping on the ice.

1003. *Chairman.*—How were the men saved afterwards?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—They escaped over the ice to the next ship.

1004. *Sir G. Back.*—Whereabouts was this?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—I think it was in Melville Bay.

1005. *Sir G. Back.*—Supposing that no ships had been near, what then would be your opinion as to what would have happened to the crew of the “Elizabeth”?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—They must have made their best way to the shore by the boats. The men on such occasions are always saved.

1006. *Chairman.*—Supposing such a catastrophe to have happened to Sir J. Franklin's ships, if there had been no other ships near, where could the people have gone to?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—They must have gone to where the natives are, and they are with them still if they are in existence at all. That is all they have to do. Some of the officers who went with Sir John Franklin know the Esquimaux; and I think that search should be made amongst these different tribes of Esquimaux on the north side of Ballin's Bay.

1007. *Chairman.*—And you think that if Sir John Franklin's ships were broken up in Ballin's Bay, and the men are still alive, they would be found among the Esquimaux?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—Yes, I think so.

1008. *Sir E. Parry.*—Have you known much of the Esquimaux in that part of Melville Bay?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—Yes, I have.

1009. *Sir E. Parry.*—From what you know of the Esquimaux in other parts do you think they are likely to have murdered our people?

*Mr. Abernethy.*—No, I never believed anything like that; they do not appear to have any ill feeling towards us; they are a different kind of people.

*Lieut. Osborn.*

LIEUTENANT SHERARD OSBORN called.

1010. *Chairman.*—You commanded the steam tender “Pioneer”?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—Yes.

1011. *Chairman.*—You were employed in the exploring parties to the southwest in the spring under Captain Ommanney?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—Yes.

1012. *Chairman.*—And you explored along the southern part land marked in the chart as explored by you?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—Yes, the last part of it.

1013. *Chairman.*—Do you think that it was so thoroughly examined that no traces could be left behind of the missing expedition?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—Yes.

1014. *Chairman.*—Did you examine the gulf laid down in the chart?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—Captain Ommanney went down and examined it.

1015. *Chairman.*—Was that the first Arctic expedition that you had been connected with?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—Yes.

1016. *Chairman*.—And you have made no personal observations as to the ice in the Wellington Strait, either in September 1850 when you crossed it going to the westward, or when you returned and crossed to the eastward?

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*Lieutenant Osborn*.—Nothing more than the other officers who made the search.

1017. *Chairman*.—In 1851 did it look like old ice or new ice?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—It was decidedly fixed ice.

1018. *Chairman*.—You think the strait had been opened the first year that you saw it?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—No, I did not think so.

1019. *Chairman*.—When you recrossed it in the following year what was the state of the ice?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—It was broken on the west side, from Barlow Inlet to Cape Hotham; there was broken or loose ice to the southward; on the east side water was running up towards Point Innes.

1020. *Chairman*.—How far did you see? What was your range of vision?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—I went on to the crow's nest, and on a clear day we calculated we saw ten or twelve miles.

1021. *Chairman*.—You saw no open water over the fixed ice?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—No, nothing that I should say that looked like that. I saw a strong ice blink to the northward.

1022. *Chairman*.—You had no opportunity of ascertaining the amount of ice north and south of the strait at that time?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—No. \* I saw an ice blink to the northward, and a piece of loose stuff to the westward.

1023. *Chairman*.—You had no opportunity yourself of seeing these two lines of ice marked on the chart. Do you think they are accurately laid down?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—I should think so. Of the lower one I can judge, for in 1850 the ice was fixed at the time we crossed, but in 1851 we were not far enough to the northward.

1024. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—How many days were you out from the ships to the south-west?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—Fifty-eight days.

1025. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—What was the total distance in miles that you went over?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—I think 506.

1026. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—How many days were you alone after parting from Captain Ommanney?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—From the 16th to the 25th of May.

1027. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—From your own observation do you consider that there is any navigable sea in the south-west direction, along the coast you travelled?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—No. I never saw anything that had that appearance.

1028. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—In what state did your men return to the ships were they much fatigued?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—On the day they returned they were much fatigued, otherwise they were in good health.

1029. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—How much longer do you consider they might have undergone the same labour with the same amount of provisions?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—On the outward march we were on bare allowance, and on that they could not have gone on more than eight or ten days. In returning we were able to give our men increased allowance of food in consequence of the rapid march. That improved their health considerably.

1030. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—What animals did you see?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—Two foxes on the outward march, two bears on the homeward march, but they were close to Griffith's Island. I killed a fox. I think I saw 18 ptarmigan.



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1031. *Chairman.*—No ducks or geese?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—Yes; I think a couple. As we reached Griffith's Island the bears were passing to the north-west.

1032. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Do you think you could have travelled over the ice with sledges during the whole of the season?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—Not with heavy sledges.

1033. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Up to what period?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—Up to the 15th of June.

1034. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—State how many men of your sledge division were frost-bitten?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—One on my sledge, and Mr. Hamilton's sledge had two men slightly frost-bitten.

1035. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—How many men returned to the ships sick under Captain Austin's arrangements?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—One man only.

1036. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Taking into consideration the provisions you had, could you have carried the search further to the south-west?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—No; if I had taken the same time in coming back as I took in going out I should have been out of provisions when I reached the ship. I timed myself.

1037. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Have you any suggestions to make to the Committee for the improvement or equipment of sledges to carry out ice-travelling?

1038. *Chairman.*—It would be more satisfactory if you were to put your suggestions on paper, and send them in to the Committee?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—I will do so. I will send them in on Friday.

1039. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Were you present at any interview in 1851 between Captain Austin and Captain Penny?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—No.

1040. *Sir G. Back.*—Did you see any Esquimaux encampments in your journeys to the south?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—Yes; one very old one.

1041. *Sir G. Back.*—How old was it?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—I cannot tell; but a great number of years.

1042. *Sir G. Back.*—From your southern extremity did you see any lane of water or loom of land to the south-west?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—Not to the south-west; I struck off to the west, and I think I saw a loom of land. It cleared up, and the loom of land disappeared, and I saw a distinct loom to the southward.

1043. *Sir G. Back.*—What distance do you suppose that land was off?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—I think about twenty or twenty-five miles.

1044. *Sir G. Back.*—Did it appear to be mountainous or hilly?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—It was distant so that I could not tell,—perhaps about 300 or 400 feet.

1045. *Sir E. Parry.*—Was it your impression that it was connected with the land on which you stood?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—Yes.

1046. *Sir E. Parry.*—From your experience of steamers in navigating among the ice, are you of opinion that they are of great value in that navigation?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—Yes, of great value. I should be sorry to go in anything else.

1047. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you think that the season of navigation is prolonged in any degree by having steamers in those seas?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—Yes; perhaps for ten or twelve days, just while the young ice is forming.

1048. *Sir E. Parry*.—To about what temperature do you think steamers make the navigation practicable under those circumstances? *Lieut. Osborn.*

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—To three or four degrees below zero. • 4th Nov. 1851.

1049. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you navigate in as low a temperature as that?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—No.

1050. *Sir E. Parry*.—Then on what do you form your opinion?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—On the ease with which we navigated at a temperature of three above zero.

1051. *Sir E. Parry*.—Were any of your pipes choked by the ice under these circumstances?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—We kept a careful watch upon the injection.

1052. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was the injection water never impeded coming in by the ice?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—It was not reported to me as having occurred.

1053. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you think that is a circumstance to be apprehended?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—Yes.

1054. *Sir E. Parry*.—What was the nature of the land to the south-west on which you went?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—The low limestone began rising in the interior to hills, forming from 150 to 300 feet.

1055. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was a great deal of the land over which you travelled there, low land?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—A great deal; the beach was mostly so.

1056. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you perceive any appearance of shoals in the offing, by ice being pressed up upon them?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—I saw the shingle showing itself constantly between nips in the floe. The floe had broken, and turned up the gravel where the pressure had been.

1057. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was that at any distance from the beach?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—The weather was usually thick. On one occasion I saw at farthest fifteen miles from the beach.

1058. *Sir E. Parry*.—Then you would consider that coast a very difficult and dangerous one?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—Yes, one decidedly to be avoided.

1059. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you find any drift wood in the course of your journey?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—No; I never saw a piece.

1060. *Sir E. Parry*.—As you got to the southward did the horizontal magnetic needle become more sluggish?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—It appeared to improve as we went from our longitude of 100 degrees.

1061. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was it of practical use as an instrument for taking bearings?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—Kater's compass was.

1062. *Sir E. Parry*.—And you used it for that purpose?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—Yes.

1063. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Were you ever in a position of particular danger in a steamer in those seas?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—I have been in a position of difficulty.

1064. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—State when?

*Lieutenant Osborn*.—Off Wolstenholme Sound. It was our intention to rejoin the "Resolute" and the "Assistance," and we had to pass through thirty miles of very heavy pack; the vessel became almost helpless, and it was only by constantly backing and proceeding that we forced our way through it.

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1065. *Sir G. Back.*—In your opinion do you think that everything was done that could be done by both expeditions for carrying out the search?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—Yes, I think so.

1066. *Sir G. Back.*—Do you therefore think that Captain Austin and Captain Penny were fully justified in coming home?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—Yes, I thought so then.

1067. *Chairman.*—Were you present when the winter quarters of the “*Erebus*” and “*Terror*” were discovered?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—No, I was there after the discovery.

1068. *Chairman.*—Did you go on shore at the time the search was being made for records?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—I visited it several times after the search had been made.

1069. *Chairman.*—And you know that every possible search was made for anything that might have been deposited there by Sir John Franklin?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—Yes, a most careful search had apparently been made.

1070. *Sir E. Parry.*—When you were on the spot, what was your opinion of the route Sir John Franklin had taken?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—My opinion was, that he had gone to Cape Walker to carry out his instructions, and that he returned when he found that it was impracticable, in order to proceed up Wellington Channel.

1071. *Sir E. Parry.*—Under all the circumstances, what is your impression on that subject now?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—My impression is, that Sir John Franklin has got to the north-west by Wellington Strait, or some other route.

1072. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you think now that Wellington Strait was the most probable route he pursued?

*Lieutenant Osborn.*—Yes.

*Lieut. Cator.*

LIEUTENANT J. B. CATOR called.

1073. *Chairman.*—You commanded the “*Intrepid*”?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—Yes.

1074. *Chairman.*—Were you present when the first traces of Sir John Franklin having wintered were discovered?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—Yes.

1075. *Chairman.*—Do you think that every search was made for records that might have been left there?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—Yes.

1076. *Chairman.*—As far as you know, do you think every possible search was made to prevent any document deposited by Sir John Franklin being left behind unobserved?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—Not when we first found them.

1077. *Chairman.*—Do you think the search subsequently made by the officers of the expeditions to obviate the possibility of anything left behind was complete?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—Yes.

1078. *Chairman.*—Did you, in crossing the mouth of Wellington Strait, make any observations on the ice? Was Wellington Strait open or closed at that time?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—It was closed.

1079. *Chairman.*—Have you been an Arctic voyage before?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—No.

1080. *Chairman.*—Then you are not able to give any information about the age of the ice with which Wellington Strait was closed?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—Comparing it with the ice met with in Baffin's Bay, I think it is much heavier in Wellington Strait.

1081. *Chairman*.—How near to the southward extremity of the fast ice in Wellington Strait did you pass in September 1850?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—We went close along the edge. We took the only opening there was. We crossed before the other ships. We had ice on both sides, and the only opening was from Point Innes to Barlow's Inlet.

*Lieut. Cator.*

4th Nov. 1851.

1082. *Chairman*.—And the whole way across was blocked up by ice at that time to the northward?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—Yes.

1083. *Chairman*.—How far do you consider you saw from the crow's nest?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—I should think twenty miles at the outside.

1084. *Chairman*.—Did you see any open water or any appearance of open water to the northward, or anything like a water sky?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—No.

1085. *Chairman*.—Did you accompany any of the exploring parties at the spring of this year?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—No. I was employed preparing the vessel for sea, and was three weeks away trying to procure fresh meat for the expedition.

1086. *Chairman*.—On the 11th of August 1851 did you again pass the southern barrier of Wellington Strait?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—Yes.

1087. *Chairman*.—What observations did you make as to the state of the ice you had left in the preceding autumn?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—I think the ice was of a heavier nature than in the previous autumn. It was more hummocky.

1088. *Chairman*.—As you passed over to the eastward did you see any leads of water?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—Up from Beechey Island, as far as I could see, there was towards Cape Innes.

1089. *Chairman*.—How far do you think you could see them?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—About ten miles.

1090. *Chairman*.—Was that a broad or narrow channel?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—It might have been four or five miles wide, without any apparent obstruction of the ice as far as I could see.

1091. *Chairman*.—Was the ice apparently running out of the strait at that time?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—I do not think it was. I should say it was packing up Wellington Strait.

1092. *Chairman*.—You did not see any ice coming rapidly from Wellington Strait?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—No.

1093. *Chairman*.—Do you recollect which way the wind was at that time?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—It was a calm in the morning. Towards one or two o'clock in the afternoon we got clear of the ice, and there was wind from the west or west-north-west.

1094. *Chairman*.—How long did you remain in that neighbourhood?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—We steered down Barrow Strait the same day and never stopped.

1095. *Chairman*.—Are you sure that was on the 11th?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—No; it was on the 12th, the day when we left "Assistance Bay."

1096. *Chairman*.—Then on the 12th you proceeded down Barrow Strait?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—Yes.

1097. *Chairman*.—Did you, from any observations of your own at the time, consider that there was a probability of Wellington Strait opening and becoming navigable during the remaining part of the season?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—No, I imagined that the ice was packed.

*Lieut. Cator.*  
4th Nov. 1851.

1098. *Chairman.*—Does that apply to the open channel that you had seen? You had seen an open channel close in to the eastern shore. Where do you think that open channel closed?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—That I cannot answer, for I have no idea where it closed. The ice struck me as packing up Wellington Strait.

1099. *Chairman.*—How far did you go in your attempt to procure fresh meat for the squadron?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—About eight miles.

1100. *Chairman.*—What animals did you see?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—Loon, and duck, and dove-key.

1101. *Chairman.*—Any quadrupeds; musk oxen, or bears?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—No.

1102. *Sir E. Parry.*—Anything besides birds?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—No.

1103. *Chairman.*—Will you state your opinion as to steam navigation. To what extent might you prolong the examination of those sea with steam vessels beyond what you might do with sailing vessels?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—We could not prolong it after the temperature fell to 3 or 4 below zero. We tried it in reaching Cape Walker, and our injection pipes froze then, and we were obliged to apply hot coals out of the furnace.

1104. *Chairman.*—And by that means could you keep the engine working?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—Yes, but not with any efficiency; for when the cinders became cold the water froze again.

1105. *Chairman.*—How many days longer in September last year were you able to prolong the navigation with the assistance of steamers?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—I should say four or five days later.

1106. *Chairman.*—Have you any knowledge of any further circumstances with regard to the search for Sir John Franklin which you wish to state to the Committee?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—No, none.

1107. *Chairman.*—Do you think that everything was done by both expeditions to carry out the instruction of the Admiralty?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—Yes.

1108. *Chairman.*—And do you think anything further might have been done by persevering at the risk of passing another winter in Barrow's Strait?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—I do not think there could, for the men were worn by their exertions in travelling in the spring. I do not think they could accomplish anything equal to the distance in the second year. Without they could have got further than Cape Riley, they would have to go over nearly 300 miles before they found new ground beyond what Captain Penny had explored.

1109. *Chairman.*—Then you do not think that anything could have been done with the ships themselves if they could have got above Wellington Strait into the open water?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—From all I have heard, I should say not.

1110. *Chairman.*—Were you present at the search and the examination that was made in consequence of a report that was received from Adam Beck?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—No, I was not present.

1111. *Sir E. Parry.*—What was your impression on the spot as to the course Sir John Franklin pursued after leaving Beechey Island?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—My idea was that Wellington Channel was the course he had taken.

1112. *Sir E. Parry.*—Having heard all the circumstances, now what is still your impression on the subject?

*Lieutenant Cator.*—I do not think he ever passed Cape Riley.

1113. *Sir E. Parry*.—Having heard and considered all the circumstances, what is now your impression on the subject?

*Lieut. Cator.*

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*Lieutenant Cator*.—My impression is that he never passed Beechey Island either to the west or north, but that he was swept away by the ice and lost in Barrow's Straits. My reason for that is, that when we were at Beechey Island the ice coming out of Wellington Strait set in round us towards Cape Riley, and very nearly cut us off from the "Assistance." We had to go close in to the land ice, between the drift and the land ice.

1114. *Sir G. Back*.—Therefore you infer that Sir John Franklin's vessels have been swept away?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—Yes.

1115. *Sir G. Back*.—Out of Union Bay?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—I suppose he has been swept from his winter quarters. My impression is, that he has cut out to the edge of the ice, and been swept away by the ice coming down, and carried away to the south-east.

1116. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Were you present at any interview between Captain Austin and Captain Penny?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—No.

1117. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Were you ever in any position of danger in the "Intrepid?"

*Lieutenant Cator*.—On the 27th of August 1851 I was driven in contact with an iceberg, and was forced forty feet up against the berg; the ice ran under us, and forced us up with our taffrail forty feet above the edge of the floe, and our bow was thirty feet above.

1118. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Describe any damage the vessel sustained, and how she was extricated?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—We lost our rudder, and broke our screw framing. We were altogether twenty-one hours in that position. The ice eased off, and we slipped down off the berg. We came down quite easily.

1119. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did the hull of the vessel sustain any damage?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—I think it was strained, but it was not damaged much.

1120. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was the steam machinery injured by it?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—No, not at all.

1121. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—What was the lowest temperature that you ever navigated the "Intrepid" with under steam?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—I think it was three or four below zero.

1122. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—What was the date of that?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—To the best of my recollection it was on the 12th of September 1850; we were navigating under steam at a temperature of three below zero.

1123. *Sir G. Back*.—After Captain Penny's return from his discovery of open water above the Wellington Strait do you know whether he asked Captain Austin for a steam vessel to pilot it up there?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—No.

1124. *Sir G. Back*.—You never heard?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—No.

1125. *Sir G. Back*.—You have said that every thing was done by both expeditions. Do you think, therefore, they were justified in coming home this season?

*Lieutenant Cator*.—Yes; I think they were justified in returning.

Mr. BRADFORD called.

*Mr. Bradford,*  
*Surgeon.*

1126. *Chairman*.—What ship were you surgeon of in the expedition?

*Mr. Bradford*.—Of the "Resolute."

1127. *Chairman*.—Were you present when the winter quarters of the "Erebus" and "Terror" were discovered?

*Mr. Bradford*.—Not when they were first discovered. I was there when the search was made.

*Mr. Bradford,*  
*Surgeon.*

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1128. *Chairman.*—And did you think the search was so complete that there was no probability of any records being overlooked or left behind?

*Mr. Bradford.*—I think the search was quite complete.

1129. *Chairman.*—Cape Riley you have no knowledge of, I believe?

*Mr. Bradford.*—No; I was not on shore there.

1130. *Chairman.*—You assisted in the exploration of the coast to the westward during the early part of the spring of this year?

*Mr. Bradford.*—Yes.

1131. *Chairman.*—Will you point out where your separate search began?

*Mr. Bradford.*—It began off Griffith's Point, east coast of Melville Island. Then I proceeded along the east of Melville Island to the northward, reaching about  $76^{\circ} 21'$  north latitude. I was there stopped by the weather, heavy gales of wind from the northward and westward. I remained two or three days, and then returned southwards towards Byam Martin Island, carrying out the instructions I had received. Then I returned to Bathurst Land from Byam Martin Island, went round Graham Moore Bay, exploring the upper parts of it, rounded Cape Cockburn, and returned along the coast by Alison's Inlet, round by Bedford Bay up to Cape Capel, where I met Mr. M'Clintock again. I then returned by Mr. M'Clintock's route to the ship.

1132. *Chairman.*—How long were you absent?

*Mr. Bradford.*—Eighty days.

1133. *Chairman.*—How many people had you ill or frost-bitten?

*Mr. Bradford.*—I sent no men back with frost bites, but every man in the tent suffered more or less from frost bites.

1134. *Chairman.*—And you are quite convinced that the search was made with such care and minuteness that nothing was likely to be overlooked?

*Mr. Bradford.*—Yes, I am convinced of that. As a proof, I found Lieutenant Aldrich's cairns on the east coast of Byam Martin Island, not having previously known that he had been there.

1135. *Chairman.*—Have you anything further that you wish to communicate to the Committee with reference to the search after the missing expedition?

*Mr. Bradford.*—No, we met with not the slightest trace.

1136. *Chairman.*—Do you think everything was done by the two expeditions to fulfil the instructions under which they were acting?

*Mr. Bradford.*—I think there was a great deal of zeal and energy displayed in carrying out the objects they had in view.

1137. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—What was the number of miles you travelled?

*Mr. Bradford.*—670 nautical miles.

1138. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—What was your lowest temperature?

*Mr. Bradford.*— $39^{\circ}$  minus was the lowest we registered.

1139. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—What was the longest day's journey?

*Mr. Bradford.*—Fifteen or sixteen miles, running under sail.

1140. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Were your men much exhausted on returning to the ship?

*Mr. Bradford.*—Their feet had become swollen by being so long in the water.

1141. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—From your experience, how much longer could the sledge crew have continued their labour with the same amount of provisions?

*Mr. Bradford.*—Not many days more, for their feet were swelling from walking so much in the water.

1142. *Sir G. Back.*—Suppose a party of men left to their own resources, how long could they maintain themselves?

*Mr. Bradford.*—I do not think a party could maintain themselves at any place I have visited during the winter. I saw game on Bathurst Land, round Graham Moore Bay, some deer, many ptarmigan, and a few hares.

1143. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—What did you consider the latest period in the season that sledge travelling could be safely continued?

*Mr. Bradford.*—We returned on the 4th of July, and I consider we were very



late. I think we might go out in many seasons, and not be able to stay longer than the latter end of June.

*Mr. Bradford,  
Surgeon.*

1144. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—State the number of animals and birds you killed?

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*Mr. Bradford*.—Fifteen or twenty brace of ptarmigan. I assisted in killing a bear at the west part of Graham Moore Bay. Melville Island is very barren of game. I saw nothing there hardly; in fact I only shot one brace of ptarmigan along the coast.

1145. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Can you suggest any improvements in sledge travelling by equipments or other means?

*Chairman*.—We will ask you to put any suggestions you may have to offer on this point in writing, and send them in on Friday?

*Mr. Bradford*.—I will do so.

1146. *Chairman*.—Were you present at any interview between Captain Austin and Captain Penny in the present year?

*Mr. Bradford*.—I have met Captain Penny in Captain Austin's cabin before the travelling commenced, but not since the 4th of July.

1147. *Sir E. Parry*.—When you were at your farthest north on the east coast of Melville Island, did you see any appearance of open water to the northward?

*Mr. Bradford*.—None.

1148. *Sir E. Parry*.—You saw nothing but ice?

*Mr. Bradford*.—Nothing but ice.

1149. *Sir E. Parry*.—What did you think was the direction of the land in Melville Island beyond your farthest point?

*Mr. Bradford*.—My view was very limited on account of the heavy drift snow and gales of wind.

1150. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you think that Bathurst Land and Melville Island are connected?

*Mr. Bradford*.—I have one reason for thinking so, the smoothness of the floe and the want of pressures on the north part of Byam Martin Island.

1151. *Sir E. Parry*.—Had you any opportunity of noticing the rise and fall of the tides on your journey?

*Mr. Bradford*.—No.

1152. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was the land very barren on Melville Island?

*Mr. Bradford*.—Yes, very barren in vegetation, and deeply covered with snow.

1153. *Sir E. Parry*.—And it appeared to shelve off?

*Mr. Bradford*.—Yes, very much. There was considerable pressure on the east coast of Melville Island from the eastward, but none from the northward.

1154. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was the ice in the neighbourhood of Byam Martin Island heavy?

*Mr. Bradford*.—Yes; the ice in the south of Byam Martin Island was very heavy.

1155. *Sir G. Back*.—Did you see any traces of Esquimaux?

*Mr. Bradford*.—None along the eastern coast of Melville Island. At the eastern point of Byam Martin Island there were several, and very old.

1156. *Sir E. Parry*.—Could you form any judgment as to the date?

*Mr. Bradford*.—They appeared to be similar in date to those of Cornwallis Island. They were numerous along the coast of Cornwallis Island.

1157. *Chairman*.—What was the state of the men when they returned to England?

*Mr. Bradford*.—They had quite recovered, and were very healthy.

1158. *Sir E. Parry*.—I think you lost one man. State to the Committee how it was?

*Mr. Bradford*.—He was frost-bitten in the feet, in consequence of wearing leather boots. It was against orders, and he put a pair of felt gaiters over to conceal them, and made them look like winter boots. I think the American mocassins are the best things to wear in the Arctic regions.

*Mr. Penny.*  
4th Nov. 1851.

1159. *The Chairman (addressing Captain Penny)* said,—Before you go, we wish to know whether you wish any other of your officers to be examined?  
*Captain Penny.*—No.

In reply to a similar question from the Chairman, Captain Austin said, he thought he should have to call Mr. Brooman. He and Captain Austin were walking together when Captain Penny returned, and he could speak as to what transpired.

The Committee then adjourned.

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*Eighth Day. November 5, 1851.*

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles C.B., M.P. Chairman,  
 Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,  
 Captain Sir Edward Parry,  
 Captain F. W. Beechey,  
 Captain Sir George Back,  
 Mr. F. J. Fegen, Secretary.

*The Chairman* spoke as follows:—The Committee having received and considered Mr. Penny's letter of this day's date, are of opinion that he should be informed by the Chairman, that the Committee do not feel themselves justified in pronouncing any opinion upon the question to which his letter refers; but that he is at liberty to use his own judgment in bringing forward further witnesses if he thinks proper.

The letter alluded to by the Chairman was as follows :

" Sir, 437, Strand, 5th November 1851.  
 " Before I wait upon the Committee this morning, I beg permission to ask if I may understand that I am not now in the wrong position in which I was placed by the publication of the correspondence between Captain Austin and myself, making me appear to be the cause of Captain Austin's not going up Wellington Channel.  
 " If this is not proved to your satisfaction, I shall beg permission to bring forward witnesses in my favour, who can prove what I wish.  
 " I have the honour to be,  
 Sir,  
 " With great respect,  
 " Your obedient servant,  
 " WM. PENNY."

LIEUTENANT ALDRICH called.

*Lieut. Aldrich.*

1160. *Chairman*.—You were first lieutenant of the "Resolute," I believe?  
*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—Yes.

5th Nov. 1851.

1161. *Chairman*.—Were you on shore, immediately after the traces of the missing ships on Beechey Island?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—No. I was much engaged for two or three days, and then I was sick for about five days.

1162. *Chairman*.—So that you have no personal knowledge of the matter?  
*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—None whatever.

1163. *Chairman*.—Did you make any observations on the appearance of the Wellington Strait as you passed in September 1850?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—Nothing, beyond it being very full of ice.

1164. *Chairman*.—Did it appear completely blocked with ice?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—Yes, with the exception of the line east and west.

1165. *Chairman*.—You were engaged in the spring of the present year with an exploring party in Bathurst Land?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—Yes.

*Lieut. Aldrich.*

5th Nov. 1851.

1166. *Chairman.*—Do you think that the part examined by you was so completely searched that there was no chance of any records or documents deposited being overlooked or left behind?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—I think so, certainly.

1167. *Chairman.*—Are you quite satisfied, generally speaking, that the whole exploration of the coast to the westward by different officers was as carefully and minutely made as that you made yourself?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—Yes, I think so. I speak somewhat confidently on the point from what I know of those officers.

1168. *Chairman.*—Have you any personal knowledge of the report made by Captain Penny in 1851, of his having discovered open water at the north and west of the strait?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—No; I was absent. I know nothing of it myself.

1169. *Chairman.*—When you got out of your winter quarters and proceeded to the eastward, in crossing the strait from Cape Hotham to Cape Riley, did you make any observations upon the ice?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—Yes. I was ordered to the mast head by Captain Austin and made a report in writing on the state of the ice.

1170. *Chairman.*—Do you recollect on what day of the month it was?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—It was on the 12th of August. We came out of the Assistance Bay on the 11th, and crossed the bay on the 12th.

*Vide p. 41. A. 352.*

1171. *Chairman.*—You stated to Captain Austin then that, “in compliance with his request that you should observe from the crow’s nest to the northward when crossing Wellington Channel, you went aloft to examine and saw large floes of ice in the channel, and that there was a continuous floe as far as the eye could reach, rendering it perfectly unnavigable, and likely to continue so some weeks to come?”

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—I must remark that at half past four o’clock that afternoon there was a very great deal of open water to the east side of the strait; but of course, as I was not called upon to give my observations then, I did not give them.

1172. *Chairman.*—Did you consider, at that time, that there was any probability of the strait clearing?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—Yes, I think so.

1173. *Chairman.*—Was the open water to the eastward of Wellington Strait?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—Yes.

1174. *Chairman.*—Will you state how far you saw the open water towards Point Innes?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—Ten or twelve miles.

1175. *Chairman.*—I suppose what happened was, that as you changed your position, and got further to the eastward, you got a view of open water which had been previously concealed from you?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—By the ice or by reflection. I could not see any water at half past one o’clock, but at four o’clock, from the change of position, I could see but very little ice.

1176. *Chairman.*—How far did the water extend?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—There appeared to be open water from Beechey Island to Cape Bowden.

1177. *Chairman.*—What is your experience in polar navigation? Have you been more than one voyage?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—None previous to this.

1178. *Chairman.*—Have you any knowledge of a communication from Captain Penny to Captain Austin asking him for a steamer to go up Wellington Strait?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—Nothing, beyond hearing that he had asked.

1179. *Chairman.*—From whom did you hear that?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—It was the subject of conversation amongst ourselves, that Captain Penny had applied for a steamer.

1180. *Chairman.*—Did you speak to Captain Penny on the subject?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—Yes; we had a long conversation. I said that I thought it would be very important to employ the rest of the season in steaming up

Wellington Channel, not with the view of remaining; but because he expressed himself very sorry that he was not able to get further than he did. He said he should ask for a steamer. I have only reason to believe that he asked from hearing people say that he did; I was not present at any communication that took place between Captain Penny and Captain Austin on that subject, nor on any other.

*Lieut. Aldrich.*  
5th Nov. 1851.

1181. *Chairman.*—Were you at Captain Penny's winter quarters after he had discovered the open water in Wellington Strait?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—Yes.

1182. *Chairman.*—And what was the result of your conversation, as far as Sir John Franklin was concerned?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—Captain Penny said he believed that Sir John Franklin's expedition had gone away in open water, and that it was now beyond our reach from this side.

1183. *Chairman.*—How did he describe the water to you that he had discovered? Did he say that it was navigable?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—There appeared to be great difficulties for ships and boats, from what Captain Penny said. He went round Baillic Hamilton and Deans Dundas Islands. On one side or the other the ice blocked up the navigation of these islands, and he stated that the currents were so swift that a boat could not possibly pull against it.

1184. *Chairman.*—What impression did that make upon your mind?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—That there was a vast difficulty in navigating it, and that the only hope was of a steamer penetrating further than he did himself, and I often said to him that I thought it would be very desirable that a steamer should go up.

1185. *Chairman.*—Did you consider yourself that if you had remained a further time to watch the opening of the Wellington Strait, you could have done so without endangering your return to England before the setting in of winter?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—I do.

1186. *Chairman.*—How long do you think you could have remained off Cape Riley without endangering the ships?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—With safety a week or ten days; but that would have shortened the time for going up Wellington Strait in order to ensure the return.

1187. *Chairman.*—What would have been the danger if you had gone up?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—The danger would have been in getting through those islands, and the risk of being blocked up on our return; the ice might have completely filled up the passage against our return. I do not apprehend that there would be any freezing in until about the first ten days in September.

1188. *Chairman.*—Suppose you had succeeded in 1851 in getting up into the open water discovered by Captain Penny, as far as Cape Sir John Franklin; do you think there would have been considerable risk of your not getting back this year?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—Very considerable risk.

1189. *Chairman.*—Why?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—From the circumstance of the ice blocking up the passages of those islands.

1190. *Chairman.*—And you would have been left there during the whole winter, encountering the greatest difficulty in obtaining provisions?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—Not if the steamers had been previously provisioned, as we were in Baffin's Bay, for the purpose.

1191. *Chairman.*—What quantity of provisions would your steamers have carried?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—Nine months.

1192. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did you report the open water on the east side of Wellington Strait to Captain Austin, or make any statement to Mr. Allen, the master?

*Lieutenant Aldrich.*—I made no official report, because I was not ordered to do so.

*Lieut. Aldrich.*  
5th Nov. 1851.

1193. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—I observed in the journals that you were a long time on board the "Lady Franklin" at winter quarters, from the 24th of July to the 11th of August, what was the object?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—I went to visit Captain Penny's vessels, and I was unable to get back on account of the breaking up of the ice, and the thaw having filled the gullies with torrents of water. Captain Penny could not spare me a boat for the purpose, being occupied preparing his ships for moving and cutting out.

1194. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Was that the time you had a conversation with Captain Penny as to the steamer?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—Yes.

1195. *Sir E. Parry*.—In your sledge journeys did you see any open water anywhere?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—None; not a particle till I returned.

1196. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you see any water sky?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—No.

1197. *Sir E. Parry*.—Could you, if you had time, suggest any improvement in such travelling parties?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—I have often thought of it, and I have made a report on the subject. I do not think I could add anything to what I have stated in my report. I think there was a great shortness of grog, and spirits of wine.

1198. *Chairman*.—What the Committee wish is this, that you would be good enough to put on paper, for the future guidance of officers similarly situated, any observations that may occur to you for the improvement and equipment of parties for polar expeditions of this sort.

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—To each of my reports there is appended, by Captain Austin's desire, my opinions as to equipments. If I were to consider for months I should have nothing to add to the reports I have already made, and our health and strength after sixty-two days I consider the best proof.

1199. *Chairman*.—As you think you could not suggest anything further, Captain Austin will be good enough to put in the report made at the time.

1200. *Sir E. Parry*.—What was the farthest north you made in your northward journey?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—76° 16'.

1201. *Sir E. Parry*.—What was the trending of the land from your furthest extreme?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—It was so thick that I could not see one mile beyond.

1202. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you think, at that time, that Melville Island is connected with Bathurst Land?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—I always thought the contrary.

1203. *Sir E. Parry*.—What was your reason for that impression?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—I could see no land between that I stood upon and the opposite point.

1204. *Sir E. Parry*.—Had you any opportunity of seeing to the northward?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—Yes.

1205. *Sir E. Parry*.—And you saw no land in that direction?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—No.

1206. *Sir E. Parry*.—What was the state of the ice in that part?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—It was level.

1207. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you see any drift wood?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—Not a bit.

1208. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you see any Esquimaux encampments?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—Only one. Not in the spring travel, but in the year before, opposite Griffith's Island; that was the only one I ever saw.

1209. *Sir G. Back*.—Did you see any animals?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—I saw twenty-seven deer.

1210. *Sir G. Back*.—Anything else?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—I saw one fox, and it was the fifty-fourth day before I saw a bear.

*Lieut. Aldrich.*

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1211. *Sir G. Back*.—If you had had no provisions could you have supplied yourselves?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—No; we could not have existed without the provisions we had.

1212. *Captain Beechey*.—Have you made any report to Captain Austin as to the number of animals?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—No.

1213. *Sir R. Parry*.—Did you leave records of your own journeys?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—Yes; on every opportunity I had I left records under cairns of stone; but I must observe that the ground was so thoroughly frozen that it was with the greatest difficulty at times that we got stone sufficient to make the smallest cairn.

1214. *Captain Beechey*.—Was there any rise or fall of the tide?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—I should judge so by the uplifting of the ice, but of the amount I cannot judge. I thought at the time that it would have been a serious loss of time if I had stopped to make any examination of the kind.

1215. *Captain Beechey*.—Were you present when Captain Penny took his leave of Captain Austin?

*Lieutenant Aldrich*.—No, I was not.

*Captain Austin* rose, and read the following paper:

“Mr. Chairman.—With regard to a journal which you have called for, I beg to state that I have no journal, but that I have with care made the log a journal from which all may be obtained of any necessary interest required. It is necessary to remind you that the transmission of journals is not called for in my orders, as upon the occasions of discovery or as on former Arctic voyages; further that such was generally understood by all composing the expedition, early after our departure from England.

“Under these circumstances I have only in my possession notes that were made from time to time. These notes are my private thoughts, and never intended, in their present state, for other eyes than my own. I place them before the Committee, who will perceive that they are so; and the Committee I am sure will agree with me in opinion, that from their nature being private, in some measure sacred, I ought not to be asked to put forward their contents, further than so far as they may bear upon the subject of the search, or matter connected with the Wellington Channel. At the same time, whatever may be there stated I most rigidly desire to abide by. My impression is, that the substance of these views has been stated already in evidence.

“These notes are as they were tied before our arrival, with the exception of one parcel which I referred to in the Committee-room when giving evidence.”

Mr. ALLEN called.

*Mr. R. C. Allen,*  
*Master.*

1216. *Chairman*.—You were the master of the “Resolute,” I believe?

*Mr. Allen*.—Yes.

1217. *Chairman*.—Have you any experience in the Arctic seas, or was this your first voyage?

*Mr. Allen*.—This was my first voyage.

1218. *Chairman*.—So that you do not consider yourself very experienced in the appearance of ice?

*Mr. Allen*.—Nothing more than I learned this voyage.

1219. *Chairman*.—Were you present when the first traces were found of the missing expedition in Beechey Island?

*Mr. Allen*.—No; the “Resolute” came up after the other ships

1220. *Chairman*.—Were you on shore afterwards?

*Mr. Allen*.—Yes, I was afterwards.



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1221. *Chairman*.—Do you consider from your own knowledge and observation that the search made was so complete as to render it impossible that any records or documents deposited there could have been overlooked?

Mr. Allen.—I think it possible that they did not dig deep enough under the cairn.

1222. *Chairman*.—How deep did they dig?

Mr. Allen.—Mr. Bradford, the officer in charge of the party, dug about two feet, and asked me if it was deep enough; and I said, Yes. Some time afterwards, when travelling, I was told that in Sir James Ross's expedition they dug four feet when searching for a document in Possession Bay, and were about giving it up, when a man took up a pickaxe, and said he would give another pick. The result was, that Sir Edward Parry's bottle turned up. I understand, however, that the "Assistance's" people dug five feet.

1223. *Chairman*.—In crossing the mouth of the Wellington Strait, as you proceeded to the westward, did you make any observations on the state of the strait as regards the ice at that time?

Mr. Allen.—Yes; we passed the Wellington Strait in the course of the afternoon and evening of the 12th or 13th of September 1850, and the ice appeared to me as though it had not broken away that season. Captain Penny came across after us some ten or twelve miles to the northward of us, and the ice had much broken. Captain Penny came across thirty-six or forty hours after us.

1224. *Chairman*.—After the ships got into winter quarters did you make any journey yourself, or form any part of the exploring parties?

Mr. Allen.—I was sent to Lowther Island, Davy Island, and Garnett Island, to examine the state of the ice generally, and to lay out a depôt of provisions for one of the return parties. I left the ship on the 24th of April 1851.

1225. *Chairman*.—And what did the state of the ice appear to you to be in Barrow's Strait at that time? Was there any appearance of open water?

Mr. Allen.—Not a bit; it was all hard frozen.

1226. *Chairman*.—When you got out of your winter quarters, and proceeded again to the eastward, you crossed Wellington Strait?

Mr. Allen.—Yes.

1227. *Chairman*.—And what observation did you make on the state of the ice there?

Mr. Allen.—In coming across it appeared to me from the crow's nest that Wellington Strait was completely filled with ice. Between two and three o'clock we had arrived over to the eastward when I saw a channel of water of about five miles in width. There was water to the eastern shore, extending to the north, as far as I could see from the crow's nest, eleven or twelve miles.

1228. *Chairman*.—Point out on the chart how far the open water extended from Beechey Island northwards?

Mr. Allen.—It came from Cape Hotham to Beechey Island, from whence open water was seen extending on the east side of Wellington Strait about ten or twelve miles.

1229. *Chairman*.—Had you any information how far that barrier of ice extended north and south?

Mr. Allen.—No; I had no means of judging.

1230. *Chairman*.—This is a memorandum which you gave in to Captain Austin at the time you were on the crow's nest, is it not?

Mr. Allen.—No, sir; I know nothing about this. It is in Mr. Aldrich's handwriting.

Captain Austin explained to the Committee that he had handed in the memorandum under the impression that it was the one given to him by Mr. Allen. He then produced another paper, which he handed to the Chairman. Vide p. 41. Q. 352.

1231. *Chairman*.—Is this yours?

Mr. Allen.—Yes, this is. This is the state of the ice at noon.

1232. *Chairman*.—At that time you saw no open water?

*Mr. Allen*.—Not up Wellington Strait.

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1233. *Chairman*.—As you went over to the eastern coast did you see any change in the appearance of the ice?

*Mr. Allen*.—Yes; a very remarkable one. There was a channel of water, five miles in width, along the eastern shore of Wellington Strait, extending from Beechey Island ten or twelve miles to the northward towards Cape Bowden.

1234. *Chairman*.—Did you report that to Captain Austin?

*Mr. Allen*.—Yes.

1235. *Chairman*.—What was your own opinion on the subject? Did you think that the channel was suddenly opening, or that it was a lane of water which you had not previously perceived?

*Mr. Allen*.—I do not know how long it could have been; but as we went in over there I saw it opened.

1236. *Chairman*.—Was the ice coming out or in motion at that time?

*Mr. Allen*.—It was stationary, but the wind would set it in motion.

1237. *Chairman*.—What was the date of that?

*Mr. Allen*.—I think it was on the 12th of August 1851; it was the day on which we passed Wellington Strait at all events.

1238. *Chairman*.—In your opinion, could you have waited in safety to examine this open water, and also to observe whether any change took place in the barrier of ice by which Wellington Strait was frozen up?

*Mr. Allen*.—Yes.

1239. *Chairman*.—How long do you think you could have stopped without risking another winter there?

*Mr. Allen*.—About a month perhaps, judging from last year; the only means I had of judging.

1240. *Chairman*.—Did you receive any information enabling you to form an opinion as to the navigation of the open water said to be discovered to the northward?

*Mr. Allen*.—The information came in such a piecemeal manner that I could not tell. At one time it was said that there was plenty of water, and at another that there was very little.

1241. *Chairman*.—When did you first see Captain Penny's Land, that is now inserted in the chart?

*Mr. Allen*.—When we went over there.

1242. *Chairman*.—Were you called upon to examine that chart?

*Mr. Allen*.—Captain Austin gave it me to look at.

1243. *Chairman*.—Were there any documents appended to it?

*Mr. Allen*.—No.

1244. *Chairman*.—You had no conversation with Captain Penny on the subject?

*Mr. Allen*.—No.

1245. *Chairman*.—Do you know on what day that chart was given in?

*Mr. Allen*.—It was on the 10th or 11th of August.

1246. *Chairman*.—On what day did Captain Penny sail?

*Mr. Allen*.—On the same day that we did.

1247. *Chairman*.—Can you say of your own knowledge that Captain Penny ever asked for a steamer to go up Wellington Strait?

*Mr. Allen*.—No. I heard some persons talking at different times that such was the case.

1248. *Chairman*.—Were you present at any conversation?

*Mr. Allen*.—No.

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1249. *Chairman*.—And can you explain in any way why you were not called upon to give your opinion, as the master, on so important a discovery as that?

Mr. Allen.—No.

An outline of a map was handed in which Mr. Allen had made for Captain Austin, from Captain Penny's description after his return from his first trip to the northward.

1250. *Chairman*.—Do you recollect when that was; I mean the date?

Mr. Allen.—It was on the 24th of May; it was when Captain Penny came over the first time.

1251. *Chairman*.—At that time had you any further consultation on the subject, with regard to any measures that should be taken to examine further what appeared to be so important a discovery as that?

Mr. Allen.—Captain Penny said he would get a boat up.

1252. *Chairman*.—Do you know that he asked for any assistance from Captain Austin?

Mr. Allen.—I do not know how I got hold of what I am going to say, so that I cannot be held responsible for it. There was a talk that Captain Austin would send people to assist the dragging of Captain Penny's boat up Wellington Strait, on the return of his people from travelling. That was my impression at the time, but I must repeat that I never heard it officially.

1253. *Chairman*.—How many people had you on board at that time?

Mr. Allen.—Not more than ten or twelve.

1254. *Chairman*.—So that it was out of Captain Austin's power at that time to lend him any assistance?

Mr. Allen.—Yes.

1255. *Chairman*.—And you are aware that subsequently Captain Penny's expedition did take a boat from their own resources?

Mr. Allen.—Yes, that was the case.

1256. *Chairman*.—Did you offer to Captain Austin to go in that expedition?

Mr. Allen.—Yes; I offered to go if any party went from our ships to search in that direction, either to act under Captain Penny or independently.

1257. *Chairman*.—Was Captain Penny aware of that offer?

Mr. Allen.—I did not mention it, but I think somebody told him of it.

1258. *Sir E. Parry*.—Had you an opportunity of observing the tides during any part of the winter?

Mr. Allen.—Very little. The tides were given in charge of Lieutenant Elliot of the "Assistance".

1259. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was it a regular tide?

Mr. Allen.—The tide ran to the north-west and south-east, between Griffith's Island and Cornwallis Island; eight hours to the north-west and four to the south-east.

1260. *Sir E. Parry*.—Could you judge which of these was the flood tide?

Mr. Allen.—That running to the north-west, coming from the south-east.

1261. *Sir E. Parry*.—You think the flood tide there came from the south-east?

Mr. Allen.—Yes.

1262. *Sir E. Parry*.—What was the rise and fall of the tide?

Mr. Allen.—Five or six feet.

1263. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you find any drift wood in the course of your journey or elsewhere near the winter quarters?

Mr. Allen.—Not any.

1264. *Chairman*.—You are aware of the instructions Captain Austin had from the Admiralty?

Mr. Allen.—Yes.

1265. *Chairman*.—In your opinion, was everything done that could be done, by both expeditions, to complete the search for the missing ships?

Mr. Allen.—Yes, I think so; the travelling will show that very fully.

1266. *Chairman*.—You have said that you might have remained a month longer in the neighbourhood of Cape Riley, to wait for the possible opening of Wellington Strait; why do you think that, having come away so soon as you did, there would have been no probability, if you had stayed, of continuing the search?

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*Mr. Allen*.—I think it very possible that the Wellington Channel might have been examined by us, if found necessary to do so.

1267. *Chairman*.—What course would you have taken to examine Wellington Strait?

*Mr. Allen*.—I would have put the two vessels in Radstock Bay, and sent the steamers up.

1268. *Chairman*.—Would you have proposed to have hazarded the steamers remaining all the winter in Queen's Channel?

*Mr. Allen*.—When I got there I should have seen what more could be done, and what means I had of sending out travelling parties for the next year.

1269. *Chairman*.—You must take into consideration the instructions of Captain Austin, and the amount of provisions left. What I meant to ask you was, if you had had command of the expedition, what measures you would have taken to search further in that direction. What do you think might have been done with safety?

*Mr. Allen*.—Such sudden changes take place from time to time that I think the ships might have been put in Beechey Island or Radstock Bay, or some place of safety, and then that the steamers might have tried to get up Wellington Strait into the water Captain Penny had discovered. But we could only see twelve miles from the crow's nest, and it is possible there might have been an obstruction. Those two vessels should have been provisioned with eighteen months each for about thirty-six men. The provisions for the expedition were for three years, and when we came home we had two years left nearly.

1270. *Chairman*.—Should you have run the risk of leaving the steamers during the winter in that channel?

*Mr. Allen*.—That I cannot answer. If it was, as Captain Penny reports, that the tides were violent there, I should perhaps have fallen back upon the ships, and in all probability returned with the expedition to England.

1271. *Chairman*.—Do not you think there might have been danger at that late season of the year of the ice closing in again and preventing the return of the steamers?

*Mr. Allen*.—Nothing more likely.

1272. *Chairman*.—You would have sent the steamers up, although you admit that the risks might have been very great?

*Mr. Allen*.—Yes.

1273. *Sir G. Back*.—Would you, under any circumstances, have made an attempt, with a sailing vessel, to get up there, providing one had been wanted for a depôt of provisions?

*Mr. Allen*.—I would not, if I could possibly avoid it.

1274. *Chairman*.—What is your opinion, from all you have heard and seen, of the probable direction the missing ships must have taken?

*Mr. Allen*.—I think they must have gone up the Wellington Strait, or to the S. W. between the meridian of 106° and 110° west longitude.

1275. *Captain Beechey*.—With reference to the operations in the polar seas; at what period do you think the climate becomes too severe for the handling of hawsers and tracking lines?

*Mr. Allen*.—About the latter end of September, or before sometimes, if the temperature falls rapidly.

1276. *Sir E. Parry*.—At what time in September 1850 did you go into the harbour in the *Resolute*?

*Mr. Allen*.—The 13th of September; that was the last day the ship was under weigh; but she was kept in expectation of getting further to the westward to the 24th of September.

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*Master.*  
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1277. *Sir E. Parry.*—How long could you have navigated the seas that year?

*Mr. Allen.*—Not later than the 13th of September.

1278. *Sir E. Parry.*—Then why did you consider the end of the month as the proper limit of the season?

*Mr. Allen.*—It all depends upon the season. At Baffin's Bay you can navigate much later.

1279. *Sir E. Parry.*—But in Wellington Strait what was the limit?

*Mr. Allen.*—The 12th of September, I think.

1280. *Chairman.*—How much sooner than the 12th of September was your progress so seriously impeded that your further progress was impossible?

*Mr. Allen.*—I think the navigation cannot be said to have ceased until the 13th of September that year.

1281. *Captain Beechey.*—Was it from the bay ice forming rapidly, or from your having been beset, that your progress was impeded?

*Mr. Allen.*—Both. We were beset at one time, and the last day we were under weigh the ice was forming. By pushing through it we got on tolerably well.

1282. *Chairman.*—Do you think that if you had waited another month would have had any chance of going out of Barrow's Strait, and home year?

*Mr. Allen.*—Yes, I think so. The Committee will recollect that this is my first arctic voyage, and I do not like to speak with too much confidence on the subject.

*Lieut. Browne.*

LIEUTENANT W. H. J. BROWNE called.

1283. *Chairman.*—What was your ship?

*Lieutenant Browne.*—The "Resolute;" I was third lieutenant.

1284. *Chairman.*—Did you explore the south part of Barrow's Strait marked with your name? It is the next land to the westward of North Somerset?

*Lieutenant Browne.*—Yes.

1285. Do you consider that the whole of that so marked on the chart was so carefully and minutely searched by you that no traces of the missing vessels could have been overlooked?

*Lieutenant Browne.*—Yes.

1286. *Chairman.*—Were you by yourself or with Captain Ommanney?

*Lieutenant Browne.*—I was travelling with Captain Ommanney, as far as Cape Walker; after that I went on alone.

1287. *Chairman.*—When did you return?

*Lieutenant Browne.*—On the 28th of May.

1288. *Chairman.*—Did you see any animals?

*Lieutenant Browne.*—Two rein deer, and two or three grouse, and one small bear.

1289. *Chairman.*—Do you think it possible for any persons left to their own resources there to have existed?

*Lieutenant Browne.*—No.

1290. *Chairman.*—Have you any personal knowledge of anything that happened subsequently with regard to Wellington Strait?

*Lieutenant Browne.*—No.

1291. *Chairman.*—Have you been out before?

*Lieutenant Browne.*—Yes; with Sir James Ross.

1292. *Chairman.*—What was your opinion of the Wellington Strait? Did you think that the ice in Wellington Strait was new ice, or of old formation that might have blocked it up for a considerable time?

*Lieutenant Browne.*—When we came past it was loose ice, but I was not near enough to see the barrier, whether it was old or new; I only saw the south edge of it, so that I could not form an opinion as to whether it was navigable higher up or not.

1293. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—How many of your men suffered from frostbites or sickness?  
*Lieutenant Browne*.—Several of them suffered, but nothing serious. All came back in good health. I suffered myself. *Lieut. Browne.*  
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1294. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you send back any of the men who suffered from the sledge to the ship?  
*Lieutenant Browne*.—No.
1295. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—How many days were you out?  
*Lieutenant Browne*.—Forty-three.
1296. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—What was the distance you travelled?  
*Lieutenant Browne*.—375 miles I think, that is out and home.
1297. *Chairman*.—Did you give in to Captain Austin, on your return, any suggestions as to improvements in sledge travelling in these regions?  
*Lieutenant Browne*.—Yes, I gave them to Captain Austin.
1298. *Chairman*.—Have you anything further to add?  
*Lieutenant Browne*.—I have only to suggest improvements in the sledge and in the sleeping apparatus.
1299. *Chairman*.—That appears in your journal?  
*Lieutenant Browne*.—Yes, it does.
1300. *Sir E. Parry*.—What was your most southern latitude in your journey?  
*Lieutenant Browne*.—72° 52'.
1301. *Sir E. Parry*.—What was the nature of the land?  
*Lieutenant Browne*.—Cape Walker was old red sandstone, and further southward limestone and traces of granite. From 73° 50' to 72° 50' it was limestone.
1302. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was it high land?  
*Lieutenant Browne*.—The point immediately to the south of Cape Walker is a remarkably high cliff, about 600 feet, perhaps more, and it lowers from that. The land for about forty miles is composed of hills 400 feet high.
1303. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you see the land of North Somerset clearly all the way?  
*Lieutenant Browne*.—No, not all the way; we saw it when the day was clear.
1304. *Sir E. Parry*.—What was the state of the ice between these two lands?  
*Lieutenant Browne*.—As far as I could see it was smooth floe ice. The whole journey was smooth ice, with the exception of the landing at Cape Walker.
1305. *Sir E. Parry*.—That ice did not appear to have been disturbed then?  
*Lieutenant Browne*.—No.
1306. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you observe the rise and fall of the tides?  
*Lieutenant Browne*.—It appeared to me in these bays that the ice was on the ground, for I saw no tide marks. I frequently went on the land without knowing it.
1307. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you make any observations on the rise and fall of the tides?  
*Lieutenant Browne*.—No.
1308. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you find any drift wood?  
*Lieutenant Browne*.—No.
1309. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—What was your lowest temperature?  
*Lieutenant Browne*.—The lowest I registered was 22° minus
1310. *Sir G. Back*.—Did you see any traces of Esquimaux?  
*Lieutenant Browne*.—At Cape Walker.
1311. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you experience any difficulty in returning over the ice?  
*Lieutenant Browne*.—It was too soon.

*Lieut. Browne.*  
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1312. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Were you present during this year at any interview between Captain Austin and Captain Penny?

*Lieutenant Browne.*—No.

*Captain Kellett* was called before the Committee, and informed that certain questions would be submitted to him, in writing, relative to any future search for the missing ships, to which he will be requested to give his most careful consideration, confining his replies (which are to be in writing) to Behring's Straits.

*Mr. McDougall.*

*Mr. McDougall* called.

1313. *Chairman.*—What position did you occupy?

*Mr. McDougall.*—Second master of the "Resolute."

1314. *Chairman.*—Had you been an Arctic voyage before?

*Mr. McDougall.*—No.

1315. *Chairman.*—You were sent to explore that part between Cornwallis Island and Bathurst Land?

*Mr. McDougall.*—Yes.

1316. *Chairman.*—Do you feel confident that the whole of that part was so completely searched as to enable you to say that no documents or records of the missing expedition were overlooked?

*Mr. McDougall.*—I did not land in the north part of the bay. I only saw it.

1317. *Chairman.*—Did you not advance yourself to the head of this gulf?

*Mr. McDougall.*—I had not sufficient provisions. I had only sufficient to take me back. Indeed I was away two days longer than I was provisioned for, and was consequently on short allowance.

1318. *Chairman.*—Did you meet Mr. Goodsir?

*Mr. McDougall.*—No.

1319. *Chairman.*—You are aware he passed along the bay you explored?

*Mr. McDougall.*—I understand he passed along the north shore of the isthmus between my position and Wellington Strait.

1320. *Chairman.*—You were always on the ice?

*Mr. McDougall.*—Yes; about a hundred yards from the shore.

1321. *Chairman.*—How long were you there?

*Mr. McDougall.*—I left the ship on the 4th of April 1851 provisioned for twenty days, to ascertain the state of the depôts laid out in the autumn of 1850. I found nearly all the provisions on Somerville Island had been destroyed by the bears and foxes. Feeling the lives of the travelling parties might depend on the safety of the depôts, I thought myself justified in deviating from my orders, and returned to the ship after an absence of five days, for the purpose of informing Captain Austin of what had occurred. I was again despatched and was absent thirteen days, a third time I left and was away twenty-two days, making in all forty days.

1322. *Chairman.*—Then you were out three different times?

*Mr. McDougall.*—Yes; five, thirteen, and twenty-two days.

1323. *Chairman.*—Did you observe the ice in Wellington Strait?

*Mr. McDougall.*—In September 1850 I was despatched from the ship to Point Innes. At that time the ice extended across the channel to Point Innes. I was desired to hoist a flag when it opened. I had not been there an hour when a floe of from seven to eight miles broke adrift, enabling the ship to pass. The ship at that time was fast to the floe about four miles off Cape Spencer.

1324. *Chairman.*—Do you think there was any chance of the Wellington Strait clearing for purposes of navigation at that time?

*Mr. McDougall.*—I should say not.

1325. *Chairman.*—When you returned the following year to Cape Riley did you observe the state of the ice?

*Mr. McDougall.*—No, except from the deck.



1326. *Chairman*.—Were you present in 1850 when the traces of the wintering quarters of the “Erebus” and “Terror” were discovered?

*Mr. M'Dougall*.

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*Mr. M'Dougall*.—I was not there when they were discovered.

1327. *Chairman*.—Were you present when the search for documents took place?

*Mr. M'Dougall*.—Yes.

1328. *Chairman*.—Do you think every possible search was made to prevent any documents being overlooked?

*Mr. M'Dougall*.—I think not a stone was left unturned. Every little cairn of two or three stones was fully searched.

1329. *Chairman*.—Was Cape Riley searched in the same way?

*Mr. M'Dougall*.—I landed at Cape Riley, looked round, and saw documents of Captain Ommanney. His documents were placed back in the cairn.

1330. *Chairman*.—What was the date of your turning back to rejoin the ship, and what was the state of the travelling?

*Mr. M'Dougall*.—When I rejoined the ship the last time (on the 13th June 1851) the travelling was very bad. The ice began to get very soft, and this difficulty increased as we approached the ship.

1331. *Sir E. Parry*.—You surveyed that land by which Cornwallis Island and Bathurst Land are connected; what was your furthest latitude north on that journey?

*Mr. M'Dougall*.—75° 17'.

1332. *Sir E. Parry*.—Are you quite sure of the junction of these two lands?

*Mr. M'Dougall*.—As far as I could see, the only opening was in the north-east corner of that bay. I saw the land all round distinctly with the exception at that part.

1333. *Sir E. Parry*.—Is the latitude of the north part of that bay liable to some correction?

*Mr. M'Dougall*.—It is very likely, as the distance is only estimated.

1334. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you observe the rise and fall of the tides?

*Mr. M'Dougall*.—Not particularly.

1335. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you find any drift wood up in that bay?

*Mr. M'Dougall*.—None.

1336. *Sir G. Back*.—In going round the bay did you perceive any Esquimaux encampment?

*Mr. M'Dougall*.—Yes, one on a point six miles north of Baker Island, apparently of very ancient date.

1337. *Sir G. Back*.—Did you see any animals?

*Mr. M'Dougall*.—Half-a-dozen bears and one or two foxes.

1338. *Sir G. Back*.—What was the character of the ice in this bay?

*Mr. M'Dougall*.—It was one mass of floe ice.

1339. *Sir G. Back*.—Was there any packed ice against Cornwallis Island or Bathurst Land?

*Mr. M'Dougall*.—Not much, but a great deal near Baker Island.

1340. *Sir G. Back*.—Did you find any other encampment?

*Mr. M'Dougall*.—Another was found about eight miles west of Baker Point. It was apparently very old. In that situation I erected a cairn composed of the stones of the encampment.

1341. *Sir G. Back*.—I merely ask you as a general question, considering your limited experience amongst the ice, whether everything was done that could be done in following out the search for the missing ships by both expeditions?

*Mr. M'Dougall*.—I am scarcely competent to form a correct idea of what was done by Captain Penny's expedition; but with reference to our own, I think everything was done that could be done.

*Dr. Sutherland.*

Dr. SUTHERLAND recalled.

5th Nov. 1851.

1342. *Chairman.*—Dr. Sutherland, you have received from the secretary a communication to the effect that I am now going to make to you, viz., that we consider the corrections and additions to your evidence which you suggest would amount to a total alteration of what you said, and that we cannot receive them in that form, but you are at liberty to state them as supplementary evidence, on which you must expect to be cross-examined. I will put a corrected copy of the evidence into your hands that you may state what you may wish to add.

After the consideration of some verbal alterations which were assented to by the Committee,

Dr. Sutherland directed attention to the following question on page 20, No. 258. of the printed evidence: "In your advances you walked over the ice across Prince Alfred's Bay; on your return was there any reason why you could not go over it?" He wished the following to stand as the answer to that question:—"There was no reason, except that the orders were to keep along the land. The ice was tolerably good, although it appeared to have suffered a little from pressure when in the form of young ice, and I had no doubt the sun had not exercised its thawing power upon it during one summer, therefore it must have been only of one year's growth, and open water must have been in that locality some time last year."

The Committee then adjourned.

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*Ninth Day. November 6, 1851.*

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles, C.B., M.P., Chairman,  
 Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,  
 Captain Sir Edward Parry,  
 Captain F. W. Beechey,  
 Captain Sir George Back,  
 Mr. F. J. Fegen, Secretary.

Sir JOHN RICHARDSON, C.B., Inspector of Hospitals, &c., called

*Sir J. Richardson.*

6th Nov. 1851.

1343. *Chairman.*—Sir John, two pieces of wood have been sent to you for examination?

*Sir John Richardson.*—Yes. I examined them and made a report upon them. There was a small piece of drift wood partially burnt. It was found in Disappointment Bay, on the north side of Cornwallis Island, latitude  $75^{\circ} 36'$ , and longitude, by computation,  $96^{\circ}$  west. It is a small piece of spruce fir, such as grows on all rivers of the North American continent that fall into the Arctic seas. It had evidently been exposed to the weather, and drifted for many years. It has been partially exposed to the action of fire recently, and could not have drifted far subsequently to its having been burnt. I cannot say, with confidence, how it has been burnt; but it may have been charred in the flame of a spirit lamp, as it has not been exposed to the strong action of fire. Then there was a piece of English elm plank picked up in Record Bay of Baillie Hamilton Island by Captain Penny, in latitude  $76^{\circ} 2'$  north, longitude, by computation,  $96^{\circ}$  west. It was eighteen inches long when found, and an inch and a half broad at its widest part. The rough saw marks remain on one side; on the other side it has been dressed and pitched. It has been split from the board to which it belonged by the blows of an axe. From the state of decay in which this wood is upon the surface, I believe it to have been exposed to the action of the atmosphere and the surf for more than ten years. These are the only pieces of wood sent for my examination. I have made a very full report of my observations, and have also included the observations of the Reverend Mr. Berkeley, who is a very high authority on microscopic observations in this country.

1344. *Sir E. Parry.*—Are you of opinion that the little piece of burnt pine may have belonged to Sir John Franklin's expedition?

*Sir John Richardson.*—I think it may have belonged to some of his spring excursion parties.

1345. *Sir E. Parry.*—With respect to the elm, are you of opinion that it also belonged to Sir John Franklin's expedition?

*Sir John Richardson.*—I am of opinion that it has no connexion whatever with the expedition.

1346. *Sir E. Parry.*—From the reports laid before us at Woolwich of the drift wood seen by Captain Penny and his officers to the north and west of Wellington Strait, with which reports you are acquainted, can you form any conjecture as to the direction from which the pieces of drift wood probably came?

*Sir John Richardson.*—From conjecture merely. I think they may have come from the westward. It is most probable they came in that direction, not from the circumstance of their being found where they were, but because

*Sir J. Richardson.* such wood grows on the continent to the westward, and not to the eastward. I believe, however, that timber drifts up the Wellington Channel also.  
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1347. *Sir E. Parry.*—What is your opinion of the piece of wood now before the Committee, brought home in the “Felix” by Sir John Ross, and reported by him to have been picked up on a hill on the north shore of the harbour where Sir John Franklin passed the winter of 1845–6?

*Sir John Richardson.*—From the cursory examination that I have given it since I came into the room, I believe it to be a piece of wood that has laid a long time on one side. The saw mark at the top is very recent. I cannot say how recent, but it does not appear to be above a year old, and is quite fresh in comparison; the post was tapered at the lower end. The handle of a rake brought home by Captain Ommanney from Beechey Island is much less weathered than the surface of Sir John Ross’s stake, which contains lichens in a knot hole, but at the same time not nearly so fresh as the saw cut.

1348. *Sir E. Parry.*—You have examined the meteorological journal kept by Dr. Sutherland in his journey to the north of Wellington Strait?

*Sir John Richardson.*—Yes.

1349. *Sir E. Parry.*—Have you compared the temperature shown in that journal with the temperature registered in Assistance Harbour on the same days and at the same hours?

*Sir John Richardson.*—I have compared them with Mr. Manson’s.

1350. *Sir E. Parry.*—What difference of temperature did you observe in making this comparison?

*Sir John Richardson.*—The temperatures shown by Dr. Sutherland were colder by upwards of three degrees mean temperature. I wish to add an observation on climate. This is a question as regards the comparative climate in these two places. The presence of open water is no indication of a milder climate, unless the degree of saltiness of the water is known. Where the water is very salt it requires a lower temperature to freeze it, and therefore a current coming from the north and north-west bringing down saltier water would dissolve the ice sooner, although the mean temperature of the atmosphere might be lower than in more southern localities, under the influence of fresh waters poured out from the continent. My meaning is, that near the mouth of a large river the fresher water would be frozen sooner, but if the ice drifted into saltier water it might again thaw.

1351. *Chairman.*—It appears, with regard to the register at winter quarters, that the thermometer was on the ice, and that Dr. Sutherland’s was on the land. Would that make any material difference?

*Sir John Richardson.*—At that time the land was mostly covered with snow. I have noticed in my report that the influence of the ship might make some difference, but not enough to overlie the 3°. There cannot be a great difference, because there is only a degree or a degree and a half of latitude between the places of observation. I think there was no evidence of a warmer climate.

The *Chairman* acquainted Captain Penny, that some of the officers of his ships wished to be discharged from further attendance, but that the Committee did not think it proper to do so without consulting him previously. He (the Chairman) wished to know, as those officers were detained at considerable expense, whether any of them need be detained for the purpose of giving further evidence?

*Captain Penny.*—I should wish some of them to be called, that I may ask them some questions in order to elicit more clearly some points I wish to bring out.

*Chairman.*—The result of that would be, that Captain Austin must re-examine his witnesses, and the inquiry would be endless. Captain Austin was permitted to be present at the first, in order that he might hear and take notes, but was not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses; and as we so decided with respect to Captain Austin, who is an accused party, we cannot alter our course of proceeding in your favour.

The Committee-room was then cleared, and on being re-opened the Chairman addressed Captain Penny as follows:—The Committee direct me to acquaint you, that having on all occasions (and more particularly yesterday) distinctly disclaimed the character of prosecutor or accuser during this investigation, you cannot be permitted to re-examine evidence; but that both Captain Austin and yourself will be allowed to offer any final observations at the conclusion of our proceedings. You have been at full liberty to be present during the whole course of the examinations, and to call all the witnesses you considered necessary.

*Sir J. Richardson.*

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#### CAPTAIN STEWART re-called.

*Mr. A. Stewart.*

1352. *Chairman.*—You have made a great many alterations in your evidence, several of them merely verbal, and the secretary will correct them with you without difficulty. There are others more extensive, and which entirely alter the sense of what you said, and we cannot allow them to be made. You will be allowed to offer any explanation you please; but where you have said “Yes” or “No” you cannot be allowed to change “Yes” into “No” or “No” into “Yes.”

*Captain Stewart.*—In reference to the following question, page 14, No. 183.: “At that time it would have been impossible for any persons not having the means of subsistence to have supplied themselves from such sources?” I said, “Quite impossible.” I meant to say, “If they had been successful in fishing it would have been quite possible.” In answer to a question in page 15, No. 197.: “State why it would have been impossible to have done any good?” the answer given was, “We might have got into the loose ice, and our two small vessels could not have effected any good.” I wish to correct this, by adding to that answer these words: “Without the assistance of steam.” The following question appears in 15, No. 199.: “Is it your opinion, under all the circumstances of the position of your vessel, and the stores you had, that you might have stopped another month?” The answer I gave was, “I think not, certainly.” I wish to explain, upon this answer, “That we could have stopped another month, but not another year. I understood a year to have been meant.” In page 15 is the following question, No. 202.: “Did you form any opinion as to the way Sir John Franklin had passed?” The answer given was, “He could not have come by the south-west.” I wish to explain, “That he could not have gone by the south-west, and that he could not have been driven down Barrow’s Strait without somebody seeing him.” In the same page (15), No. 204. this question occurs: “Did you express any wish to remain in the ‘Sophia,’ for that investigation?” I answered “No.” I wish to add, “Except I had been accompanied by a steamer.” In page 16, No. 209., the following appears: “Did not Captain Penny, at the same time, express his opinion that further search was unnecessary.” No answer is given in the evidence. I wish to make the following statement: “After the ‘Resolute’ came into Assistance Bay, I went on board with the chart, and Captain Penny followed immediately afterwards. After they had looked over the chart, and Captain Penny had explained to Captain Austin where he had been, he asked Captain Austin for a steamer.” He said to him, “You say we have been acting in concert. Let us prove the sincerity of that concert. Give me a steamer, and with the little ‘Sophia’ I will go up 500 miles further?” Captain Austin did not say “No;” but he drew himself up,—refused. I do not recollect the exact words he said; but it was a refusal. He said something, and Captain Penny said, “Then I know the truth of your sincerity, and I will have nothing more to do with you.” Then Captain Penny left immediately, both displeased and disappointed. This took place on the 11th of August, on board the “Resolute.” The next question, No. 209., is, “Did not Captain Penny at the time express his opinions that further search was unnecessary.” The answer I gave was, “Captain Penny wrote a letter to that effect; but I believe it was contrary to his convictions.” After the word “letter” in that answer I wish the words “which appears” to be inserted. In page 16, No. 211. is the following question: “Have you seen any cause to alter them?” The answer given was, “I did not know at the

*Mr. A. Stewart.*

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time that traces had been found in any other direction." I should have said, "I saw cause for further search with proper means." On the same page (16), No. 218. is the following question: "If you could not have got up there, why could Sir John Franklin; if you think he is gone up there he must have got through; if he could not get through how could you get through?" The answer I gave was: "He might have got through, but of course there is a great deal of chance work in it. It is a very difficult navigation." I wish to add to that answer, "When there is loose ice." In page 16, No. 219. is the following question: "The tides make it difficult?" The answer I gave was, "Yes." I wish to add, "When there is much ice." In page 17, No. 220. is the following question: "Then we are to understand that from Cape Beecher to Baring Island and Houston Stewart Island there is a great deal of packed ice that was driven to the eastward, and blocked up the channel?" The answer I gave was, "Yes." I wish to add these words, "About the middle of July." In the same page is the following question, No. 221. "Will you mark the line where you saw the ice packed when you were there in June?" The answer I gave was, "It was to the westward of Baillie Hamilton and Dundas Islands. There was loose ice as far as the eye could reach." I wish to add, "None of it was packed on the 1st of June." In the same page (17), No. 228. is this question: "And do you know anything more of any conversation that took place between Captain Penny and Captain Austin?" I answered, "No; I was never on board after that." I wish to add these words, "Captain Penny told me, a day or two afterwards, that he had said to Captain Austin, 'Go up Wellington Strait, and you will do the cause some service.' That was coming down Barrow Strait." In answer to a question in page 18, No. 234. I said, "Captain Penny meant to say, that no search was required beyond the Wellington Channel under the circumstances." I wish "in" to be substituted for "beyond."

The Committee, after a lengthened consultation, adjourned.

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*Tenth Day. November 7, 1851.*

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles, C.B., M.P., Chairman,  
 Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,  
 Captain Sir Edward Parry,  
 Captain F. W. Beechey,  
 Captain Sir George Back,  
 Mr. F. J. Fegen, Secretary.

COMMANDER PULLEN called.

*Commander Pullen.*

1353. *Chairman.*—You were First Lieutenant of the “Plover,” I believe?  
*Commander Pullen.*—Yes.

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1354. *Chairman.*—And you left her to go to Mackenzie River, and to explore the North American Continent?

*Commander Pullen.*—Yes; I left the “Plover” off Wainwright Inlet, and proceeded to Cape Barrow, and then to Mackenzie River.

1355. *Chairman.*—Will you give us some account of your journey, and inform us what were your observations on the thickness of the ice?

*Commander Pullen.*—From Wainwright Inlet I proceeded to the northward; a little to the southward of Cape Smyth I discovered what I considered to be a barrier of ice; from its appearance I thought there was no passage along the coast, and that I should have to return to the vessel. I hauled off the shore to the westward, ran along the line of ice three or four miles, met the yacht “Nancy Dawson,” and learning from Mr. Shedden (her owner) that he had been up to seventy-two degrees north without finding a lead to the north, and seeing no open water, hauled in for the land again, still keeping along the ice, when I met the Esquimaux, who told me that there was sufficient water for boats along the coast. Approaching the shore about Cape Smyth I got into a deep bight formed by the pack on the shore, and made fast to a heavy grounded mass of ice; this was late in the afternoon. We arrived at Mackenzie River on the 27th of August 1849, after an absence from the “Plover” of thirty-three days. Fort Simpson on the Mackenzie we reached on the 13th of October.

1356. *Chairman.*—Will you state how many boats and men you had?

*Commander Pullen.*—On leaving the “Plover” we mustered twenty-five men, including the Russian interpreter. We had four boats, the “Herald’s” barge decked over, the “Plover’s” pinnace, and two dockyard whale boats. We had seventy days provisions for each man.

1357. *Chairman.*—Do you think after leaving the “Plover,” and on your way to the Mackenzie River, you observed sufficiently close to enable you to say you did not pass any traces of the missing expedition?

*Commander Pullen.*—Yes; except between Cape Halkett and Point Berens, and there the shore was very low. I was aground in two feet of water out of sight of land.

1358. *Chairman.*—Did you generally travel in the day or night time?

*Commander Pullen.*—I only went on once at night; in fact it was hardly possible to do so; for as to taking rest in the boats so loaded as they were was out of the question, and we did not muster strong enough to spell; I therefore always considered it better to land; the coast then in the vicinity was always most particularly examined.



*Commander Pullen.*  
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1359. *Captain Beechey.*—What is the probability of Sir John Franklin's vessels from the eastward being able to pass Cape Barrow;—through the ice of course?

*Commander Pullen.*—In July 1849 the ice was packed heavy off Point Barrow, so as to prevent the possibility of a vessel getting in to the coast, and as far to the westward as I went.

1360. *Captain Beechey.*—What is the nature of the shore to the eastward of Point Barrow as to its depth?

*Commander Pullen.*—The shore generally speaking is low, but in many places deep enough to allow of heavy ice lying close in; inside a line from Cape Halkett to Point Barrow the water is very shoal; crossing this bay, when outside of this line, ice was aground in three fens water. This was out of sight of land.

1361. *Captain Beechey.*—That was at the mouth of the Colville River, was it not?

*Commander Pullen.*—I consider small vessels can generally go along the coast if not more than eight feet draft of water. From Herschell Island there is a deep water close in shore until you approach the mouth of the Mackenzie, then it becomes shallow.

1362. *Captain Beechey.*—Would it be safe, in your opinion, for a vessel of the "Plover's" draught of water to attempt the navigation of that shore between the ice and the land?

*Commander Pullen.*—No.

1363. *Captain Beechey.*—What draught of water is the "Plover"?

*Commander Pullen.*—Thirteen feet, I believe.

1364. *Captain Beechey.*—And why do not you think a vessel of that draught could not navigate there?

*Commander Pullen.*—There is not sufficient water, except in parts; there would not be water for a vessel of the "Plover's" draught between the ice and the land at the time I passed.

1365. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you meet many natives there?

*Commander Pullen.*—Yes.

1366. *Captain Beechey.*—Whereabouts?

*Commander Pullen.*—From Point Berens to the return reef was where I met the largest number of them. They also mustered strong at Point Barrow, but at other parts in small numbers.

1367. *Captain Beechey.*—Are you of opinion that a party deprived of their ships along that coast would find the natives friendly, and willing to render them assistance?

*Commander Pullen.*—At the time I came along it is likely they would, but not now, I think, on account of the massacre at Point Separation, which I reported to the Admiralty.

1368. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you land at any part of your journey between Cape Barrow and the Mackenzie?

*Commander Pullen.*—Yes, we landed frequently; we landed to get our meals, generally about three times a day.

1369. *Captain Beechey.*—What probability is there of persons without resources receiving assistance in those parts?

*Commander Pullen.*—In summer a good huntsman could supply a small party with deer and wild fowl, and would be able to procure salmon and other fish, otherwise there is no probability, as the Esquimaux about the Mackenzie are, I think, unfriendly.

1370. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you ascend any heights along the coast during your voyage?

*Commander Pullen.*—No. The highest was on the east point of Flaxman's Island; from twenty-five to thirty feet.

1371. *Captain Beechey.*—Then, from what you saw of the ice in the offing, do you think that the pack extends any considerable distance from the shore?

*Commander Pullen.*—Yes, I do not recollect that I saw a water sky in the offing;—nothing but ice.

1372. *Captain Beechey.*—Was that ice there similar to what you saw at Mackenzie?

*Commander Pullen.*—It was not so heavy about Mackenzie. After leaving

Point Kay I did not see much ice, it having been driven off by the streams of the Mackenzie. Between Herschell Island and Point Barrow the ice is all of the same heavy character as it is to the westward of Point Barrow. Commander Pullen  
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1373. *Captain Beechey*.—Did you notice any tides in your journey?

*Commander Pullen*.—Yes. The rise and fall was very small; I think fourteen inches was the greatest. I should call eleven inches the average from Point Barrow till you get in the influence of the Mackenzie.

1374. *Sir G. Back*.—I would ask you whether the fresh water you got was brought down from the Babbage River or the Mackenzie?

*Commander Pullen*.—The water we drank was from the Mackenzie.

1375. *Sir G. Back*.—Did you find any harbour between Return Reef and Flaxman's Island where a ship might anchor in safety?

*Commander Pullen*.—No.

1376. *Sir G. Back*.—Nor anywhere else?

*Commander Pullen*.—Yes. Inside Herschell Island a vessel of small draft of water could anchor, and they might possibly winter under or to the south end of the eastern part of Flaxman's Island and the Spits between the Return Reef and Jones' Island.

1377. *Sir G. Back*.—Did you find much drift wood?

*Commander Pullen*.—Immense quantities, chiefly of pine. One piece was eighty feet in length and ten feet in circumference. That was in Camden Bay.

1378. *Sir G. Back*.—May I ask whether the highest piece of ice had any gravel on the top of it?

*Commander Pullen*.—The highest ice was from seventy to eighty feet, about two miles off the shore. I saw no gravel on the top of it, as I did not ascend it. As we came along there was a great deal of fog, and we were making use of ice to drink.

1379. *Captain Beechey*.—Did you notice that the tides were high at any particular days of your journey?

*Commander Pullen*.—Yes, we did; the effect of wind. It is in my journals in the Admiralty.

1380. *Captain Beechey*.—Will you state whether, between the Mackenzie and Cape Bathurst, a vessel would be safe in navigating that shore with the same draught of water as the "Plover"?

*Commander Pullen*.—No, it would not. The same objection exists as that I stated just now.

1381. *Sir G. Back*.—Did you not find the water proceeding to the eastward from Point Barrow vary very much in depth; four or five miles out for instance?

*Commander Pullen*.—I never could get out so far on account of the ice, except in crossing Harrison's Bay.

1382. *Captain Beechey*.—If a party were deprived of their ships, proceeding from Mackenzie to Cape Bathurst, would there be any material difficulty from the natives in reaching the Mackenzie?

*Commander Pullen*.—There would be great difficulty for want of boats, and when reaching the Mackenzie great difficulty from the natives. The Mackenzie natives have told us that they would show white men no quarter.

1383. *Captain Beechey*.—If a party had been amongst the natives and destroyed by them, do you imagine that you would have heard of it?

*Commander Pullen*.—We should have been sure to have heard of it.

1384. *Sir G. Back*.—Did not your party find a gun made by Barnett in the possession of the Esquimaux?

*Commander Pullen*.—Yes.

1385. *Sir G. Back*.—Had you any idea at the time to whom that gun had belonged?

*Commander Pullen*.—I had not the slightest idea, nor how they came by it.

1386. *Sir G. Back*.—You did not find out that the gun was lost by one of the men in my boat in 1826?

*Commander Pullen*.—No; I did not know it until the other day.

1387. *Sir G. Back*.—Supposing a party of men wrecked on that coast, midway between Icy Cape and the Mackenzie River, do you think they

*Commander Pullen.* would be able to proceed to the post on that river without aid from the natives?  
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*Commander Pullen.*—Yes, if the party was not weakened by want, and the natives were friendly.

1388. *Captain Beechey.*—How far along the coast eastward did you proceed?

*Commander Pullen.*—As far as the Spit off Cape Bathurst.

1389. *Captain Beechey.*—Is Cape Bathurst high?

*Commander Pullen.*—No. I could not get to it for ice, but should say the Cape itself was from ten to fifteen feet high.

1390. *Captain Beechey.*—From what you saw of the ice and the offing, knowing the position of Banks's Land, what probability would there be of success of a party attempting to cross?

*Commander Pullen.*—None at all; I do not think it possible.

1391. *Captain Beechey.*—What is the nature of the ice off Cape Bathurst?

*Commander Pullen.*—It is heavy hummucky ice. It was one continued struggle from the 25th of July to the 5th of August to get along that ice, it being so close in, and we were cutting all the time.

1392. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you see any land to the northward during your voyage?

*Commander Pullen.*—No.

1393. *Captain Beechey.*—Did there appear to you to be any general current along that shore, beyond what is occasioned by the wind?

*Commander Pullen.*—No, I do not think there is.

1394. *Sir G. Back.*—Now there seems a remarkable difference in the season when you were there and when I was with Sir John Franklin, viz., that on the 15th of August 1826 there was a complete open sea, with the exception of one piece of ice to the north and west. What was its state when you were there?

*Commander Pullen.*—It was all ice to seaward, and along the coast east and west.

1395. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—How many days were you occupied in exploration with the boats after you left the "Plover"?

*Commander Pullen.*—From the 25th of July to the 30th August. That was the first time, in 1849, from the "Plover" on the coast when we entered the Mackenzie, and my arrival at Fort Simpson was 3d October.

1396. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—What was the health of your party on reaching Fort Simpson?

*Commander Pullen.*—Their general health was good.

1397. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Not much exhausted from their labour?

*Commander Pullen.*—I was obliged to leave five of them at the most northern post. One of them I thought I should lose.

1398. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—What was the second journey?

*Commander Pullen.*—On the 22d of July 1850 I got into the Arctic seas, reached Cape Bathurst on the 10th of August, remained there, or in its vicinity, until the 15th of August, and returned, arriving at the mouth of the Mackenzie River on the 1st of August, and reached Fort Simpson on the 5th of October.

1399. *Sir E. Parry.*—Just state to the Committee what boats you think best adapted for navigating that shore?

*Commander Pullen.*—Steam launches of about three feet draft of water.

1400. *Sir E. Parry.*—Could you carry fuel for that purpose?

*Commander Pullen.*—I should depend principally upon the drift wood, of which there is plenty. There is an immense quantity of it to be found. With these steam launches I should like to have a light boat, a good whale boat; not like the present dockyard whale boat, but one with more beam and flatter floor, such as the whalers use.

1401. *Sir E. Parry.*—Can you suggest any practicable means of prosecuting the search for Sir John Franklin's expedition from the continent of America?

*Commander Pullen.*—Not from the continent at all with boats. The disadvantage of boats is, that the best season for navigation is when we are making

the best of our way for our winter quarters. If there had been a ship or establishment on the coast I could have remained there much longer than I did. It was only the 5th of October when I reached winter quarters at Port Simpson. The ice was making then in the Mackenzie, and driving fast down when we came up; it was one continued drift of ice and heavy snow storms. I refer to the year 1850; in 1849 the weather was somewhat better.

*Commander Pullen.*

7th Nov. 1851.

Mr. BROOMAN called.

*Mr. Brooman,  
Paymaster.*

1402. *Chairman.*—You were Paymaster of the “Resolute,” I believe?

*Mr. Brooman.*—Yes.

1403. *Chairman.*—Were you in any of the exploring parties yourself?

*Mr. Brooman.*—No.

1404. *Chairman.*—Did you land at Beechey Island, where traces of Sir John Franklin’s winter quarters were found?

*Mr. Brooman.*—Yes.

1405. *Chairman.*—Were you present at the search which took place for records and documents?

*Mr. Brooman.*—Yes, on one occasion.

1406. *Chairman.*—Do you think that the search was so complete as to render it impossible that any documents left there could have been overlooked?

*Mr. Brooman.*—Yes, I think so.

1407. *Chairman.*—During the time you were in winter quarters you remained in the ship?

*Mr. Brooman.*—Yes.

1408. *Chairman.*—You know nothing, then, except from the reports you heard?

*Mr. Brooman.*—Nothing more.

1409. *Chairman.*—Were you present at any conversation between Captain Penny and Captain Austin as to the discoveries that had been made by Captain Penny?

*Mr. Brooman.*—Yes. We were walking from the shore, towards the latter end of May 1851, shortly after Captain Penny had returned. Captain Penny was talking of the immense distance he had travelled, and of the amazing quantity of water he had seen, at least, I think he said sixty miles. Captain Austin expressed astonishment at that. Captain Penny threw himself back, and said “Austin! Austin! do you doubt me?” Captain Austin said, “No, but I think you may be mistaken.” Captain Penny said this water was teeming with life; seals, walruses, white whales, ducks, gulls, and some bears were seen. He stated that from the top of the hills,—after some conversation,—he must have seen fully thirty miles of water. Captain Austin still expressed doubt, and he then said there was at least ten miles of water. He came back from sixty to ten. Captain Austin then said “Why, you must have discovered the Polar Basin.” Captain Penny said he did not know about that. I am speaking to the best of my recollection. Captain Austin then said “You will discover the north-west passage;” and Captain Penny said “There is no difficulty about that, but that he would not try it through Wellington Strait, but would go round by Behring Straits.” Captain Austin then said he would leave that honour to Captain Penny, or to younger men than himself.

1410. *Chairman.*—Did you hear Captain Penny make any distinct request to Captain Austin for assistance, in boats, men, or in any other way, to enable him to proceed with his discoveries?

*Mr. Brooman.*—While smoking that evening, I heard Captain Austin offer Captain Penny officers, boats, or anything else for that purpose, but I did not hear Captain Penny apply for them. The impression on my mind was that Captain Penny wanted it. After smoking a cigar, about a quarter to eleven at night, Captain Austin went down. Captain Penny, Dr. King, and I went down into the gun-room, and had a glass of brandy and water. I asked Captain

*Mr. Brooman,  
Paymaster.*  
7th Nov. 1851.

Penny distinctly whether he thought Sir John Franklin went up the Wellington Channel. His answer was, "It is my firm conviction that he never went up there." Captain Penny retired to bed, as I thought, as it was very late. About an hour afterwards I heard that he had put his dogs to, and had gone away entirely, very suddenly indeed. I was at a loss to account for it, except that the next day being Sunday he might have gone to read prayers to his crew. As he did not return on the Monday as I expected, I began to consider that he had been offended some way or another, but how I did not know.

1411. *Chairman.*—Is there anything further you can relate on the same subject? Did you hear any conversations between Captain Austin and Captain Penny, on arriving at the winter quarters of the latter, when they met again?

*Mr. Brooman.*—No. I have no personal knowledge.

1412. *Captain Beechey.*—Have you anything to remark on the provisions, in case it is necessary to send another expedition to the polar seas?

*Mr. Brooman.*—Yes. I consider the preserved meats perfectly tasteless. I would advise that spice should be mixed up with them so as to render them more palatable.

1413. *Chairman.*—Have you given in any report or suggestions as to the quality of your provisions, and the better care that should be taken in future?

*Mr. Brooman.*—No.

*Chairman.*—Then the Committee will request you to draw up a paper containing a full report of all you have observed, with your objections to the provisions taken out under Captain Austin, and suggesting such alterations as may cause better care to be taken for the future. You will be kind enough to send those suggestions in to the Committee in the course of this or next week.

1414. *Chairman.*—We understand a large quantity of the provisions was returned as unserviceable?

*Mr. Brooman.*—I think we had only about four cases of preserved meat that were bad.

1415. *Chairman.*—Can you state the quantity of provisions you returned into store?

*Mr. Brooman.*—About two years for the whole complement or number victualled.

*Mr. R. King,  
Assistant Surgeon.*

Mr. RICHARD KING called.

1416. *Chairman.*—What situation did you fill in the "Resolute"?

*Mr. King.*—Assistant surgeon.

1417. *Chairman.*—Were you present at any conversation between Captain Penny and Captain Austin?

*Mr. King.*—Not between Captain Austin and Captain Penny, except when Captain Penny first returned from Wellington Strait. He returned on the 24th of May. In the gun-room he stated the distance he had gone, what he had seen, and what he believed to be the state of Wellington Channel. He mentioned about the island he got to,—Baillie Hamilton. He said he went on shore at Baillie Hamilton Island, and saw water to the north-west. He saw a piece of ice, and from the rapidity at which it was going, he thought the current was four knots an hour. He was very sorry he had not sufficient food for his dogs to eat, otherwise he would have had some other views, which he thought would have been of great assistance to him. Not having food for his dogs, he was obliged to return. I think Captain Penny said he saw a bear, but that he had no opportunity of killing it.

1418. *Chairman.*—We have heard it stated that you were present at a conversation between Captain Penny and Captain Austin?

*Mr. King.*—No, I was not. In the evening Mr. Brooman and I were chatting with Captain Penny, and having some brandy and water. Mr. Brooman asked Captain Penny whether he thought Sir John Franklin had not gone up Wellington Channel. Captain Penny said he thought he had not, and that he considered that the old ice had been there for a number of years; I think Mr. Penny said twenty years. Mr. Brooman and I were the only persons there. Mr. May was sketching something; I do not think he heard the conversation:

1419. *Sir E. Parry*.—Were you present at any other conversation at any time between Captain Austin and Captain Penny?

*Mr. King*.—No.

*Mr. R. King,*  
*Assistant Surgeon.*

7th Nov. 1851.

*The Chairman*.—I should mention to Captain Austin and Captain Penny, that after to-morrow the Committee will adjourn to Monday se'nnight. It may be convenient for you to know this, that you may make your arrangements. I must observe to you (addressing Captain Austin) that we have had some supplementary evidence from Captain Stewart; and the Committee wish me to mention it to you, because there are several points which Captain Stewart now adds to his original evidence, and which you may perhaps wish to call somebody to explain.

*Captain Austin*.—I have not gone into that evidence sufficient to say; but I think that Captain Ommanney might recollect something more of it.

*Chairman*.—You will recollect that you are not to call any witnesses to examine them yourself. The feeling of the Committee is, as regards the additions that Captain Stewart has made, that he ought to have recollected them before. If there are any of your officers who were present at the time, we are ready to call and examine them.

*Captain Austin*.—Captain Ommanney is the only one I think of at present.

*Chairman*.—After hearing Captain Stewart's new evidence we looked at Captain Ommanney's, and found it very distinct on the subject.

*Captain Austin*.—As this is now a question of character, and as, from what Captain Stewart has said, there may be some doubt in your minds whether I have always rendered assistance to Captain Penny in every way, I will put in a note written by him in reference to that subject, in his own handwriting. It is dated "Assistance Bay, 10th April 1851."

*Chairman*.—That is a very early date. Nobody says anything about what took place between you at that time.

*Captain Austin*.—I beg to put in the letter.

1420. *Chairman (to Captain Penny)*.—Will you look at this letter, and say whether it is in your handwriting?

*Captain Penny*.—Oh yes, I quite admit it.

The following is a copy of the letter.

" My dear Austin,

Assistance Bay, 10th April 1851.

" In answer to your kind letter allow me to express my opinion of your admirable arrangements. They are such, my dear Austin, that had the Board of Admiralty, with dear Lady Franklin at their head, they could not have improved upon them, to serve the mission we have been sent upon. The result is in the hand of the Disposer of all events; and whosoever may be the fortunate one, we will look back with pleasure in having acted together in forwarding the noble cause we have entered upon with all the energy of our natures."

" There has been no expedition ever out in the Arctic sea that has managed as you have done with so many wild spirits to control. I have no doubt you have much to annoy you, but you will look back with pleasure on the sacrifice you made. The country demanded an active and energetic officer, and they have not been disappointed, whatever the result may be.

" I must now conclude with an earnest prayer that all may be enabled to do their duty.

" I remain,

" Yours sincerely,

(Signed)

" W. PENNY."

The Committee then adjourned.





*Eleventh Day. November 8, 1851.*

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles, C.B., M.P., Chairman,  
Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,  
Captain Sir Edward Parry,  
Captain F. W. Beechey,  
Captain Sir George Back,  
Mr. F. J. Fegen, Secretary.

ERASMUS YORK, the Esquimaux brought over by Captain Ommanney, was introduced to the Committee for the purpose of giving information. The Rev. P. Latrobe, Secretary to the Moravian Missions, and the Rev. Christian Beck, acted as interpreters.

*Erasmus York.*

8th Nov. 1851.

1421. *The Chairman (addressing the Rev. Mr. Latrobe).* You are perhaps aware that a report prevailed last year amongst the Esquimaux at Baffin's Bay, that Sir John Franklin's ships had been lost, and their crews murdered?

*Mr. Latrobe.*—Yes. At the request of Captain Hamilton, some papers connected with the subject were forwarded to Germany for translation by our missionaries. The translations have been made, and the papers are now in Captain Hamilton's hands.

1422. *Chairman.*—There is another deposition of Adam Beck's, taken before a magistrate, which has been sent to Copenhagen for translation, but which we have not yet received.

1423. *Sir E. Parry (to Mr. Latrobe).*—What is Mr. Beck, who is about to act as Esquimaux interpreter?

*Mr. Latrobe.*—He has been a missionary in Labrador thirty-four years. He was born in Greenland. His father was a missionary in Greenland fifty-two years, and his grandfather forty-three years on the same coast.

A paper containing a deposition by Adam Beck, an Esquimaux, who professed to have received the information it conveyed from his countryman Erasmus York, was put in by Captain Ommanney, and translated into German by the Rev. Christian Beck, Mr. Latrobe giving the sense in English. It was as follows:

“ While I have been here there have been many ships. There were also many people upon the land. On the islands there were but few native people. A good many show themselves when pleased. (The Rev. Mr. Latrobe understood this to mean that when anything occurred to interest or please them a great number showed themselves.) There were birds, such as eider fowl (and there was another word which he the Rev. Christian Beck did not understand, signifying a particular kind of bird which he did not know). There were also other little birds, that look white, that are found in the country, and also ravens; little ravens and great ravens, and various birds mixed together. (There are other words, evidently names of birds, but incorrectly written, probably local names for birds, which the Rev. C. Beck did not understand). There is a little bird with

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"red at the top of the head. The people here are few. And this is written by me from my heart.

(Signed) "JOHN ROSS, witness to the above being written  
"by Adam Beck on board Her Majesty's  
"Ship 'Assistance,' this 17th day of August  
"1850, in my presence.

"Erasmus Ommanney, Captain of Her Majesty's  
"Ship 'Assistance,' this 17th day of August 1850,  
"witnessed the above being written in my presence by  
"Adam Beck."

1424. The Chairman directed that the first question put to Erasmus York should be the following:—"What have you related to Adam Beck?"

The Rev. Mr. Beck put this question to Erasmus York, and after a considerable time communicated the answer to the Rev. Mr. Latrobe.

*Mr. Latrobe.*—Mr. Beck and the Esquimaux seem to understand each other very well, a few expressions excepted. Erasmus admits that he mentioned to Adam Beck a number of things, chiefly about the country. Further than that Mr. Beck has not been able to get anything out of him.

1425. *Sir E. Parry.*—Ask him of what place he was a native?

*Erasmus York*, in reply to the question, said he was a native of Innagana, being Cape York of the English.

1426. *Sir E. Parry.*—How far north has he ever been?

*Erasmus York* said that when a little boy he had gone up as far as a place marked on his own chart "Pickierloo." Since he had grown up he had not been farther than Wolstenholme Sound.

1427. *Sir E. Parry.*—Has he ever heard of any Kabloonas (white men) ships being wrecked on that coast?

*Erasmus York* replied that Adam Beck had related to him that two ships had been wrecked.

1428. *Sir E. Parry.*—But does he say he ever heard it from his own people?

*Erasmus York* said that far up to the north a ship had been wrecked. He had heard a woman say so. The name of the place was Onoetoke.

1429. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did he ever hear of more than one ship being wrecked there?

*Erasmus York.*—Only one ship.

1430. *Sir E. Parry.*—How long was that ago? How many winters ago?

*Erasmus York.*—Eight winters ago.

1431. *Sir E. Parry.*—Does he know what became of the Kabloonas belonging to the ship?

*Erasmus York* replied that he had never heard what happened to the people.

1432. *Sir E. Parry.*—Has he ever heard that there are any Kabloonas in that direction now?

*Erasmus York* said he knew nothing of any Kabloonas being on shore within the last four years.

1433. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did he see the "North Star" on its arrival there?

*Erasmus York.*—Yes.

1434. *Sir E. Parry.*—That was only two years ago. Ask him when?

*Erasmus York.*—Two winters ago.

1435. *Sir E. Parry.*—Has he ever heard of any Kabloonas being murdered by the Esquimaux on the north?

*Erasmus York* said he had neither seen anything of the kind, nor heard anything of the kind on that coast.

1436. *Sir E. Parry*.—Has he heard anything of the kind on any other part of the coast?

*Erasmus York* replied that he had not. He had never heard of any murder or ill-treatment.

1437. *Sir W. Parry*.—Ask him again how long it was since these ships were lost that he heard of?

*Erasmus York* replied that it was when he was eight years old.

1438. *Sir E. Parry*.—Does he know how old he is now?

*Erasmus York*, on this question being put to him, counted upon his fingers up to nineteen.

1439. *Sir E. Parry*.—What does he think is the character of Adam Beck?

*Erasmus York* replied to the question in English as follows: "Adam Beck tell lie; no good."

*The Rev. Mr. Beck* remarked, that, after the Esquimaux fashion, Erasmus was very reluctant to speak out. Sometimes he would say that Adam Beck was good, and sometimes that he was bad. He said too that he was a mixture of good and bad.

1440. *Sir E. Parry*.—Ask him whether he believes Adam Beck's word?

*Erasmus York* said, "Adam Beck's words are fine, but they are not to be believed."

A long conversation took place on the subject of Adam Beck's depositions which had been submitted last year to the Moravian missionaries for translation.

*Mr. Latrobe* said the missionaries had attentively considered the depositions, and had returned a translation. The Rev. Gentleman then read the following letter:—

Letter from the Rev. A. S. Elsnar to the Rev. P. Latrobe.

Translated from the German.

"Dear Brother,

Hernhut, October 29, 1850.

"I am very sorry to be only now enabled to send you the result of my investigation referring to the two Esquimaux sentences in No. 20,608 of the Times. This long delay has been occasioned by the following circumstance: both passages, as you know, being written in impure Esquimaux, and being therefore only half intelligible to me, I considered it absolutely necessary to confer with one of our Greenland missionaries. But Paulsen Lund, the only Greenland missionary here, being on a journey, I had to put off the matter until to-day. Unfortunately, however, the very words which are not intelligible in the Esquimaux language are likewise not completely so to a person conversant with the Greenlandish dialect. I, therefore, prefer sending rather an imperfect than a false translation. The following is the result of our investigations.

"The first sentence merely states the different dwelling places and names of the Esquimaux who went to 'Omanak' (the name of a place, probably an island). The sentence, however, is so confusedly composed that it is hardly possible to give a coherent translation of it. The only word whose interpretation is rather doubtful is the word 'innaesonet.' As the spelling of this word is incorrect, it might either mean 'many persons' or the plural number of 'murderer.' In our Esquimaux dialect a murderer means 'innuartok,' and in the Greenlandish 'innuraersok.' It is, however, very improbable, that the interpreter should designate as murderers all those Esquimaux who had gone to Omanak from so many different places which he mentions; especially since he merely states in this sentence, that those Esquimaux had gone there, without stating the object of their going. He then finishes this sentence with these words:—'Twenty-six is the number of the Esquimaux in the neighbourhood of Omanak.' The second sentence, speaking of the vessels themselves, is better constructed, and, with the exception of a few words, is intelligible to us. The sense is as follows:—'The Esquimaux, whom I saw for the first time on the 13th August 1850, and whom I asked

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" whether they had seen any vessels which staid over winter in their country, answered.' (The three words which indicate the time when the ships set sail again are unintelligible. The writer then continues,) 'Therefore I write concerning them' (which probably means as much as 'I suppose') 'in the year 1846, when the ice began to break, they set sail and went to Omanak, and stayed there during the winter, because they could not proceed on account of the ice; because there were many vessels the Esquimaux' . . . The last four words are unintelligible to us. The writer annexes to one of them the syllable 'gog,' which means 'they say.' This proves that he was not quite sure of what he is stating. I am sorry to be obliged to send so imperfect a translation; but it is impossible to make a better one. We cannot well decide here whether, in those parts, another dialect is spoken, or whether the bad spelling produces the difficulty. The latter is a very common fault of the Greenlanders who have not been regularly instructed."

*Lieut. Elliott.*

LIEUTENANT J. E. ELLIOTT called.

1441. *Chairman.*—What situation did you hold?

*Lieutenant Elliott.*—Second Lieutenant of the "Assistance."

1442. *Chairman.*—Did you accompany any of the exploring expeditions?

*Lieutenant Elliott.*—No.

1443. *Chairman.*—Did you make any observations on the state of the ice in Wellington Strait when you came out of your winter quarters, and when you returned to the eastward, and were sent to the crow's nest to report on that subject?

*Lieutenant Elliott.*—I found the ice more to the southward than it was the year before. It was to the Southward of Barlow's Inlet, and extended two thirds across Wellington Strait.

1444. *Chairman.*—To the westward, did it appear fast ice?

*Lieutenant Elliott.*—Yes; it was completely blocked up.

1445. *Chairman.*—But to the eastward it extended farther to the north?

*Lieutenant Elliott.*—Yes. We could see as far as Point Innes, and the open water reached apparently as far as that.

1446. *Chairman.*—Had you been on an Arctic voyage previously?

*Lieutenant Elliott.*—No.

1447. *Chairman.*—From your own observation at the time, and comparing the ice in 1850 and 1851, when you passed it going to the westward, did it appear to you as thick as on the preceding year?

*Lieutenant Elliott.*—Yes. In September 1850 we passed farther north than in 1851.

1448. *Chairman.*—How high were you yourself in September 1850?

*Lieutenant Elliott.*—Nearly as high as Point Innes.

1449. *Chairman.*—Did you see any open water?

*Lieutenant Elliott.*—None to the northward. There was a fixed floe right across.

1450. *Chairman.*—Do you think from what you saw that there was any probability of the strait clearing that year after you passed?

*Lieutenant Elliott.*—No.

1451. *Chairman.*—Why?

*Lieutenant Elliott.*—Because it appeared so thick and fixed, and the thermometer fell to near zero soon after we were obliged to go to winter quarters.

1452. *Chairman.*—Were you present at any conversation that took place between Captain Austin and Captain Penny?

*Lieutenant Elliott.*—No.

1453. *Chairman.*—You know nothing then, except from hearsay?

*Lieutenant Elliott.*—Nothing more.

1454. *Chairman*.—Were you present when the search for traces was made in Beechey Island?

*Lieut. Elliott.*

*Lieutenant Elliott*.—Yes. I discovered the first traces myself. It was a piece of bottle found at Cape Riley. We searched further, and found a staff, iron bar, and other articles.

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1455. *Chairman*.—Do you think the search you made was so complete that there was no chance of any records or documents being overlooked?

*Lieutenant Elliott*.—Yes. I assisted in taking down a cairn on Beechey Island. We took it down stone by stone, and dug two feet underneath it, but found nothing.

1456. Did you know anything of the search in Cape Riley?

*Lieutenant Elliott*.—It was at Cape Riley where the piece of bottle was found.

1457. *Chairman*.—Were you one of the party that went down and discovered the graves?

*Lieutenant Elliott*.—No. Captain Penny came down to us when beset in the ice. We told him what we had done, and that we had left Beechey Island and coast near it unfinished. Captain Penny said he would return, and complete the search of Beechey Island and the neighbourhood, as we were beset.

1458. *Chairman*.—In 1851, when you crossed Wellington Strait again, going to the eastward, did the ice appear to be in motion?

*Lieutenant Elliott*.—The outward or southern edge of the ice was in motion, the floe in the channel was to all appearance fixed.

1459. *Chairman*.—Was there any appearance of the ice breaking up before the close of the season, so as to render the Wellington Strait navigable?

*Lieutenant Elliott*.—I cannot say.

LIEUTENANT MECHAM called.

*Lieut. Meham.*

1460. *Chairman*.—What rank did you hold in the "Assistance"?

*Lieutenant Meham*.—Third Lieutenant.

1461. *Chairman*.—I believe you explored the coast to the southward in the chart which is marked with your name?

*Lieutenant Meham*.—Yes.

1462. *Chairman*.—Without any superior officer?

*Lieutenant Meham*.—Yes.

1463. *Chairman*.—Are you sure that you explored so carefully that no traces of the missing expedition could have been overlooked?

*Lieutenant Meham*.—Yes.

1464. *Chairman*.—Have you such personal knowledge of the ice in Wellington Strait as would enable you to say whether the strait would be navigable this year or not?

*Lieutenant Meham*.—In August 1850 it was not navigable to the north as we crossed it. In recrossing in August 1851 heavy ice was streaming down its western shores, but as we approached the eastern side we could see no fixed ice to the northward from the crow's nest.

1465. *Chairman*.—How far did the open water appear to extend?

*Lieutenant Meham*.—We saw open water as far as we could see from the crow's nest. I should judge that fixed ice could not be distinguished over ten miles.

1466. *Chairman*.—You have no personal knowledge of any conversation between Captain Austin and Captain Penny?

*Lieutenant Meham*.—None.

1467. *Chairman*.—Were you on shore when the search took place on Beechey Island and Cape Riley for traces of the missing expedition, when just discovered, in 1850?

*Lieutenant Meham*.—No; I was on board the ship off Gascoigne Inlet.

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1468. *Chairman.*—Did you give in any report when you returned from your exploring expedition as to the sledges, and the improvements that might be made hereafter?

*Lieutenant Meham.*—Yes. They were contained in my travelling journal which I gave to Captain Austin.

1469. *Chairman.*—Have you anything to add to that?

*Lieutenant Meham.*—I should like to look over it again. I do not think I could state anything more on the subject now.

1470. *Chairman.*—We understand you left a boat somewhere. Will you explain the circumstances?

*Lieutenant Meham.*—I was ordered to take it to the position of Captain Ommanney's first dépôt, latitude  $73^{\circ}57'$ , longitude  $99\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ . The boat was placed fifteen miles to the eastward of that, and was left there in case Captain Ommanney wished to leave the first dépôt direct for the ship, instead of proceeding to Cape Walker for the purpose of obtaining one of the Halketts which were buried there. The boat was left to the east of the dépôt, on account of the heavy character of the ice.

*Mr. Pickthorne.*

Mr. PICKTHORNE called.

1471. *Chairman.*—What rank did you hold in the "Resolute?"

*Mr. Pickthorne.*—Additional Assistant Surgeon of the "Resolute" for service in the "Pioneer."

1472. *Chairman.*—Were you present at any conversation between Captain Penny and Captain Austin in May 1851 or August 1851?

*Mr. Pickthorne.*—I recollect being present on the 24th of May, when Captain Penny dined with Captain Austin, and spent the evening there. During the evening Captain Penny gave Captain Austin an account of his proceedings up Wellington Channel. He said he intended to transport a boat across the ice, in order to carry on the search in the open water he had discovered. In the course of the evening Captain Austin offered him, if I recollect right, two sledge parties and officers to assist him in transporting his boat up Wellington Channel. I do not recollect any more of the conversation. Captain Penny left in the evening rather hurriedly.

1473. *Chairman.*—All that you heard?

*Mr. Pickthorne.*—Yes.

1474. *Chairman.*—Can you state any further conversation that took place?

*Mr. Pickthorne.*—No.

1475. *Chairman.*—Were you present at any conversation that evening amongst the officers of the "Resolute" after Captain Austin had retired?

*Mr. Pickthorne.*—No.

1476. *Chairman.*—Were you present at a conversation between Captain Austin and Captain Penny on the 11th or 12th of August 1851?

*Mr. Pickthorne.*—I was on board the "Lady Franklin," but I was not present at any conversation.

1477. *Chairman.*—Was the impression on your mind when this took place, that Captain Austin was doing all he could to co-operate with Captain Penny, or that Captain Penny had any ground of complaint from not having the assistance rendered him that he had asked for?

*Mr. Pickthorne.*—I think Captain Austin was endeavouring to co-operate with Captain Penny, by offering to furnish him assistance. On the night of the 11th of August Captain Penny said to me, when he was going, "I asked Captain Austin if he would let me go up Wellington Channel in one of his steamers to prosecute the search there; but that has not been agreed to;" leaving an impression on my mind that he wished to go up in a steamer if Captain Austin lent one. This was on board the "Lady Franklin," after Captain Austin's interview with Captain Penny.

1478. *Chairman.*—Did Captain Penny appear to be of opinion that there was open water in Wellington Strait at that time?

*Mr. Pickthorne.*—On the 26th of July I understood from Captain Penny's report and others that there was a fixed barrier twenty miles in width.

1479. *Chairman*.—Was any third person present at the conversation with Captain Penny? *Mr. Pickthorne*.

*Mr. Pickthorne*.—No. It was in bidding him good-by.

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1480. *Chairman*.—Did you accompany any other exploring expedition?

*Mr. Pickthorne*.—No.

*The Chairman* (addressing Captain Penny) said, “ You have communicated to the Committee this morning that you shall require Dr. Sutherland and Captain Stewart to be in attendance here. The Committee desire me to remind you of the communication made to you on the preceding day, in which I was directed to acquaint you, that, you having on all occasions, and particularly yesterday, distinctly disclaimed the character of prosecutor or accuser during this investigation, you could not be permitted to re-examine evidence; but that both yourself and Captain Austin would be allowed to offer any observations at the close of our proceedings. We therefore think it right to acquaint you now, that we shall not permit you to re-examine either Dr. Sutherland or Captain Stewart yourself; that they will be continued here in attendance until the Committee discharge them, and they will be in attendance here until the 17th; but you must clearly understand that you will not be permitted to re-examine them yourself. The Committee may recall any one they please, but they will not allow either you or Captain Austin to do so.”

The Committee then adjourned until Monday the 17th instant.





*Twelfth Day. November 17, 1851.*

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles, C.B., M.P.,  
Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,  
Captain Sir Edward Parry,  
Captain F. W. Beechey,  
Captain Sir George Back,  
Mr. F. J. Fegen, Secretary.

CAPTAIN OMMANNEY recalled.

*Capt. Ommanney.*

17th Nov. 1851.

1481. *Chairman.*—Captain Ommanney, there is a question the Committee wish to ask you with respect to the Esquimaux paper signed by Adam Beck, and witnessed by Sir John Ross and yourself. When that paper was drawn up, did you imagine that it was a paper of any consequence, or that it had any bearing upon the loss of the ships and the massacre of the crews?

*Captain Ommanney.*—I considered that that was the subject alluded to, and no other.

1482. *Sir E. Parry.*—Have you, in your intercourse with Erasmus York, had occasion to believe that there is any truth in Adam Beck's statement relative to the wreck of the ships and the murder of their crews in Baffin's Bay?

*Captain Ommanney.*—Erasmus York always maintained the same opinion, that Adam Beck made a false statement; and he said that no two ships ever came up the coast except the North Star, that is, to remain on the coast; he has seen passing whalers. Peterson, the interpreter, came to the ship once or twice during the winter, and I used to get him into my cabin in order to obtain further information from him. His answer always was, "No, no; no ships came there but the North Star."

1483. *Captain Beechey.*—From whom did Adam Beck receive his information?

*Captain Ommanney.*—From three Esquimaux, of whom York was one; a woman, and a child.

1484. *Sir G. Back.*—Were they of York's tribe?

*Captain Ommanney.*—Yes. The tribe consisted of three men (one of whom was York), three women, and four or five children.

1485. *Captain Beechey.*—Was this statement taken down at the time? [The statement referred to was the paper dated 17th August 1850, and which is given in answer to question 1423 in the examination.]

*Captain Ommanney.*—We communicated at Cape York, in the first instance, on the 13th or 14th of August 1850, when an investigation with the natives took place, and we were perfectly satisfied that there was no foundation for the report. This paper was taken down on the 17th. After clearing Sir John Ross from the ice, he came on board, and in parting company requested that York's statement might be taken down in writing by Adam Beck.

*Capt. Ommanney.*  
17th Nov. 1851.

1486. *Captain Beechey*.—Was that statement taken down by Adam Beck in York's presence at that time?

*Captain Ommanney*.—York dictated, and Adam Beck wrote, in the presence of Sir John Ross and myself.

1487. *Captain Beechey*.—Then Adam Beck received his entire information from York?

*Captain Ommanney*.—Yes; what is written here.

1488. *Captain Beechey*.—Did Adam Beck deliver that as the statement he had received of the loss of the ships as related to him by the natives?

*Captain Ommanney*.—As far as I could understand him, he did.

1489. *Sir E. Parry*.—Then you supposed, when you came to England, that that statement did relate to Adam Beck's story?

*Captain Ommanney*.—Yes, certainly; I was always under that impression.

1490. *Captain Beechey*.—That that paper would contain the substance of the story respecting the loss of the ships?

*Captain Ommanney*.—Yes, certainly. During our first communication with the natives on board the *Intrepid*, as I understood, he was an interpreter. I pressed him to give me all the information he could, during our conversation with the natives. And at that time, he said nothing whatever about the murder of the crews or the loss of the ships. It was about eight hours after leaving Cape York that Adam Beck's statement relative to the wrecked ships and murdered crews was made known to me.

1491. *Captain Beechey*.—Had Adam Beck remained on board your ship all the time?

*Captain Ommanney*.—No; he remained on board the *Intrepid* some time, and then he dropped down, first on board our ship, and subsequently to the *Prince Albert*, which was towing close under our stern.

*Captain Austin.*  
*Mr. Penny.*

CAPTAIN AUSTIN and CAPTAIN PENNY recalled.

1492. *The Chairman* (addressing Captain Penny).—As you were the first examined of the two, the Committee think they would rather have your final observations on the matter first.

*Captain Penny* then produced the following statement, which he read to the Committee :—

“STATEMENT I.—I am not the cause of Captain Austin's return, as I am made to appear by the publication of that correspondence (alluding to letters Nos. 4. and 4 (a) of Captain Austin's letters to the Secretary of the Admiralty), since, besides other reasons I have given, Captain Austin says, ‘Sir John Franklin is not gone that way.’ 2.—I showed my desire for co-operation, and to continue the search, by asking Captain Austin to let me pilot a steamer up Wellington Channel; and I deny that I had any other reason for asking for the steamer than to seek for Sir John Franklin. Captain Ommanney was not present in Captain Austin's cabin when I asked for it. 3.—My decided opinion that Sir John Franklin had gone north-west from Wellington Channel was given to Captain Austin at the same time, and with my chart before us, that I asked for the steamer to be sent up the channel, on the 11th of August. I went on board the *Resolute* for the express purpose of telling everything to Captain Austin, and of asking for the steamer. So I had repeatedly told Lieutenant Aldrich I would, and he assured me he thought Captain Austin would grant my request. I left the *Resolute* very much hurt and angry. 4.—I have to say again that the correspondence between myself and Captain Austin followed our conversation almost immediately, all but my letter, which I was very unwilling to give at all; but Captain Austin came on board the *Lady Franklin*, and urged me all he could to give him a letter, he left without it, and then sent his boat for it some hours after, and I then wrote in great irritation. To a man like me, one conversation was worth fifty letters, and I could not understand what he meant by it. 5.—I wish to say that I do not acknowledge the correctness of the conversation with me, which Captain Austin and Captain

" Ommamney have *written* down. I never did the like of that myself, and  
 " I am not a match for those that do it. 6.—In all I have now said I am  
 " only replying to charges made against me, either directly or indirectly, by  
 " Captain Austin. I could press against him what I have already stated,  
 " namely, that he treated me upon several occasions very unfairly and unkindly,  
 " and this I could bring his own officers to prove, but unless compelled I do  
 " not want to do it, only to set myself right, which I am determined to do."

" WILLIAM PENNY."

*Captain Austin.*  
*Mr. Penny.*

17th Nov. 1851.

1493. *Chairman*.—Now, Captain Austin, the Committee will be happy to hear any final observations you may have to make?

*Captain Austin*.—I have put them on paper, as I have felt hurt and pained at the observations which have been made. I thought it better to put them on paper.

*Captain Austin* then proceeded to read the following statement to the Committee:—

" In availing myself of the permission of the Committee, I beg to offer a few  
 " words in addition to my former statement. The evidence of some of my  
 " officers has recalled to my mind the substance of the note which I wrote to  
 " Captain Stewart shortly after his return from his search, to the effect that  
 " it would be a happy event should the reported barrier of ice in Wellington  
 " Channel break away so as to admit of the steamers going up; that I could  
 " put on board several surveyors, who would in a very few days fix positions  
 " and get some angles. I have no doubt that this note gave rise to the notion  
 " that the steamers would be sent up. I suppose this note to have been written  
 " about the end of June. But Captain Penny never asked for a steamer, nor did  
 " he ever give me the slightest reason to hope that either trace or rescue was  
 " to be obtained by sending a steamer up the Wellington Channel. I merely  
 " alluded to the possible event of my sending the steamers up, and to the extent  
 " I have described. These are the only additions I have to make to my  
 " former evidence, with one exception. I forbear from making any observa-  
 " tions whatever upon the statements made by others upon the present inquiry.  
 " As the officer in charge of the expedition, I feel that I ought not to allow the  
 " present inquiry to close without noticing a portion of the evidence given by  
 " Lieutenant M'Clintock. In answering question 908, Lieutenant M'Clintock  
 " states that he could have reached Banks's Land if he had been left to his own  
 " discretion. I am willing to believe that Lieutenant M'Clintock gave that  
 " answer with the view of showing his own zeal and devotion in the cause,  
 " and without considering the consequences to which his answer inevitably led.  
 " My orders to Lieutenant M'Clintock, and to all, were *to prosecute the most*  
 " *active, earnest, and persevering search for our missing countrymen*, and it  
 " was my firm belief (a belief entertained by me until I heard his own assertion  
 " to the contrary) that Lieutenant M'Clintock had done his utmost; and it was  
 " for that reason, and on that account alone, that I placed Lieutenant M'Clin-  
 " tock's name in the very prominent position it occupies in my report. In  
 " laying before the Committee the outline chart furnished by Captain Penny,  
 " received on the 11th of August, I may observe that no separation of channels  
 " is shown there by naming as Queen's Channel the open water stated to be  
 " seen either the northern or westward at the head of Wellington Channel.  
 " Therefore, until my arrival in England, I had not the slightest knowledge of  
 " any other name than that of Wellington Channel to any water stated to  
 " have been seen to the northward and westward at the head of that channel."

" HORATIO T. AUSTIN."

CAPTAIN STEWART recalled.

*Mr Stewart.*

*Captain Penny* informed the Committee that he did not wish to be present during Captain Stewart's re-examination, and accordingly withdrew.

1494. *Chairman*.—It appears from Captain Penny's journal that you received fresh instructions from him on the 15th of August 1851. Will you state to the Committee what those instructions were?

*Captain Stewart*.—My instructions were then to make the best of my way home. I was to have received written instructions the following day, but the weather came on thick, and we parted company without my having received written instructions. I then proceeded homewards for England.

*Mr. Stewart.*  
 17th Nov. 1851.

1495. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—I understand you expected to have received instructions to the same effect?

*Captain Stewart.*—Yes, I supposed so.

1496. *Sir E. Parry.*—When did you part company?

*Captain Stewart.*—I do not recollect the date. You will see it in my journal.

1497. *Sir E. Parry.*—Was it the day after you received the instructions, or some days afterwards?

*Captain Stewart.*—It was some days afterwards. It was coming through the ice the night after we got clear of the middle ice.

1498. *Sir E. Parry.*—Captain Penny's journal says, on the night of the 21st of August, "This night lost our consort;" was that the day?

*Captain Stewart.*—I do not know the date. It was just after we left the middle ice.

1499. *Sir E. Parry.*—It was a few days after you received these verbal instructions?

*Captain Stewart.*—Yes, a few days afterwards.

1500. *Chairman.*—Did you receive a letter from Captain Austin, after your return from your exploring journey, about the end of June this year?

*Captain Stewart.*—Yes.

1501. *Chairman.*—Will you state to the Committee the purport of that letter?

*Captain Stewart.*—I do not recollect; I have not got my papers here.

1502. *Chairman.*—Can you state, to the best of your recollection, what it was about?

*Captain Stewart.*—I think the purport of it was congratulating me on my safe return, and on having discovered that new land to the northward.

1503. *Chairman.*—Did he say anything about steam vessels prosecuting the discovery, or any thing to that effect?

*Captain Stewart.*—I do not think he said it in the letter, but I saw him afterwards, when he spoke about it; he said that if there were steamers up there, they could fix their positions so nicely, as there were such excellent surveyors.

1504. *Chairman.*—Then he meant if the channel opened, for they could not get up at that time, could they?

*Captain Stewart.*—No, not at that time.

1505. *Chairman.*—Then the communication from Captain Austin to you was expressing a wish that steamers could pass up the channel and examine the open water more thoroughly?

*Captain Stewart.*—I do not know that it was expressing a wish. He stated that if the surveyors were there they could fix the points so well.

1506. *Chairman.*—Could you send up the note to the Secretary of the Committee when you get home?

*Captain Stewart.*—Yes, if I can find it; all my papers are in Scotland.

The Committee then adjourned.

## **A P P E N D I X.**





## Enclosure No. 3.

## INSTRUCTIONS to Captain AUSTIN, C.B.

Captain Austin's  
Instructions.

By the Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c.

1. Having appointed you to the command of the Expedition which it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to despatch on a further search for Her Majesty's ships "Erebus" and "Terror," under the command of Sir John Franklin, you are hereby required and directed to take the vessels named in the margin under your command, and, so soon as they are in all respects ready to put to sea, and to make the best of your way to Davis' Straits, for the express purpose of prosecuting a most vigorous search for the missing ships.

Resolute,"  
Assistance,"  
Intrepid,"  
Pioneer."

2. We have directed you to be furnished with a copy of our orders which were given to Sir John Franklin, and which will afford you full information how he was directed to proceed. We have likewise ordered you to have a copy of our instructions to Captain Sir James Ross; and to these we have to direct your especial attention.

Vide Evidence,  
p. 40.

3. The various papers which have been laid before the Houses of Parliament have also been sent for your information. By reference to them you will be made aware that we have taken the opinions of the most able and experienced persons connected with Polar navigation relative to the missing Expedition; you will observe that many valuable conjectures have been made; and it has been suggested that Sir John Franklin may have effected his passage to Melville Island, and been detained there with his ships. It has again been suggested as possible that his ships may have been damaged in the ice in the neighbouring sea, and that with his crews he may have abandoned them, and made his escape to that island. To these, as well as the other possibilities, you will not fail to give every proper weight.

4. It therefore appears to us to be a main object of the Expedition for you to use every exertion to reach Melville Island, detaching a portion of your ships to search the shores of Wellington Channel and the coast about Cape Walker, to which point Sir J. Franklin was ordered to proceed. We trust that a diligent examination of these several places will afford you some certain trace or record of the missing Expedition which will enable you to form an opinion of the best course to adopt for their rescue. As your course of action must clearly depend on such information, we consider it unnecessary to give you any definite or specific instruction, and inexpedient to bind you down to any certain line of proceeding. We confide in your knowledge and experience of the navigation of the Polar Seas; and, placing just reliance on your energetic character and zeal, we leave you entirely unfettered to do what may seem to you best for attaining the great object of the expedition intrusted to your charge, feeling assured that you, as well as all those under you, will use your utmost exertions to afford relief to our unfortunate countrymen, and to justify the reliance we have placed in you.

5. The officers whom we have consulted have expressed an opinion that no vessel should be allowed to prosecute the search alone, and it is for this reason that to your own and to Captain Ommanney's ship an auxiliary screw vessel has been attached. We therefore direct your attention to this important consideration.

6. Your ships have been fully equipped and provisioned for a period of three years, to meet any emergency which may arise from falling in with Sir John Franklin's party. In addition to these supplies, there are stores and provisions, &c. left by Sir James Ross at Port Leopold, and a further store was sent out in the "North Star" in the summer of last year. These will be available for you in case of necessity; but you are not to consider them as a part of your own stock, but as a reserve for the aid of any of Sir John Franklin's party who may reach that spot, or as a depôt on which any party may fall back upon, should they unfortunately be separated from their ships.

7. In the prosecution of your search you will use your utmost efforts during *this* summer, taking care not to lose any opportunity which may be open to you of getting to the westward, and of securing your ships in some safe harbour before the winter sets in, from whence you will despatch such overland parties as the means placed at your disposal will permit. On the return of the open

Captain Austin's  
Instructions.

season of 1851 you will again renew your search; but it is our intention and directions that you shall return to England in the autumn of that year, unless some trace should be found of the missing expedition, which may lead you to believe that a delay may contribute to their rescue, and which may justify a deviation from our orders.

8. You are aware that this is not the only expedition fitting out or being despatched with the same object. One such, under the command of Mr. Penny of Aberdeen, has already sailed for Davis' Straits, provisioned as your own for a period of three years. We furnish you with a copy of the instructions under which he is acting, and we desire that you will render him any aid and assistance in your power, as well as to any other expedition, either from this country, the United States of America, or from any other nation, so far as you may be able to do so without risk of crippling the resources of the vessels under your command.

9. You will take the utmost care in leaving memorials of your track in the usual manner and in every prominent place, and enjoin the same precaution upon all the ships and land parties detached from you or them.

10. You will keep your second in command well informed of the instructions under which you are acting, consulting with him on all points, and stating your own views as to the best means of carrying them out, so that no information may be wanting on his part, if accident to yourself should cause him to succeed to the command.

11. As soon as you reach the Whale Fish Islands, to which rendezvous the "Emma Eugenia" transport has already been despatched, and that you have distributed the supplies taken on board that vessel for the use of the expedition, you will send her to England, and you will also give orders to the master of the "North Star," should you fall in with that vessel, to return home.

12. The several vessels thus placed under your command have been fitted out under your own immediate superintendence, and with every attention to the wants and requirements of the great enterprise you have volunteered to undertake. The officers in command of the vessels composing it, and who are animated with the same ardour as yourself, have been selected by you, with our full concurrence as to their fitness for this particular service. All that could be effected by the generous sympathies of your Queen and your country has been done; and it only remains for us to conclude our instructions with an earnest prayer that success may attend your exertions, and that a good Providence may guide your councils, and be your constant defence.

Given under our hands, this 2d of May 1850.

F. T. BARING.  
M. F. F. BERKELEY.

To Horatio T. Austin, Esq., C.B.,  
Captain of Her Majesty's Ship "Resolute."  
in charge of an Expedition to the Arctic Seas.

By Command of their Lordships,  
J. PARKER.

## Enclosure No. 4.

INSTRUCTIONS to Mr. W. PENNY.

Mr. Penny's  
Instructions.

By the Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of Great Britain and Ireland, &c. &c.

1. HER Majesty's Government having determined that further endeavours shall be made to trace the progress of Her Majesty's ships "Erebus" and "Terror," under the command of Sir John Franklin, and to resume the search after that Expedition, and having resolved to employ you in the command of the two vessels, the "Lady Franklin" and "Sophia," which have been equipped for that service, you are hereby required and directed, so soon as the said vessels shall be in all respects ready for sea, to proceed with them with all due despatch to Davis's Strait.

2. In intrusting you with the above command, we do not deem it advisable to furnish you with minute instructions as to the course you are to pursue.

In accepting your offer of service regard has been had to your long experience in Arctic navigation, and to the attention you had evidently paid to the subject of the missing ships. We deem it expedient, rather, that you should be instructed in all the circumstances of the case, and that you should be left to the exercise of your own judgment and discretion in combining the most active and energetic search after Her Majesty's ships "Erebus" and "Terror" with a strict and careful regard to the safety of the ships and their crews under your charge, and with a fixed attention to that part of your orders which relate to your returning with those ships to this country.

3. For this purpose you will be furnished with copies of the original instructions given to Sir John Franklin, and which instructions will indicate the course he was directed to pursue, together with our orders and directions to Sir James Ross, when he was despatched on a search after Sir John Franklin, in the spring of 1848.

4. You will be aware that the case virtually stands now as it did then; Sir James Ross, from adverse circumstances, failed in discovering traces of the missing Expedition.

5. Our orders of the 9th May 1848 to Sir James Ross will still serve as the indication of our views of the general course you will have to pursue; but it being our desire that a certain strait known as Alderman Jones's Sound, and which would not appear to have been as yet examined, should be searched, you are hereby required and directed to proceed in the first instance to that sound, closely examining the shores for any traces of Sir John Franklin's course, and proceeding, should it offer the means of your doing so, in the direction of *Wellington Strait and on to the Parry Islands and Melville Island.*

6. On your proceeding in the above direction, too much vigilance cannot be observed in your search along the various shores for traces of the missing Expedition. At the same time you will bear in mind that Sir John Franklin's orders were "to push on through Lancaster Sound, without stopping to examine any openings north or south of that sound, till he had reached Cape Walker." And although it may be possible that the obstructions incident to navigation in those seas may have forced Sir John Franklin north or south of his prescribed course, yet that his principal object would be the gaining the latitude and longitude of Cape Walker.

7. To that point, therefore, failing your discovering traces of the Expedition in your course by Jones's Sound and the Parry Islands, your efforts will be directed, and beyond this your own judgment must be your principal guide.

8. The circumstance of Sir James Ross having partially searched the shores of Lancaster Sound and Barrow's Strait as far west as Cape Rennell without discovering traces of Sir John Franklin's ships has led in some quarters to the supposition of an extreme case; viz., that failing to get into Lancaster Sound, Sir John Franklin had proceeded in the direction of Smith's Sound, at the head of Baffin's Bay.

9. We do not deem it expedient to direct your attention specially to this sound (or supposed sound); but should your passage by Jones's Sound, to which you *are* specially directed, be early and absolutely impeded, and there should appear to you to be the time (without hazarding the only remaining chance of proceeding to Wellington Strait, the Parry Islands, and Cape Walker by Lancaster Sound,) for examining Smith's Sound, you are at liberty to do so; but this is a contingency scarcely to be contemplated, as, in the event of your being frustrated in the attempt to get to the westward and towards Wellington Strait by Jones's Sound, the late period of the year when Smith's Sound is said to be open would render it difficult, if not impossible, to combine a search in that quarter with the securing a passage into Lancaster Sound before the season closed.

10. Much of the painful anxiety that now exists respecting the missing ships might possibly have been avoided if greater care had been taken to leave traces of their progress. You will consider it rigidly your duty, and a matter of the utmost importance, that every means should be adopted for marking your own track.

For this purpose you will provide yourself with an ample supply of red and white lead for making paint; and, in addition to the usual pole or staff, or cairn of stones, usually looked for on a cape or headland, you will, wherever the colouring of the cliff or shore admits of a mark being made in strong relief,

Mr. Penny's  
Instructions.

paint a red or white cross, as the case may be, depositing as near to its base as possible, and at right angles with the perpendicular part of such cross, a bottle or other vessel containing a short summary of your proceedings up to the date of the deposit, an account of the state of your supplies and resources, the health of your party, and your further intended course.

11. There remains but to caution you as to your return with your ships to this country.

These ships have been provisioned and stored for three years; but you will bear in mind that this liberal supply is to meet contingencies separate on the one hand from the victualling of your own people, and, on the other, from a needless, reckless, and hazardous continuance in the Arctic regions.

You have been victualled to supply the missing Expedition, or any part of it you may providentially discover; here is the one contingency; unforeseen impediments, or a certain prospect of coming up with any part of the missing Expedition, compelling you to pass a second winter in the ice, is the other; but our directions to you are, 1st, to use your utmost endeavours (consistent with the safety of the lives of those intrusted to your command) to succour in *this summer* the party under Sir John Franklin, taking care to secure your winter quarters in good time; and, 2d, that the same active endeavours will be used by you in the ensuing summer of 1851 to secure the return of your own ships to this country.

12. We refer you to the instructions contained in par. 21. of Sir John Franklin's orders, for your guidance in the event of one of your ships being disabled, or in case of any accident to yourself; and in par. 22. of the same orders are full instructions as to transmitting reports of your progress to our Secretary for our information; to both of which you will strictly attend.

13. In conclusion, we have only to repeat the expressions of our confidence in your skill and in your known ardour in a generous cause; and we commend you and those with you to a good Providence, with our earnest wishes for your success.

Given under our hands, this 11th April 1850.

(Signed)

F. T. BARTING.

J. H. D. DUNDAS.

By Command of their Lordships,  
W. A. B. HAMILTON.

Mr. William Penny,  
Ship "Lady Franklin,"  
in charge of an Expedition to the Arctic Seas, at Aberdeen.

Captain HAMILTON to Captain PENNY.

Sir,

Admiralty, 10th April 1850.

I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith the original and duplicate of a letter addressed to Mr. Saunders, Master commanding Her Majesty's Store Ship "North Star," in the Arctic Seas, containing instructions for his guidance, one of which my Lords request you will take charge of yourself, for delivery to that officer, should you fall in with him, and the other you are to put in the possession of Mr. Stewart of the ship "Sophia," for the same purpose.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. A. B. HAMILTON.

Enclosure.

Sir,

Admiralty, 10th April 1850.

I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you,

1. That Sir James Ross having returned to England in the month of November last without having discovered any traces of the missing Expedition under Sir John Franklin's orders, and the necessity for the stores and provisions with which he was charged being deposited as directed being all the more urgent, my Lords can only trust that you have been able to land them accordingly.

2. That as our last reports from you were dated 19th July 1849, lat.  $74^{\circ} 3'$  long.  $59^{\circ} 40'$  W., the anxiety on the part of their Lordships to receive further intelligence of your proceedings is great; and they can therefore only hope, in the event of this despatch reaching you, and of your not having succeeded in affording succour to any of Sir John Franklin's party, that it may find you returning with Her Majesty's ship under your command to England.

Mr. Penny's  
Instructions.

3. And that, in order that you may be in full possession of all that has occurred or that has been done since your departure relative to the relief of Sir John Franklin, you are herewith furnished with a printed return which will put you in complete possession of the state of the case, and to which my Lords have only to add, that four ships under the command of Captain Austin, two of them being auxiliary steam vessels, are now fitting at Woolwich, in addition to the two vessels under Captain Penny's orders, and by which this despatch is sent, for the purpose of continuing the search after Sir John Franklin's Expedition (irrespective of private expeditions from this country and the United States); and that as supplies of stores, especially coals, would be most needful for these vessels, as an auxiliary, you are to land at the Whale Fish Island or at Disco whatever proportion of coals or provisions you consider you can with propriety spare, returning without loss of time to England.

I am, &c.

Mr. James Saunders, (Signed) W. A. B. HAMILTON.  
Master Commanding H.M.S. "North Star."

### Enclosure No. 5.

Rear Admiral Sir JOHN ROSS to Mr. FEGEN, Secretary to the Arctic Committee.

Sir John Ross's  
Replies.

Sir,

Ayr, 1st November 1851.

I am to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 31st ult., annexing, by desire of the Arctic Committee, certain questions for my answers, which have been submitted to other officers, and to give them my careful consideration.

I have to acquaint you, for the information of the Committee, that I have annexed to this letter my answers to the said questions, after having given them a *most careful* consideration.

I am, &c.

(Signed) JOHN ROSS, Rear Admiral.

### Enclosure.

*Question 1.*—Do you suppose it probable that Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crews composing his expedition, still survive? If so, in what direction?

*Answer.*—I do not think it probable that Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crews composing his expedition, still survive. It is *barely* possible, if the ships have been wrecked on the east or west coast of Baffin's Bay, where there are natives, but nowhere else.

*Question 2.*—What are your grounds for forming that opinion?

*Answer.*—From my experience in having passed four successive winters in the Arctic regions, I do not think that British-born officers and men could withstand the effect of six winters, even if they had plenty of food. I have a very strong constitution, but I think it was very doubtful if I could have withstood the effects of the fifth winter, and most certainly not the sixth. Ten out of twenty would have perished in a month had we not been picked up by the "Isabella."

Sir John Ross's  
Replies.

**Question 3.**—Should a further search be decided on, what measures do you recommend for this purpose, and in what direction?

It is requested that this question be answered with a full explanation of every particular of the proposed place of search.

**Answer.**—A further search in the Wellington Channel will depend on the mildness or severity of the approaching winter and spring. But at any rate the truth or falsehood of Adam Beck's report should be ascertained in the manner pointed out in my evidence. If I could have obtained provisions (which I expected to find at Disco), I should have remained during this winter on the east side of Baffin's Bay as far north as I could get, to decide that question. But as the "North Star" did not land or leave any provisions there according to orders, I was disappointed, and, having only three months provisions left, I was obliged to return to England.

On leaving Lancaster Sound in August last, I told Adam Beck that I was determined to visit the place where he reported the ships were wrecked, when he appeared much delighted, and when it was evident that the state of the ice prevented our approach to it, he was much dejected.

The only other place that requires a strict search is the west coast of Baffin's Bay between Ponds Bay and Cumberland Strait. This Mr. Penny told me, in presence of Mr. Goodsir and others, that he intended to do most thoroughly, as he had now an interpreter; and conceiving it would take him to examine 600 miles of coast, at least all October, I did not send my letters by the "Lady Franklin."

JOHN ROSS, Rear Admiral.

### Enclosure No.6.

Dr. Scoresby's  
Replies.

The Rev. Dr. SCORESBY to Mr. FEGEN, Secretary to the Arctic Committee.

Sir,

Torquay, 7th November 1851.

I regret that a small part of my designed "replies" is yet wanting, the manuscript having been sent off a week ago. If I receive the article, as I hope, I will take the liberty of forwarding some remarks on "Appliances for Search," &c.

The first two questions, you will perceive, I have ventured to recast, as, in the form I have adopted, they were more convenient for answering.

I have, &c.

WILLIAM SCORESBY

Enclosure.

REPLIES to QUESTIONS proposed for personal consideration and opinion by the ARCTIC COMMITTEE, by William Scoresby, D. D., F. R. S., London and Edinburgh, &c.

**Question 1.** Do you suppose it probable that Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crews composing his Expedition, still survive; and what are the grounds for forming that opinion?

**Reply.**—That Sir John Franklin or some portion of his associates *may* still survive is a position which cannot be controverted. It follows, therefore, that *some degree of probability*, whatever that degree may be, does exist. Such probability, it appears to me is involved in or supported by a variety of considerations. Sir John Ross was absent and unheard of for *four years* and some months (though never at a greater distance from positions often visited by the whalers than 250 miles), and returned with nearly all his crew in health. Hence I conceive that Sir John Franklin, or some portion of his associates, with incomparably superior equipment and resources, might yet survive, at some much greater distance beyond the positions ordinarily visited, though a period of somewhat more than *five years* (reckoning from the date of the plain indications and traces of him found on and near Beechey Island) have since elapsed without further information. 2. The Esquimaux, in similar regions, as cold, as desolate, and as apparently resourceless (*altogether* resourceless indeed, except in Arctic



animals), live out, not six or seven winters merely, but a fair portion of the ordinary life of man. Why then may not hardy enterprizing Britons, sustained, over and above, by the moral courage and Christian hope which preserved the same Franklin, a Richardson, a Back, and others, when the ordinary powers of life in men experienced in like hardships, Canadian voyages, failed. Why may they not be yet surviving amid the desolateness of Arctic solitudes, and the wreck of the hopes of the timid and doubting? 3. In the well-known case of four Russian seamen, who, after the loss of their ship on the coast of Spitzbergen in 1743, took refuge on an island near the main, three out of the four survived on resources (except a few pounds of flour and a little tobacco) entirely provided by themselves, during a period of six years and three months, whilst unheard of, and assumed to have perished, and were then rescued, and, enriched with the results of their hunting and fishing, restored in health to their friends. With facts such as these before us,—with the knowledge of their extensive original resources, and of the abundance of animal life in the region into or beyond which I believe they have entered, available for the extension of their original supplies,—I cannot but believe it to be probable that Sir John Franklin, or some of his associates in adventure, do yet survive.

In the entire absence of either information or traces of the expedition beyond the spring of 1846, I might observe there is, in my judgment, no essential grounds for detracting from the assumed probability. There being no information,—none among them having yet returned from whence we could hope to seek them out,—only necessarily implies, either that their appliances for ice travelling, or their condition of physical strength, (circumstances quite to be expected,) are inferior to ours. And there being no observable traces within the extent of recent researches, except at Beechy Island, can prove nothing against such probability, or against the direction we believe they have pursued, as marks on shore would scarcely be planted anywhere except under circumstances of detention, and might not be planted till the second summer's progress was closed, or if planted might not be seen.

It may be proper to notice (as bearing on the question of probability of success of the Expedition) a conjecture which some have entertained, that the ships may have been wrecked, and that the entire crews may have summarily perished, by some sudden catastrophe of the Arctic ices. There is only one special case, however, and that, I think, not in the least degree probable in respect to the Franklin Expedition, in which such *summary catastrophe*, attended by the imagined destruction of the adventurers, could, I believe, be rationally contemplated; and that is, the case of the ships being drifted out to seaward after the manner of Sir James Ross and Captain de Haven, and on approaching the seaward edge of a pack of ponderous ices being overturned by a heavy gale at sea. And even in this possible case the contingencies are such as not in any instance that I am aware of to have been ever fulfilled, even among the thousands and tens of thousands of adventurers in these regions in pursuit of the whale fishery, so that the entire crews of two ships, with the ships themselves (and these, as to the Franklin Expedition, among the strongest ever sent out to the Arctic seas), should be so completely annihilated as to leave not a wreck behind. In every other case but this,—of which I believe we have no corresponding or commensurate example in modern history, as to Davis' Strait or Baffin's Bay,—any sudden catastrophe happening to a ship within the icy regions referred to would yield at least the opportunity of escape to the crew, by the platform of the ice itself, to which, in the first instance, they might retreat. But against the conjecture alluded to, in regard to its bearing on probabilities, we have to set the incomparably better supported conjecture of the ships having advanced on the object of their mission towards the north-west into such a position or circumstances as to render the self-applied efforts of the voyagers inadequate to the effecting of their retreat. For as the probability of the discovery ships advancing in the direction they wished to pursue (as they might have advanced apparently either to the westward or the north-west) must obviously be greater than that of their being driven away, under some special embarrassment, in the very contrary direction, the conjecture of the least likely circumstance, consummated by a barely possible issue in total annihilation, should, I conceive, have the least possible weight, when set against the contrary probabilities.



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*Question 2.*—In what direction do you suppose Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crews composing his Expedition, if surviving, is to be looked for? And what are your grounds for forming that opinion?

*Reply.*—From the information derived from the operations of the various Search Expeditions, the impression conveyed to my own mind from the very first has been, that the Franklin Expedition must, on the strongest probabilities, have proceeded by the Wellington Channel, and from thence north-westward into some remote position, or into some position of inextricable embarrassment among the ices of the north-west Polar Sea. In the official instructions of the Admiralty, directing Sir John Franklin (failing in finding a passage westward and south-westward beyond Cape Walker) to proceed, as a second route, by Wellington Channel, we have sufficient grounds for looking to this as the probable direction pursued. But it may be proper to state my views in respect to this probability more particularly.

From the ascertained fact of the voyagers having wintered at Beechy Island in 1845–6, the inference is irresistible, that in the first season of their adventure either no passage was found to the westward at all, or some such opening only as that met with by the Search Expedition in the summer of 1850, or else that the ships were too late for that year to enter on the desired exploration. In any of these cases the next season would necessarily be employed in searching out one or other, whichever might appear the most promising, of the two principal routes prescribed for their investigation, for their guidance in which their fortunate position at a point commanding both of the routes afforded peculiar advantages.

As to which of these was actually pursued the conclusion arrived at by Captain Austin, after his admirable and elaborate explorations of the regions westward from Barrow's Strait, seems to afford, negatively at least, satisfactory guidance; viz. "that the Expedition under Sir John Franklin did not prosecute the "object of its mission to the southward and westward of Wellington Strait." The primary direction proposed by Sir John Franklin's instructions being thus disposed of, we reasonably look for him in that other direction next in order appointed to him, which Captain Penny's interesting researches show us he *might have pursued*,—a direction which a mere view from the hills might have shown him to be open, or which a very short sledge exploration in the spring might have proved to him was as replete with promise of a grand and successful progress north-westward as was the westerly channel which burst forth upon the delighted view of Captain Parry and his ardent comrades, when, on the 1st of August 1820, he first passed through Lancaster Sound and entered into Barrow Strait.

But, in further support of these probabilities, it should be borne in mind, first, as to the practicability, apparently, of Wellington Channel, that on Captain Parry's discovery of this "noble channel," 22d August 1820, when, on a beautiful clear evening, they came before the mouth of it, "neither land nor ice could be seen (within it) from the masthead;" and, secondly, as to Sir John Franklin's favourable opinion of this channel, we have documentary evidence in Arctic papers, I believe, published by the Admiralty; whilst the accordant opinion of Captain Fitzjames, the second in command in the expedition, is still more explicitly shown in a letter to the late Sir John Barrow, dated January 1845, where he says, "The north-west passage is certainly to be gone through by Barrow's Strait, but whether south or north of Parry's group remains to be proved. I am for going north, edging north-west till "in the longitude of 140 deg., if possible."

Where then, we might confidently ask, under such variety of according circumstances, could we rationally seek our missing adventurers but by this channel, deemed to be practicable,—which, on Parry's discovery of it, seemed then to be practicable,—and to which, failing in the first route, the high expectations of Franklin and his next in command were so decidedly and hopefully directed? And who of their sympathising and benevolent countrymen, I would add, will not join us in the ardent decided expression, "Let us, in reliance on the Divine blessing, seek them there."

As to the probable practicability of a passage through Wellington Channel, notwithstanding the recent experience of an icy incumbrance of the entrance, we have, I think, satisfactory grounds for concluding favourably thereon. We have, indeed, no evidence which might lead us to infer anything

like a general incumbrance of this channel. No ship that I am aware of has come home to report the actual existence throughout the year of an impassable barrier, except for one solitary season, that of 1850. And no ship removing from the entrance for a single week in any one summer could give conclusive proof that the barrier had not relaxed even in that very week. After the retreat of the recent searching expedition before the close of the present season, the incumbering field, which was only about fifteen miles in breadth in the previous autumn, might, under the power of a few hours favouring gale, have so drifted upward and westward from the eastern shore as to have afforded a free and easy passage, had they been on the spot, to the entire fleet. And most probably it was a sudden and unexpected opening of this kind,—filling the hearts of our adventurers with hope and gladness, in the prospect of at once reaching a sea which had perhaps, as with Captain Penny, before been seen from the hill,—which urged a departure so hurried and imperative as to leave no moment for caring for records, when the idea of bringing through Behring's Straits their own despatches was the one grand and absorbing impression of the whole of the adventurers. And as to the extreme importance of improving the chance of progress at the earliest possible moment, every experienced navigator in Arctic seas is aware of the fact that one hour of time, yea, a few minutes, wasted, may possibly sacrifice the results of months of previous labour and diligence. These are facts of experience which hundreds can verify. Well, therefore, might Franklin, if a prospect of furtherance and success so suddenly burst upon him, be in haste to improve it, and well might the relics brought home by Captain Penny and others of the Search Expeditions be the only records of a sojourning at Beechey Island, and of a hasty departure.

As to no traces of the progress of the Expedition being met with in all the extent of Captain Penny's explorations, I would take occasion to remark that we cannot fairly infer from this anything essentially discouraging. All that can be concluded is, that the probability of Sir John Franklin having passed that way into the north-western or north Polar Ocean lacks what might have been demonstration, but loses, as to probability, nothing. A variety of circumstances, such as a fair and rapid and hopeful progress, when blowing hard, an intervention of land ice, or packed ice on shore, a strong offshore wind, &c., might have prevented the erection of cairns on shore on the part of Franklin, whilst other circumstances, various in their kind, might have prevented Penny's party from discovering even existing traces. Many of the traces which have now been met with at Beechey Island escaped the observation of those who first visited it, and none of them would have been detected by an ordinary course along shore. If the progress of Franklin through Wellington Channel, which I cannot but believe he has passed, were free and rapid, there could be no reasonable expectation of his staying; his progress anywhere within the limits of Penny's shore examinations—a distance, in a direct course by the south channel, of perhaps not more than 120 to 140 geographical miles; and it could only be when the erection of marks on the shore could be effected without essential interruption of progress that the adventurous party could think of providing for the information of those who might chance to follow them.

Whilst submitting to the Committee the foregoing views on the first two questions on which they have done me the honour to request my opinion, it may be proper to notice certain objections which have been publicly announced to the conclusions, as to personal convictions, I have arrived at.

1. The first of these objections, indeed, as to a conjectured retrograde movement of the Expedition after wintering at Beechey Island, has already been referred to as bearing on the probability of Sir John Franklin or some portion of his associates being yet surviving. It bears, too, (by consequence,) on the views now expressed as to the direction in which survivors, if any, would probably be met with. Hence I may take occasion to observe, that the supposition,—urged, I believe, on the indications of a hasty and unpremeditated departure of the Franklin Expedition from its winter quarters,—that it was driven off to the southward by some sudden disruption and movement of the ice, can have no greater probability for its support than what belongs to a sudden drifting northward through Wellington Channel, in correspondence with the primary drifting of the American Expedition; whilst the supposition of the Franklin Expedition having passed Wellington Channel has the *additional*

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*foundation*, 1st, of this being one of the directions which Sir John Franklin was instructed to try; 2d, of this direction being in all probability occasionally navigable; 3d, of this channel actually communicating with a further channel in a north-westerly direction of the most promising extent towards the object aimed at, and open and navigable at an early period of the season; and, 4thly, of this direction being not unlikely to be suddenly opened out during a heavy gale from the eastward or south-eastward, and, if so, presenting an opportunity or prospect of effecting the grand object of the Expedition such as would abundantly explain the indications of a hasty retreat from their wintering quarters.

2. In regard to another suggestion bearing on the possible fate of our missing countrymen which some persons have felt to be discouraging, viz., that where we might penetrate they might get out. I would take occasion to add, that this is only a particular and limited truth. All things on both sides being the same, the proposition would of course be true. Mechanically, the force required to move a body from A. to B. on a horizontal plane would, under like circumstances of resistance, be the proper force for moving the same body from B. to A.; but, physically and geographically, the relative resistances, as well as the appliant forces, are not necessarily equal. In the present case they are obviously very unequal. Besides, we have fresh hands, full of hope and health; and we have now well-tested appliances which our predecessors had not duly estimated.

*Question 3.*—Should a further search be decided on, what measures do you recommend for this purpose, and in what direction?

[“It is requested that this question be answered with a full explanation of every particular of the proposed plan of search.”]

*Reply.*—Nothing of actual progress, except in the nature of pioneering, it is obvious, has yet been accomplished in the search for Sir John Franklin. Captain Austin sought him where, as the result of a search of something like 6,000 miles of sledging has shown, he was not to be found. Captain Penny pursued what I believe to have been his track, but up to a position only where he could not have halted, or, if he had stayed, could not now have been missing. In pioneering before the march of humanity much and most important information has been gained. In the widely-spread trackless common, so to speak, in which we had hitherto been so perplexed, and our adventures so prevalently wasted by the indefinite variety of directions of more or less promise, a track has now most happily been discovered narrowing to one specific direction the pursuit of the missing, and guiding us in the concentration of newly-directed appliances, where zeal and energy, sympathy and humanity, may have their most hopeful and encouraging exercises.

From what we know of the region to be explored, the uncertain extent of interruptions from the condition of the ice, peculiarity of season, and incidents attending a difficult and often perplexing navigation, we can only calculate, as a probability, on the reaching of any particular advance station during the first summer's enterprize of a renewal of search. But in the employment of a sufficient number of vessels, say four, with tenders, some of the contingencies will become proportionally reduced, so as to leave a reasonable confidence of gaining some such position as that wintered in by the recent expeditions. On such an advanced position at least we may, I think, reasonably calculate. And on the passing beyond this position within Wellington Channel, or probably beyond it, even during the summer of 1852, we may entertain, if the views we have submitted be sound, no inconsiderable expectation. In either case, whether the navigation through the newly-discovered Victoria Channel be actually accomplished, or whether the exploring vessels should be stopped at the entrance of Wellington Channel, all the requirements of humanity, by the appliances now at command may, we believe, be satisfactorily attained.

In order to this, four vessels, besides tenders, would, I think, be necessary; two of them, as the experience of the late trials sufficiently point out, having efficient steam-propelling power. One of the vessels, a principal one in tonnage and accommodation, I would propose (as originally submitted in “The Franklin Expedition,” published in January 1850,) for the service of a general dépôt, receiving or refuge ship, for parties which might adventure in distant researches.

And this ship should be stationed as near as practicable to the entrance of Wellington Channel, such as at Beechey Island or Assistance Bay, in reliance upon the shelter and resource of which the other vessels might, with much confidence of safety, be pushed forward to the very extremity, perhaps, of any sea or channel of navigable waters extending towards the western outlet of Behring's Strait.

In like manner each of these other vessels having succeeded, as we now assume, in passing through Wellington Channel, would, in the extreme position which they might happen to gain, serve in its turn as a second or third refuge ship and dépôt for travelling parties thrown out from their advance position. So that, thus provided with two or more places of principal replenishment and refreshment, in positions far advanced, it might be hoped, beyond each other in the desired direction, we can see no unreasonable risk in attempting to explore the so-long sought north-west passage, to any extent whatever to which our missing voyagers may have advanced, and in which, by circumstances on which we have no data for calculating, they may have become, as to any means capable of being made self-availible, inextricably embarrassed; for if the very encouraging channel discovered by Penny were to happen to yield an advance in free navigation of 500 miles from Beechey Island, we should have the residuc of the distance to Point Barrow, the north-western headland of the American continent, reduced (as estimated on the great circle direction) to some 500 or 600 miles. To travel so far, and return to the supposed advance dépôt, did the means by favourably disposed ice admit, would not very greatly exceed an extraordinary performance of Dr. Rae in the spring of 1847, who informs us that himself and one of his men travelled, without lacking resources, a distance of 1,000 miles on foot, and on their return, though rather low in flesh, were as sound and well as when they started. And a distance such as that referred to it will be remembered is fully within the range of one of the transglacial journeys so admirably effected by no less than four of the enterprising parties sent out by Captain Austin in his late expedition, and might therefore be possibly repeated under the imagined contingencies of the now contemplated search, provided the parties were not required to return, by supplies or a refuge vessel being secured to the adventurers at the Behring's Strait extremity of their great undertaking. And here, whilst contemplating the practicability or the possibility, at least, of such a grand result with searching parties from a far westerly station, an important question naturally arises; whether, for the encouragement of such an undertaking and such a completion of the great object of search, means should not be taken, and promptly if at all, to meet the adventurous travellers in a sufficiently northerly parallel from the westward, or to secure to them, in case of success, the resources necessary to preserve them from becoming sacrifices in the cause of humanity? In contemplating a possibility of such a consummating result as this referred to, we do so advisably, and, with Commander Pullen's wonderful enterprise fresh, as it were, before us, with a reasonable measure of hope; for with such appliances as we have now at command, hitherto quite unapprehended, what may we not hope for from a renewal of the search as stimulated by the ennobling and soul-stirring feelings of humanity, and undertaken with the zeal and bravery characteristic of British seamen?

But we return from the contemplation of these very sanguine views, grounded on the hope of the passage of Wellington Channel being effected, and considerable westing in the newly discovered channel beyond being gained, in the summer of 1852, to the consideration of the prospect of remote and successful researches in the same direction being effected by ice-travelling and boating parties, starting from a position no further advanced than that of the winter quarters of the recent Search Expedition.

From a starting point such as this, which we are encouraged to believe to be very generally attainable, we doubt not but efficient and conclusive researches might be made north-westward, provided the channel, or Polar Sea, as presumed, so contigues to an extent of several hundreds of miles. Previous to the late splendid experiments in ice-travelling I had confidently expressed (at page 85 of "The Franklin Expedition") the firm persuasion that we were but yet beginning to learn what might be done by this method of research. Towards this attainment, besides some suggestions as to the application of auxiliary agencies for the furtherance of progress, I took occasion to submit

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the plan of pushing forward depôts and supplies to stations 100 to 150 miles in advance, and of the employment of small parties on the several lines to be explored, &c. ; a plan to which the admirable results of recent enterprise have given such satisfactory approval. No less than five of Captain Austin's parties, we find, accomplished with six or seven men sledges a distance averaging for each above 600 miles ; whilst one of them, under the direction of Lieutenant M'Clintock, travelled the extraordinary distance of about 800 miles, returning, after an absence of eighty days, in safety and good health. And it is worthy of particular consideration, that of the numerous parties despatched from the "Resolute" and her associates (some of whom were exposed to the severity of a temperature of 37° below zero), as well as those under the general direction of Captain Penny, all accomplished their respective enterprises in safety.

So much in these admirably conducted enterprises having been already accomplished, the repetition, under as favourable circumstances, may be reasonably expected ; and, assisted by recent experience and information, we believe still greater triumphs in the humane enterprise now contemplated to be, under the furtherance and protection of that gracious Providence so fittingly and piously invoked by the late adventurers, reasonably attainable.

In order to this we would submit, as of vast importance, the extension in distance and number of stations (now that one line of research requires only to be pursued) of the system of depôts. Something considerable, perhaps, might be done towards this object in the early autumn, as soon as the navigation for ships should be found closed ; a plan, indeed, tried by Captain Austin, with considerable advantage, I apprehend, to his spring successes. The economizing of training exercises, capable of being commenced probably by the middle of March in a tolerably favourable season, might give important aid in the preliminary arrangements. No physical labour, I would submit, even in training for the great adventure, need be wasted. Until the whole of the supplies for the advance posts and depôts should be despatched, even a four hours exercise would be available for useful service ; and when the training might be extended to one or two or more nights bivouacking abroad, the mass of supplies could get pushed forward with much advantage to the ultimate measures for travelling. To carry forward this system too, to the best advantage, it would be important to add to the stores of the advance depôts, or to continue to push forward still more extended supplies long after the departure of the exploring parties towards points or positions previously agreed upon. Baillie Hamilton Island, under the contemplated arrangements, would obviously be a very important position for a principal depôt, where, by means of hunting, shooting, and fishing parties, there would be every probability of obtaining an ample enlargement. All this would of course require the reservation of a considerable number of hands for the special service, but they would well and effectively subserve the great object in view ; for, whilst every fresh station for a depôt would yield additional security to the adventuring travellers, each additional advance station must give encouragement to further and more complete researches after the objects of our sympathy abroad. Under such a system, and under circumstances tolerably favourable, an extension of exploration might not improbably be attained, at once unapprehended in previous expectations, and commensurate with the requirements of the great undertaking humanely contemplated.

Open water, it appears, was discovered by Captain Penny at no great distance westward of Baillie Hamilton Island so early as the 16th of May of the present year, with a dark "water sky," not to be mistaken, indicating an indefinite extension of it in a westerly direction beyond ; for the indications of a dark water sky, when favourably elicited, I may remark by the way, are, under the eye of an experienced whale fisherman, not to be mistaken ; at least with the one exception, not in the case referred to of probable occurrence, of bay-ice, a condition peculiar to ice of new formation, whilst yet without any covering of snow, and so thin as to present a surface equally unreflecting of light as that of the sea. In every other case a plainly developed water sky is unfailing in its indications.

The occurrence of water at so early a period in the year in the region to be explored involves at once a difficulty and an advantage in the contemplated researches,—a difficulty in requiring the conveyance of a boat or boats, with the requirements for again taking to the ice if the extension of open water



should fail,—and an advantage as to the means of making rapid progress, compared with the necessary tediousness of men-drawn sledges. But the difficulties, being anticipated, would no doubt be efficiently provided for, so that, on the whole enterprise, the general anticipations we have ventured to submit might possibly gain rather than lose by the change of circumstances in the method of progress.

Whilst contemplating thus hopefully the probability of effecting satisfactory and conclusive researches in respect to the fate of our missing voyagers, it may be proper, in order to a candid exposition of the whole subject, to remark, that an undue importance in the public mind appears to me to have been given to the condition of the region explored by Captain Penny, as indicating *a change in and improvement of climate*. No such inference, I feel assured, can justly be drawn from the circumstances of open water, early decaying ice, or multitudes of birds and other living creatures. Peculiar geographical and hydrographical conditions are obviously sufficient to account for the apparent amelioration of climate. Thus, on the western coast of Spitzbergen, in the parallels of 77° to 79° or even up to 80°, the sea is often open as early as (or before) the month of May, and abounding near the shore with animal life, when to the southward of the lowest of these parallels the ice is continuous from Nova Zembla to Cape Farewell in Greenland, and when to the northward of the 80th or 81st parallel of latitude neither bird nor beast is to be seen, but a sea covered with a continuous and unbroken surface of ice, and that never, I believe, penetrable by shipping, except to a small extent beyond the latitude of 81° occasionally (perhaps *rarely*) in summer, and within the particular meridians of 10° to 25° east. Again, on the east coast of Greenland, when in Scoresby's Sound in the 71st parallel all ice was gone, and a temperature such that in one spot on which a landing was effected the men were bitten by mosquitos, in regions farther north the coast was blocked with heavy ice, and no such moderation of a mild or genial climate (except again in some peculiar geographical or hydrographical positions) to be met with.

The Rev. Dr. SCORESBY to Mr. FEGEX, Secretary to the Arctic Committee.

Sir,

Torquay, 14th November 1851.

I beg leave to add to my former replies to queries of the Arctic Committee the portion *on means and appliances* herewith sent.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. SCORESBY.

Enclosure.

In conclusion of this communication in reply to the questions of the Arctic Committee, I may yet venture to append a few observations *on the means and appliances* available for further, and, I would hope, more extended explorations in search of our missing voyagers. And of these various appliances yielding promise of most effective aid that of steam propelling power is obviously of grand importance. This, indeed, was one of the special advantages contemplated in the case of the Franklin expedition. Captain Ross had first tried it, but it failed in his case by the unfortunate adoption of an untried, and, as it proved, a useless system of machinery. To this instrumentality, though the power of the machinery in the Erebus and Terror was but feeble, Sir John Franklin could yet look as affording the means of advancing under circumstances when mere sailing vessels could do nothing, and of so facilitating the general progress as to afford new and additional hopes of accomplishing the long and ardently sought north-west passage.

In the expedition under Captain Austin the steamers Pioneer and Intrepid, though of no very commanding capabilities, yet did all and more indeed than was generally expected from them. Their services in towing the rest of the expedition, in making rapid researches in clear water, in clearing the passage of ordinary obstructions, and by their momentum, employed as a battering-ram, crushing or breaking through blockings of ice not otherwise removable, were so important and effective as to cause this species of agency now to take

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position among the leading essentials in an exploring expedition among Arctic ices.

The only difficulty indeed ever apprehended in rendering this powerful agency available was that of securing the propelling apparatus from damage by contact with ice. In the use of the screw propeller there was obviously sufficient security for general circumstances, and for the ordinary quality of the ices of Baffin's Bay. But there was a risk to the projecting sternpost or frame of the screw, as was remarked in the Franklin Expedition, "of its being twisted" or carried off by contact with any deeply immersed masses of ice, together "with that essential machine appended to it, the rudder." Whilst, however, the experience in the late expedition of the vast importance and availableness of the screw-apparatus was such as to counterbalance, in the general result, the measure of risk encountered, yet I can hardly pass over the curious impression of the before-expressed views, as found in one of Captain Austin's reports to the Admiralty, where he says, "Upon one occasion (referring to a dangerous position of the ships at the conclusion of their researches in Baffin's Bay) the Intrepid was driven upon the tongue of a berg, while her rudder "was carried away, and the frame of her screw broken." But this incidental risk, in much less degree to be apprehended in these western regions than among the heavier ices of the Spitzbergen Seas, leaves the general advantage so exceedingly predominant as to cause this important appliance, as above intimated, to be now considered as indispensable in any contemplated enterprize for Arctic researches.

Great, however, as the power of steam is, and admirably as it is adapted for the facilitating of researches among Arctic ices, there is in the public mind, as the Committee are well aware, much misconception as to the limitation of its applicability, not merely as to its incapability of acting against the impenetrable masses of fields and floes, or severely compressed or consolidated heavy packs, but even with any satisfactory effect against the continuous resistance of hundreds of miles of bay ice. In the advance of summer, when the ice becomes decayed, and the crystallization is in the course of separation, a powerful steamer might easily pass through a sheet of bay ice of considerable thickness; but in the progress of freezing, when the texture is compact and tenacious, a sheet of ice of six or eight inches would, I believe, arrest any steamer within a space of a quarter of a mile, or even a hundred yards. If indeed the bay ice were disposed to separate (whereas it would be more likely to be disposed to close), a steamer might be possibly backed in the canal she had commenced, and so gaining a fresh momentum, might make a further and a further advance; but the attempt to effect by such a process, with the chances of stoppage by pressure, a passage of perhaps a hundred miles or more through this tenacious substance, must necessarily and eventually fail. None but those who have actually experienced the mortifying and vexatious effects of bay ice in resisting the progress of a ship, even when urged by a favouring gale, can duly estimate the formidableness of such a hindrance.

The advantage derivable from the employment of *dogs* in transglacial travelling has long been matter of history in Arctic adventure. Explorations of an extraordinary extent, as well as of rapidity in the performance, are on record in connexion with Russian discoveries within the Arctic circle; and Captain Penny on different occasions seems to have realized much advantage from his dog-sledges. In one instance, when obliged to return from a position forty-two miles in advance, the dog-sledges accomplished the distance in *one stage*. And from Point Surprise, on Baillie Hamilton Island, the dogs appear to have run the distance to the ship, probably a hundred miles, in about three days. But future explorers, knowing these facts, will of course avail themselves of the like instrumentality, if what appears on the face of Captain Penny's brief report be here correctly understood.

In conclusion of these suggestions, which I throw out with a view to consideration by the Executive in the renewed enterprize of humanity, rather than as the formal proposition of a plan expected to be pursued, I may allude to another and most important agency which, with much deference, I would submit, as being not improbably available for ice-travelling; viz, the employment of a steam-propelling power. The feasibility of adapting this powerful agent to a *sledge-boat* designed for the proposed researches—a boat which on arriving at open water might leave her runners and frame behind—is commended to my own



mind by the two important facts elicited in the late sledge operations of our Arctic exploring parties; first, the extraordinary load which each man, on an average, was able to draw,—a weight, stated in Captain Penny's report, of 200 pounds, and in Captain Austin's, of 205 pounds per man; and, secondly, the deducible fact of the extremely small resisting force with properly adapted sledges.

What the actual resistance to be overcome in a six-man sledge amounts to we can only judge (no actual experiments that I am aware of having been made thereon) by estimation on the datum of ordinary manual power in drawing. Such datum we have in the experiments of M. de la Hire, published in an early volume of the Memoirs of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Paris, where he determines that the whole strength of a man is only available to the extent of a force of 27 lbs. or livres (about 30 lbs. English), in drawing in a horizontal direction. On this estimate we cannot suppose the draught per man in our ice-travelling parties, whilst making a distance of ten to fifteen miles daily (or ten miles on the general average, including all delays and stoppages), to have been more than 20 lbs. avoirdupois per man, and it is much to be doubted whether it were so much. This estimate would give a resistance of 120 lbs., or 10 per cent. of the load, on the general average of ice-travelling at a rate of perhaps one and a half or two miles per hour.

A compactly constructed steam-engine of a couple of horses power would in such case be sufficient, I suppose, if its force could be made duly available, to carry forward, and with no inconsiderable speed, a sledge of the weight referred to, say 1,200 lb., besides the additional burden of itself. Not possessing positive information on the subject of the weight of such an engine, that is, with tubular boiler, and heated by spirituous or oleaginous fuel, I can only throw out the suggestion for more accurate inquiry. But I cannot suppose that the additional weight of the engine, with its requisite supply of fuel, could present any essential objection to the employment of such an apparatus. There would be an obvious advantage, I may observe, in employing oil for fuel, inasmuch as the Arctic regions afford such variety of means of replenishing the store of this combustible; for almost every creature which inhabits the sea or frequents the waters of the north, furnishes oil; not only the whale, but the seal, walrus, bear, and, in a slight degree, even the aquatic birds.

As to the mode of adapting the power of the engine to the propelling of a sledge, I would merely submit the apparent applicability of a modification of the ordinary paddle-wheel, such as in a projecting series of radiating points of metal on the rim of the wheel, adapted to penetrate or scratch upon a surface of snow or ice, with an upward movement regulated by a spring, to provide against a too violent resistance from any hard and elevated surface travelled over. These radiating points might, I conceive, be rendered ultimately available for the attachment of the requisite floats of the paddle-wheel, should it be found that the sledge-boat might be convertible into a steam-boat, on reaching any navigable water.

The steering of a sledge of this kind could probably be effectively accomplished by a short fore-keel, slightly depressed below the runners of the sledge, and moveable on a pivot by an apparatus on board, so as, by deflecting the line of the fore-keel out of the longitudinal centre, it would act after the manner of the movements in the fore-body of a carriage, in giving direction to the entire machine.

From any hasty judgment that such a scheme is chimerical, the triumphs of art hitherto realized in the employment of the agency of steam should be sufficient to defend it. I submit it with diffidence, but do not imagine that it involves any mechanical or other essential difficulties which, should the demand for its trial call out the ingenuity of our practical engineers, would not be easily overcome.

An important matter of economy would be involved in the expenditure of fuel, which it may be proper to notice, that of the providing for the travellers, without trouble or waste of resources, a constant supply of *water* and of water heated, according as the arrangements for the economizing of the heat of the escape or condensed steam might be provided, so as to be always ready for their culinary requirements.

Such are the means and appliances as well as the plans for practical operation which have occurred to me as being likely to be available, and, I would venture

Dr. Scoresby's  
Replies.

to hope, effective too, in the prosecuting of the desired researches after our anxiously sought adventurers. With the variety of minor or isolated particulars belonging to the general subject of these communications which have from time to time occurred to me I need not trouble the Committee, except, indeed, to call attention to a new article of portable provision, the American *meat-biscuit*, the invention of Mr. Borden, which might, not improbably, be a useful addition to the stores of ice travelling parties.

All the matters, however, which have appeared to me of any essential consideration as bearing on the important subject of inquiry before the Arctic Committee having now (with the previously stated views on the same general subject given in "The Franklin Expedition") been sufficiently elicited, I would close this communication by the expression of the fervent and prayerful hope that the special cause of humanity and national duty now being inquired into may, under the blessing of the ALMIGHTY, be so prospered through the instrumentality of an ample and conclusive Expedition for search, that the sadly-tried mourners amongst us may eventually be comforted, and Britain be yet called upon to rejoice at the restoration of her long-lost sons.

WILLIAM SCORESBY.

Torquay, Nov. 14, 1851.

### Enclosure No. 7.

Captain Austin  
Replies.

Replies of CAPTAIN AUSTIN to Questions put by the Arctic Committee relative to the subject under their inquiry, 28th October 1851.

*First Question.*—Do you suppose it probable that Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crews composing his Expedition, still survive? if so, in what direction?

*Reply.*—Having most carefully and most anxiously given this question the fullest consideration, I am compelled, with deep regret, to state, "I do not believe, nor suppose it probable, that Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crews composing his Expedition, still survive."

*Second Question.*—What are your grounds for forming that opinion?

*Reply.*—1st. The protracted period of their absence, a period of six years in July last having elapsed since the Expedition under Sir John Franklin left the Whale Fish Islands, provisioned at that time for three years.

2d. From my own knowledge, and from the opinions and reports of the officers, made to me during the time they were actually in the performance of duties under the responsibility of my orders. Those reports were to the effect, that resources could not be obtained for the support of a party either in the neighbourhood of our winter quarters, or of the parts visited by any one of the Expedition under my charge.

This conclusion is borne out by the circumstance, that although native encampments have been constantly met with by our parties, yet nothing has been seen to indicate the existence of a human being for a lengthened period; from which I assume, that the inability of the natives to procure subsistence had compelled them to abandon these parts for others.

3d. The ill-effects of a second winter on the mind and body, arising from the want of fresh food (both animal and vegetable), are much greater than is generally considered, and are much greater than even those who have experienced its intensity are willing to acknowledge when they are no longer undergoing the privations. Our crews were free from scurvy, yet at the close of the winter season they had, I am sure, lost a considerable portion of their original physical strength, and to such an extent in some that they could not proceed with the travelling parties; and my belief is, that those individuals would not have survived a second winter.

4th. It further occurs to me, that even after a second winter, although Sir John Franklin's crews would have been much debilitated, and rendered less capable of encountering the fatigue of travelling, yet still that some individuals amongst those crews would have been despatched in the hope of effecting a

communication with whalers, or for the purpose of reaching Melville Island (as they knew that animals had been seen there), or that they would have pushed forward for the American continent.

Captain Austin's  
Replies.

This opinion may be considered as opposed to the representation that has been made to the Committee, that Sir John Franklin had "gone away in clear water beyond our reach" (say 500 miles). From my experience, I am unable to place any confidence in such a representation, and I believe that those who are thoroughly conversant with Arctic navigation will entertain similar distrust.

5th. In addition to the grounds which I have offered for supposing it to be impossible that Sir John Franklin and his crews are now alive, I beg to refer to the opinion of Captain Penny—not the opinion adopted by Captain Penny since his return to England, and after communication with other parties—but I beg to refer to the opinion of Captain Penny, written by him upon the spot, in his letter to me of the 4th of August 1851, at his winter quarters. After expressing his intention of returning to England, Captain Penny concludes his letter thus, "Poor Lady Franklin, and the friends of those brave men whose fate will ever remain in oblivion! Was it not a strong conviction of my sense of duty, the very thought of meeting any of them without intelligence would almost tempt me to another winter." This letter is in the hands of the Committee.

*Third Question.*—Should a further search be decided on, what measures do you recommend for this purpose, and in what direction?

*Reply.*—It is with much diffidence that I offer any opinion on this subject. But first, as to the direction:—any search up the Wellington Strait would, in my opinion, be fruitless. I cannot bring myself to search at all with the hope of success in any direction. I found this conclusion on the circumstance of the late extensive search, having discovered no traces beyond those in the neighbourhood of the first winter quarters; and I cannot resist the conviction that the missing Expedition did not advance in the second season beyond Beechey Island.

I am confirmed in this belief by the following considerations:—assuming that my opinion is correct, that Sir John Franklin did not advance in the second season beyond Beechey Island; I have then to observe, that he had failed in prosecuting his discovery during the previous season, even as far as had been accomplished by the Expedition of 1819; that Expedition reached Melville Island, and it was the generally received opinion that that point might be reached every season, and under every circumstance, and did not depend upon favourable seasons and ice navigation. Sir John Franklin would therefore have to commence his second season, with his crews suffering from the prejudicial effects of an Arctic winter, with the additional discouragement of their success not having been equal to even what had been accomplished 25 years before.

It is also reasonable to suppose that Wellington Channel was blocked when his ships took up their winter quarters in 1845. Impressed with these considerations, I feel that a prudent commander, duly regarding his responsibility, would not have considered himself justified in prosecuting north-west in an unknown region, bearing too in mind that he had only some 20 months provisions in search of a passage to the Pacific, a distance of 1,100 to 1,200 miles of ice navigation, and approaching 3,000 miles from any place where supplies could be obtained, and that difficult navigation to be accomplished in the five or six weeks only which is open during each year for that purpose.

With regard to Wellington Channel, it will be seen from my report that that channel was blocked in September 1850; and that, although aided by steam, not more than 30 miles of direct advance to the westward in Barrow's Strait (a far more extensive channel) was made; and although Wellington Channel was reported favourably from aloft in 1819 and 1820, yet knowing that in Arctic navigation how frequently the reports of a clear sea from the crew's nest in narrow waters are followed by the end of the lead or a block being seen within an hour, it was not a sufficient inducement for a former very experienced Arctic navigator, either to prosecute in that direction, or to examine the extent of the water seen, in the hope of success in the object of a north-west passage.

Captain Austin's  
Replies.

Furthermore, I am convinced by late experience that the navigation of Wellington Channel is most critical; as all narrow straits in icy seas are, more or less, of which good proof is furnished in the cases of "Griper," "Fury," "Victory," and "Terror"; in that of the "Fury," my recollections are fully alive to our state of helplessness.

In passing Radstock Bay in the "Resolute" in August 1850, the ice came in so rapidly towards the shore, that had not steam been at hand, she might have been beset and carried to the eastward: a similar event occurred to the "Intrepid." The "Pioneer," when rounding Beechey Island with the "Resolute" in tow in August 1850, found the effect of the ice in motion was such that she was driven into shoal water, where she grounded, and it was not until after considerable labour that she was hove off at the expiration of two days. The "Resolute" nearly experienced a similar disaster at the same time, gaining the fast ice with considerable difficulty, and avoiding being set on shore or drifted out of the channel. The "Assistance" and her tender were subject to very severe pressure in Wellington Channel, when the "Intrepid" had her rudder head carried away: afterwards, from the easterly set with pressure off Cape Hotham, the "Assistance," was in a very critical position. Lieutenant De Haven informed me, that in September 1850, while attempting to make his way up the channel, when near Point Innes his vessels were in considerable danger from the movement of the ice when affected by wind or tide; indeed, he, of necessity, employed every effort to reach security in Barlow Inlet. The situation of the "Resolute" and her tender in September 1850, when drifting from above Barlow Inlet out of the Strait, I consider, was very critical and helpless; had they been nearer in they might have been forced on shore; and had it not been for the aid of steam, I believe that they would have been carried away to the south-east in the Pack--the Pack being all but tied together for the winter. In the case of Captain Penny, when crossing from Union Bay in September 1850, his brigs were nearly forced on shore at Cape Spencer.

The accounts that have recently been received of the drifting of the American Expedition in Wellington Channel appear to confirm these views.

If Wellington Channel gave much hope for advancing in the second season, is it not fair to infer, that parties would have been despatched if only to reconnoitre for places of security as the Expedition proceeded? but it appears that these did not extend beyond Cape Bowden to the northward, and Caswell's Tower to the eastward. A bottle was found at Cape Bowden; meat canisters at Caswell's Tower; the remains of a coal-fire at Cape Spencer (most probably of a shooting party); and more extensive remains at Cape Riley; but in no case beyond those places. And I would submit, as a just inference, that if it had been Sir John Franklin's object to prosecute up Wellington Channel, economy of his fuel would have been a matter of most rigid care and anxiety, and that he would not have left at his winter quarters a quantity of materials that would have served for fuel, and which at the time did not escape remark.

Further, it appears most probable that if Sir John Franklin's Expedition had proceeded up Wellington Channel, a record of it would have been left. It is also reasonable to consider that vessels could not have passed through a narrow passage between the islands which appear in Captain Penny's chart without detention; and (being new discovery) possession would have been taken and some mark of such discovery left on them. I may also mention, that Sir John Ross, Captain Ommanney, Lieutenant De Haven, and Captain Penny all left the Wellington Channel and proceeded towards the south-west.

I have now offered my views of Wellington Channel, and have expressed some of the grounds upon which I entertain them; but there are other grounds,—there are opinions which have influenced and guided me,—there are the recorded opinions of our most eminent Arctic navigators and men of science, far from favouring the search for Sir John Franklin by the way of the Wellington Channel. The Committee will remember that the orders to Sir John Franklin himself laid no stress upon the importance of that channel, but pointed his especial attention to another direction.

I may here remark, as bearing upon the present inquiry, that Lady Franklin in a letter to me upon my departure, expressed her anxiety that particular search should be directed to the south-west of Cape Walker; but not one word of Wellington Channel.

With all these important considerations before me, I am at a loss to account for the strong feeling that is abroad in favour of a further search for the missing ships in the direction of Wellington Channel. With reference to the extent of open water reported in the upper part of Wellington Channel, it is well known to those accustomed to ice navigation, that much deception arises from ice covered by water being mistaken for open water, particularly in the months of June and July; the snow being melted on the surface of the ice, the latter becomes transparent and acquires a sea-tint; and has, combined with the almost constant deceptive state of the atmosphere, not only the appearance of water, but with numerous pools upon it presents also the appearance of an open sea, in which the undulating wave can almost be fully recognized; and it is to this optical deception that much that is said to have been seen may be fairly ascribed. Beyond six or eight miles the floe ice upon the horizon frequently presents such a peculiar surface that much caution and determination is necessary to avoid being led into error.

In explanation of the water said to have been seen "on each shore, and for some miles distant from the places of observation," without its following that there was a navigable sea or outlet, I would observe, that the situation of our wintering corresponded in a manner with that of the head of Wellington Channel; and although much limited in extent, the west side being formed by islands, and a bay with no outlet at the head, yet water made to the northward two to three miles from our position, while we were fixed to a fixed barrier, and blocked in to the southward. The "Intrepid" afterwards sailed in this water, which then proved of limited extent. It had before given the idea of an extensive navigable space; and although there was much more water in Barrow's Strait in the autumn of 1851 than in that of 1850, yet there was very little difference as to the power of navigating Wellington Channel.

Having therefore very maturely weighed all these circumstances, I cannot but be strongly impressed that Sir John Franklin did not prosecute beyond Beechey Island; but that leaving his winter quarters, he was either beset on that occasion, or was attempting to return to England. The loss of whalers in the pack will fully account for the complete destruction of any vessel or vessels; and if at a period of winter, instead of summer, also for the total loss of the crews. Contact with bergs would also sufficiently account for the disappearance of the ships, with all on board. Many whalers, having large numbers of casks on board, have been destroyed in Baffin's Bay, without scarcely a vestige having ever been found; and I am not aware that any part of the hull or the spars of the "Fury" have ever been found.

In reply to that portion of the third question which requires what measures I should recommend if a further search be decided on, I have to say, that the two ships and the two steam-vessels which composed the late Expedition under my orders, were found to be well adapted for the service upon which they were then employed; and that (except in some little matters of detail) I have no improvements in their equipment to suggest.

I have now completed my answers to the written inquiries of the Committee, and I have endeavoured to lay before them, through the medium of those answers, not only all the information in my power, but every opinion and answer which my own experience has suggested. If from inadvertence or forgetfulness I have failed in affording the Committee all that they may require, I will at once supply the omission as soon as I am made acquainted with their wishes.

HORATIO T. AUSTIN, Capt. R.N.  
Late of Her Majesty's ship "Resolute," and  
in charge of the Arctic Expedition.

London, 15th November 1851.

## Enclosure No. 8.

Captain Kellett's  
Replies.

Captain KELLETT to Mr. FEGEN, Secretary to the Arctic Committee.

Sir,

10, Alexander-square, Brompton, 6th November 1851.

With reference to your letter of yesterday's date, submitting to me certain questions relative to the missing Expedition under Sir John Franklin, I have to request that you will lay before the Arctic Committee the accompanying paper, containing my most carefully considered replies.

I have, &c.,

F. J. Fegen, Esq.,  
Secretary Arctic Committee.

HENRY KELLETT,  
Captain, R.N.

## Enclosure 1.

Answers to Questions submitted by the Arctic Committee to Captain  
Henry Kellett, 5th November 1851.

Do you suppose it probable that Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crews comprising his Expedition, still survive?

There is, I consider, no evidence of their having been wrecked; on the contrary, I think we have evidence that they have not been wrecked.

I feel that it is not within the power of man to say that they are dead, nor do I consider it right to do so when we hear the evidence of the experienced traveller, Dr. Rae, as to the small quantity of food and fuel that will support vigorous life in those regions; as well as Captain Penny's and Lieutenant M'Clintock's account as to the number of animals that may be procured in a higher northern latitude than I think they would be found in.

I must therefore give it as my *opinion* that there is a *possibility* that some may *still* survive.

If so, in what direction?

What are your grounds for forming that opinion?

The answers to these questions must be conjectural.

I base my opinion on the following points:—Giving Sir John Franklin credit for pursuing the object of his Expedition, the ships will be found, I think, a long way to the westward of any point reached by the parties from the late Expeditions.

In the summer of 1846 he may have reached a navigable sea, north of the Parry Islands, which may have enabled him to get to the westward and probably to the southward of Melville and Banks's Land (which may be one), making his return by the eastward more difficult than that by the westward; and the open water, as far as he could know, less distant by the western route. He would therefore persevere westerly, and having made his westing, may have been stopped in his endeavour to get south by continuous land or islands.

We have certain proof of there being land in this sea, for, on the 17th August 1849, I *landed* on an island in lat.  $71^{\circ} 19' N.$ , long.  $175^{\circ} 16' W.$  (named Herald's Island); it is almost inaccessible, and literally alive with birds. From the neighbourhood of Herald's Island, I saw (as far as a man can be positive of his sight in those seas) to the westward an extensive land, very high and rugged, distant I consider from my position 50 or 60 miles.

I could not land or approach it with my ship, unfortified as she was, but I am convinced it might have been easily reached by a steam vessel.

Now I do consider that it is more probable that the ships are stopped to the westward of the meridian of Behring's Straits, than anywhere within 600 miles north-west of their winter quarters, 1845-6; for, had they been within that distance, we should have had long ere this some *one* out of so large a party return to give us information of their whereabouts.

Being in the meridian of Behring's Straits, or to the westward of it, is, I consider, the very reason we have not heard from them; for they could not possibly reach either America or Asia in boats or on foot.

Vide extract  
from my official  
letter to their lord-  
ships, enclosed.



Should a further search be decided on, what measures do you recommend for this purpose, and in what direction? Captain Kellett's  
Replies.

To reach the point I refer to, I consider screw steam vessels would be the most eligible. We have heard what they have done with Captain Austin. The season is so short, that vessels capable of taking advantage of every opening must be employed; not being able to avail themselves of a lead either from foul winds or calms, may and is likely to cause the loss of the whole season. There should by all means be two vessels with small crews, and filled with provisions; all their resources must be within themselves, as I know of no port where a reserve of provisions would be of any use to vessels endeavouring to get to the north-eastward by Behring's Straits. A depôt in either Kotzebue Sound or Grantley Harbour could only be useful to a vessel having failed; and then I consider her return to a southern port would be preferable to her wintering in either of those ports where her departure in the ensuing spring would be dependent on the breaking up of the ice.

In October 1850, there were 300 tons of government coals at the Sandwich Islands; here these steamers might fill up. Between these islands and the ice, from where their voyage would commence, they certainly would not require more than two days fuel, one to take them through the Aleutian Chain, and another through Behring's Straits.

Before stating the route I should follow to gain what I suppose may be the position of the missing ships, I will describe the character of the ice in Behring's Sea, as required from me by the Arctic Committee.

I found it whenever I made it, with only one or two exceptions, closely packed; not in general high, as I could easily land on it from a boat; very much broken or rough, with pinnacles of considerable height. Travelling over it for any distance, is, I should say, impossible; many of the floes are nearly covered with water, the mirage from which distorted objects in the most extraordinary way.

Its general trend from the coast of America was to the north-west, by steps of unequal sides, the northern sides being the longest. By following this course, I reached on the 28th July, 1849, lat.  $72^{\circ} 51' N.$ , long.  $163^{\circ} 48' W.$ , where I was stopped by impenetrable packed ice; a water sky was reported to the northward (by the ice men) which I could not reach, though, I am convinced, had my object been to reach a higher northern latitude, I might have done so by following the pack to the westward.

Again in 1850 I found the packed ice near the coast of America in nearly the same position as Captain Beechey did in 1827, but still Captain Collinson, in the same year, after rounding that point of the pack, was enabled to reach a higher latitude by 20 miles than has ever been attained before; from this position he attempted to get to the eastward, where he was stopped by closely packed and heavy ice. Packed ice, in Behring's Sea, cannot be seen from a ship's mast head more than ten miles. I have proved this by running to, and even from, the pack.

In nearly the same longitude.

Although I was always stopped by packed ice, yet it will be recollected that it was my object to keep my ship *clear* of the ice, and not to *enter* it.

Were I proposing to make the N.E. passage, I should recommend an attempt to be made, directly north, in the meridian of Behring's Straits, where the sea is clearer of ice for a greater extent northerly than in any other direction; but as the object of an Expedition would be one of search, not of discovery, I should recommend their making Herald Island, and then push westerly for the land seen by me, which may be a continuation of the land seen by the natives from Cape Jakan, and which we know, from Baron Wrangell's voyage, is not connected with the coast of Asia. I would pass, if possible, to the westward of this land, and then prosecute the search easterly along its northern face.

In this unknown sea much must be left to the discretion of the officer in command, both as to the time of his return and the direction circumstances may oblige him to pursue to reach the point of search indicated.

• Where was her Majesty's Ship "Investigator" last seen?

The "Investigator" was last seen by the "Plover" in lat.  $70^{\circ} 44' N.$ , long.  $159^{\circ} 52' W.$ , steering to the north with a strong S.W. wind. It will be seen by

H h



Captain Kellett's  
Replies.

the accompanying chart that she would have an open sea ahead of her for some distance.

Should Commander M'Clure be successful in getting far to the eastward, I am convinced, from a conversation I had with him, and indeed his own letter will show, that he will use every endeavour to reach Melville Island with his parties if he failed with his ship. Should one of these parties reach Melville Island, or *even* the northern shore of Banks Land, they will endeavour to get home by the east, being a safer route than attempting to return to their ships.

Should a further search be decided on through Behring's Straits, I cannot too strongly urge the necessity of an immediate departure. Captain Moore, in the "Plover," and Captain Collinson, in the "Enterprise," left this country a great deal too late; it leaves an officer, in the event of any casualty, no time to remedy it, and he must, therefore, fail; steam vessels *even* should be clear of the channel by Christmas to *ensure* their being up with the ice in time.

HENRY KELLETT, Captain, R.N.

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Enclosure 2.

Extract from my Official Letter to their Lordships, dated 17th November 1849, relative to Islands and supposed Land discovered by "Herald" on August 17th of the same year.

Shortly after 8 A.M., when one of the snow storms cleared off, the packed ice was seen from the mast head from S.S.W. to N.N.E. 5 miles distant. The weather was so bad that I was obliged to bear up for the rendezvous; it however as suddenly cleared up, and I hauled my wind for the N.W. extreme of the ice that had been seen.

Named "He-  
rald Island."

At 9:40 the report of "Land ho" was made from the mast head. In running a course along the pack towards our first discovery a small group of islands were reported on our port beam. The pack here was not so close as I found it before; lines of water could be here seen, reaching almost to the group, but too narrow to enter unless the ship had been sufficiently fortified.

Since named  
Plover Islands

These small islands at intervals were very distinct. Still more distant than this group (from the deck) a very extensive and high land was reported, which I had been watching for some time, anxiously awaiting a report from some one else. There was a beautifully clear atmosphere (such as can be only seen in this climate) except in the direction of this extensive land. There the clouds rolled in heavy masses, occasionally leaving its very lofty peaks uncapped, when could be distinctly seen columns, pillars, and very broken angles on their summits, which is characteristic of the high headlands in this sea. East Cape and Cape Lisburne, for example.

With the exception of the N.E. and S.W. extremes, none of the intermediate lowland could be seen, unless, indeed, what I at first took for a small group of islands was a point of this great land. This island or point was distant 25 miles from the ship's track; the higher part of the land not less, I consider, than 60 miles. When we hove to off the first land seen, the north extreme of the great land showed out for a moment to the eastward, and so clear, as to cause some who before had doubts to cry out "*There, Sir, is the land quite plain.*"

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Enclosure No. 9.

Capt. Ommanney's  
Replies.

Captain OMMANNEY to Mr. FEGEN, Secretary to the Arctic Committee.

Sir,

40, Charing-cross, 12th November 1851.

In compliance with the desire contained in your letter of the 28th ult., I beg to transmit, for the information of the Arctic Committee, my replies to the questions annexed thereto, after giving them my most careful consideration.

I have, &c.,

ERASMUS OMMANNEY,  
Captain, R.N.

## Enclosure.

Capt. Ommanney's  
Replies.

*Question 1.*—Do you suppose it probable that Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crews composing his Expedition, still survive ; and if so, in what direction ?

*Answer.*—I am of opinion that neither Sir John Franklin or any portion of the Expedition can be now alive.

*Question 2.*—What are your grounds for forming that opinion ?

*Answer.*—First, from the fact that on leaving Whale Fish Islands in June 1845, the Expedition was then provisioned for three years. It was, probably, August 1846 when they quitted Beechey Island. Thus they had less than two years provisions left to last them up to the present time ; even allowing that their numbers diminished, I maintain that no English constitution or people habituated to civilized life could exist so long on reduced allowance.

Secondly, I place no reliance upon the support they are likely to procure from the quantity of game or animals found in those regions. The whole amount of game procured near our winter quarters this summer amounted to about one bird a man for the whole Expedition, although parties were sent out expressly to shoot ; and, bear in mind, these were obtained with some labour by people in good health. Admitting that there are birds and animals,—the former are migratory, as are most of the latter,—then there are but 8 weeks out of the whole year on which you can depend for this supply. There is nothing to induce me to suppose that any party could kill sufficient food to sustain them for the remaining 10 months. The numerous old Esquimaux settlements met with along the south shores of the Parry group leads me to believe that a change has taken place in those seas, in the course of time, which, becoming blocked up with ice for a longer period of the year, deprived the natives of the means of living, which caused them to emigrate eastward. I consider the opinions of continental travellers on this subject as fallacious, for it does not follow that because animal life abounds on the American continent, the same should be found 400 or 500 miles further north. I see no analogy between the two countries,—the coast of America and the Parry group.

Thirdly, if they abandoned their ships northward of the Parry group, in all probability their travelling parties would have retraced their steps towards their first winter quarters, or made for Melville Island, where it appears there is more animal life, of which they, of course, were quite aware of from Parry's voyage.

Lastly, there are reasons to suppose they did not prosecute the north-west passage after leaving Beechey Island. We know that 3 of their men (young men) died the first year, from which we may infer they were not enjoying perfect health. It is supposed that their preserved meats were of an inferior quality. No records being left, does not look like advancing ; as Sir John Franklin and Captain Crozier, the latter of whom had served in four expeditions, were alive to the importance of depositing records. Again,—look at the position of Cape Riley,—they had made little progress in the object of their voyage ; all their work was still before them, for I regard that position merely as the threshold of the north-west passage. Under these circumstances, and supposing that Franklin had examined the seas beyond Cape Walker in the fall of 1845, and by travelling parties found this impenetrable barrier of ice across the Wellington Channel, spoken of by Penny's Expedition, what other course had Franklin left but to retreat ? That two ships could be lost in the ice without meeting a vestige of them afterwards, is a catastrophe I can easily conceive possible, especially if the two ships happened to be beset close to each other.

Assuming that they did advance through the Wellington Channel, and became blocked up in some inaccessible place, my firm conviction is that none can now survive ; for I think it impossible for the constitution to endure the climate and the privations necessarily exposed to, even with a moderate allowance of provisions, for so long a period.

Capt. Ommanney's  
Replies.

*Question 3.*—Should a further search be decided on, what measures do you recommend for this purpose, and in what direction?

*Answer.*—Should another search be considered desirable, I would recommend that the Expedition be composed of vessels fitted with screw-propellers, so as to act without the encumbrance of a sailing vessel after reaching the ground of operations.

From the indefinite statements made with regard to the channel seen by Mr. Penny's Expedition since his return to England, and the impression excited in consequence on the public mind about a navigable sea in that direction, viz., north-westward of the Wellington Channel, it seems to me to require a further examination. To accomplish this, two questions present themselves:—first, whether it would be requisite to provide for a prolonged absence; secondly, whether it would not be more desirable to arrange for a rapid execution of this service? In the former case it would involve the necessity of a depôt ship being stationed at Beechey Island; in the other, I would be attended with one depôt ship to accompany the steamers as far as practicable, so as to secure her return to England the same season.

My firm conviction is, that if ever the Wellington Channel is navigable to any considerable distance, it must be only on an occasional open season. Should an Expedition be so favoured as to hit on such a season the year of its departure from England, we should gain an advanced position, from whence an extensive search would be effected in the ensuing spring; accordingly I would recommend preparing an Expedition for rapid movements.

I propose having two steam screw-propelling vessels; they cannot have much power because you want all the space you can gain for your crew and provisions; to accomplish a rate of 7 knots per hour at full speed is quite sufficient; and, in my opinion, their size should not exceed 500 or 600 tons, drawing about 12 or 13 feet water. They should not be so long as our last steamers were, and broader in proportion, being so constructed, as far as may be practicable, preserving her efficiency as a steamer, to possess all the qualities of a sailing vessel—one that would work quickly in narrow lanes of water in the event of being solely dependent on the use of sails. They ought to spread more canvas than our last steamers, and be provided with square sails on the main-mast. Vessels of this description would require to use their steam less frequently than we did on the late Expedition.

To stow the same proportion of fuel, on reaching the Arctic seas, as was effected by our last steamers, is ample; being unencumbered with sailing vessel, that quantity, or even less, would produce a greater result in distance than before, and I am satisfied, as before stated, be less frequently used.

As a depôt ship to carry out the ultimate supplies for these two steamers, I would take the "Assistance," which is ready prepared for such a service; she has great capacity, and will stow 100 tons more than on the last voyage. Let her have 50 working hands, with a limited number of officers. She should accompany these steamers, as far as the nature of the season would admit of, to the entrance of Lancaster Sound, if possible. Port Dundas, which I visited, near Cape Warrender, would be a good position to complete up with fuel and provisions. This accomplished, the "Assistance" would return, and the steamers proceed with the search.

The "Assistance" would have to carry 300 tons of fuel, independently of the stores and provisions for the steamers. This would be effected by removing the warming apparatus, dispensing with unnecessary anchors, cables, boats, &c., and all the stores which we carried for three years use, would in this case be substituted for by provisions, and with only sufficient executive officers, a large space would also be gained; she would be quite adequate to answer this purpose.

• Should it prove a very favourable season, I would carry the depôt ship as far as Beechey Island, there complete up, and make a depôt on shore as well, before advancing.

From my experience, and looking to all previous Arctic navigation, it is impossible to follow up any previously-defined line of operations to pursue; no two seasons are ever alike; whoever he may be, he must be guided by circumstances: assuming that we reach Cape Riley (which may not be gained in all seasons,—refer to Sir John Ross's Expedition, and to the North Star,) with the

two steamers, efficient in all respects, and with leads before you up the channel, then I should push forward while the season lasted, to gain the most advanced position for wintering in, and with travelling parties would in all probability effect the desired search.

Capt. Ommanney's  
Replies

But taking such a season as we met with, there is no alternative but to winter at Beechey Island, from whence it would also be practicable by travelling, (through the experience of the late Expedition,) to set at rest the question respecting the channel seen by Mr. Penny; it may terminate in a deep gulf, which I am not unprepared for, from what I remarked about the tides in Wellington Channel.

Another proposition here presents itself; you find the Wellington Channel blocked up, but all promises well for advancing to the westward: as some people express wish for Banks Land to be explored, the leader of the Expedition might have authority for detaching one vessel in that direction.

I would not recommend advancing up the Wellington Channel a second season, unless certain of your retreat again, for it almost amounts to a certainty that the vessels would be blocked up, as may have been the fate of Franklin.

Having gained an advanced position to the north-westward of the Wellington Channel in 1852, in an open season, in all probability a succession of close seasons will follow, leaving the Expedition blocked up; we must therefore be prepared to sacrifice the ships; the spring of 1854 would therefore be the period to abandon the ships, and retreat with the crews to Port Leopold, and the dépôt left by the "North Star," near Admiralty Inlet.

I have no faith in the theory of a Polar Basin, consequently my opinion is, that the success of a searching Expedition to the north-westward of the Wellington Channel depends entirely on the state of the navigation next year; the commander of the Expedition should have full discretionary power, and every one who joins must understand that their lives are to be risked, not only with a hope to save others, but to ascertain the fate of the missing Expedition.

The travelling gear should be of the most perfect description, and in ample quantity, availing ourselves of all the improvements recommended by myself, and the officers of the late Expedition, and given in to Captain Austin at his request; the detail of all the travelling equipments have, I believe, been all laid before you.

Some description of light boat, on runners, for carrying over ice, would be most desirable.

A large quantity of Bickford's fuze should be carried for ice-blasting; we had to prepare all our charges, which involved loss of time, and the occupation of two or three working hands when most required; these might be prepared by the Ordnance, of the proper weight, and stowed in cases, ready for use and the application of the fuze; we found the blasting most invaluable in clearing away a short trip, and I recommend it for all future Arctic Expeditions.

The Expedition ought not to be less efficiently equipped than the last, which in all respects was most complete; there was a superabundance, perhaps, of some stores, which might be dispensed with; the provisions and vegetables might consist of a greater variety with great advantage; and the salt provisions, the beef particularly, should be cured without so much saltpetre; travelling boots should be prepared before starting; glass shades for the protection of the eyes for all the crew should be supplied, and of the best description.

I would recommend that no more officers than are actually necessary be employed, the non-executives only occupy space, require attendance, and curtail the accommodation for the crew. It is also important that the officers should be well versed in practical astronomy, with some knowledge of surveying, sufficient to lay down a coast line correctly. The engineers must be ready to perform any other duty when not navigating or at work about their engines. It is my decided opinion that none but naval officers should be employed on such a service, selecting those who have already proved themselves competent to undergo the privations in the former Expeditions, and by their ability and dispositions adapted for such peculiar service. More time should be allowed for fitting out the Expedition than we had; and I consider the middle or end of May quite early enough to sail. The selection of men is most important, and I much prefer the "man-of-war's man." The system of having ice quarter-masters answered admirably, and I would recommend the same again.

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In selecting steam-vessels such as I have described, for independent operation, it will be necessary to provide for a larger crew and more officers; but they should not exceed 600 tons, and 7 knots is the utmost limit of speed required. A large steamer should accompany the Expedition to the edge of the ice, or Disco.

I have thus stated my general opinion for a further search on the basis of rapid operations, which I consider, under the present circumstances, is all that is required. As we are in possession of the detail necessary for equipping an Arctic Expedition it is needless here to enter into them. The officer, selected from former experience, will be fully competent to make his own arrangements, as was done in the late Expedition under Captain Austin; and of all things let the officer in command be unfettered from co-operation with other expeditions.

ERASMUS OMMANNEY, Capt. R.N.

London, 12th November 1851.

Late Her Majesty's Ship "Assistance."

### Enclosure No. 10.

Sir J. Richardson's  
Replies.

Answers to three questions from the Arctic Committee, by  
SIR JOHN RICHARDSON, C.B., M.D.

Sir,

Haslar Hospital, 15th November 1851.

I have to request that you will lay before the Arctic Committee the subjoined replies to the three questions which they have done me the honour of submitting for my consideration, and which I have most carefully weighed:—

*Question 1st.*—"Do you suppose it probable that Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crews composing his Expedition, still survive? If so, in what direction?"

*Answer.*—I think it probable that part of the crews may still survive, to the north, or north-west of Melville Island.

*Question 2d.*—"What are your grounds for forming that opinion?"

*Answer.*—The reply to this question divides itself naturally into two heads, viz., the possibility of people surviving for a series of years on the polar islands, and the direction which the discovery ships took after leaving their winter quarters of 1845-6.

With reference to the first head, many facts may be adduced to prove that life may be supported for a number of years on animals inhabiting the land and waters of the most northern known islands. The existence of Eskimos up to the 77th parallel, and perhaps still higher in Baffin's Bay, is in itself sufficient evidence of the means of subsistence being produced in these latitudes. Except practical skill in hunting seals, and the art of building snow-houses, that people have no qualifications that may not be surpassed by the intelligence, providence, and appliances of Europeans. The islands lying to the north of Lancaster Sound and Barrow's Straits were once frequented by Eskimos, and the remains of their winter huts, though perhaps two centuries old, are still numerous along the coasts. Why these islands have been abandoned by them in recent times is unknown, but that the tribes that once resorted thither were not cut off by any sudden pestilence or famine is apparent from the absence of human skeletons in the vicinity of the deserted dwellings, while the much decayed bones of whales, walrus, seals, deer, musk-oxen, birds, and other animals are abundant, and the small fireplaces built near the huts still contain morsels of charred wood, hidden beneath the moss which has overgrown them in the lapse of years. The absence of the natives is favourable, inasmuch as the animals, whether marine or terrestrial, not being hunted will be more easily accessible.

Musk-oxen frequent Melville Island, and with ordinary caution a whole herd may be secured by moderately skilful hunters, since it is the habit of the animals to throw themselves into a circle on the approach of danger, and to remain in that position, with their heads facing outwards, though individuals of their number are falling from their ranks under the fire of their assailants. Lieutenant M'Clintock, on his recent admirable pedestrian journey, shot a musk-bull, and having gone to his sledges for assistance to carry down the meat, on his return with a party of men found the herd still grazing beside their slaughtered leader.

Reindeer also pass over from the continent to the islands in numbers in the months of May and June, and though they are shy animals if they be allowed to get scent of man, they may be readily approached on their lee side by a hunter who possesses the requisite stock of patience.

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The nature of the country in the vicinity of the ships will necessarily influence its productiveness in animal life, and in the absence of information respecting it, our conclusions cannot but be in great measure conjectural. A flat limestone tract, whereon the surface stone is continually splitting into thin slates under the action of frost, and from which the mud is annually washed into the sea by floods of melting snow, or a low, shingly, barren flat, such as that coasted by Captain Ommanney, produces few grasses and little vegetation of any kind, hence it is shunned by herbivorous animals, or if they must necessarily cross it in their migrations they do so at speed; but in the sheltered ravines of a sandstone or trap country, or in the narrow valleys which occur among granite or gneiss rocks, there are grassy meadows to which deer and musk-oxen resort, the latter also frequent lichen-producing acclivities, which are generally denuded of snow by high winds. Mr. Rae saw the reindeer migrating over the ice of Dolphin and Union Straits in the spring, and passing in great haste into the interior of Wollaston land. There seems to be no reason why these herds should not range beyond the 80th parallel, if the islands reach so high, since the same kind of deer travel annually from the continent of Europe to Spitzbergen, over a wider expanse of sea-ice. Polar hares are also numerous on Wollaston and Melville Islands, and as they are very tame and consequently easily shot, they add to the means of support. In the neighbourhood of open water the Polar bear is frequent, and being bold in its approaches falls a ready sacrifice to a party armed with fowling pieces. The simplicity of the Arctic fox renders its capture a very easy affair. Fish of various kinds are by no means scarce in the Arctic seas, and the fresh water lakes abound in trout. Sir John Franklin was well acquainted with the methods of taking these by hooks or in nets set under the ice in spring.

Brent geese, cider and king ducks, gulls and many other water fowl, resort in the breeding season in vast flocks to the most remote islands; and it may be necessary to state here, that these birds reach their breeding stations in the high latitudes only in July, hence officers travelling a month or two earlier, when the ground is still covered with snow, are not aware of the manner in which the most barren islets teem with life later in the summer.

Walruses and seals of several species were observed by Captain Penny and his officers to be numerous in Victoria Channel, and *beluge* and black whales may be looked for wherever open water of considerable extent exists. Both kinds abound in the sea that washes Cape Bathurst.

This enumeration comprises all the principal animals likely to yield food to a party shut up by ice in the Arctic Archipelago. How far they could be made available for feeding the crews of Sir John Franklin's ships for four years beyond the expenditure of his English provisions must depend on many circumstances, concerning which we are at present in total ignorance. Such as whether the ships were enclosed in ice and drifted to a distance from the land, in which case the hope of aid from terrestrial animals would fail; or, whether they were simply shut up in a convenient harbour with their resources entire; or, thirdly, whether the ships were overwhelmed by ice or pressed ashore and wrecked, and if so, what clothing and ammunition were saved, also what portions of the wreck convertible into fuel drifted on shore. Fuel is as indispensable as food in the high latitudes, and the Eskimos generally employ animal fat for this purpose, especially in the winter. Drink in that season can be procured only by melting snow or ice, and for this service one pound of fat, at least, is required daily to make drink for three people, exclusive of other cookery.

It seemed necessary that I should enter into this lengthened detail, in order to present a faithful view of the prospects of ships' crews shut up to the north of Melville Island. We must also advert to the fact, that provisions for the whole year must be secured in two short summer months; hence a skilful and complete organization of the hunting parties would be necessary to husband the natural resources of the country. Rash and awkward efforts would surely drive the animals out of the district.

The shortness of the hunting season would be a great obstacle to the movement of a large party, either towards the continent or Lancaster Sound. Many



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of the number would be sick and the remainder could scarcely transport their disabled companions, the utensils, and a year's provisions to any great distance. We ought also to take into account the probable ravages of scurvy among the crews, in the course of so many years seclusion in the north. That disorder has hitherto always appeared in a greater or lesser degree in the discovery ships after the second winter; and it is likely to be severe and fatal, just in proportion to the scantiness of the diet on which the people feed.

Much of what I have advanced above is conjectural, since we are ignorant of the position of the ships, and it is fortunate that we can refer to fact to prove that life may be maintained in the most Arctic lands under circumstances, at first sight, seemingly the most hopeless. A narrative printed in St. Petersburg in 1768, by M. Le Roy, and translated and published in Parkinson's collection, relates the adventures of four Russian sailors, who being left on Spitzbergen almost destitute of supplies of any kind, supported themselves there by their ingenuity and activity for six years and a quarter. These four men were part of a crew of 14 who went in a small vessel to fish for whales on the east coast of Spitzbergen in the year 1743. The ship having neared the land, was enclosed by ice, and the master, despairing of extricating her, was minded to winter on shore. He accordingly landed his boatswain and three men to look for a wooden hut which he knew of in that vicinity. The men having to travel over the ice, set out purposely with very light loads, and in fact took with them only a small bag of meal, a musket, a powder-horn, 12 charges of ammunition, an axe, a knife, a small kettle, a stove, a piece of touchwood, a tobacco-box, and each man his tobacco-pipe. At the distance of a quarter of a mile from the beach they found the hut, which was built of deal, and was 30 feet long, 9 feet wide, and also 9 feet high. Within there was a fireplace constructed of clay, and a stove without a chimney, the smoke being allowed to escape by holes in the roof. The interior was damp and uncomfortable, and the afternoon was spent in making it habitable by caulking the rents in the walls with moss, and expelling the damp by fires made of drift-wood. After completing these operations, and supping on a portion of their meal, they went to rest, and passed a night of sound repose; but on repairing to the beach in the morning, their ship was no longer visible, having drifted off with the ice, and she was never again heard of. The men were not overwhelmed by this unlooked-for calamity, but instantly set about providing for their future wants. The wreck of a ship which they found on the shore supplied them with fuel, and the 12 charges of powder and ball procured them as many reindeer, which fortunately were numerous on the island. With nails extracted from a piece of ship-timber, they made three lances, wherewith they killed a bear, and with the strong tendons of the bear they strung and strengthened a piece of crooked drift-wood, which they had fashioned into a serviceable bow, with the knife. With this bow, and the arrows which they easily made, they killed all the reindeer and blue and white foxes they required during their enforced stay on the island. They constructed a lamp of baked clay, curing its porousness with a little of their meal, and feeding it with the fat of the animals that they killed. Wicks were obtained by tearing their shirts into shreds, and the skins of the deer, bears, and foxes furnished them with clothing and bedding. During the six years of their residence they killed in all 250 reindeer, 10 bears, with a multitude of foxes; and when they were at length relieved by a vessel which touched unexpectedly on the island, they were able to pay for their passage home, with 2,000 lbs. of deer-fat, and many hides of the animals they had slain. One of their number, Fedor Weregii, a very indolent man, who from the beginning had eschewed almost every kind of exertion, died of scurvy, while the other three found health in their daily active employments.

I may also adduce the success of Mr. Rae in wintering on the very unpromising shores of Repulse Bay, as another proof of the possibility of sustaining a party on the products of an Arctic country. That coast yields no drift timber, but trusting to the withered stems of a herbaceous *andromeda*, he determined on passing the winter there, and having built a house of stones gathered from the beach, and collected the *andromeda* into small cocks like so much hay, he fed his party of 13 men for 11 months, principally on the produce of his own gun and that of his Eskimo interpreter. In the month of September 1846 alone, 63 deer, 172 ptarmigan, and 116 salmon were brought into store, and when he departed in 1847, after completing his discovery and survey of the shores of



Akkolee or Committee Bay, he returned to Churchill with more than a third of the two months provisions with which he originally set out, and with his well-fed crew in excellent health and prime working condition. These facts, and they might be largely added to, will, I believe, be generally considered as sufficient to prove the general argument of the northern islands being frequented in summer by herds of animals sufficient to feed large bodies of men.

With respect to the second clause of the answer to question 2d, viz., the reasons for supposing that Sir John Franklin went up Wellington Channel, and is now beset somewhere to the west or north-west of Melville Island, the absence of any written document mentioning his intended line of route after leaving his winter quarters of 1845-6, renders the reply to this also one of election among various probabilities. I do not, however, feel inclined to admit the inference that has been drawn from the want of such a memorandum, namely, that the only reason for Sir John's not leaving one, was his intention of returning forthwith to England. It is well known that he contemplated staying out a second winter, if necessary, in the prosecution of his enterprise; and the moral certainty that there was no mortality among his crews during his stay in Union Bay subsequent to the beginning of April, supports the belief that his ships and their equipage were in an efficient state at the opening of the navigation in August or September 1846. It is much more probable that he did actually leave a memorandum, but that the post intended to call attention to the spot has been thrown down by bears or wolverines, and thus overlooked. Beechey Island seems to have been very carefully searched for documents, but the memorandum may have been placed on the north or east side of Union Bay; and I have not heard that the cairn from which the thick post had fallen, which was carried on board the "Albert" by Adam Beck, was searched.

It is certainly possible that on emerging from under the shelter of Beechey Island the two ships may have been involved in a pack of ice, and drifted therein involuntarily into Baffin's Bay, as Sir James Ross's ships and the two American schooners were, and there overwhelmed. Looking, however, to the great strength of the "Erebus" and "Terror," I should think that such a catastrophe could not have occurred without leaving some traces of it, either in boats, spars, or other pieces of wreck to be discovered by the whalers. Adam Beck's confused and imperfect story of the murder of two ships companies by a feeble horde of Eskimos in Wolstenholme Sound, is sufficiently disproved by the "North Star" having seen neither ship's timbers nor the spoil of the crews in possession of the Eskimos, during the long anchorage in that quarter. In the defect of positive evidence of the shipwreck and wholesale murder of the crews, or other loss of the ships in Baffin's Bay, the necessity for search in Queen Victoria Channel remains the same as if no such calumny had ever been mooted.

The direction of search is now actually limited to the channel here indicated, since Captain Austin's most extensive and accurate examination of the shores of Barrow's Strait to beyond the 114th meridian, shows that the discovery ships did not take a westerly course. If this conclusion needed further support, it has been supplied by the account of Mr. Rae's very remarkable pedestrian journey which has just arrived, and by which we are informed, that that zealous and active traveller had explored the coasts of Victoria and Wollaston Lands from the 110th to the 118th degrees of longitude, approaching on the one side within 220 miles of Lieut. Osborn's farthest point south-west of Cape Walker, and on the other within an equal distance of the north side of Banks's Land. The large horde of Eskimos, exceeding 100 in number, met by Mr. Rae on Victoria or Banks's Land, (for they form, probably, only one island), had never seen ships or white men; and it is not probable that Franklin's crews, if cast on any part of that island, would not, in their summer excursions, have left tracks that would have been seen during the lapse of five years by the Eskimos hunters, who pursue the reindeer in their migrations into the interior.

The way in which I think the information that has been collected by the various searching Expeditions ought to be interpreted is, that in the summer of 1845, Sir John Franklin was foiled in his attempts to pass Barrow's Straits, that while waiting for the disruption of ice, Captain Fitzjames and other magnetic observers landed on Cape Riley to keep the August term day, and having then discovered the qualities of Union Bay as a secure harbour, the ships eventually chose it as their winter retreat. In the spring, exploring sledge

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parties were sent up Wellington Channel, and having merely a passage to look for, and neither bays to examine nor the circuits of islands to make, they had gone much beyond Captain Penny's furthest, and that cairns will be found erected as usual at the limits of their journeys. The strong tides or currents in the straits which bound Baillic Hamilton Island will probably keep the sea open there in most seasons; and thus Sir John would be encouraged to take that route, which his instructions justified him doing, if the ice remained fast to the westward.

*Question 3rd.* Should a further search be decided on, what measures do you recommend for that purpose, and in what direction?

*Answer.* The considerations adverted to in the preceding paragraphs limit the direction to Queen Victoria's Channel, and its westerly or north-westerly prolongations.

In reference to the measures to be adopted, I beg to state, that the very variable condition of the ice in the Polar seas and straits in different years, and the experience of the late searching squadron, show that in most seasons the search may be most effectually carried on by sledge parties; ample provision should, therefore, be made for that department. With respect to the kind and size of the ships to be employed, I would say generally, that such an Expedition as that lately commanded by Captain Austin seems to be fully adapted for the purpose. The experience of the officers employed on it will suggest such improvements on the equipments as are needful, and it would be presumptuous in me to offer details on that head. But in regard to provisioning the ships, I would recommend a very considerable proportion of pemican to be furnished. This article has great advantages in respect of stowage, and if served out together with wheaten flour, or, what is preferable, sound, coarse barley meal, at the rate of from 2 to 3 lbs per diem, I should have very little fear of scurvy; and I think that it would be preferred by the men, as a standing article of food, to the preserved meats, which are less nutritious, weight for weight, owing to the quantity of water the cases contain. Meat biscuit made of wheaten flower, and dried and pounded meat, is another form in which nourishing food may be carried, and if it be secluded from moisture in tin canisters it will remain long in a sound state. As a further preventative against scurvy, a considerable stock of preserved potatoes may be laid in, though bulk for bulk it is much less nutritious than the substances mentioned above.

To render sledge parties thoroughly effective, advanced depôts should be made, if possible, in the autumn, and well secured against the depredations of bears. If the ships, for instance, were to reach Beechey Island in July or August, and to find Wellington Strait choked by floe ice, boats should forthwith be launched over it, instead of waiting for its disruption, and provisions transported as far to the westward as can be done. This would not be lost labour, even if the ice broke up, so as to allow the ships to follow, for it will be prudent to establish depôts at convenient distances, as a necessary precaution for retreat. With this view also, it might be advisable to land a party of four or five in Union or Radstock Bays, with provisions and materials for erecting a winter hut, so as to form a channel of intercourse between the ships, should they pass up Victoria Channel, and Queen's ships or whalers that may be sent with instructions or supplies into Lancaster Straits.

For sledges to be employed on the ice, I would recommend those of the Canadian construction, with high runners made of wrought iron faced with steel, welded on and not screwed, as screws invariably work loose. To accommodate parties that may find it necessary to cross tracts of land, a few sledges, made of two narrow thin birch deals rolled back—fiddle-fashion—in front, and sewed with strong sinew to slender cross-bars, should be supplied.

Each sledge party should have an apparatus made of tinned iron or copper, for the melting of snow and cooking with a lamp. Snow is best melted in a shallow dish like a frying-pan, and the apparatus should have a cork casing, for the purpose of reducing the waste of heat. Could two or three Eskimos be procured, the necessity of carrying tents, which are a great encumbrance, would be avoided in the spring parties by the erection of snow houses. Mr. Rae, on his recent journey to Victoria Land, found the snow huts which he had practised his men in raising during the winter superior in comfort to tents. For draught I would further advise dogs to be carried out in the proportion of six or eight for each of the large sledges. Young dogs taken from this country in spring

would be serviceable when about a year or fourteen months old in the beginning of the following season, and they are very speedily trained. A cross between an English mastiff and a Newfoundland dog is superior in strength to an Eskimo dog. Seal blubber, especially when rancid, is a kind of food on which dogs will labour well, but on board ship they may be kept in good condition on oatmeal.

Sir J. Richardson's  
Replies.

For the men's use in winter, I would recommend shoes made of soft tanned leather (such as boots are made of) in preference to canvas shoes. They should be made in shape of the Canadian mocassin, and roomy enough to hold three socks of white fearnought. For spring travelling, mocassins of tanned ox-hide should be substituted, made equally roomy; and as the season advances, and the ground or ice becomes bare, gutta-percha soles may be added with great advantage. The efficiency, and even the safety, of a travelling party depends on rigid attention to minute particulars in their equipment. A surtout coat of leather, lined with warm flannel, is the best for winter travelling. Snow-houses, erected as soon as a sufficiency of material can be procured, will stand until the spring is far advanced, and may be constructed with advantage at the end of each day's journey, so as to be available for parties returning or coming up with supplies.

I take it for granted, that steam tenders, or a steam-vessel of superior power, will be employed in the event of another Expedition being decided on. As early as 1826, I had formed an opinion, which I have alluded to in the narrative of Sir John Franklin's second Expedition, that steam would eventually be employed in the Arctic seas, and recent experience has fully shown that many advantages attend its use.

I beg leave to add, that pemican is made best in the winter time, and directions should therefore be given for its preparation as soon as another Expedition is decided upon.

I have, &c.,

F. J. Fegen, Esq.,  
Secretary, Arctic Committee.

JOHN RICHARDSON,  
Medical Inspector.

## Enclosure No. II.

Replies of Mr. PENNY to Questions put by the Arctic Committee.

Mr. Penny's  
Replies.

*Question.*—Do you suppose it probable that Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crew composing his Expedition, still survive? if so, in what direction?

*Answer.*—I do think it possible that Sir John Franklin and his crews or a portion of them may still survive. My grounds for thinking so are, first, my knowledge of the habits of the Esquimaux, who live to a good old age in an equally inhospitable climate; the same mode of procuring food which the Esquimaux have is open to our countrymen, who have amongst them men, Mainely, Blanky, McDonald, and Read, well acquainted with the means employed by Esquimaux in obtaining food.

Secondly. Independently of their guns and snares, they could subsist by fishing for seals, walrus, narwals, (all of which I saw in Victoria Channel) and possibly whales, this can be done by harpoon and lance, lings and drags; there are also thousands of eider and king duck which may be easily snared upon their nests in the season. It may not be out of place here to mention, that on one small island on the east side of Davis' Straits during my last voyage we loaded a whale boat with eggs, and might have done so again and again if they had been in season; and from what fell under my observation, I have no doubt the same thing occurs more to the north, where the ice is more broken up.

As to the next part of the question, in what direction, I am firmly of opinion that Sir John Franklin pursued his course through Wellington Straits and Victoria Channel, and has got far advanced towards Behring Straits; my reasons for thinking so are first, the strong easterly gales, which we experienced from 18th August to the 5th September, 1850, had counteracted the effect of the prevailing currents from the west, and had cleared Victoria Channel by the westward; on the latter date, with my officers from the top of Cape Spencer, I saw beyond the fixed ice in Wellington Straits the channel free from ice to

Mr. Penny's  
Replies.

the northward, and an open sea. Again, on the 17th May, 1851, when at Point Surprise, open water was found to the extent of 25 miles to the west, and was visited at different intervals up to the 23d July, 1851, when the channel to the westward of Hamilton and Dundas Islands was clear of ice as far as the eye could reach, from the top of a hill 600 feet above the level of the sea, with a dark blue sky beyond—a sure indication of water.

Sir John Franklin must have been well aware of the presence of this water, having passed his first winter at the mouth of Wellington Straits, and a watch tent having been discovered north of Cape Spencer, about 4 miles from the ships, from which they could observe any change in the state of the ice in the channel that they could take advantage of, also the ruts of loaded sledges which apparently had been sent to examine the channel. These circumstances, taken into consideration with the second clause in Sir John Franklin's instruction, and his own well-known preference, and that of his officers, for the passage by Wellington Strait is quite conclusive to my mind, that he has gone in that direction, while our finding no cairns or appearance of his having landed, seems to me to indicate that the passage must have been open and nothing to stop him in 1846; and that he took every advantage of it.

*Third Question.*—Should a further search be decided on, what further measures do you recommend for this purpose, and in what direction?

*Answer.*—For the plan of operations I would prepare five vessels, namely, two steamers, "Lady Franklin" and "Sophia." A store ship manned with 150 men; they would be all working men. Vessels like the "Pioneer" and "Intrepid" will do very well, only it would be better if they were a little shorter, and with more steam power. The store ship to be left as a depôt ship at Beechey Island, rather than at any place higher up, because it is so easy of access from England. Their crews would be employed in collecting provision from Navy Board Inlet and Whale Point to the above-named position. The other four vessels to proceed through Wellington Strait, leaving depôts of provisions at every 100 miles. After advancing 400 miles, I should leave another of my vessels to be a connecting link to keep up the communication between the searching vessels and Beechey Island, and thence to England. From this second vessel one will proceed upon the same plan as already described, either with the remaining ships or boat sledge, until a point be reached in Behring's Straits.

But should a barrier preclude our passing through Wellington Strait, I would be prepared with six boat sledges to drag over the ice to the water, which I have no doubt will be again found in lat. 76° 30' long. 97° at a very early period of the year. Four boats will continue to pursue the west and north-west, the other two boats keeping up the supplies to advanced positions, as directed by the notices left by the advancing boats for their information. If food and fuel could be procured, I would establish a winter quarter for two boat crews, at the farthest advanced position of course. This Expedition would be greatly aided by vessels coming to meet it from Behring's Straits.

#### OBSERVATIONS.

##### No. 1.

I wish to make a few observations besides.—First, it is my opinion that Albert Land extends to the north-west not less than 500 miles, and that Sir John Franklin has kept along this shore to that extent, and that at this distance from Cape Beecher will probably be found another winter quarter; my reasons for thinking so are, that had this land not extended a great distance to the west, Victoria Channel would have filled with ice, whereas the N.W. winds had driven the ice round Melville Island upon the American shore, in place of filling up this Channel.

##### No. 2.

It may be a singular opinion, but I cannot help thinking that a migration of Esquimaux has taken place from a people living in a higher latitude, and that they came down Wellington Strait, from the remains of stone huts along the north-east side of the Channel, and that the stock from which they came may still be existing on some land to the north of the open sea, which I expect to find leading to Behring's Straits. From what I have said of the climate and resource, there is no reason why this should not be so; and Sir John Franklin and his companions may have found a refuge among them.

In connexion with this view, I know of a race of Esquimaux at Hogarth's Inlet, as I named it on discovery, 1840, or rather rediscovering it, because I believe it to be the Cumberland Strait of Baffin, but since improperly called Northumberland Inlet. This race of Esquimaux is far superior to any I have seen, either on the east or west side of Davis's Straits. The opinion I have formed of the cause of the improvement of this race is, that it has taken place in consequence of their amalgamation with shipwrecked seamen of early discovery ships, many of them having decidedly European cast of features.

I have, &c.,

The Secretary of the Arctic Committee.  
November 15th, 1851.

WILLIAM PENNY.

Mr. Penny's  
Replies.

### Enclosure No. 12.

Mr. A. STEWART to Mr. FEGEN, Secretary to the Arctic Committee.

Sir,

437, Strand, 15th Nov. 1851.

I beg leave to acquaint you, for the information of the Arctic Committee, that having seen Captain Penny's plan of "*search*," in which I fully concur, I need not, therefore, trouble the "Committee" with a repetition of the same.

And I have the honour to be, &c.

ALEX. STEWART.

### Enclosure No. 13.

Lieutenant M'CLINTOCK to Mr. FEGEN, Secretary to the Arctic Committee.

Sir,

90, Great Portland-street, London,  
7th November 1851.

Agreeably to the direction of the Chairman of the Arctic Committee, I have drawn up the enclosed scheme of equipment for searching parties detached from their ships when wintering within the Arctic circle; and I have to request you will place the same before the said Committee.

This scheme has been prepared with all the care which so important a subject demands, and with an earnest desire not to over estimate the period for which a party so provided could maintain itself.

The party consists of 1 officer and 10 men; they are amply provisioned for 50 days, and otherwise equipped and clothed for 100 days, commencing from the end of March.

It is also contemplated that travelling parties may render important services in the autumn by setting out as soon as the ship is secured in winter quarters, and continuing their labours until the end of October.

I have, however, to regret that some valuable plans and notes, made during and subsequent to my recent journey to Melville Island, have been forwarded to Ireland with other papers, and therefore are not available on the present occasion; and I am thus deprived of the gratification of more clearly and accurately illustrating the various articles of equipment.

With reference to the advance of our knowledge in carrying out this mode of search, as derived directly from the experience of the recent Expedition, I beg to refer the Committee to a letter dated 5th June 1850, which I had the honour of submitting to Captain H. T. Austin, and which embraces all that was known upon the subject at that period. A copy of this letter is enclosed.

I have, &c.,

F. L. M'CLINTOCK, Lieut.  
Late of Her Majesty's Ship "Assistance."

Lieut.  
M'Clintock's  
Suggestions.

### Enclosure 1.

Sir,

Her Majesty's Ship "Assistance," at sea,  
5th June 1850.

In consequence of your having expressed to the officers of the Expedition your willingness to receive any suggestions calculated to promote the grand object of our voyage, I am induced to address you upon the subject of

Lieut.  
M<sup>c</sup>Clintock's  
Suggestions.

travelling parties; the more so, as the list of articles necessary for their equipment, which by your direction I prepared, received your approval, and were accordingly provided.

It may not, therefore, be altogether unnecessary to offer some explanation of such as are novel in their construction, that they may be perfectly understood and used to the utmost advantage. Indeed, I feel fully persuaded that we have at our disposal the means of accomplishing a far more extensive and lengthened search by detached parties than has hitherto been attempted, or even contemplated.

I have, therefore, ventured to draw up the following memoranda in the hope that something of utility may be gleaned therefrom; and trust that an ardent desire of being useful, together with the Experience of the last Expedition, and the constant study of this important branch of our deeply interesting duty, may be received as an excuse for my seeming presumption.

It is of great importance that depôts of provisions be carried out in autumn, that the searching parties may be despatched as early in spring as the climate permits. This may be done in October, the mean temperature of that month usually being 10°; but the parties should be on board again by the 25th; as at this season the snow is soft and deep, the flat sledges must be used. To carry out and deposit at a distance of 14 days' journey from the ship a month's provisions for 7 men, 3 flat sledges, 12 men and 2 officers will be required. The constant weights (that is the tents, furs, blankets, spare clothing, and sledges) will amount to about 650 lbs.; and the weight of provisions for 14 persons for 40 days will be about 1,550 lbs. Hence the load for each man will not exceed 183 lbs. Sir James C. Ross's party dragged 191 lbs. each.

Suppose they travel outward for 14 days, and then deposit 14 days' provisions, being sufficient for 7 persons for 28 days, they will still have remaining 12 days' provisions, which will be ample to serve them for their return with light sledges. The depôt should consist of cases of pemican, and of bread, flour, tea, sugar, tobacco, and perhaps spirits of wine, packed in a cask to protect them from the bears and foxes. For the use of the autumn provision parties, a small boat's stove is well adapted, weighing only 20 lbs., and by using lignum vitæ a large expenditure of spirits of wine will be saved. During this journey the men should wear their cloth boots, reserving the sealskin travelling boots for the more important spring journeys.

The spring parties, each consisting of an officer and 6 picked men, should start about the middle of April. The following is an outline of one such party, together with the approximate weight of each article:—

|   | lbs. |
|---|------|
| Tent, 5 poles, 2 fur blankets, 7 blanket bags   | 85   |
| Macintosh, floor-cloth, shovel, cooking apparatus, complete   | 26   |
| Spare clothing (for each person) 1 pair stockings, 1 pair boot hose footed with lambskin, 1 pair blanket socks, 1 pair drawers, towel, and soap, stowed in a knapsack, together with the blanket bag                            | 50   |
| Spyglass, sextant, artificial horizon, compass, chronometer, thermometer  | 20   |
| Medicines in an 8lb. tin canister, "calico and flannel bandages, plaster, lint, salts, linament, eye-wash, pills, ointment, lancet, pins, and instructions"   | 5    |
| Sundry bag, containing "slow match, awls, sail and sewing needles, twine, thread, spare soles, wax, bristles, nettlestuff, two yards of crape, hammer, shoe-tacks, cylinders, and white lead to render them water-tight, brush" | 12   |
| Luncheon haversack, 7 pannikins, and covered meat-tins (in which to keep the daily allowance of pemican)  | 6    |
| Two guns, either a double gun and a rifle, or 2 double guns, cleaning rods, powder flasks, shot pouches, covers, &c.  | 17   |
| No. 1 shot, 5 lbs.; No. 4, 3 lbs.; bullets, 3 lbs.; powder, 2 lbs.; caps, packages, &c.   | 38   |
| Small runner sledge, lashings, and drag ropes (of hair rope)  | 60   |
| Gutta percha sledge top or boat, stancheons, and 3 yards No. 4 canvas   | 30   |

Amount of the necessary constant weights - 349



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Suggestions.

40 days' provisions, according to the following scale :—

|   |      |
|---|------|
| 1 lb. pemican ; $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. pork ; $\frac{3}{4}$ lb. biscuit ; $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. flour or bread dust to mix with pemican into a hot mess ; $\frac{1}{4}$ oz. tea ; $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. sugar ; 3 oz. tobacco weekly ; also, pepper and salt for 7 persons | lbs. |
| - - - - -   | 711  |
| 30 pints spirits of wine, also as extra, 4 pints of ditto ; tea, sugar, and biscuit   | 66   |

Total weight, amounting to 188 lbs. a man, nearly - - 1,126

The men should start in the following dress :—1 flannel shirt or Guernsey frock, 1 pair drawers, 1 blue serge or knitted frock, 1 pair breeches, waistbelt, 1 pair worsted stockings, 1 pair cloth boots, comforter, Welsh wig, southwester, mitts, veil, jacket or sealskin jumper—the latter is much preferable, being longer, less bulky and cumbrous, much lighter and impervious to wind, snow, or wet.

I would suggest that dressed sealskin be purchased from the Esquimaux for this purpose, and made up on board.

After arriving at the dépôt they may put on their sealskin boots and leave the cloth ones until their return.

By this arrangement the party is victualled for 68 days, should it return by the same route, and 54 days if by any other ; they will also have a sufficiency of extra necessaries to prolong their absence for several days, should they be so fortunate as to procure game. As Sir James C. Ross made  $10\frac{3}{4}$  miles daily, including all stoppages and with many of his men disabled, and moreover as he did not set out until 15th May, the whole of his journey was performed through soft snow, we are led to infer that 12 miles daily is not too much to expect from our parties, which will be much better fed and clothed ; and that every such party could perform a journey of 800 miles in 68 days, proceeding with safety to a distance of 400 miles from their ship.

The routine to be observed upon a spring journey is as follows :—Sleep by day, travel by night ; breakfast at 5 P.M. upon tea, biscuit, and a portion of pemican ; whilst breakfast is preparing, measure off the allowance of rum, fuel, pork, and biscuit to be used at luncheon ; after tea is made dissolve enough snow to dilute the concentrated rum, making up the mixture to a gill of stiff grog for each man ; start at 6 P.M. ; halt for half an hour to lunch at midnight ; dissolves now for drinking ; encamp about 6 A.M., issue the day's allowance of pemican, flour, and  $\frac{1}{2}$  lb. biscuit (the remaining  $\frac{1}{4}$  lb. reserve for luncheon) ; warm a portion of the former for supper ; wind up chronometer before the fur blankets are allowed to be spread, and write up the remarks for the previous march.

The officer should not trust entirely to the tinder-box, but be well provided with lucifer matches. Sir James C. Ross's allowance of provisions was, 1 lb. meat, 1 lb. biscuit, and the usual allowance of rum, chocolate, and lemon-juice : it was not sufficient to maintain the strength of the men.

Sir John Richardson recommends 2 lbs. of pemican and  $\frac{1}{4}$  lb. of flour : he deprives the men of their greatest luxuries, namely, biscuit, rum, and tobacco.

By pushing out the dépôts in autumn the men may be employed in searching parties exclusively in the spring. If men can be spared, fatigue parties are very desirable for the first few days of both the autumn and spring journeys.

As no preparations were made in autumn it was not until the middle of May that Sir James C. Ross could set out.

I have, &c.,

F. L. M'CLINTOCK, Lieut.

Capt. H. T. Austin, C.B.,  
Her Majesty's Ship "Resolute."

#### Enclosure 2.

SCHEME of the COMPLETE EQUIPMENT necessary for a PARTY consisting of ONE OFFICER and TEN MEN to perform an ARCTIC SPRING JOURNEY.

It has been arranged under three principal heads ; namely, EQUIPMENT, PROVISIONING, and CLOTHING, to each of which a Detailed Explanation is subjoined ; then follows a Travelling Routine ; and after which a few General Remarks are added.



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Suggestions.

## LIST OF EQUIPMENT.


| Articles.   | Weight.    |
|---|------------|
| 1 tent, with rope and poles, complete   | 75 lbs.    |
| 2 floor clothes   | 24         |
| 2 fur blankets  | 45         |
| 2 shovels   | 10         |
| 2 cooking apparatuses, complete   | 26         |
| 1 medicine canister, complete   | 5          |
| 1 small chopping axe  | 3          |
| 1 store bag, complete   | -          |
| 1 luncheon haversack, with measures, daily rum<br>can, water bottles, pannikins, and spoons | 10         |
| 2 guns and gear, complete   | 20         |
| 1 ammunition bag  | } complete |
| 1 small ditto   |            |
| 1 runner sledge, sledge boat, and lashings, complete  | 160        |
| 11 knapsacks, containing the spare clothing   | 110        |
| 11 sleeping bags  | 48         |
| 1 pickaxe   | 11         |
| Instruments   | 12         |
| Total   | 590 lbs    |

*Detailed Explanation.*

**Tent.** The *Tent* to be of the same material and plan as used in the recent Expedition, but to be of the following dimensions :

Length - 14 feet  
Breadth - 8 "  
Height - 8 "

The flap round the bottom of the tent to be 1 foot wide; to have curtains attached to the door end so as to form a porch, each curtain to be 3 feet wide and 6 feet high. It is intended to keep out the snow drift and afford shelter to the cook or look-out man.



Four small holes in the top will be found useful to permit the escape of steam and breath, which otherwise condenses and falls in a shower of fine snow. The tent should be double-seamed only at the corners, and lined along the ridge; roping is not required. The tent poles should be of ash, pointed at one end

with metal, and they should be 9 feet 8 inches in length; boarding pikes can be obtained of this length, and answer very well.

Two spare poles should be taken, one fitted with a boat hook, the other stouter and longer than the rest, to serve as a mast; 15 fathoms of 2-inch rope is required for the tent; the doorway should be fitted with large hooks and eyes.

*Floor Clothes.*—One to be waterproof, of the description of macintosh which is now prepared to remain pliant in extreme cold; the other to be of No. 7 canvas, to spread over it or upon gravel; also to be used as a sail, for which purpose it should be fitted with ear rings and rope bands; their dimensions should be:—

Macintosh - - 15 feet by 9 feet  
The canvas - - 13 „ 8 „

*Fur Blankets.*—It is recommended to have the underneath one of reindeer-skin, and the upper one of wolfskin; their dimensions should be:—  
16 feet by 9 feet.

*Shovels,* such as are supplied from the dockyard; they will serve also as paddles, if required

*Cooking Apparatus* very similar to those used in the recent Expedition, and made by Mr. Dale of Thames-street, after a plan furnished by me, but to be proportionably larger, the kettle to hold 12 pints instead of 8 pints. When complete, the articles included under this designation are—stand and cover, hoop, kettle, stewpan, spirit or tallow lamp, and tinder-box; the whole shutting up closely, and may be conveniently carried in a bag. The kettle should be made of very stout double block tin, no solder to be used in any part of the apparatus, fearnought should be sewed on to the cover to prevent as much as possible any waste of heat; one apparatus should have a spirit lamp, the other a tallow lamp.

A plan of this most useful article would here have been introduced, with some improvements and alterations, but for the reason assigned in my letter to the Secretary of the Arctic Committee.

*Medicine Canister* to be fitted by the surgeon. The following have been found most useful:—Calico and flannel bandages, plaster, lint, cotton wool, simple ointment, aromatic spirit of ammonia, wine of opium, laudanum, pills of opposite qualities (“compound colocynth” and “compound rhubarb”), liniment, lancet pins, and instructions.

Two or three splints may also be supplied to each party

*Small Axe* necessary to chop up the pemican when frozen.

*Store Bag* to contain 12 spare soles; a small bag of shoemaking gear, namely—awls, waxed ends, shoe-tacks, and small hammer; slowmatch; sail, sewing, and glover's needles; palm; twine; white thread; cotton for wicks; brimstone match; tent brush; 2 yards of No. 4 canvas; large knife; skein of marline; 30 fathoms of cod line, marked as a lead line; a few strips of canvas for wicks for the tallow lamp; 2 yards of crape; records, and small copper cases for do.; also rosin, sealing-wax, or pitch, to render them water-tight; several boxes of lucifer matches (vestas).

*Luncheon Haversack.*—With this a number of small articles are enumerated, the only measures required are—one half pint, one gill, and one half gill, a pannikin may be marked to serve as a pint measure; a small can to hold the day's allowance of rum; a pannikin and spoon for each person; also one or two spare ones; and a tin water-bottle for each person, to hold three quarters of a pint, and to be of a flattened form to adapt it to be carried as close as possible to the body.

*Two Guns and Gear, complete.*—Double-barrelled percussions, gauge 12, so that they will take a musket-ball; with cleaning rod, nipple wrench, and spare nipples, turncrew, 2 powder flasks (filled), 2 shot pouches (filled), 2 water-proof gun covers, and gun slings.

*Ammunition Bag, complete.*—No. 1 shot, 6 lbs.; No. 4 shot, 3 lbs.; bullets, 36; wads, 500; percussion caps, 250; powder, 2 lbs.; some white oakum or tow. The small ammunition bag is intended to hold “present use” ammunition, and to be always kept at hand.

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Suggestions.

Floor Clothes.

Fur Blankets.

Shovels.

Cooking  
Apparatus.

Medicine  
Canister.

Axe.

Store Bag.

Luncheon Haver-  
sack, Measures,  
Water-bottles.

Two Guns com-  
plete.


Ammunition Bags.

Lieut.  
M-Clintock's  
Suggestions.

Runner Sledge.


*Runner Sledge* to be constructed wholly of Canada elm, with the exception of the cross-bars, which should be of ash; the uprights (*u*) to be tenoned through the upper and lower pieces termed the bearer and the runner, and with a wood screw through each tenon; a shoeing of one eighth inch iron 3 inches wide, and slightly convex on its under surface, to be secured on with nuts and screws. Dimensions are—length extreme, 13 feet; space on the sole, 7 feet; curve at each end, 3 feet; breadth of all parts, 3 inches; height from shoeing to top of bearer, 12 inches; thickness of bearer,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  inch; of runner,  $1\frac{3}{4}$  inch, the lower side slightly convex to fill the shoeing, the upper edges chamfered off; thickness of uprights, 1 inch; width of sledge from out to out, 3 feet; length of cross-bars, 3 feet 2 inches, their width 1 inches, and thickness 1 inch, the edges to be chamfered off; one cross-bar to be placed over each upright and securely lashed with well soaked hide.

*A broadside view of Sledge and Boat.*



*Section through the midship stanchions.*

SCALE:—  
 $\frac{1}{2}$  inch to a foot.



Sledge Boat

*The Sledge Boat* should be made of strong material, similar to that used in the construction of Lieut. Halket's boats, but should be of the newly-prepared material which continues pliant under any degree of cold, as the new patent waterproof cloth, which can be obtained from Mr. Roberts, 32 Moorgate-street, and which has been tested in the Hudson Bay Company's territories. Its dimensions will be—length on the top, 14 feet; at bottom, 11 feet; breadth on the top, 4 feet; at bottom, 3 feet; depth, 20 inches; the gunwales to be formed of 4 tent poles, supported by 6 stanchions; the sides of the boat laced to the poles; the bow to be kept in shape by a few slight battens, which can be shipped and unshipped at pleasure. The boat is attached to the sledge by beackets along the sides, which are made fast to the bearers between the cross-bars. When laden with the complete equipment the immersion of the sledge boat will be  $10\frac{1}{2}$  inches. It is indispensably necessary for extended journeys, and renders the advance or retreat practicable, although considerable spaces of water may exist; being always in its place, there is no delay occasioned, as when Halket's boats are used, since the lading of the sledge must be transferred to them.

For sledge lashings, about 20 fathoms of soft rope is required.

**Knapsacks.** - These are most convenient when of the ordinary size, without any wooden framing; they should be precisely similar to those used in the recent Expedition, and can be made on board of No. 8 canvas. In the event of the sledge being rendered useless, they would become extremely useful.

**Sleeping Bags** should be made of felt, similar to those used in the recent Expedition, and should be 7 feet long.

**Pickaxe** required for making *cachés* in the frozen ground, and should be strong.

**Instruments.** - A good sextant; artificial horizon; 4-inch prismatic compass (Kater's), with small tripod and table; pocket chronometer; thermometer; box sextant; telescope and sling and small measuring tape; a square case, which will receive the sextant with eye-tube fixed and any angle on the arc, and will also receive the artificial horizon, will be found very convenient.

The box sextant is intended as a pocket companion for the officer, and will be very frequently required for taking angles.

Lieut.  
M'Clintock's  
Suggestions.

Knapsacks.  
Sleeping Bags.

Pickaxe.

Instruments.

#### LIST OF PROVISIONS.

| Daily allowance<br>for each person.                | Total quantity<br>for 50 days. |
|--|--------------------------------|
| 1 lb. pemican - - - - -                            | - 550                          |
| 4 oz. pork (when boiled and bones extracted)       | - 137½                         |
| 12 oz. biscuit - - - - -                           | - 118½                         |
| ¼ oz. tea - - - - -                                | - 8½                           |
| ½ oz. sugar - - - - -                              | - 17                           |
| 1 oz. pounded biscuit - - - - -                    | - 34½                          |
| ½ pint of rum (its equivalent of concentrated rum) | - 115                          |
| Weekly 3 oz. of tobacco - - - - -                  | - 15                           |

For the party of 11 persons:

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 2 lbs. fuel, spirits of wine, or tallow                | 110 |
| Salt, 4 lbs.; pepper, 2 lbs                            | 6   |
| Lemon-juice and sugar, 15 lbs.; allowance for packages | 85  |

|                                |         |
|--------------------------------|---------|
| Weight of provisions - - - - - | - 1,487 |
| "    equipment - - - - -       | - 590   |

Total weight of complete equipment - - - 2,077

*Being 207¾ lbs. per man.*

The load of 207¾ lbs. is less than that of most of the spring parties detached from the recent Expedition, and admits of their carrying a sufficiency of extra necessaries to prolong their journey for several days, should they be so fortunate as to procure game.

#### Detailed Explanation.

**Pemican**, with the exception of such portions as may be intended to be placed *en caché*, may be stripped of its tin covering, then marked with saw-cuts into daily allowances, and sewn up in old canvas, which will subsequently serve as wick for the tallow lamp.

**Pork** is intended to be used for luncheon only, after it has been well soaked, boiled, and bones taken out; it should be weighed and cut up as nearly as possible into daily allowances for the party, and then put up in bags.

**The Biscuit** should be sifted, then stowed in bags of 2, 3, or 4 days allowance each.

**Tea**, ¼ oz. and **Sugar** ½ oz. They should be mixed together and made up into packets for daily use; the whole to be stowed in a bag.

Pemican.

Pork.

Biscuit.

Tea and Sugar.

|  |  |
|--|--|
| Lient.<br>McClintock's<br>Suggestions. | <i>Pounded Biscuit</i> to be made up into packets of 2, 3, or 4 days allowance each; the whole to be stowed in a bag.  |
| Pounded Biscuit.<br>Tobacco.           | <i>Tobacco</i> .—Each weekly allowance for the party to be made up in a separate package, and the whole to be kept together in a bag.  |
| Fuel.                                  | <i>Fuel</i> .—Spirits of wine and tallow in equal quantities, the former to be camphorated and kept in tin cans similar to those supplied (by Mr. Dale of Thames-street) to the recent Expedition, having patent hinges and secured with padlocks; the tallow may be kept in a bag. Should fuel become short, the rum may be used in the spirit lamp, also strips of gutta percha or the fat of animals will burn well in the tallow lamp. |
| Rum.                                   | <i>Rum</i> .—It should be taken in its concentrated form as supplied to the ship, and the day's allowance diluted previous to commencing each march; to be contained in tin cans similar to those used for the spirits of wine, and which should contain 2, 3, or 4 gallons each. This stimulant was much approved of by all the travellers.   |
| Lemon-juice and<br>Sugar.              | <i>Lemon-juice and Sugar</i> .—Ten days full allowance should be taken as a medical luxury; the lemon-juice in bottles, and the sugar in packets for daily use.  |
| Salt and Pepper.                       | <i>Salt and Pepper</i> .—Highly necessary where so much animal food is daily consumed; is most convenient when packed in half pound tin canisters.   |

## LIST OF CLOTHING.

|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| Clothing in wear. | <i>In wear</i> .—Flannel shirt.<br>Knitted woollen frock.<br>Blue serge frock.<br>Loose overall sealskin frock.<br>Waistbelt.<br>Pair of stockings.<br>" blanket feet wrappers.<br>" wadmil boot hose.<br>" Canadian mocassins.<br>" thick woollen drawers.<br>" sealskin trowsers.<br>Welsh wig.<br>Fur cap and crape veil.<br>Woollen comforter and pair of winter mittens.<br>Every person is expected to carry a knife. |
| Spare clothing    | <i>Spare clothing</i> .—1 flannel shirt.<br>2 pair of stockings.<br>2 " blanket feet wrappers.<br>2 " mocassins.<br>1 " Esquimaux sealskin boots.<br>1 " canvas boots with leather soles.<br>1 " boot hose (to be reserved for sleeping in).<br>1 " woollen drawers.<br>1 " mitts.<br>1 towel, soap, and comb.  |

*Detailed Explanation.*

|                                   |  |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| Probable range of<br>temperature. | The clothes enumerated as "in wear" are such as would be suitable for the commencement of a spring journey; when the weather becomes more mild many of these may be dispensed with, and when thawing has begun, sealskin or canvas boots must be substituted for the mocassins. The range of temperature experienced during the recent journey to Melville Island was 88° Far. |
| Sealskin frock.                   | The loose sealskin frock should resemble that worn by the Esquimaux, but should  |

have outside breast pockets; it will be very useful in cold, windy, or wet weather.

Lieut.  
M'Clintock's  
Suggestions.

The mocassins to be made of the thickest smoke-dressed mooseskin, and made of the largest size.

After the thaw has commenced, the *Esquimaux Boots* are superior to every thing else. They can be obtained from St. John's, Newfoundland, through the Messrs. Hunt, 34, Great Winchester-street; but at least ten weeks notice should be given. It is also possible they may be obtained in time for a Barrow Straits Expedition, from the Hudson Bay districts, through Mr. Roberts, 32, Moorgate-street. It is difficult to get boots of this description sufficiently large for Europeans.

Esquimaux Boots.

How to be ob-  
tained.

Precaution.

*Canvas Boots* also answer well for the latter part of a spring journey; they can be made on board by any ordinary shoemaker. The soles should be of single leather, very broad, and sewn on "pump fashion," as shoemakers term it; and they should be large enough to go on easily over 1 pair of stockings, 2 pairs of blanket wrappers, 1 pair of boot hose.

Canvas Boots.

Precaution.

The *Blanket Feet Wrappers* should be 14 inches square.

Blanket Wrappers.

The winter *Mitts* to be of dressed deerskin, lined with duffle or blanket.

Mittens.

#### TRAVELLING ROUTINE.

To avoid snow-blindness, occasioned by the dazzling whiteness of the snow under a bright sun, it is necessary, after the 20th April, to sleep by day and travel by night. Breakfast at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, upon warm pemican, biscuit, and tea. After tea is made, dissolve enough snow to dilute the day's allowance of rum, and fill the water-bottles. After breakfast measure off and dilute the rum, measure off the day's allowance of fuel and of pork, which, with the remainder of the previous day's allowance of biscuit, serves for lunch.

Precaution.

See the tallow-lamp trimmed to prevent delay in dissolving snow when halted for lunch; it is most difficult to allay the sensation of thirst occasioned by hard labour in severe cold. Start about 6 p.m., varying the time an hour or two according to the east or west direction to be travelled in, so as to keep the sun as much as possible in your back.

Constant thirst.

Precaution.

Halt for lunch after five or six hours, according to the labour undergone, dissolve snow, serve out biscuit, pork, and half allowance of rum, refill water-bottles, and proceed.

The period between lunching and encamping should be about an hour shorter than between the time of starting and halting for lunch. When encamped, serve out the day's allowance of biscuit and remaining half allowance of rum; the allowance of pemican may be chopped off as required. Supper to consist of biscuit and warmed pemican, after which a drink of water. Wind up chronometer before the fur blankets are allowed to be spread, and write up the remarks for the previous march. In very severe weather it is safer to breakfast before getting out of the blanket bags, and to get into them before supper, so that the man whose turn it is to cook alone remains outside. It is, however, sometimes necessary to cook in the tent. Unless in the vicinity of Esquimaux, it is unnecessary to keep watch; but the guns should always be ready for bears, and kept within the tent.

Chronometer, pre-  
caution.

Frostbites, precau-  
tion.

Watch keeping.  
Defence.

Cooking.

Unless constant and strict attention is paid to the lamps and system of cooking, much valuable time will be wasted. After encamping, everything should be placed on the sledge, and covered over to keep out the snow drift, or hung up to the tent-rope. If these precautions are not taken, and things are left lying about on the snow, many losses will be sustained, since the lightest wind is sufficient to drift the snow over them.

Snowdrift, pre-  
caution.

## GENERAL REMARKS.

1. By paying attention to the arrangement and packing up of the provisions—so many days allowance in each package—the certainty of their lasting the allotted period is insured, and much of the delay and labour of “measuring off” is saved.

2. Preserved potatoes (Edwards’) may be substituted for pounded biscuit to mix with pemican, but double the quantity is necessary.

3. It is recommended to take some concentrated rum in lieu of a small portion of the spirit of wine, so that if fuel is abundant it may be used as a part of the provisions.

4. In like manner, 2 or 3 pounds of lard may be substituted for tallow, since bears will probably be shot, and the steaks will not fry themselves, although the blubber will cook them.

5. All the small provision bags may be made of “waxed wrapper” as it comes off the bales of slop clothing.

6. A few gutta percha or horn cups would be very desirable for drinking water or grog out of, as at very low temperatures it is difficult to drink out of metal without having the skin taken off one’s lips.

7. To secure depôts of provisions from bears it is necessary to bury them in the earth, and to cover the place with snow, or pour water over it, so as to destroy the scent.

8. Gutta percha depôt cases for containing the dry provisions would be very useful, since those which are not taken up before the thaw commences are frequently destroyed. The cases should be made and taken out in the ship, and if of sizes to stow within each other would occupy but little room on board; besides, being the lightest material adapted to the purpose, these cases would subsequently be valuable as fuel.

9. Portions of the 50 days provisions should be packed in these cases previous to leaving the ship, that they may be ready for depositing at any stage of the journey that it may be deemed desirable to do so.

10. A very light waterproof cloth of dark colour will be found serviceable. In the severe cold it may be spread over the upper fur to receive the condensed steam, which falls in the shape of very fine snow; and later in the spring, to thaw snow for drinking, by spreading it on an inclined plane in the sun, and sprinkling it lightly over. This cloth should be of the vulcanized material called the “new patent waterproof cloth,” which remains pliant under any temperature, and is devoid of smell.

11. If a small quantity of the prepared solution is taken, the cloth just described may also be used to patch up leaks in the sledge-boat or floor-cloth.

12. The kites presented by Mr. Smyth to some of the officers of the Expedition were used by me, and found very useful in directing the course when the winds were fresh and fair, and snow drift or fog obscured distant objects; also in lessening the labour of dragging the sledge. I think one or two large kites (7 or 8 feet square) would be found useful, more particularly if any improvements have since been made in their construction.

13. For autumn travelling, a lantern and candles will be required.

14. The second set of spare blanket wrappers should not be cut off, but the blanket supplied to the party, and used for other purposes as required, until necessary to apply it as originally intended.

15. The iron shooing of the runners should be as even as possible, and highly burnished; if case-hardened they would be more durable, and retain their polished surface much longer.

16. It often happens that the sun is clear, but snow drifting so heavily as to render the mercury unsteady, or instantly to cover the glass roof; also it is



frequently too low to be brought into the artificial horizon, as at the inferior meridian passage, and the land often intercepts the natural (or ice) horizon; in any of these cases one of the many ingenious fog or false horizons would be very useful, and could be used with much greater accuracy than is possible at sea.

Lieut.  
M'Clintock's  
Suggestions.

17. The eyetubes of telescopes, and, as far as practicable, all the metal parts of instruments requiring delicate manipulation, should be covered with chamois leather.

18. Where there is any probability of meeting with large spaces of open water, as in Wellington Channel, efficient boats should be provided; those used by Sir Edward Parry in 1827, and still preserved in Woolwich Dockyard, will serve as models; but as only about half their burthen and strength would be necessary, the weight of the boats required would probably be reduced to 400 or 500 lbs. each. In order to render the equipment of the detached parties complete in every respect, one such boat should be attached to each division of the search.

19. Lastly, the officer fares in all respects precisely as the men; he carries a gun, spyglass, thermometer, chronometer, compass, box sextant, note-book, and small measuring tape.

20. In the plan of travelling here submitted, the scale of victualling is almost precisely the same, but the equipment is rendered more complete, and clothing much better adapted for the severe climate of an Arctic March or April, than that adopted in the recent Expedition; the travellers will but rarely be detained in their tents by the weather, and they will be able to travel later in the autumn, and earlier in the spring, with perfect safety; also the resources of each party, which in the recent Expedition amounted to 40 days provisions, being now increased to 50 days, it is confidently hoped that future explorers will find their journeys lengthened and difficulties diminished in the same proportion.

F. L. M'CLINTOCK, Lieut.,  
Late of Her Majesty's Ship "Assistance."

Prepared for the Arctic Committee,  
7th November 1851.

Lieut. M'CLINTOCK to Mr. FEGEN, Secretary to the Arctic Committee.

Sir,

2, Gardiner's-place, Dublin, 9th November 1851.

The enclosed letter is the reply of Messrs. Hunt and Henley, relative to obtaining a supply of Esquimaux boots for any future Expedition which it may be in contemplation to send out; and the necessity for having them is shown in my "Scheme of Equipment," which you have already received, and to which, perhaps, it would be as well to attach the enclosed letter.

I remain, &c.,

F. L. M'CLINTOCK, Lieut.

Enclosure.

Sir,

34, Great Winchester-street, 8th November 1851.

In reply to your inquiry a few days since, we find that about 150 pairs of sealskin boots were sent round to Newfoundland by our Labrador agent this autumn, and altogether we may have some 200 pairs there. But they will be gradually disposed of during the winter, and if you wish to secure any, it will be well to give us notice in time for next week's mail, 14th instant.

The price in Newfoundland remains the same as for many years; say, two dollars, equal to 8s. 4d. sterling per pair.

We are, &c.,

HUNT & HENLEY.

Lieut. M'Clintock, R.N.,  
90, Great Portland-street.

Lieut. Osborn's  
Suggestions.

## Enclosure No. 14.

### REMARKS ON THE EQUIPMENT OF SLEDGES and TRAVELLERS FOR ARCTIC SERVICE, by LIEUTENANT OSBORNE.

*Sledge runners*.—Would be improved by the curve being constant, as in those constructed by the Danes for travelling in Greenland,—a model of which is in my possession.

The more rigid the runner can be made the more will the friction and resistance be reduced. I think weight may be sacrificed to gain this point with advantage.

*Sledge casing*.—For parties likely to be back to their vessels by the 15th or 20th June, I deem casing on boats unnecessary weight, a piece of oil canvass laced taut over the stretchers being sufficient. For longer parties, however, a casing on boats capable of floating the sledge with a light load, is imperatively necessary. Common mackintosh material, of strong texture, would answer well.

Where parties have to cross broad channels or straits of from thirty miles and upwards, I would always recommend that a light wooden boat be placed so that she may be available. The rapid manner in which the water makes after the 15th June in the most confined seas is remarkable.

*Boats for travellers*.—The boats in our Expedition were none of them adapted for rapid transit over the sea. I feel confident that the short floor and light build of the South Sea whale boat would make it a far more useful description of craft for such service. The Greenland boats are built strong and heavily, for express purposes.

*Sledge sail*.—The floor-cloth answered so well as a sail that I think it needs no improvement beyond being made full large for the tent.

*Number of party*.—I prefer sledge parties consisting of seven men and one officer to that of six men and one officer. The increased number of men enables the dead weight to be reduced with much effect; and the breaking down of one man in seven is not so serious as one in six.

*Eye-shades*.—Spectacles of a neutral tint, with side-shades, and set in bone or tortoiseshell, would be much superior to any shades or veil for the eyes.

*Weight per man*.—On starting in the spring or autumn, should not be afraid to load the sledge to a weight of 210 lbs. per man, if the crews are generally healthy.

*Depôts of provision*.—The provisions for forty days, which is about what a crew can well start with, should be divided into small proportions, so as to form a series of depôts at every fifth day's journey, or indeed oftener, if it can be done without entailing great additional weight in packages.

*Securing depôts*.—Depôts should be placed under large stones; and when made in the autumn for the use of spring parties, I would advise water being poured on the mound, so as to cement the whole over with ice. Snow or blocks of ice are useless; the bears remove it easily. The Esquimaux secure their caches as I have proposed.

*Additional tallow for fuel*.—The allowance of spirits for fuel, being better under control than tallow, is preferable; but, in addition to the full allowance of spirits of wine, as much tallow as can possibly be carried will be found the greatest comfort and luxury.

*Vary the food*.—Where no game is likely to be killed, I think it would be advantageous to carry out a proportion of cheese, jerked meat, dried beef, or other nutritious and portable food, so as to give the men an occasional variety, instead of feeding constantly on pemmican.

#### PROPOSED SCALE OF VICTUALLING.

|                           |   |                             |  |
|---------------------------|---|-----------------------------|--|
| <i>Per man</i> .—Pemmican | - | 12 oz.                      |  |
| Pork                      | - | 8 oz.                       | •  |
| Biscuit                   | - | 16 oz.                      |  |
| Concentrated rum          | - | 4 oz. = $\frac{3}{4}$ gill. | { When travelling in April, at<br>low temperature, allow 1 gill. |
| Tobacco                   | - | $\frac{1}{4}$ oz.           |  |
| Biscuit dust              | - | 1 oz.                       |  |

|   |                     |        |   |  |                                 |
|---|---------------------|--------|---|--|---------------------------------|
| { | Chocolate (Moore's) | 1½ oz. | { | For half the number of days the sledge is provisioned. | Lieut. Osborn's<br>Suggestions. |
|   | Sugar               | -      |   |  |                                 |
|   | Tea                 | -      |   |  |                                 |
|   | Sugar               | -      |   |  |                                 |
|   |                     |        |   | Strong mixed tea.                                      |                                 |

*Fuel*.—Spirits of wine, - 1 pint 2 gills For party of eight.

or  
Tallow - - - 1 lb. 12 oz. " "

*No lime juice*.—The lime juice I consider pernicious. The men, when suffering from extreme thirst, would, if possible, try and allay it with lime juice, and were much weakened by severe purging, &c.

*The conjuror*.—The cooking apparatus we had requires improvement in many ways, and should be much larger.

*Bougie instead of match*.—A wax bougie for burning to light the pipes with would be a great improvement to slow match; the latter when burning giving extreme pain to any men afflicted with snow blindness, or having a tendency to it.

*Compass*.—Ordinary compasses being found by our division entirely useless, I should recommend only those on Kater's construction being taken.

The clothing of the men, I think, requires much improvement, the object being to give them warmth combined with lightness.

An oiled south-wester, with broad flaps lined with fur.

A sealskin frock } Taking care the skin is well dressed.  
Do. breeches }

Hudson's Bay moccasins - 3 pair per man, for cold and dry season.

Canvass boots (large) - 1 pair - for the wet season.

Blanket feet wrappers - 8 pair.

Stockings - 2 pair.

Flannel drawers - 1 pair, fine wool.

Chamois leather drawers - 1 pair, of best description.

Flannel shirt - 1, fine wool, with a collar.

Chamois leather shirt - 1, strongest description.

Comforter - 1.

Nightcap - 1, thick woollen.

Guernsey frock - 1, of same description as those we had.

Mittens - 2 pair { One, thick wool.  
One, large sealskin.

It now only remains for me to say that I believe a very great deal may be done in the autumn of the Arctic regions towards laying out depôts on the intended line of march in the spring; and that in the *early* spring short journeys, of from one week to ten days continuance, can very well be carried out, and good service done, so that the *long* parties may leave the vessels comparatively light, and therefore make longer as well as more expeditious journeys than have yet been accomplished. The first week in April parties should all be away from their ships.

SHERARD OSBORN, Lieutenant,  
late in command of H.M.S. "Pioneer,"  
Arctic Expedition.

To the Chairman,  
Arctic Committee.

### Enclosure No. 15.

MR. A. P. BRADFORD, Surgeon, late of H.M.S. "Resolute" to Mr. FEGEN, the Secretary to the Arctic Committee.

Mr. Bradford's  
Suggestions.

Sir,

2, Charlton Terrace, Woolwich, 5th Nov. 1851.

In obedience to the directions received from the President of the Arctic Committee, Rear Admiral Bowles, to forward, in writing, any suggestions for an improvement in sledge travelling, by equipment or other means, I beg leave to offer the following as the result of my experience, acquired in several journeys made with sledge parties from the expedition under the command of Captain Austin, C.B.

Mr. Bradford's  
Suggestions.

One of these journeys occupied a period of eighty days absence from the ships stationed in winter quarters between Cornwallis and Griffiths islands, and was directed to the exploration and search of the north-east shores of Melville Island, with the coast-line of the intermediate lands.

*Men for the party.*—Too much importance cannot be attached to the duty of selecting the men to compose the party. They ought to be strong and robust, ruddy complexioned, with a good and full chest, perfectly sound in their wind, flat and well-muscled about the loins, with good buttocks and strong muscular thighs.

Having the men of nearly the same height is favourable to the effort in dragging being simultaneous. Tall long-legged men stow badly in the tent, and frequently are not so capable of long-continued fatigue as those of a shorter stature and more compact form. Five feet seven inches and a half to five feet eight or nine inches is a height that frequently combines great strength and power of endurance with a sufficient length of limb to admit of free action. The very short-legged heavy-bodied man ought not to be selected, as he soon becomes exhausted in deep snow by his struggles to clear his legs. The age may vary between twenty-five and thirty-five years. Temper is not to be overlooked, as an irritable man, under the privations and hardships of a lengthened journey, is certain to break out, and be a constant source of annoyance and irritation to his more patient neighbours, both on the drag-rope and in the tent.

The true thorough-bred man-of-war's man or royal marine I should select in preference to any others, as they never think of having an interest, in cases of difficulty, at variance with that of their officer, whereas the merchant-seaman is apt on such occasions to think of himself. Stewards, idlers whose duties have confined them much below, and men who have led debauched lives, ought not to be selected for lengthened travelling, as it will be found on trial that after a few days they either shrink from their fair proportion of work or else break down.

Having the party composed of ten persons in preference to that of seven, as was the case in the Melville Island division, would be attended with some advantages, and probably lead to greater results, as the weight per man would decrease with the increased number of men, and still admit of several additions, more especially an increased allowance of fuel.

But the principal reason for having the larger party in preference to the smaller consists in the confidence a party so strong would have in case casualties occurred; one or two men disabled in such a party would have little or no influence on their safety, should they be at the time 300 or 400 miles from their ship; whereas the same loss to the smaller number under similar circumstances might lead to their total destruction, as a sufficient force might not be left to drag the sledge along.

*Sledge.*—The "runner-sledge" is the only one that can be used for travelling in the Arctic regions. The one made use of by our parties was not sufficiently high for the summer season. It ought to be raised at least four inches higher, should it be contemplated keeping parties out so late in the season as we were. Whenever the bottom of the sledge came in contact with the soft snow it stopped dead, and required a standing pull or bowline haul, and frequently the shovel to clear the snow away, to enable us to get on a few feet, when the same labour had to be again repeated. If the sledge had been four inches higher a great deal of this very severe work would have been saved. The increase of height in the sledge would necessarily carry with it an increased weight and substance in some of its component parts.

The "runner-sledge" supplied to me for the Melville Island journey was remarkably strong and well put together, reflecting great credit on its builder. The only defect proved by so long a journey in the "fastenings" was in the manner in which the iron-band or "tire" was secured to the lower runner, viz., by means of screws into the wood (commonly called wood-screws), nine of these worked out by the time I had returned to the ship, one of the bands was very loose, and the wood of the runner, in consequence, much cut by the young ice. We had no means of replacing these screws; and a wood-screw never holds well when replaced in a hole from which it has worked out. I

ould therefore suggest that the screw should go through to the top of the

under-runner, and be there secured with a nut, which could be tightened at pleasure, or, in case of accident to the screw, it could be readily replaced.

Mr. Bradford's  
Suggestions.

*Tent.*—The one supplied answered the purpose well. The head requires doubling about half way up. This end is always pitched to windward, with strong winds, in a low temperature. The cold was intensely bitter from the wind coming through the single part of the light material of which the tent was made.

*Sleeping gear.*—Was good, and in my opinion cannot be improved, unless it should be intended to send away parties at a very low temperature, such as we had it, viz. 69° of frost, when buffalo ought to be substituted for wolf skins.

*Cooking apparatus.*—In form and size answered well enough. Not sufficiently strong for the rough handling of seamen, or capable of bearing with impunity the intense heat given out by the combustion of tallow. The one supplied was made of tin, and some parts of it soldered together. I am of the opinion that it ought to be made of the best copper, and "rivetted" throughout.

*Provisions.*—The allowance was liberal, but not too much for the work required of the men. Pemman 1 lb.; boiled pork 6 oz.; biscuit  $\frac{3}{4}$  lbs.; Moore's preserved chocolate  $1\frac{1}{4}$  oz., or tea  $\frac{1}{4}$  oz., on alternate days; sugar  $\frac{1}{4}$  oz.; and 1 oz. of biscuit-dust to mix with the pemman; rum 1 gill; spirit fuel 6 gills. The fuel consisted of a proportion of spirits and tallow, both having their comparative advantages.

The latter was much preferred in my tent to the spirits, as it was more easily managed by the cooks in very cold weather, and required little preparation. The disadvantages attending its use were, that it could not be used inside the tent on account of the dense smoke it gave out; secondly, it required some little time to solidify, when we were in a hurry to pack up, after our short halts at midnight for refreshment.

The spirits of wine was not so much liked by the cooks, as the spirit lamp required constant attention to the "wicks," and was very cold to the fingers when handled. Six gills per diem barely suffices to give two warm meals, and a small quantity of water at midnight. This was more particularly the case when the temperature was minus in April and the early part of May. In June, three and four gills was sufficient to cook our meals; but had it not been for the fortunate circumstance of shooting a bear giving a small supply of fat we should have been very hard up for fuel. The spirits of wine requires vessels for its safe custody and carriage, thereby increasing the weights; a great and important question in all subjects relating to sledge equipment. The lump of tallow is perfectly secure, wrapped up in a piece of old canvass or placed in a bag, which can be cut up to supply wicks to burn it with.

A small supply of the preserved potato and lime juice was added to the allowance; the former in lieu of an equal proportion of the bread-dust. Of these two articles (potatoes and lime-juice) I would recommend an increased allowance, to be used as antiscorbutics, as I am satisfied that several of the men of my party showed some of the premonitory symptoms of scurvy, which I think was in some measure owing to the saltness and under-cooked state of a part of the pork supplied, as well as to the long-continued use of a meat diet without vegetables.

*Dress.*—The outward clothing was not in the least adapted to the exigencies of an Arctic travelling party, more particularly so in the colder season, when the cold winds, loaded with a fine drift, penetrated through every garment that was in the most minute degree open in its texture, such as woollen and cloth fabrics.

The prepared leather trousers and frocks worn in the Hudson Bay territory appears to me to be peculiarly well adapted to the Arctic regions.

On such a smooth surface as the leather garments afford, no accumulation of drift can lodge.

The Esquimaux sealskin dress stands next in my estimation. When procured from the natives, ready made, it is scarcely ever sufficiently large to go on our men comfortably; but this is a difficulty that might be overcome. Clothing

SCALE OF VICTUALLING for the Arctic Ships; Captain H. T. Austin in charge of Expedition.

|           | Miscellaneous or flour. | Spirits. | Salt  |       | Flour, including suet and currants. | Preserved |        |             | Tea. | Split peas. | Oatmeal. | Scotch barley. | Vinegar. | Pickles. | Mustard. | Pepper. |          | Salt (fine). | Lemon juice. | Sugar for lemon juice. | Apples. | Sugar for apples. | Dried yeast. | Chili. | Baking powder. |
|-----------|-------------------------|----------|-------|-------|-------------------------------------|-----------|--------|-------------|------|-------------|----------|----------------|----------|----------|----------|---------|----------|--------------|--------------|------------------------|---------|-------------------|--------------|--------|----------------|
|           |                         |          | Beef. | Pork. |                                     | Meats.    | Soups. | Vegetables. |      |             |          |                |          |          |          | Black.  | Cayenne. |              |              |                        |         |                   |              |        |                |
| Monday    | 1                       | 1        | 1     | 1     | 1                                   | 1         | 1      | 1           | 1    | 1           | 1        | 1              | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1       | 1        | 1            | 1            | 1                      | 1       | 1                 | 1            | 1      | 1              |
| Tuesday   | 1                       | 1        | 1     | 1     | 1                                   | 1         | 1      | 1           | 1    | 1           | 1        | 1              | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1       | 1        | 1            | 1            | 1                      | 1       | 1                 | 1            | 1      | 1              |
| Wednesday | 1                       | 1        | 1     | 1     | 1                                   | 1         | 1      | 1           | 1    | 1           | 1        | 1              | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1       | 1        | 1            | 1            | 1                      | 1       | 1                 | 1            | 1      | 1              |
| Thursday  | 1                       | 1        | 1     | 1     | 1                                   | 1         | 1      | 1           | 1    | 1           | 1        | 1              | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1       | 1        | 1            | 1            | 1                      | 1       | 1                 | 1            | 1      | 1              |
| Friday    | 1                       | 1        | 1     | 1     | 1                                   | 1         | 1      | 1           | 1    | 1           | 1        | 1              | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1       | 1        | 1            | 1            | 1                      | 1       | 1                 | 1            | 1      | 1              |
| Saturday  | 1                       | 1        | 1     | 1     | 1                                   | 1         | 1      | 1           | 1    | 1           | 1        | 1              | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1       | 1        | 1            | 1            | 1                      | 1       | 1                 | 1            | 1      | 1              |
| Sunday    | 1                       | 1        | 1     | 1     | 1                                   | 1         | 1      | 1           | 1    | 1           | 1        | 1              | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1       | 1        | 1            | 1            | 1                      | 1       | 1                 | 1            | 1      | 1              |
| Monday    | 1                       | 1        | 1     | 1     | 1                                   | 1         | 1      | 1           | 1    | 1           | 1        | 1              | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1       | 1        | 1            | 1            | 1                      | 1       | 1                 | 1            | 1      | 1              |
| Tuesday   | 1                       | 1        | 1     | 1     | 1                                   | 1         | 1      | 1           | 1    | 1           | 1        | 1              | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1       | 1        | 1            | 1            | 1                      | 1       | 1                 | 1            | 1      | 1              |
| Wednesday | 1                       | 1        | 1     | 1     | 1                                   | 1         | 1      | 1           | 1    | 1           | 1        | 1              | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1       | 1        | 1            | 1            | 1                      | 1       | 1                 | 1            | 1      | 1              |
| Thursday  | 1                       | 1        | 1     | 1     | 1                                   | 1         | 1      | 1           | 1    | 1           | 1        | 1              | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1       | 1        | 1            | 1            | 1                      | 1       | 1                 | 1            | 1      | 1              |
| Friday    | 1                       | 1        | 1     | 1     | 1                                   | 1         | 1      | 1           | 1    | 1           | 1        | 1              | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1       | 1        | 1            | 1            | 1                      | 1       | 1                 | 1            | 1      | 1              |
| Saturday  | 1                       | 1        | 1     | 1     | 1                                   | 1         | 1      | 1           | 1    | 1           | 1        | 1              | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1       | 1        | 1            | 1            | 1                      | 1       | 1                 | 1            | 1      | 1              |
| Sunday    | 1                       | 1        | 1     | 1     | 1                                   | 1         | 1      | 1           | 1    | 1           | 1        | 1              | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1       | 1        | 1            | 1            | 1                      | 1       | 1                 | 1            | 1      | 1              |

In substituting one article of Provision for another,  $\frac{3}{4}$  lb. of preserved meat is to be considered equal to  $\frac{1}{2}$  lb. of salt meat;  $\frac{1}{2}$  lb. of vegetables, or  $\frac{1}{4}$  pint of soup, or  $\frac{1}{4}$  pint of split peas, equal to  $\frac{1}{2}$  lb. of flour or  $\frac{1}{2}$  pint of peas.

(Signed)

HORATIO T. AUSTIN,  
Captain.

## Enclosure No. 17.

## EXTRACTS FROM MR. PENNY'S JOURNAL.

1st.—16th May 1851. The moment I passed over this point (Point Surprise?), the expression that escaped me was, No one will ever reach Sir John Franklin. Here we are, and no trace. So we returned very much disappointed.

2d.—19th July 1851. Oh, to have been here only with my little vessels! what could we not have done in the way of search; but I fear greatly that even if we had they (the missing ships) are beyond our reach.

The struggle (as to returning in the boat, having only one week's provisions left,) was severe, but there was no other course left but to return. That he is beyond our reach I have no doubt, for if he had not we would have found trace about some of the Bird Heads or Duck islands, which have been surrounded with water ever since the 17th May.

3d.—6th August 1851. Poor fellows! (Alluding to his ship's company.) All day standing up to the knees in water, but no complaint, they are all so very anxious to get home, as we have no hope now of being of any use to our missing countrymen, whose fate will for ever remain in obscurity.

## EXTRACT FROM DR. SUTHERLAND'S JOURNAL.

11th August 1851. --In the afternoon Captain Austin's squadron came steaming into the harbour, and dropped anchor. We again met our brother "Arctics;" and, certainly, if anything could have moved the adamant human heart to gratitude, surely this meeting of both ships and men in, I may safely assert, perfect safety and health, failed not to raise the ideas of every individual in the harbour far above what his eyes were beholding. After the "heads" of the Expedition had considered matters fully, we were given to understand that little remained to be done but proceed to England. Captain Austin was satisfied the missing Expedition need not be searched for to the due west or south-westward; and Mr. Penny, uncertain whether they had proceeded up the channel, could hold out no hopes of our being able to accomplish anything deserving almost inevitable risks of a *second winter*.

Extract from  
Dr. Sutherland's  
Journal.

## Enclosure No. 18.

(*Authorized Chart annexed.*)

## Enclosure No. 19.

(*Mr. Penny's Outline Track Chart annexed.*)













